SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 6, August 25, 2003

SRI LANKA

An Equal Place in the Peace Process
Guest Writer: Jehan Perera
Media Director, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka

There is a sense of crisis in Sri Lanka's multi-ethnic eastern province, where there have been reports of renewed clashes between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Muslims. The Government appointed an overall security forces commander for the region on August 19, following the killing of five Muslims within a week, allegedly by the LTTE. Militant Muslim youth are reportedly receiving arms training as part of a strategy to defend the community against LTTE attacks. The Government's failure to offer the Muslims stronger assurances of safety is reported to have strengthened the idea of securing such training, with some reports even suggesting that hardliners within the community have established links with Muslim groups outside Sri Lanka.

The Muslim presence was very marked at the National Convention on 'Bridging the Gap between War and Peace' at the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute last week. The Colombo convention followed dozens of meetings between citizens' groups that had been held earlier in different parts of the country. One of the key obstacles identified was the lack of Muslim representation at the peace talks that had been taking place between the Government and LTTE. The other was the killing of Muslims taking place in their areas of concentration in the east of the country, where the Muslims are the largest single community in many parts.

From the beginning of the peace process, representatives of the Muslim community have been asking for a place at the negotiating table. They have been arguing that being part of the Government delegation is not sufficient, as the Government has failed to give sufficient attention to Muslim concerns. The Muslims have little reason to believe that peace talks between the Government and LTTE, from which they are excluded, will meet their interests.

Virtually all Muslims support the present ceasefire and wish it to continue. In this sentiment they are on common ground with their Sinhalese and Tamil neighbors. But they also have a grievance against the ceasefire agreement that relegates them to the status of an affected party only, and does not make them a party to the peace talks. The Muslims have suffered directly and massively at the hands of the LTTE. The entirety of the Muslim population in the north of the country, numbering about 90,000, had been expelled by the LTTE in 1990 in an incident that has seared Muslim consciousness. The Muslims were given just two hours notice to leave their homes, and had to leave without their jewelry and valuables which were confiscated by the LTTE.

The current killing of Muslims in the East, and the Tamil-Muslim communal disturbances this is giving rise to, are counter productive to the Tamil cause that the LTTE is committed to promoting. LTTE leaders are currently in Paris trying to secure an interim North East regional administration for themselves. The ongoing alienation of the Muslims, who may constitute the largest single community in the East (the LTTE did not permit the last census of 2001 to be carried out in the region) can be a fatal blow to its viability.

A Muslim refusal to agree to an LTTE-dominated interim administration for the North East would make it difficult for the Government to deliver such an administration to the LTTE. If there is a groundswell of opposition to the interim arrangements from the Muslim community, the Muslim MPs in Parliament will be unable to acquiesce in it. This would also raise the possibility of a crossover of Muslim MPs into the ranks of the Opposition, if the Government goes ahead with the interim administration, regardless of Muslim opposition.

The rising tensions between the LTTE and the Muslims are counter productive to such a high degree that doubts may reasonably arise whether the LTTE is indeed responsible. In order to mend its fences with the Muslims, the LTTE has been returning land that they had taken from the Muslims in the years of war. A considerable proportion of the land has been returned and the process is continuing. This enlightened attitude is at variance with the killings and intimidation of the Muslims that is simultaneously taking place.

A possible explanation of this dual phenomenon is that the LTTE is following a two-tracked policy. It has a political track and a military track. The political track is currently epitomized by the deliberations in Paris regarding a response to the Government's proposed interim administration for the North East. Tamil intellectuals from Sri Lanka and abroad are attending these deliberations. These deliberations are expected to yield a demand from the LTTE that would ensure virtually total political control over the North East. The military track, however, operates on a parallel, and is not subordinate to political imperatives. The intimidation and coercion of the Muslims is part of the LTTE's strategy to physically dominate the North East.

Many Tamils from the East see validity in the theory that the killings of Muslims are the result of an internal power struggles within the Muslim community. Others see a hidden hand, possibly international, that is trying to destabilize the East, and thereby undermine the peace process. But the undeniable fact is that, over its three decades of existence, the LTTE has consistently used the weapon of violence and terror to achieve its objectives of total control. The representatives of the victims, and all Muslim leaders, even those politically opposed to one another, allege that the LTTE is the perpetrator.

There is also a sociological explanation of the LTTE's harsh treatment of the Muslims. The Muslims, who did not identify themselves with the Tamil struggle for a separate state, tended to ally themselves with the Sri Lankan Government and its military forces, and were able to obtain benefits from the Government because of their cooperative attitude. When the LTTE turned its guns on the Muslims in the time of war, the Government provided the Muslims with weapons to defend themselves. In turn, the homeguard units of the Muslims dealt harshly with their Tamil neighbors, who were unarmed. A vicious cycle was set in motion, whose reverberations continue to this day.

Most of the LTTE cadres have imbibed a crude form of Tamil nationalism. In their view, the North East is the traditional Tamil homeland stretching back into history. It is Tamil, and not Muslim or Sinhalese, land. LTTE cadres exact taxes from the Muslim peasantry on this basis, that the land the Muslims till is not their own, and therefore they owe taxes to the Tamil state-in-making. Some LTTE cadres reportedly tell the Muslims that the land is not theirs, and they will finally be evicted from it.

The recent Tamil-Muslim clashes in the East have brought to the fore the Muslim apprehensions about domination and ill treatment by a Tamil-majority in the merged North East. Time and again, the Muslims have expressed their fear of a Tamil plot, spearheaded by the LTTE, to destroy the economy of the Muslim community. They suspected that the Muslim economy could be destroyed by organizing riots, such as those that occurred at Valachchenai, which destroyed or damaged most of the Muslim business ventures there, a little over a year ago. Even worse, the Muslims of the East are fearful that the events taking place today may be harbingers of the type of ethnic cleansing that took place in the North in 1990.

Ironically, there is a sense that the present state of Muslim-Tamil relations is a repeat of the Tamil-Sinhalese relationship that existed three to five decades ago. State aided colonization by the Sinhalese in the East had then seen a Sinhalese takeover of land that Tamils considered to be theirs. In some areas, such as Manel Aru (now renamed in Sinhala as Weli Oya), Tamils were physically driven out. In turn, Tamils created an ideology that the land was exclusively theirs and no one else's, which is encapsulated in the doctrine of traditional Tamil homelands. The Muslims of the East are now fearful that they will become second-class citizens in a merged North East region dominated by Tamils.

Like the Tamils, the Muslims have also been physically driven out of their lands (in the North) by an oppressor (the LTTE). They fear being driven out of the rest of the North East as well. In order to guarantee their right to remain, it is reasonable that the Muslims should ask for a recognition by the Government and the LTTE, of their own claims to the land on which they were born, and which they till. This recognition will not only enable them to negotiate on an equal footing with the Tamils, it will also create the right of the Muslims to govern themselves in that lands in which they are a majority, within the framework of a federal state. The Muslims, no less than the Tamils, have the right to demand that this principle should be accepted.

Those who fear the fragmentation of Sri Lanka due to these ethnic claims to territory and autonomy may wish to oppose them. Those who are pragmatic enough to recognize that the Tamil demand, which is backed by LTTE firepower, cannot be resisted, might be prepared to grudgingly concede it, while continuing to oppose the Muslim demand. But pragmatism may not be the best answer in this instance.

Demarcation and separation of Tamil land, Muslim land or Sinhalese land on the island of Sri Lanka would be a disaster. Instead there should be recognition that there are local majorities of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese living in different concentrations in different parts of the country. They should have the power to decide matters for themselves, to the extent that these are regional matters and not national ones that affect all communities. This is the place called federalism.

NEPAL

The Gordian Knot
Guest Writer: Deepak Thapa
Kathmandu-based journalist and editor

The entire country's attention was focused on the much-awaited third round of peace talks between the Nepali Government and the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) that began on August 17, 2003, in the western Nepal town of Nepalgunj, near the border with the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. And, as the two sides prepared to sit down to negotiate, in a demonstration of the people's fervent desire for immediate peace, the usually sleepy town of Nepalgunj witnessed a peace rally wishing success to the dialogue process and demanding a peaceful end to the bloodshed that has claimed over 7,000 lives in the past eight years.

The talks had assumed greater importance since the present round came two weeks after the Maoists had agreed to a resumption of the dialogue after having threatened to walk out of the six-month-long ceasefire in the face of the Government's 'intransigence', particularly on the inclusion, in the agenda of the talks, of political issues outlined by the rebels in April 2003. In a sign of their impatience, the Maoists had also reduced their earlier five-member team to just two - Dr Baburam Bhattarai and former Member of Parliament, Krishna Bahadur Mahara. The Government side was represented by Finance Minister Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani as convenor and Information and Communication Minister Kamal Thapa as secretary.

The last Maoist-Government face-to-face had been in May, just as the political parties who were represented in the Parliament that was dissolved in May 2002 had begun their agitation against King Gyanendra. The King had ousted the democratically elected Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and formed a Government with his own nominees in October 2002. On May 30, 2003, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, who had headed the Government appointed by Gyanendra, had resigned. His place was taken by another royal appointee, Surya Bahadur Thapa. The Thapa Government had held six informal meetings with the Maoists over the course of six weeks. But disagreement over the decisions of the May meeting had led to rising tensions and many of the rebel leaders who had surfaced following the January 2003 ceasefire, went underground again. It was then that the Maoists had warned of a breakdown of the ceasefire.

The Government team had briefed the King on its agenda in preparation for the Nepalgunj meeting. The political parties had also been kept in the know even though the parties - conducting a rather lackluster 'people's movement' demanding the restoration of Parliament and the formation of an all-party Government - have so far steered clear of any involvement in the talks between the Government and the Maoists. This is in spite of the Government's repeated pleas that the parties join hands to ensure the success of the talks. In fact, the Maoists had insisted on the inclusion of the political parties while accepting the Government's invitation for the third round of talks.

As expected, at Nepalgunj, the Government presented its own 'concept paper', outlining its suggestions for changes in the state mechanism. The Government paper contained responses to most of the Maoist demands. Most importantly, it agreed to two key demands - a roundtable conference and an interim government. On the question of the third major demand - elections to a Constituent Assembly -, however, the Government held that the reforms demanded by the Maoists could be introduced through amendments to the present Constitution itself. The Government suggested that the political parties be included in the roundtable to discuss the reforms and that the rebels be included in an interim Government that would hold elections to a new Parliament, which could, in turn, endorse the decisions of the roundtable.

The Government also declared that the issues of "people's sovereignty, constitutional monarchy, multiparty democracy and the country's integrity and unity" are non-negotiable. Its proposals, however, contained a number of provisions that could have far-reaching implications for Nepal. These include granting regional autonomy, converting the Upper House of Parliament into a 'house of nationalities' to represent the various population groups in the country, reservation of seats in Government employment and the education sector for backward groups and women, use of languages other than Nepali in local Governments, and the provision of a referendum to decide issues of national importance - all in line with what the Maoists have been demanding. The two major issues the Government did not raise regarded the role of the Army and the long-standing rebel demand that Nepal be declared a secular country.

The Government wanted to activate the team formed five months ago to monitor the ceasefire to ensure compliance of the code of conduct agreed upon by the two sides. Since the January ceasefire, nearly 70 people have been killed in stray incidents, including 19 in eastern Nepal just as the Nepalgunj talks were beginning, and each side has accused the other of violating the code of conduct. The Government also insisted that the Maoists give up their arms and communication equipment so that talks could be successful.

The Government's wide-ranging proposals for change were, however, brushed aside by the Maoists, who expressed their disappointment at what they called 'cosmetic changes'. Talking to the Press soon after meeting the Government side, Dr. Bhattarai warned that chances of a peaceful resolution looked dim. He, however, reiterated his Party's commitment to dialogue.

The third round of talks continued for another two days, this time in the Maoist hotbed of the neighbouring Dang district. But the conflicting stances on the question of a Constituent Assembly could not be reconciled, and the talks ended with only a commitment to meet again at a date to be decided within a week.

Watching from the sidelines are the political parties, and their ambiguous position on the whole affair is adding to the uncertainty of the outcome of the peace process. Even as they urge the Maoists to continue talking, the parties have declared that the Government proposal is only likely to strengthen the monarchy. If that was not confusing enough, former Prime Minister, and President of the Nepali Congress, Girija Prasad Koirala, even warned that the parties may demand a Republic if the Government and the Maoists agree on a new Constitution.

The Gordian knot that is Nepali politics tightens once again.

INDIA

Arunachal Pradesh: Legitimising Insurgency?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

Commenting on the annulment of the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act (APCOCA), 2002, State Home Minister L. Wanglat declared in the State Legislative Assembly: "APCOCA is not in the interest of the State, the nation and the people." T.L. Rajkumar, Minister of Law, Legislative and Parliamentary Affairs echoed the sentiment, asserting, "APCOCA is a notorious child."

On August 19 a newly aligned Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly rediscovered wisdom to repeal the Act, which the new Chief Minister Gegong Apang found 'draconian'. By repealing APCOCA, Apang, who orchestrated a coup extraordinaire by enlisting the support of 38 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of the previous Congress regime, fulfilled a promise he had made on August 2. However, this hurried repeal of a 'hurriedly enacted legislation' appears to have resulted from the interplay of extraneous power centres that now stand to gain substantially in the absence of the Act.

For the former Chief Minister, Mukut Mithi, the reason for APCOCA's enactment in August 2002 was to control the worsening law and order situation in the State, primarily in the districts of Tirap and Changlang, which border the conflict-ridden State of Nagaland. Unlawful activities of cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in these two districts had reached a peak, and were threatening to spill over into other areas in the State, and also threatened the body politik of the State.

Traditionally, Tirap and Changlang have been a happy hunting ground for both the factions of the NSCN. While the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) made its first inroads into this virgin territory in the early 1990s, the NSCN-IM soon made its move to carve out separate areas of influence in these districts. According to data available with the Arunachal Pradesh Police, 149 insurgency-related incidents took place in the State between 2000 and 2002, in which 60 insurgents, 25 security force personnel and 16 civilians were killed. It needs emphasis, however, that these figures fail to portray the gravity of the situation and the dominance enjoyed by the insurgent outfits in these districts, which are afflicted by widespread extortion, and where few politicians dare to challenge the insurgent diktat. The ground situation reflects poorly on the capabilities of the State police force, which, with just 5,900 personnel, is the smallest among the Northeastern States (excluding Sikkim).

Rampant extortion and abductions have become the order of the day in Tirap and Changlang, which otherwise suffer from government apathy, evident in their pitiable infrastructure and absence of basic civic facilities. Cadres of both factions of the NSCN enjoy a free run in the otherwise inaccessible villages, and in the handful of urban centres like Changlang, Miao and Khonsa. Traders and bureaucrats are forced to shell out as much as 10 per cent of their gross income to the insurgents as 'development funds'. Interestingly, in a bid to check extortion, the government has banned the use of currency notes above the denomination of Rs.10 in these two districts. It is this lawlessness, which Mithi's APCOCA tried to rein in. During its existence, however, just 14 cases were registered and 26 persons arrested under the Act. The high point of the Act, however, remained the arrest on April 30, 2003, of three MLAs, including a Minister, for their alleged nexus with the NSCN-IM.

In a State, where both the past and present Chief Ministers, Apang and Mithi, are believed to be aligned with different factions of the NSCN, regime changes are also highpoints in the intense power struggle between these factions. A few months before his ouster, Mukut Mithi spoke incessantly of the machinations by the NSCN-IM to remove him from power. After his ouster, he also charged Apang of collusion with the NSCN-IM and a high profile Member of Parliament (MP) from Assam, to orchestrate the change of government, a deal that reportedly witnessed an amount of Rs. 150 million changing hands. A media report on August 21 quoted Mithi as saying that 'representatives of the concerned MP and NSCN-IM met Apang on July 19 for finalisation of strategies for a change of guard in the State. The NSCN-IM agreed to use its might on one condition, that the APCOCA would be repealed.'

Evidently, Mithi's removal and the annulment of APCOCA directly serve the IM faction's interests. The NSCN-IM's activities had been constrained by the stringent law, as well as Mithi's continuation in power, since the Chief Minister was seen to be 'close to' the Khaplang faction. Mithi maintained in the Legislative Assembly on August 19, that the repeal 'was a gift to the outfit.' The repeal of the Act is a clear indication of the growing clout of the insurgent group that, through a curious mix of political machination, threat and diplomacy, has been able to browbeat its opponents into submission. This has happened repeatedly in Nagaland (the most recent example being the dissolution of the Reconciliation Commission) and it has now happened in Arunachal Pradesh as well.

Several civil society and human rights organisations, at least some of which are associated with, or fronts of, the NSCN-IM, have strongly opposed APCOCA. The All Arunachal Pradesh Students' Union (AAPSU), remained vocal against the Act in the pre-enactment stage as well as after it came into force. In a publication in November 2002 AAPSU described the Act as "illegal as it seeks to suppress the fundamental rights of the citizens and victimize political opponents." The organisation maintained, "The ground realities in the State do not warrant the enactment… the imposition of stringent measures and giving blanket powers to police to act with impunity will not only destroy the democratic polity, but also turn Arunachal Pradesh into a police State." Similarly, the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) issued a press release on July 22, 2003, in which it held that APCOCA had resulted in "gross violations of human rights and denial of basic right of life to Naga civilians" in Tirap and Changlang in the "guise of counter-insurgency operations." It further cautioned that the "Government of Arunachal Pradesh have committed crimes against the Nagas of Arunachal and against humanity in general, who will be held accountable and responsible for any consequences that may arise." The Tirap Changlang Human Rights organisation (TICHRO) also complained of 'excesses' by the Security Forces in the districts. In a press release in August 2003, TICHRO maintained that 11 persons had been booked under APCOCA, out of which 5 were subsequently released on bail. The rest had been kept with 49 other undertrials in police lock-ups and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camps. TICHRO's relations with the NSCN-IM are not clear, but TICHRO's press releases are displayed on the insurgent outfit's website.

Interestingly, political compulsions have made the Centre look the other way. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which heads the ruling coalition at the Centre, is trying to establish the first BJP regime in India's Northeast by engineering the defection of the entire 38 member Apang team to the BJP. These moves are also expected to keep the NSCN-IM in good humour, as Apang is believed to be on his way to provide autonomous district council status to Tirap and Changlang. Such a move would tend to provide legitimacy to the NSCN-IM's grand design of creating a unified Nagalim (greater Nagaland), since the Tirap and Changlang districts are an integral part of their projection.