SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 7, September 1, 2003

INDIA

A Tide of Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

For years now, the Institute for Conflict Management has built the case that the conflict in Kashmir is not about Kashmir; that it reflects, rather, an irreducible conflict between the ideology of religious exclusion and hatred that underlies the creation, existence, politics and strategic perspectives of Pakistan, and India's secular, pluralistic democracy; and that it has, at its heart, objectives that go far beyond the apparent territorial dispute over Kashmir, and that are intrinsically linked to the current 'global jehad' by a wide and interconnected network of Islamist terrorists.

The dramatic succession of incidents, arrests and seizures over an extended geographical area across India in the seven days past, virtually encapsulate the broad underlying dynamic that fuels the Islamist extremist jehad in South Asia, and its roots in the ideological and political pathology that lies at the core of the Pakistani state.

The week began with by far the worst of these incidents on August 25, in Mumbai, India's financial capital, where two coordinated bomb blasts killed 52 persons and injured another 148 in the vicinity of the historical landmark, the Gateway of India and at the crowded Zaveri Bazaar. While definitive identification of the perpetrators is still to come, forensic patterns and recent history - at least five similar explosions have occurred in different parts of the city since December 2002 - point the finger at cadres of Pakistan-based terrorist groups, particularly the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and their local affiliates, the proscribed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Kashmir-based militant Islamist women's organization, the Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM).

Hours after the blasts, more than 100 detonators were found inside a railway tunnel at Ghatandevi near Igatpuri, approximately 60 kilometers from Nashik in Maharashtra, just an hour before an express train carrying a large number of pilgrims was to pass.

On August 27, while the Inter-State Council was meeting at Srinagar, with several Chief Ministers and Union Cabinet Ministers in attendance, and presided over by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, two terrorists entered Hotel Greenway - under three kilometers away from the venue of the Council - and engaged in an exchange of fire with the security forces (SFs) for approximately 12 hours. The encounter ended during the early hours of August 28, with five persons - including the terrorists - dead and an unspecified number injured. National Conference leader Javed Shah, a former militant and legislator, was among those killed. Al-Mansooran, a front organization of the LeT, claimed responsibility for the incident.

On August 30, acting on a tip-off, the Border Security Force (BSF), engaged with two terrorists - including, crucially, Shahnawaz Khan @ 'Ghazi Baba', the operational chief of the Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the Noorbagh locality of Srinagar. Three persons - including a BSF soldier and the two terrorists, were killed, though the JeM has claimed that Ghazi Baba was not among the dead. The operation is extraordinary in its significance, and could mark the unraveling of an India-wide terrorist network directly controlled by Ghazi Baba, who was one of the key accused in the attack on India's Parliament at Delhi on December 13, 2001; the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly on October 1, 2001; the Akshardham Temple attack in Gujarat on September 24, 2002; the hijacking of IC 814 on December 24, 1999; the 1998 massacre of 25 Kashmiri Pandits (descendants of Hindu priests) at Wandhama in Anantnag, Kashmir; the abduction of six Western tourists, one of whom was beheaded, and another four of whom are yet to be traced and believed dead (one American tourists managed to escape), by the Al Faran in July 1995; and a succession of high profile fidayeen (suicide squad) attacks on security force establishment in Jammu & Kashmir.

On August 30, again, two terrorists - a Pakistani and a Delhi resident - of the JeM were killed in an encounter at the Indraprastha Millennium Park in Delhi. The encounter occurred after the Police had intercepted a truck containing a large quantity of explosives, arms and ammunition, including Under Barrel Grenade Launchers, from a truck, and arrested three terrorists. On interrogation, the arrested terrorists had disclosed that the weapons and explosives were intended to engineer major incidents in the capital, and that they were to be received by the terrorists at the Millennium Park. In another incident on the same day, the police found 148 sticks of gelatin explosives at the New Delhi railway station in an unclaimed bag.

In follow-up operations after the Delhi arrests and encounter, further arrests of two JeM terrorists took place in Bulandshahr in the State of Uttar Pradesh on August 31. 23 electronic detonators and three remote control devices were also recovered in this incident.

Despite the geographical spread of these various incidents, and the firepower expended or recovered, this is barely the tip of the iceberg of Pakistan sponsored Islamist terrorism in India. In the wake of the Mumbai blasts, a great deal of poorly informed 'analysis', both in the Indian and the international media, sought to link the incidents to proximate triggering events - including, among others, the Gujarat riots last year, and the disclosure of a report by the Archaeological Survey of India, on the very morning of the twin explosions in Mumbai, which claimed that a 10th Century Temple lay under the foundations of the disputed Babri Masjid (mosque) site in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. These analyses fail to comprehend the sheer enormity of the Islamist extremist enterprise in South Asia, the continuity of motives that underlie a long succession of incidents, and the complexity and number of cells and networks that have been established across the country to secure a sustained and subversive strategic agenda. For one thing, for each terrorist conspiracy that manifests itself in a successful operation, there are literally scores that are discovered and pre-empted. In just the past four and a half years, since mid-1998, over 250 Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist cells have been discovered and disrupted across the length and breadth of India outside Jammu & Kashmir. Hundreds of arrests occur, and literally thousands of kilograms of explosives and numberless weapons are seized each year. In private conversations, General Hamid Gul, the former Director General of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), is reported to have recently boasted that this Agency had established at least another 300 operational cells across India, that these had been charged with the responsibility of recruitment and mobilization of local cadres, and that these could be activated on command.

Even a surface acquaintance with the motivating ideologies of the groups involved in the Islamist extremist enterprise in South Asia exposes the essential logic and dynamic of their operations. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of the LeT, for instance, writes that jehad is imperative until "the way of life prescribed by Allah dominates and overwhelms the whole world… Fighting is also obligatory until the disbelieving powers and states are subdued and they pay jizya (capitulation tax) with willing submission." Similarly, the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin's Fazl-ur-Rahman declares, "Delhi, Calcutta, Mumbai and Washington are the real targets of militants. Muslims should cooperate with militants for dominance of Islam in the world." SIMI's manifesto rejects democracy, but resolves to exploit its processes to "expose the nature of the system, democracy, socialism, secularism, nationalism, etc., and ask the people to boycott the election and march for the Islamic revolution." Significantly, despite the fact that SIMI draws its cadres from within India, its concerns are not integrally linked to local Muslim grievances. Of the nine major demonstrations organized by SIMI, and listed on its now-defunct website, only two related to communal violence in India. The last on the list was organized to protest the Saudi Arab Government's 1996 decision "to allow American troops to enter Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) in direct violation of the instruction of Prophet Mohammad." SIMI has integral and demonstrable links both to the ISI and a number of Pakistan-based terrorist groups, and substantially derives its inspiration from Osama bin Laden - who it iconizes as an outstanding example of a 'true mujahid' (holy warrior) and a 'champion and true savior of Islam.'

With their abiding ideological underpinnings, it must be clear that these groups are not swayed by local events, though they exploit local grievances to extend the resource pool of potential recruits. Groups like the LeT, JeM and SIMI will, consequently, continue to target India as long as they retain their capacities to strike, and as long as they continue to receive the enormous material and logistics support from, and safe-havens in, Pakistan.

While the dramatic incidents of the past week do focus attention on the enormity of the conspiracy that is being executed in South Asia, they tend to detract from the equally important 'bleeding war' that is integral to its realization. In Jammu & Kashmir alone, each month and on the average, well over 200 persons are killed in the ongoing campaign of cross-border terrorism, even as Pakistan engages in, and secures legitimacy from, the pretence of participation in a 'peace process' with India. Unless a far greater measure of realism and consistency attends the world's perceptions and assessments of the Islamist extremist enterprise, and Pakistan's unrelenting and central role in its advancement, the footprint of terror will continue to enlarge itself, not only in South Asia, but across the world.

NEPAL

Return to Bloodshed
Guest Writer: Yubaraj Ghimire
Editor, Kantipur

All hopes and wishes for a peaceful resolution of the Maoist conflict were razed to the ground last week when Maoist 'supremo', Prachanda, called off the peace process and the truce which had been in effect for the past seven months. Prachanda's call was implemented by his armed guerrillas in the capital city of Kathmandu and in far flung areas, provoking the government to declared the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) a terrorist organization, giving a liberal mandate to the security agencies to deal with them.

The Maoists seemed well prepared, at least for the time being. On Thursday, three armed Maoists shot and killed one of the country's most celebrated Army Officer - Col. Kiran Bahadur Basnyat in Kathmandu - as he was about to get into his jeep. Basnyat was being tipped to shortly head a battalion charged with looking after security arrangements in the capital and keeping a tab on Maoist activities, after his promotion to the rank of Brigadier General,. Three bullets pierced his temple and other vital organs, and Basnyat was declared dead in the Army hospital.

But the list of those attacked does not end with Basnyat. Another army officer, Colonel Ramindra Chhetri, who used to run the army propaganda directed against Maoists on the Government owned Television; Devendra Raj Kandel, a former Minister of State for Home and a die-hard anti-Maoists were hit and wounded, while the ancestral house of Prakash Chandra Lohani, the present Finance Minister and Chief Negotiator in the failed dialogue process, was set ablaze.

The Maoists seem to have adopted urban guerrilla warfare and hit and run tactics, giving a tough time to the equally committed armed forces, who have been supplied with more sophisticated automatic weapons by the Government. Nevertheless, Kathmandu's future is uncertain and lies in the shadow of terror. According to official assessments, the Maoist decision to target the senior level Army officers is solely intended to reject all possibilities of a peace process, even in future.

Nepal's unstable politics currently revolves around three poles, and its consequent direction is hard to predict. King Gyanendra, who is away in London for a routine physical check-up, does not enjoy a harmonious relationship with the major political parties, which have been agitating ever since he dismissed the Government headed by Sher Bahadur Deuba on October 4, 2002. Arguing that the King had no right to dismiss the Prime Minister, these parties want Madhav Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist, CPN-UML) installed as the Prime Minister as a precondition for the restoration of the relationship with the King. They have refused to recognize the legitimacy of Prime Minsiter Surya Bahadur Thapa's Government - the second since royal takeover in October - although the King made it clear two months ago that the power he appropriated in October duly lies with the new council of ministers.

Nevertheless, in a country where royalty has been revered and backed in the past, the institution continues to be recognized as a force to reckon with, both by the agitating political parties, as well as the Maoist rebels who were insisting till recently that they 'would hold talks only with the king who represents the old regime', claiming that the Maoists themselves represented the 'new or future regime'. But the distance between the three poles - the King and his Government, the political parties, and the Maoists - is ever-increasing and that is what is creating a problem for the country.

The selective targeting of senior Army officers and politicians has, however, injected fear among politicians - both in the Government and those opposing it. It was in this context that Prime Minister Thapa appealed to the political parties on Friday, August 29, to put off their ongoing agitation, which is to enter a new phase with proposed 'mammoth rallies' in the capital in support of their demand to have their nominee, Madhav Nepal, installed as the new Prime Minister. The lack of a security environment has increased the possibility of politicians or the proposed rallies being targeted by the Maoists, on the one hand, or by the security forces under provocation. That is something that political parties may have to consider seriously before rejecting the Prime Minister's appeal.

What remains far more important, however, is that a durable peace cannot be brought back unless the Maoists are either defeated decisively in a military action, or a fruitful peace process is initiated. An extended spell of Emergency Rule between November 2001 and July 2002 - in the wake of collapse of the first ever peace dialogue during the Sher Bahadur Deuba Government - was a proof that military action alone cannot defeat the guerrillas, who now have better arms and safer and strategic hiding places.

Why did the peace process collapse? The Government and the Maoists are blaming each other. According to Information Minister Kamal Thapa, who was also one of the negotiators from the Government side, the Maoists were simply using the peace process to consolidate their tactical and military strength. "The Government was flexible and willing to discuss any political demand put forth by the Maoists. But they insisted that the Government should outright accept the demand for the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft the new Constitution."

Were the Maoists actually in a hurry to be part of the Constitutional process? The rebels have not explained their position, but abruptly calling off the peace process and resuming violence does not suggest a serious intent in this direction. "They simply wanted to put the onus for the break-down of the peace process on the Government", a senior Army Officer said, adding that this would be an opportunity lost for the rebels. With the latest round of violence by the Maoists, they are, perhaps, more feared, but are gradually losing respect as a 'political force'. They have, no doubt, acquired power and a certain status through the barrel of their guns. But the Maoists will eventually need to have their legitimacy and status endorsed by the people through a peaceful electoral process. The current round of violence is only blocking the process of their legitimization.

INDIA

Nagaland: Chastising Insurgency
Sashinungla
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management Database and Documentation Center, Guwahati

In Sungkomen ward of the north-western town of Mokokchung in Nagaland, on August 24, 2003, two senior cadres of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-K), the Secretary and the Chairman of the outfit for the Lotha region, Wobemo and Chumthungo, decided to celebrate the death of a cadre of their rival NSCN-IM (the Isak-Muivah faction) in the adjacent district of Wokha the previous day. They took out their guns and started firing in the air, causing great panic among the people. As residents repeatedly asked these cadres to stop disturbing their children, who were preparing for their examinations, the insurgents turned their guns on the residents, leading to the death of a student. What followed was unprecedented in the history of insurgency in the State of Nagaland.

Irate residents of Sungkomen, one of the fifteen wards in Mokochung town, lynched the two militants responsible for the killing. The reaction did not stop there. On the next day, August 25, a mob joined by residents of other wards went on to set afire eight houses of top NSCN-K leaders, including that of the organisation's General Secretary, Ketovi Zhimomi, as well as 22 vehicles belonging to the militant group. It was nothing sort of a little revolution, which cleaned out Mokokchung of the menace of the NSCN-K.

What is so symbolic about the 'little revolt' in Mokokchung, the bastion of the Ao tribe? Most of the top ranking leaders of the NSCN-K faction, kilonsers (ministers) in the outfit's parlance, have their residences in Mokokchung and, even though the organisation's chief, Khaplang, operates from his mobile headquarters in the jungles of Myanmar, Mokokchung is, for all practical purposes, the de facto headquarters of the NSCN-K. Cadres and middle ranking leaders are obliged to report at Mokokchung to the kilonsers, such as Captain Lanu Ao, the second rung leader of the outfit, 'Major' Aheto, Niki Sema, and R. Lotha Mhatsung. A central intelligence officer, posted at Mokokchung, speaking to the writer, disclosed, "If NSCN-IM cadres have to come to Mokokchung, they will come through Wokha district, but not through the Dimapur-Mokokchung road, because this area is mostly controlled by the NSCN-K."

After the infamous vertical split in the NSCN in 1988, both the factions have clearly demarcated areas of operation in Nagaland's 13 districts. Since those days, the NSCN-IM gradually built its base in the Manipur Hills among the Thangkuls, and around Kohima, while the NSCN-K, coming under pressure from the Myanmarese Army in the Hukwang Valley, moved to the friendlier Konyak and Ao areas in the Tuensang and Mokokchung region. Thus, at present, the IM group draws most of its cadres from the Semas, Thangkuls and Phoms and is strong in districts such as Zunheboto, Wokha, Ukhrul, Dimapur, Kohima and parts of Tuensang, while the Khaplang group is active in Mokokchung, Mon and parts of Tuensang district, with a sizeable following among the Konyak, Ao and Burmese Nagas.

The NSCN-K, till the recent incident, carried on with rampant extortion activities in Mokokchung, with public resentment increasingly finding expression in complaints to the police. In July alone, for instance, police arrested a NSCN-K cadre while extorting money from a shop in the Daily Market area on the 17th; on July 21, police apprehended two NSCN-K militants who were demanding goods and money from the shops in the town; again, on July 26 police arrested two NSCN-K cadres extorting money from a shop in the Daily Market, and recovered a pistol with six rounds of ammunition.

The lynching incident and the violence that followed, threatens the very existence of the NSCN-K in the area. So great has been the anger of the people - who have not only tolerated the outfit's presence in their area but also provided the cadres with 'tax' regularly, albeit under the point of gun - that local organizations have taken up the responsibility of teaching the insurgents a lesson. Under the initiatives of local organisations like the Ao Senden (Hoho or Tribal Council), the Town Ward leaders, and the Ao Students Conference (Ao Kaketshir Mungdang, AKM), people of the area have decided to stop paying 'tax' to the outfit. The sizeable income, which the outfit used to make from all wards and villages of the district, could, consequently, now simply dry up.

Further, under the aegis of Ao Senden, the AKM, the Village Councils and the Town Ward leaders, a public general meeting was held on August 29, where citizens of the district decided that no payment of 'tax' would henceforth be made to either faction of the NSCN; and that the NSCN-K cadres, who used to stay overnight at villages and the district headquarters, would not be allowed to do so in future.

This is a serious setback for the NSCN-K, which lost one of its great patrons when the previous Chief Minister, S.C. Jamir, was ousted in the State Assembly Elections in February 2003. Speculation is rife that the present Chief Minister, N. Rio, with an alleged pro-NSCN-IM, stance, may be behind the Mokokchung violence. Evidently, in a State, where hardly any leader exists without some sort of links with either of the factions, the marginalisation of the Khaplang group would serve the present regime in no small way. There is, however, a dominant feeling in Mokokchung that the violence did not, in fact, point significantly to the role of 'interested' politicians, but is, rather, an outburst of the people's anger against 'unnecessary harassment' by the insurgents who had 'threatened peaceful existence through their unjustified action'.

The incident also appears to have had dramatic reverberations on the NSCN-IM, with a copycat lynching at Tuensang town on August 28. The Tuensang incident occurred during a meeting between NSCN-IM cadres and leaders of the Tuensang and Mon Students' Federation (TMSF), to settle a dispute over the assault on two of the Federation's leaders on August 21. The lynching took place during a 12-hour bandh (general strike) called by leaders of the TMSF and the Tuensang Mon Public Organisation (TMPO) to register their protest against the assault and harassment of the two leaders by the NSCN-IM militants. Tempers flared during the meeting, and a large crowd beat up Raising Tangkhul, one of the two NSCN-IM cadres who had allegedly assaulted the student leaders on August 21. Raising Tangkhul died of his injuries, while his companions managed to escape. In a hurried reaction to the incident, the NSCN-IM announced a 'code of conduct' for its cadre, which warned them against harassing members of the public and also banned the collection of 'tax' from any individual or organization - in the process conceding what it had long denied, that widespread extortion by its cadres has long been the norm.

The lynching and mass protests will certainly force some rethinking within the leadership and ranks of both the factions of the NSCN. However, those who hope that this may be the beginning of a larger mass movement for peace in the State need to accept there are still many miles to traverse before such an eventuality can be realized. The five-decade-old insurgency in Nagaland has created its own networks and complexities, and these are too strong to be broken by such impulsive and sporadic reactions by the people. It can, however, reasonably be expected that such unprecedented jolts from the suffering public will impose a measure of sobriety on the armed cadres of both groups, who have long subjected the people to indiscriminate bullying, harassment and extortion.

INDIA	BANGLADESH

Catch 22 in Dhaka
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

Bangladesh may not be Pakistan, but it is another South Asian neighbour with whom India has an uneasy blow-hot-blow-cold relationship, despite the extraordinary support extended during its fight for freedom 32 years ago. And, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has always thrived on shrill anti-India rhetoric, leading the present coalition Government in Dhaka, any move that may have even a slight bearing on New Delhi is closely monitored, analyzed and dissected.

It is against this backdrop that the Bangladesh Government's decision on whether or not to grant political asylum to Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua is keenly awaited. Chetia is the detained general secretary of the outlawed Northeast Indian separatist group, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). New Delhi and Dhaka do not have an extradition treaty in place yet, but India would expect Bangladesh to hand over the ULFA leader to it once he is released from jail.

Chetia completed his six-year jail term at the high-security central prison in Dhaka on Monday, August 25. Technically, he should have been a free man that day. But, his detention has been extended by another six months, as he failed to pay a fine of Bangladesh Taka 10,000 ($172). This extension, in fact, has come as a breather to Premier Khaleda Zia's BNP government as the Bangladesh High Court had, on August 23, ordered authorities in Dhaka to decide on Chetia's plea for political asylum within four weeks. The Bangladesh High Court's order came in response to a petition moved by the Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSFEHR), a frontline rights group in that country, seeking the court's intervention on the asylum pleas by Chetia and 21 others belonging to countries ranging from Sri Lanka to South Africa.

Chetia, now 52, was arrested by Bangladesh immigration and security officials from downtown Dhaka's North Adabor locality on December 21, 1997. The main charges against the Indian separatist leader was illegal entry into Bangladesh, possession of two forged Bangladeshi passports (No 0964185 and 0227883), possession of an unauthorized satellite telephone and illegal possession of foreign currency of countries as diverse as the US, UK, Switzerland, Thailand, Philippines, Spain, Nepal, Bhutan, Belgium, Singapore and others. Two of Chetia's accomplices, Babul Sharma and Laxmi Prasad Goswami, were also arrested along with Chetia the same day. Chetia had earlier pleaded guilty on the charge of illegal entry into Bangladesh, telling the court that he was fighting a 'freedom struggle' in Assam and had to flee to that country to escape the Indian security forces. The ULFA, formed in April 1979, is fighting for a 'sovereign, socialist Assam' and is engaged in a bush-war against the Indian state. New Delhi has declared the group an outlawed organization.

Dhaka is indeed in a Catch 22 situation. Granting political asylum to Chetia, who still continues to be the ULFA's General Secretary, would amount to openly facilitating this Indian rebel group to establish a representative in Bangladesh with Dhaka's consent. This would, once again, bring into sharp focus New Delhi's authoritative claim that top ULFA leaders, including the outfit's 'chief of staff', Paresh Barua, have been operating out of Bangladesh, and that the rebel group from Assam was receiving the backing of sections in the Bangladeshi intelligence community, in collaboration with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). On the other hand, refusal to grant political asylum to Chetia, from the BNP's point of view, would go against the party's stated position on the ULFA and 'human rights'.

As Opposition leader in May 1998, within six months of Chetia's arrest, Ms. Khaleda Zia had told this writer during an interview at the BNP headquarters in Dhaka, that her party regarded the ULFA cadres as 'freedom fighters', just as the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini were freedom fighters. She had then also expressed her gratitude to the people of Assam and Meghalaya for sheltering the Mukti Bahini during the Bangladeshi freedom struggle, indirectly implying that there was nothing wrong in some ULFA men taking shelter inside Bangladesh. That, obviously, may not be the BNP or Premier Zia's official position now, particularly after 9/11, when the world has declared a 'global war' against terror.

Moreover, Dhaka's strong denials notwithstanding, international attention is certainly focused on Bangladesh following western media reports that the country has become a new hub of Islamist terrorist groups and elements linked to Al Qaeda. Curiously enough, some of these reports had said that the ULFA, too, had sent its representatives to attend a meeting of radical Islamist outfits at a secret rendezvous in Bangladesh last year. Charges of the BNP being soft on some such forces or the ULFA attending such a meeting cannot be definitively confirmed or refuted. What cannot be ignored, however, are the discussions in intelligence circles of a local terror group, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), with an estimated strength of 2,000, currently active in Bangladesh, with direct links with Al Qaeda. When New Delhi raises its oft-repeated charge that Dhaka was not doing much to halt Northeast Indian separatists from operating out of that country, it touches a sympathetic cord among those who watch international terrorism and cross-border insurgencies.

Considering various aspects, Dhaka may finally reject Chetia's asylum plea, but is unlikely to hand the ULFA leader over to India. What happens then? In a conversation with this writer from Dhaka on August 29, Sigma Huda, secretary general of the BSFEHR, the rights group that has taken up Chetia's case from the beginning (ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa had, in fact, thanked BSFEHR for taking up the Chetia case through a letter dated February 4, 1998), said that if the ULFA leader is denied asylum by Bangladesh, he has to be given a chance to opt for asylum in another country. "According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948) and other conventions on political asylum seekers and refugees, Dhaka is not supposed to send Chetia back to the country of his origin and, instead, let him give names of three other countries of his choice before negotiations on those destinations could begin," Huda said. Bangladesh may not grant asylum to Chetia, but could well cite existing UN provisions to let him first try for shelter in a third country.

The ULFA too is expected to use all resources at its command to try and prevent Chetia from falling into the hands of Indian authorities. The outfit has faced some major reverses in recent months in the wake of a sustained counter-insurgency offensive by Indian security forces, and with the Royal Bhutan Government mounting pressure for the ULFA to pull out its cadres from at least nine well-entrenched camps inside the kingdom in a peaceful manner or face 'military force.'

To add to its woes is the recent sentencing of two detained ULFA cadres to life imprisonment by a Guwahati court on charges of being involved in the kidnapping and murder of well-known social activist Sanjoy Ghose at the eastern Assam river-island of Majuli in July 1997. The court, acting on submissions made after the probe into the Ghose murder by the Central Bureau of Investigation, India's apex criminal investigative agency, found 11 ULFA cadres guilty of the crime. Significantly, this includes ULFA 'chief of staff' Paresh Barua, who Indian authorities are convinced, is operating from within Bangladesh. Both Dhaka and the ULFA may deny that the rebels were operating out of bases inside Bangladesh. However, the Chetia case and the BNP-led Government's handling of it in the days to come will once again inevitably shift the spotlight on the issue of separatists from Northeast India using Bangladesh as a secure staging arena for their campaigns of terror.