SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 17, November 8, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

NEPAL

Drifting into Disaster
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The ongoing civil war between the 'People's Army' of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Government's security forces, took a violent turn immediately after the end of the short-term ceasefire announced by the Maoists for the Dashain festival between October 20 and 28, 2004. Within hours of the expiry of the temporary truce, the security forces and the Maoists clashed at Kamirechour in the Kavre Village Development Committee (VDC) of Dang district on October 29. On October 31, some 1,000 Maoists attacked Gamagdhi, Mugu District headquarters. The insurgents have also threatened, according to a widely reported statement by an unnamed 'Political Commissar', "to attack and destroy the mid-western regional headquarters Birendranagar in Surkhet district." The statement claimed, further, that, "the Gamagdhi attack was an unplanned, small attack. Now we will show them by attacking Birendranagar and turning it into ashes." The Maoist threat against Birendranagar, one of the Government's key strategic locations in the mid-western region, clearly demonstrates the progress and direction of the 'protracted war' in Nepal.

The Maoist 'Chairman', Pushpa Kamal Dahal, aka, Prachanda, has made it clear that the armed confrontation with the state is the primary instrument of the 'People's War', and the movement has relied on popular Marxist-Leninist-Maoist slogans such as 'The People without an army have nothing of their own'; 'The main instrument of the state is the army'; 'In the New Democratic Revolution the main form of organization is the army and the main form of struggle is the war'. The Maoists objective is to transform the unarmed masses into the armed masses, and little effort has been spared to this end over the past years. The absence of parallel development and a sincere national leadership has made their task easier, pushing common folk, voluntarily or under coercion, into the armed struggle, validating the revolutionary theory that war teaches war.

There has, over the past months, been a steady and strong evolution of the Maoist military strategy from rural and jungle-based guerilla warfare to a greater focus on urban targets, with a number of tactical attacks on various district headquarters, where the Security Forces are currently concentrated. More significantly, the Maoists appear to be hunkering down for a conventional confrontation, with reports that the insurgents have commenced extensive construction of bunkers and tunnels, particularly in the mid-Western and Western districts of Rukum and Achham respectively. This fortification and 'tunnel warfare' is expected to provide greater security to the Maoist cadres and leadership against increasingly sophisticated operations by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) which has received a substantial bounty of improved weaponry, and has been conducting offensive operations using modern weapons, armour and aircraft against the Maoists. At the same time, these fortifications can be expected to provide the Maoists a more secure base to launch their own operations against urban targets.

Current trends in Maoist activity, consequently, suggested that they see their movement as having reached the 'third stage' postulated by Mao's theory of protracted war - the strategic offensive (the two preceding stages are 'strategic defense' and 'strategic equilibrium'). Indeed, the beginning of the 'strategic offensive' phase had been announced by the CPN-M after 10 days of the 'Central Committee' meeting at an undisclosed location on August 31, 2004. The push forward is motivated by the conviction that other revolutionary movements such as "the Shining Path and the Colombian revolutions failed because they let the strategic balance drag on for too long. In Nepal, the Maoists think a quick push when the state is vulnerable will take them to victory." It appears that the Maoists now seek the 'decisive destruction of the enemy's armed forces' and the seizure of power.

The Maoists have been long in their preparation, building rural base areas and establishing military control and political authority in ever-increasing parts of the countryside, to surround the cities. Apart from the abductions and coercive recruitment, largely among young rural students, the Maoists have designed curricula for primary school students (4th and 5th Grade) in the name of 'pro-people education'. The curricula include subjects such as military science, Maoist philosophy and ideology, profiles of Maoist leaders, and history and politics of the People's War.

To increase the pressure on the Government, the Maoists have extensively targeted the political and economic structure across the country with devastating attacks on power plants, bridges, telecommunication centers and government buildings, which have caused immense damages to the national economy. Since the end of the temporary cease fire on October 29, there have been at least 30 incidents of Maoist violence across the country, and the Maoists have detonated bombs in all their attacks, including those at Gamagdhi in Mugu, Humla, Jajarkot, Dolpa, Bardia, Palpa, Rukum and in the mid-Marsyangdhi power plant project area. According to a study conducted towards the end of 2003, the seven-year long Maoist insurgency has cost the nation Rs. 66 billion, with tourism being the worst hit sector of the economy incurring a loss of Rs. 5.9 billion during 2002-03. Subsequently, the slump in tourism sector had a spillover effect on the banking and hotel industry, and ultimately on all productive activities. Security expenditure has increased by almost 300 per cent over the last five years of the civil war. The cost of destruction of physical infrastructure, such as power stations, telephone towers and VDC buildings by the Maoists was estimated at Rs. 18 billion. In general, the overall business environment has deteriorated drastically as a result of Maoist violence. The insurgents have also been intensifying their activities in the districts surrounding the Kathmandu Valley, simultaneously putting pressure on the capital city itself with well-targeted bombings, abductions, strikes and economic blockades. The buildings of more than three-fourths of the 3,915 VDCs in the country have already been totally destroyed by the Maoists, either during attacks or in bombing incidents. Almost all the remaining VDCs are vulnerable to their attacks.

Significantly, the Maoists are now claiming the lion's share from the money allocated to VDCs for development works. Various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international NGOs, moreover, have been forced to recognize the Maoist 'People's Governments' in their areas of domination, and can only work after procuring or securing the Maoists' permission to continue their developmental projects. NGOs, along with local businessmen, government employees and common civilians, are now routinely paying 'revolutionary taxes' to the Maoists in much of the country, even as the countryside witnesses an incredible exodus from the rural areas, with an estimated over two million villagers fleeing their homes over the last two years. These distress migrants are mostly young men and women who have streamed out of the hills into the Indian Terai plain to the south, or into the District headquarters and cities within Nepal. Observers estimate that the migration continues at a rate of about 75,000 persons each month.

On the flip side, an offensive strategy for the Nepalese security forces also appears to be crystallizing. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) has rejected the proposal for a unilateral ceasefire from the Government side, and continued its patrolling activities even during the Dashain temporary ceasefire period. In mid-October the RNA had carried out a week-long and massive military operation, 'Operation Lekbesi', against Maoist training camps in Myagdi, Baglung, Gulmi and Arghakhanchi districts, to flush out the Maoists from their stronghold areas, and had set up a 'tactical headquarters' at the Upallochour barracks to coordinate their operations. At the same time, the Army had conducted 'Operation Simarekha' in the Rukum, Dolpa and Pyuthan areas and in the Accham District, establishing significant presence in these areas of Maoist domination. The Armed Police Force (APF) of Nepal, which has been working under 'operational instructions' of the RNA, is also expected to form a brigade for the security of Kathmandu, and to establish a battalion in each of the 75 districts in the country.

Despite some successes for the RNA, however, there is little evidence, or even possibility of the political re-consolidation of the country, and of the restoration of the institutions of civil governance in the vast areas that have been lost to the disorders. Indeed, as Kathmandu almost exclusively and alternately emphasizes either talks or military operations, there appears to be no will or motivation to restore the structures and activities of normal civil governance in rural areas, and the entire administrative paraphernalia has been withdrawn into the District Headquarters across the country.

On the political front, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's Government had clearly specified that the Government would hold a national election, even if the Maoists did not join in a negotiation process, though the feasibility of an election in prevailing circumstances is highly suspect. The Maoists, in an official statement, have further claimed to have initiated processes to 'hold dialogue' with all political parties and organizations 'other than the royal palace and India', to find a way out of the country's current political impasse, and to preclude the possibility of 'foreign intervention'. If anything, this move will only further isolate the incumbent regime. The prime power in the conflict, King Gyanendra, is yet to make public his stand on the future of his country, and Nepal can only anticipate a further deterioration in the situation, as the warring groups rely increasingly on the 'military option'.

INDIA

Manipur: Yet another 'final' assault
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

Army authorities are asserting that Sajik Tampak, a stretch of thick-forested mountains in the Chandel District of Manipur, which has long served as a citadel to four prominent militant groups - the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) - has been 'captured' after an intense battle. If true, this would be an outstanding achievement for the security forces, since earlier attempts at over-running this 'liberated zone' had resulted in several red faces. For years, Manipur - stuck in a state of perennial warfare against 15 active militant groups - had to suffer the ignominy of tolerating the reign of the militants over vast stretches of its territory, where even a minimal state presence could not be maintained. The present 'victory', however, is not unqualified, and Army authorities admit that, "the area is yet to be completely cleared of rebels".

In January 2003, an attempt by three battalions (125th, 64th and 2nd) of the Border Security Force (BSF) to cleanse the area of well-entrenched Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) militants proved a disaster. Even the desperate use of helicopter gun-ships and sophisticated war equipment, hailed as the biggest operation in 20 years of counter-insurgency operations in the State, failed to outwit the insurgents, who succeeded not only in surviving the synchronised onslaught, but inflicted deadly losses on the BSF. Eight BSF personnel were reported to have been killed although the official fatalities figure was quoted to be only two. Worse, the areas were never recovered from insurgent control, and the BSF's failure left their confidence and audacity greatly augmented. So disastrous were the consequence that Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, in a statement in the Assembly on March 13, 2003, had advised the security forces not to repeat the misadventure without adequate preparation.

More than a year later, in April 2004, another 'area domination exercise' was conducted by the Army in Sajik Tampak, just before the elections from the outer Manipur constituency to the Indian parliament. Amidst calls for a boycott of the elections by the militants, the operations were aimed at neutralising the influence of the 'underground'. After Army authorities claimed 'success' for their mission, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) informed the media, on April 19, that its cadres had killed three Army personnel and seized their arms and communication devices. Insurgent presence and activities in the area did not appear to have been significantly undermined. These are only the most recent in a long series of unsuccessful efforts to recover these areas from insurgent domination over the past decade and more.

It was against this backdrop that the Army launched the current series of operations in the first week of October 2004, targeting the militants with the objective of making them respond to the Chief Minister's October 17-call for a 'negotiated settlement'. The Army, under clear direction from Delhi, is seeking a 'decisive outcome' through these operations, even as the Central Government is busy negotiating with the Apunba Lup, an umbrella body of Manipuri organisations, for a 'more humane law' to replace the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA). About 7,500 Army personnel are reported to be engaged in the operations in four districts: Imphal East, Bishnupur, Churachandpur and Chandel. Significantly, the operation was reported only in the first week of November, after it had been underway for about a month, entirely outside the glare of the media.

Given the duration of the current operation, however, the neutralisation of about 54 militants (20 killed and 34 arrested), as of November 6, out of an estimated strength of 2,000 cadres present in the area, is at best a modest achievement. Considering the claim that more than 100 militant hideouts have been attacked, the seizure of just 20 weapons indicates a long struggle ahead. The troika of the UNLF, PLA and PREPAK, along with a lone Kuki outfit, the KRA, appear to have evaded the brunt of the Army's offensive.

The Army has been quick to assert the impact of the ongoing operations, and its Public Relations Officer stated: "The progress of the operation is so far very encouraging with the local people actively supporting the soldiers in their fight against militancy". Limited success is also confirmed by the Editor of an English Daily in Imphal: "Since the attack in Sajik Tampak started, there has been a quantum decrease in activities and movement of the underground cadres." Civil Government officials have reportedly reopened offices in small towns and villages in the area, which had been out of bounds for several years.

Perceived successes may however, be deceptive, and may not even indicate a noteworthy long-term decline in the striking capabilities of the militant groups. The underground organisations that have mushroomed in this State since the formation of the UNLF in 1964, have several other 'liberated zones' spread out all over the State, including areas such as Thanga and Thangjing hills in Bishnupur and Churachandpur districts. They have repeatedly orchestrated strikes not only in the areas along the border with Myanmar, but also in the heart of the fortified capital city of Imphal. Apparently, such capacities have been derived from an effective combination of popular support, an elaborate intelligence network and highly motivated cadre strength.

Worse, three of the four districts in which the current operation is underway - Bishnupur, Churachandpur and Chandel - share an international boundary with Myanmar, and the insurgents have simply melted across the border during past operations. This time around, however, the Myanmarese Army is understood to be providing support to their Indian counterparts to prevent the fleeing guerrillas from entering Myanmarese territory. With encirclement by the Indian Army from three directions, and containment action by the Myanmar forces, the ongoing operations could force a desperate 'fight or perish' choice on the Indian militants. But things do not seem to be quite so simple, despite what authorities may want us to believe. Certainly, the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Governments of Myanmar and India does adequately addresss India's security concerns and commits Myanmar to do everything to stop its territory being used by the anti-Indian rebels. But, to believe that Myanmar could amass sufficient Force to effectively deny the rebels access across 358 kilometres of a notoriously porous border with Manipur, let alone 'seal' it in entirety, is far from realistic.

Irrespective of the claims of success by the Army, consequently, a substantial number of the militants can be expected to have crossed over the border to take refuge in their existing camps in Myanmar. This is also what had happened when Indian troops claimed to have 'sealed' the borders with Bhutan when the latter conducted military operations against the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) in December 2003. A number of these militants managed to cross the border and travelled the entire length of at least two of four Indian states - Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Meghalaya - to reach the safety of their camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Thus, in the present case, any effort that falls short either of joint operations by the Indian and Myanmarese Army or a quick show of aggression by the latter on the militant bases in Myanmar, is bound to fail as far as the larger objective of controlling militancy in Manipur is concerned.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November 1-7, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	1	0	9	10
INDIA
Assam	0	1	1	2
Jammu & Kashmir	5	6	27	38
Left-wing extremism	3	1	0	4
Manipur	2	0	2	4
Tripura	1	0	2	3
Total (INDIA)	11	8	32	51
NEPAL	4	1	28	33
PAKISTAN	0	0	8	8
SRI LANKA	2	0	0	2

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

INDIA

Ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir can be considered, says Home Minister Shivraj Patil: Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, on November 7, after visiting border outposts in R S Pura sector, stated that a cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir can be considered by the Government of India "if the situation so arises". However, the Home Minister charged Pakistan with not doing much to stop infiltration from its side. On the question of illegal intrusions, Patil said that there had been a reduction in infiltration from across the border after the fencing. At the same time, infiltration, though not on a large scale, was still going on, he added. Daily Excelsior, November 8, 2004

NDFB threatens to pull out of ceasefire in Assam: The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), on November 6, threatened to pull out of the unilateral ceasefire it declared 'if the Government does not stop killing its cadres', which the outfit said 'sends wrong signals'. In an e-mail sent to a Daily, NDFB 'chairman' D.R. Nabla alias Ranjan Daimari stated that the Government must formally reciprocate their gesture and officially call a ceasefire, so that all operations against the outfit are stopped. Sentinel Assam, November 7, 2004

PAKISTAN

Eight soldiers killed in South Waziristan: Eight soldiers were killed and six others wounded when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by militants near Kanigoram in South Waziristan on November 4. An Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) spokesman said the vehicle was part of a military convoy that was travelling from Kanigoram to Ludda when the incident occurred at around 10.30am (PST). Dawn, The News, November 5, 2004

NEPAL

Mugu district headquarters attacked by Maoists: Around 1,000 Maoist insurgents attacked Gamgadhi, the headquarters of Mugu district on October 31 and destroyed nearly one dozen government offices including police, forest, postal and revenue offices, and also private houses rented out to two Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) by setting fire to them. The power station and the telephone exchange were also destroyed in the Maoist attack. Later, security forces recovered a dead body of an insurgent and one of a former policeman, even as there were no clear reports of the total casualties. This was the first attack by the Maoists after the brief ceasefire (October 20-28) observed by both the Government and the Maoists during the Dashain festival. Nepal News, November 2, 2004.

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 17, November 8, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 17, November 8, 2004