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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 12, September 28, 2009

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT

 

PAKISTAN
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An Education in Failure
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

The madrassa (religious seminary) has long been a principal component of the supply chain of Islamist extremism in Pakistan. Most much-publicised but altogether half-hearted attempts at fixing this problem have inevitably failed, substantially for want of any real commitment to reform. The Pakistani madrassa, consequently, continues to provide foot-soldiers for the jihad in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India, as well as in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres of Islamist extremism and terrorism across the world.

Successive Governments, both at the federal and provincial levels, have announced reforms of the madrassa system, to and bring them at par with the mainstream education system. These have, however, inevitably run into a dead-end, as they come up against opposition from the various organisations controlling the seminaries, as also because of the lack of any serious intent within the administration.

The Wafaq-ul-Madaris, Pakistan’s main confederacy of seminaries, which runs over 8,200 institutions, has been at the forefront of opposition to madrassa reform, along with the Tanzeemaat Madaris Deeniya and Tanzim-ul-Madaris Ahle Sunnat. The ulema (religious leaders) claim that the reform process is intended to curb the ‘independence and sovereignty’ of madrassas and is, consequently, not acceptable. A majority of the seminaries source funds from local businessmen, domestic and foreign religious foundations, charities and the Pakistani Diaspora. With financial independence and enormous social and political power, seminaries in Pakistan are entirely unwilling to accept any oversight by the Government.

Most of the officially estimated 15,148 seminaries (unofficial estimates range between 20,000 and 25,000, with some approximations going up to as much as 40,000) in Pakistan, with an enrolment of about 1.5 million students, have squarely rejected tentative reform proposals – essentially requiring the registration of madrassas and the maintenance of accounts, including records of domestic and foreign donors, as well as the teaching of ‘secular’ subjects as part of the curriculum – initiated by the Government in 2003. They maintain that the proposed reforms are a conspiracy to secularise or de-Islamize the education system at the behest of the United States.

Among the objectives of proposed reforms is to register, regularise and supervise the operation of madrassas within the ‘mainstream’ education system, and to introduce a more secular and modern curriculum. In the national capital Islamabad itself, however, at least 18 seminaries have, according to reports on September 10, 2009, outright refused to register themselves with the Government, claiming that they will cooperate only if they are contacted through the madrassa body, the Tanzim-ul-Madaris. Official sources told Dawn that 122 madaris or religious schools have, however, been registered with the capital's District Administration. The Deputy Commissioner of Islamabad, Amir Ali Khan, stated that he had directed the Auqaf Department to invite representatives of the 18 openly non-compliant religious schools for a meeting to persuade them to register, since there is no existing law through which the Government can force religious schools to do so. In fact this has been the story with many an attempt at seminary reform over the years. Absent a system of penalties, there is not much that the state can do. For the record, Jang reported on June 18, 2009, that the Government had discovered that there were 260 seminaries in Islamabad, out of which at least a dozen were altogether illegal.

Saleem H. Ali of the University of Vermont, in an empirical study of madrassas in Pakistan (under a grant from the United States Institute of Peace), conducted a survey of every single madrassa in one district of rural Punjab, Ahmedpur, and found that only 39 out of 363 surveyed madrassas were registered with the Government. This study also found evidence of a link between a large number of seminaries and sectarian violence, particularly in rural Punjab. Analysis of Police arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias and Sunnis clearly shows that "sectarian activity in areas of greater madrassa density per population size was found to be higher, including incidents of violent unrest." Furthermore, the number of madrassas has increased over a ten year period by around 30 per cent, and in some areas they are competing with Government and secular private schools for enrolment.

In the Punjab province, there is currently an impasse between the Auqaf and Education departments and administrators of five seminary bodies on the issue of constituting religious boards on the pattern of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education. Office bearers of the five establishments, including Tanzim-ul-Madaris (Barelvi), Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Deobandi), Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Shia), Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Ahle Hadith) and Rabita-ul-Madaris (Jamaat-e-Islami), are insisting that they be given the status of a secondary board to conduct exams by themselves and issue certificates/degrees equivalent to Matriculation/SSC (Secondary School Certificate) without any Government interference. The Government had offered to allow the seminaries to continue issuing their own certificates of religious education like Dars-e-Nizami, Hafiz Quran and Nazra, The Nation reported. However, the Government has demanded that students of these seminaries also study subjects like Mathematics, English and Pakistan Studies, and appear in the respective proposed boards for SSC at par with the students passing examinations in Government and recognised private schools. The Government has "also offered teachers’ employment in accordance with Government standardised scale in the three subjects along with computer labs. It has also agreed that the appointment of teachers will be made in consultation with the proposed religious boards."

The consolidation of radical madaris, however, continues apace. A report in London’s The Telegraph stated that the proscribed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has acquired a 4.5-acre compound outside Bahawalpur city in Punjab province in addition to the madrassa named Usman-o-Ali inside the city. While the local authorities acknowledge that the group has "spread out of the city, they deny that the new acquisition is anything more than a cattle farm to supply milk to the Jaish seminarians." The city, with a population of 408,395 (1998 Census) and counting, already has an estimated 1,000 seminaries. Bahawalpur, where the JeM is headquartered, has for years been "a centre for ideological indoctrination and terrorist planning due to its isolation." Daily Times reported on September 14, 2009, that the group "openly runs an imposing madrassa, Usman-o-Ali, in the centre of the town, where it teaches its extremist interpretation of Islam to hundreds of children every year." Jaish's new compound, approximately five kilometres outside Bahawalpur at Chowk Azam, on the main road to Karachi, is much larger, The Telegraph has reported. It said there is evidence "it could contain underground bunkers or tunnels, adding that it has a fully-tiled swimming pool, stabling for over a dozen horses, an ornamental fountain and even swings and a slide for children – contradicting claims by the group and Pakistani officials that the facility is simply a small farm to keep cattle. On the inside walls, extremist inscriptions are painted, including a warning to "Hindus and Jews", with a picture of Delhi's historic Red Fort." Unsurprisingly, the local administration (Bahawalpur also has a huge cantonment) has chosen to overlook the issue. Mushtaq Sukhera, the Regional Police Officer for Bahawalpur, while confirming that both facilities belong to the JeM, claimed that "there's nothing over there except a few cows and horses... No militancy, no military training is being imparted to students (at Usman-o-Ali)," he said, adding, "There is no problem with militancy (in south Punjab), there's no problem with Talibanisation. It's just media hype." Some security personnel, however, were quoted by Daily Times as stating that the new facility is a "second centre of terrorism" designed to complement the existing Jaish madrassa in the middle of Bahawalpur.

Having failed over the decades to strengthen the mainstream education system, Governments are now declaring that the madrassa system is doing great ‘social service’ by providing free education to more than 1.5 million students in Pakistan, articulating the dangerous viewpoint that there is no alternative to the seminary system, both in terms of its large reach across the country and the state’s own failure to generate adequate financial and other resources for a secular and modern education system.

The failure at reforming the seminary system and the state’s inability to have a secular pedagogy also has to do with Pakistan’s power structure. It is the feudal-cleric bloc which wields enormous power and patronage across the country and this bloc has an entrenched vested interest in persevering with an education system which supports extremism and militant violence. In addition, the articulation of Pakistan’s identity in terms of an exclusivist and dogmatic religious state has, over the years, consolidated the system of madrassa education.

In July 2009, the Pakistan Government informed the United States that it would not close the madrassa system of education in the country, and it has become a habit for regimes in Pakistan to whine about the lack of money for social sector reforms. However, there is now increasing evidence that Pakistan clearly lacks intent to reform a system of education that essentially teaches a brand of Islam which produces suicide bombers and militant youth. The Federal Government has virtually shelved a US-aided, multi-million dollar plan to reform seminaries considered nurseries of terrorism, as it has failed to garner the support of clerics. The Government had initiated the project in 2002 in an attempt to introduce a secular curriculum in the seminaries. The project sought to introduce computer skills, science, social studies and English into the predominantly religious curriculum at thousands of madrassas across Pakistan. "We had a huge budget of Rs. 5,759 million (USD 71 million) to provide madrassa students with formal education but we could not utilise it," Education Ministry spokesman Atiqur Rehman disclosed. The Government has failed to meet the target of reforming around 8,000 seminaries within five years. "We reached 507 madrassas only, spending Rs. 333 million and the rest of the [money] – Rs. 5,426 million – has lapsed," Rehman said. "The Interior Ministry held talks with various madrassas... but many of them refused to accept the Government’s intervention," said Mufti Gulzar Ahmed Naeemi, a senior official of the Sunni clerics’ alliance, the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat.

There is a school of thought in Pakistan which fervently believes that, since Government schools have not had any comparable measure of success with nation-building, and since there is also a severe ‘resource crunch’, madrassas, which purportedly fill a social void by offering free education and sustenance for the vast majority of the poor in the countryside, need to be engaged and also encouraged. The state appears to have no immediate interest in diminishing recruitment into the seminaries and has, on the contrary, decided to engage with the madrassa system, without any process of internal reform, to take advantage of its vast physical and financial infrastructure. That these schools are also the base of an intense radicalisation of impressionable minds is knowingly ignored.

For long considered a nursery for the global jihad, the madrassa system in Pakistan is closely linked to the country’s foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and Afghanistan, which have dominated the country’s historiography since its creation. Attempts to control or neutralize the growing threat from this supply line of extremism would undermine an entire spectrum of Islamists in their present positions of power, their memberships of the national Parliament and State Assemblies, and their influence across the countryside.

The failure of madrassa reform has also a great deal to do with fear. The feudal-clerical elite (with considerable help from state agencies) have captured a great deal of grass-root support and, more ominously, linkages – indeed controlling interests – in many of the jihadi groups. There is a latent threat that too hard a push release even greater terrorist violence than is already manifested across Pakistan.

The central problem of curricular reform has been ignored for decades in Pakistan. Instead of pluralistic interpretations of Islam, an exclusionary doctrine is taught in most of the seminaries. These doctrines, Mustafa Qadri opines, have developed to the extent that "today the more fundamentalist, puritanical views of Salafist Islam, while not inherently synonymous with extremism, are the most organised, vocal and hence powerful religious voices in Pakistani politics and society. They have historically been the greatest apologists for Taliban violence, especially during their rule in Afghanistan before September 2001."

Seven years after its inception, the Madrassa Reform Project has been an unambiguous failure. While there is certainly resistance and even confrontation at the ground level, ambivalence and a reluctance to implement the reforms dominate the state’s agencies and initiatives. The collapse of the seminary reform project is a clear indication that the power of the extremist infrastructure across the country has not diminished in the post 9/11 era, and that the state lacks both the will and the capacity to dismantle this radical network.

INDIA
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Assam: A Rebellion in Deep-freeze
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Director, Centre for Development and Peace Studies, Guwahati

Their terror-run, which began in March 2009 in a tiny but rugged 4,890 square kilometre District in India’s northeastern state of Assam, did shake the nation, as 63 persons were killed by the group by July this year. The Jewel Garlossa faction of the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD-J) abruptly menaced the region as one of its most lethal insurgent outfits – the butcher among the 30 or more active militant groups that keep the Northeast on the boil.

But the DHD-J’s three-month rampage received a sudden jolt, when the Assam Police, as part of a trans-national offensive codenamed ‘Operation Treasure Hunt’, managed to capture its chief, Garlossa, in the south Indian city of Bangalore. Garlossa’s arrest on June 4, 2009, along with two of his associates, had an instant impact on the group, though no one had anticipated that it would collapse so quickly, like a pack of cards, leading to the en masse surrender of its cadres within three months of Garlossa’s capture.

The DHD-J sought to, and had succeeded in, paralyzing normal life in the North Cachar Hills District — train services were brought to a halt and a key highway project was delayed beyond acceptable limits due to sustained violence. Worse, the situation degenerated into an ethnic feud between the District’s majority Dimasa community (from which DHD cadres are mostly drawn) and the minority Zeme Nagas. Garlossa’s arrest changed things dramatically. On June 7, 2009, within 72-hours of his capture, the DHD-J offered a unilateral ceasefire and expressed its desire to hold peace talks. The authorities, for a change, were in no hurry. On July 22, 2009, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram told the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) that the DHD-J could lay down arms. A week later, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi said the group was keen on peace talks.

For once, the central Government took a tough position. Home Minister P. Chidambaram rushed Union Home Secretary G. K. Pillai to personally review the situation, and later held a meeting exclusively to discuss the violence in the North Cachar Hills. At this September 1, 2009, meeting, Chidambaram sent out a no-nonsense signal — he asked the DHD-J to surrender by September 15, 2009, adding that the Government would consider talking peace with the group only if its cadres laid down arms before that deadline, and agreed to stay in designated camps, end extortion altogether, and ensure the presence of all its top leaders at the talks, as and when they commenced.

The tough-talking worked. The DHD-J surprised many by actually adhering to the Government’s diktat. What began as a trickle on September 10, 2009, (when 12 DHD-J rebels laid down arms with 11 weapons), quickly turned into a flood. Between September 13 and 14, 2009, as many as 372 rebels laid down their arms, depositing 136 weapons, including AK-47 and M-16 rifles, as well as other weaponry, including rocket launchers and grenades. The authorities have housed these cadres in two temporary camps at Kapuchera and Jatinga in the District.

It remains to be seen whether the DHD-J is actually putting its rebellion in deep-freeze, or is engaged in a tactical adaptation to the shock of losing its top leadership. After Garlossa’s arrest, the DHD-J had become rudderless, since he had, perhaps deliberately, not groomed anyone to lead the outfit in the event of his exit from the scene.

The big question is, now what? Already, there are reports that the DHD-J has, in fact, held back a huge cache of weapons in case its cadres have to return to the jungles in the event of the failure of the peace process, though going by record of groups that have entered into a truce in the past, with their cadres lodged in Government-run designated camps, it is never easy to order cadres back to the fight. Not one of the dozen odd militants groups in the region who are in a ceasefire with the Government has called off the truce, so far.

That is insufficient cause for complacence, though. Already, there is talk of a new outfit, the Halam National Liberation Front (HNLF), taking shape in the North Cachar Hills. The Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagland (NSCN-IM) is said to be propping up the HNLF to neutralize the impact of the surrender of the DHD-J. Earlier, the parent DHD faction headed by Dilip Nunisa, had entered into a deal with the Government in 2003. Both the earlier DHD factions were opposed to the NSCN-IM’s expansionist ideas, seeking to create a ‘Greater Nagalim’ by incorporating Naga inhabited territories in States abutting Nagaland, including areas in the NC Hills. The HNLF’s agenda remains unclear at present, but may give cause for concern in the coming days.

The Government now faces two principal challenges — one, to make sure no new rebel group manages to consolidate itself in the District; and two, to push the peace process forward. Significantly obstacles exist to both objectives. Tribal rivalries in the District, which mesh into the wider conflicts of the region, cannot be wished away, any more than its backwardness, isolation and poverty can. The region is densely forested and poorly connected, creating ideal guerilla county. New adventurers will certainly attempt to fill the gaps left behind by the surrendered DHD factions. As for the peace process, while both DHD factions (DHD-J and the one headed by Dilip Nunisa, DHD-N) have raised more or less the same demands – maximum autonomy for the NC Hills – their leaderships will now be fighting to occupy the same political space. In this small District, that can only result in a competitive escalation of demands, purportedly in the interest of the land and its people. There is a slippery slope here, and a risk that the Government will be sucked into the vortex of internecine conflicts in the dual negotiations that must, at some stage, ensue.

The Government’s standard procedure in the various ceasefires and peace processes in the region has tended to rely on delay and protraction to wear out down any radical demands. Indeed, in many cases in the region, the Government has preferred to virtually forget about rebel groups after sealing ceasefire deals with them. The truce, then, produces new problems of restive cadres in camps gradually returning to some illegal activities, particularly extortion, protected by a curious state of suspension of normal laws – since they have an ‘understanding’ with the Government. At the same time, with the ‘political issues’ remaining unsettled for extended periods, new insurrections would arise in the jungles of southern Assam, bringing the situation back to square on. A ceasefire and a peace process can only be meaningful within the context of a broader solution – but there is little evidence that the Government has any coherent idea of what this is to be.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
September 21- 27, 2009

 

Civilian

Security Force Personnel

Terrorist/Insurgent

Total

BANGLADESH

 

Left-wing Extremism

0
0
3
3

INDIA

 

Assam

1
0
3
4

Jammu and Kashmir

1
4
9
14

Manipur

2
0
5
7

Nagaland

0
0
1
1

Left-wing Extremism

 

Chhattisgarh

1
0
12
13

Jharkhand

1
1
3
5

West Bengal

2
0
0
2

Total (INDIA)

8
5
33
46

PAKISTAN

 

FATA

1
0
54
55

NWFP

41
6
23
70

Sindh

0
0
1
1

Total (PAKISTAN)

42
6
78
126

SRI LANKA

0
0
1
1
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

Army won’t be used against Maoists, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: The Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram said on September 25 that the Army would not be involved in the offensive against Naxals (left wing extremists). "There is no proposal to involve the Army in the anti-Naxal operations," said Chidambaram, who was in Ranchi, Jharkhand, to review the security situation in Jharkhand. He said it was a matter of concern that Jharkhand had become the "epicentre of left-wing extremism" along with Chhattisgarh. "Left-wing extremism is the gravest challenge to our way of life, our republic and our democracy," he said. "Our policy on left-wing extremism is very clear. There is no place for violence or so-called armed struggle for liberation in a republican, democratic form of government. They believe in armed liberation struggle. We reject that argument. So long as any one indulges in violence, the State has to oppose and fight the group." He said the Centre had made it clear at the recent Chief Ministers’ Conference in New Delhi that the so-called armed liberation struggle was unacceptable, and the Police would act against it.

The Home Minister also said that Naxalites penetration into civil society is a serious impediment to anti-Naxal operations. "But his would not stop the Government from taking action against the Maoists,'' he added. In reply to queries by media persons, Chidambaram said action would be taken against any politician found sheltering or patronising Naxalites. Naming Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh as the epicentres of Maoist activities, he said the menace, however, was restricted to six or seven Districts in Orissa. He added that the Centre would provide full support, including adequate companies of para-military forces, to these States to fight the Naxalites. Chidambaram also said, "It is a long drawn fight against Naxals (Maoists). The centre is totally supporting Chhattisgarh in its efforts to counter left-wing extremism." The Hindu; Times of India, September 26, 2009.

Naga groups make a joint declaration for reconciliation in Thailand: The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and Naga National Council made a "declaration of commitment" to relentlessly pursue Naga reconciliation at Chiang Mai in Thailand on September 25. "We affirm our total commitment to work together in the spirit of love, non-violence, peace and respect to resolve outstanding issues among us. Therefore, we pledge to cease all forms of offensive activities in toto," the declaration stated. Telegraph India, September 26, 2009.


NEPAL

Maoists to table 'no confidence' motion if compromise does not emerge by October 7: The chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (Unified CPN-Maoist) Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, on September 23, said that his party would table a 'no confidence' motion in the Parliament against the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)-led Government, if there was no agreement to 'rectify' the President's move of reinstating the then Army Chief sacked by the then Maoist-led Government. Speaking to reporters at Tansen in Palpa District, Dahal said the Unified CPN-Maoist would try to reach an understanding with the CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress till October 7, but it would go for a no confidence motion if the talks failed.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal rejected the Unified CPN-Maoist proposal for parliamentary debate on the President’s move to reinstate the Army Chief sacked by the then Maoist-led Government. Addressing a function organised by the US chapter of the National Federation of Indigenous Nationalities in New York, Nepal said the Constitution has restricted such debates. Nepal News, September 24-26, 2009.


PAKISTAN

54 militants among 55 persons killed during the week in FATA: Troops killed 10 Taliban militants and inured several others in the Nawaz Kot locality of Razmak in the North Waziristan Agency on September 25. Official sources said that the Taliban militants fired 12 missiles on the Razmak Army Camp, but no casualties to the Security Forces (SFs) were reported.

A suspected US drone strike on premises allegedly operated by an Afghan militant killed 10 suspected Taliban militants in North Waziristan, officials said on September 24. Two Taliban militants were wounded in the attack. According to reports, all of the dead belonged to the former anti-Soviet resistance commander Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Haqqani network is a powerful group based in northwest Pakistan closely linked to al-Qaeda.

A person, Saddam Hussain, was killed when an artillery shell fired by Security Forces hit his house in Musakhel area in Khwezai Baizai subdivision of Mohmand Agency on September 23.

At least 26 suspected militants were killed and several others injured, when helicopter gunships pounded militant hideouts in the Spina Tigha and Makeen areas of South Waziristan, Dawn reported on September 22. In addition, the Tehrik-i-Taliban spokesperson Azam Tariq claimed that the Taliban killed at least 45 SF personnel in the attack.

Eight suspected militants were killed in clashes with the SFs in the Razmak area of North Waziristan. Sources said a security check post in Upper and Lower Kofar in North Waziristan came under attack by some 600 militants. In the ensuing clashes, eight suspected militants were shot dead. Dawn; Daily Times; Times of India, September 22-28, 2009.

41 civilians and 23 militants among 70 persons killed during the week in NWFP: Two suicide bombers separately rammed their explosives-laden vehicles into a Police Station in Bannu and a military-owned commercial bank in Peshawar cantonment area of the NWFP on September 26, killing at least 27 people and injuring around another 200, officials said. At least 10 people were killed in the attack in Peshawar, while seven, including two Policemen, were killed in the assault on the Bannu Police Station. But a Police official in Bannu said 13 people had been killed. Authorities said the death toll could rise as many among the injured were in critical condition. Around 94 people were injured in Peshawar and 64, including 31 Policemen, in Bannu. Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the Bannu attack and threatened to unleash bigger attacks on the Government to avenge the killing of their leader Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone attack in August.

Troops arrested 13 Taliban militants and 57 others surrendered before them in Swat on September 25. The Security Forces (SFs) conducted a search-and-clearance operation in Rema near Bar Shaur and arrested nine Taliban militants, while another four were arrested from Imam Dheri.

Suspected Taliban militants killed seven members of a pro-Government tribal lashkar (militia) at Janikhel area in the Bannu District on September 24. The victims of the Taliban ambush included tribal chief Malik Sultan, who was raising a militia against the Taliban in the region. In retaliation, members of the laskhar killed nine Taliban militants. Two Khasadar (a local Security Force) personnel were also killed in the skirmishes. Separately, Taliban militants killed seven tribal heads, according to sources. Their bodies were found from various parts of Bannu.

Further, troops killed eight Taliban militants while two volunteers of a local lashkar were killed during operations in the Swat and Malakand areas, sources said on September 24. Eight militants were killed by the SFs in the Palai area near Dargai. Two SF personnel were also injured in the firing. The Taliban attacked the SF personnel in Sar Colony and killed two lashkar members.

At least five militants were killed and four SF personnel wounded during a clash at Malakand Division on September 23. In addition, militants killed two members of an anti-Taliban citizen's group tasked with protecting their community at Swat on September 23, a local official said. Mayor Mohammad Ibrar Khan said the assailants struck as members of the ‘peace committee’ slept in Swat's Sertelegram area. Security Forces engaged the militants in a gun battle and Khan said several attackers were killed, though no bodies were found.

Police officers foiled a plan to assassinate the NWFP Education Minister Sardar Hussain Babak in Tatalai District on September 21, when they confronted four militants in a gun battle that ended with a teenage suicide bomber blowing himself up, Police said. An informant tipped off Police Officers that insurgents had gathered in a Government High School after midnight and were planning to kill the Minister and attack Government installations and the SFs, said Police Officer Noor Jamal Khan. Police confronted the militants and a fire fight ensued. A loud explosion rocked the building and three of the militants managed to escape, including one who was wounded, Khan said. Dawn; Daily Times; The News, September 22-28, 2009.

Pakistani and Iranian spy agencies are supporting Taliban, says US and NATO Commander Mc Chrystal: Factions of the Pakistani and Iranian "spy services" are supporting Taliban that carry out attacks on coalition troops, Washington Post quoted top US and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley Mc Chrystal as saying on September 23. In a detailed analysis of the military situation delivered to the White House, the US military commander said he had evidence that the Taliban in Afghanistan were being aided by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He said they were contributing to the external forces working to undermine US interests and destabilise the Government in Kabul. "Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan," Mc Chrystal wrote, adding that senior leaders of the major Taliban groups were "reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan’s ISI." "There is a mixture of motives and concerns within the ISI that have accounted for the dalliances that have gone on for years" with insurgent groups, Paul Pillar, a former senior CIA counter-terrorism official was quoted as saying. Mc Chrystal’s report also said that Tehran was playing "an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance to the Government even as it flirts with insurgent groups that target US troops". "The Iranian Quds Force is reportedly training fighters for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of military assistance to insurgents," Mc Chrystal added. Daily Times, September 24, 2009.

Taliban movement stronger than ever, says militant ‘commander’ Qari Hussain Mehsud: The Taliban movement is stronger than ever, despite the killing of its top commander and will stage more suicide attacks if the Army launches another offensive against it, a top Taliban ‘commander’ Qari Hussain Mehsud said on September 25. Qari Mehsud, known for training Taliban suicide bombers, met with an Associated Press reporter at a secret location in North Waziristan. "Our movement has gained more strength after the martyrdom of Baitullah Mehsud," he said, adding, "We are united." Mehsud said he had been appointed the latest spokesman for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) new chief, Hakimullah Mehsud. He acknowledged leading a group of suicide bombers who, he said, would act if Pakistan proceeds with offensives in the Tribal Areas. Daily Times, September 26, 2009.


SRI LANKA

LTTE communication system is still working, says Minister of Export Development and International Trade G.L. Peiris: The Minister of Export Development and International Trade G.L. Peiris at a press briefing held in Colombo on September 23 said that although the Sri Lankan Government is able to control all international activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the LTTE communication system is still functioning and continuing acts against the country. The Minister said that the general public is always ready to support the Government in its war against terror but some political parties try to let down war heroes who crushed the LTTE terrorism in the country. "Pro-LTTE people still try to summon leaders of the humanitarian mission against the LTTE to the International Criminal Court," Peiris noted. Recently a proposal to bring war crime inquiries against Sri Lanka has been submitted to the United States Congress, the Minister disclosed. Peiris added that the Government plans to hold a national level election after the upcoming Southern Provincial Council election. Colombo Page, September 24, 2009.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


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