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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 12, September 28, 2009
Data and assessments
from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence
Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal |
An
Education in Failure
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management;
Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict
& Resolution
The
madrassa (religious seminary) has long
been a principal component of the supply chain
of Islamist extremism in Pakistan. Most much-publicised
but altogether half-hearted attempts at fixing
this problem have inevitably failed, substantially
for want of any real commitment to reform. The
Pakistani madrassa, consequently, continues
to provide foot-soldiers for the jihad in
Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India, as
well as in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres
of Islamist extremism and terrorism across the
world.
Successive
Governments, both at the federal and provincial
levels, have announced reforms of the madrassa
system, to and bring them at par with the mainstream
education system. These have, however, inevitably
run into a dead-end, as they come up against opposition
from the various organisations controlling the
seminaries, as also because of the lack of any
serious intent within the administration.
The
Wafaq-ul-Madaris, Pakistan’s main confederacy
of seminaries, which runs over 8,200 institutions,
has been at the forefront of opposition to madrassa
reform, along with the Tanzeemaat Madaris
Deeniya and Tanzim-ul-Madaris Ahle Sunnat. The
ulema (religious leaders) claim that the
reform process is intended to curb the ‘independence
and sovereignty’ of madrassas and is, consequently,
not acceptable. A majority of the seminaries source
funds from local businessmen, domestic and foreign
religious foundations, charities and the Pakistani
Diaspora. With financial independence and enormous
social and political power, seminaries in Pakistan
are entirely unwilling to accept any oversight
by the Government.
Most
of the officially estimated 15,148 seminaries
(unofficial estimates range between 20,000 and
25,000, with some approximations going up to as
much as 40,000) in Pakistan, with an enrolment
of about 1.5 million students, have squarely rejected
tentative reform proposals – essentially requiring
the registration of madrassas and the maintenance
of accounts, including records of domestic and
foreign donors, as well as the teaching of ‘secular’
subjects as part of the curriculum – initiated
by the Government in 2003. They maintain that
the proposed reforms are a conspiracy to secularise
or de-Islamize the education system at the behest
of the United States.
Among
the objectives of proposed reforms is to register,
regularise and supervise the operation of madrassas
within the ‘mainstream’ education system,
and to introduce a more secular and modern curriculum.
In the national capital Islamabad itself, however,
at least 18 seminaries have, according to reports
on September 10, 2009, outright refused to register
themselves with the Government, claiming that
they will cooperate only if they are contacted
through the madrassa body, the Tanzim-ul-Madaris.
Official sources told Dawn that 122 madaris
or religious schools have, however, been registered
with the capital's District Administration. The
Deputy Commissioner of Islamabad, Amir Ali Khan,
stated that he had directed the Auqaf Department
to invite representatives of the 18 openly non-compliant
religious schools for a meeting to persuade them
to register, since there is no existing law through
which the Government can force religious schools
to do so. In fact this has been the story with
many an attempt at seminary reform over the years.
Absent a system of penalties, there is not much
that the state can do. For the record, Jang
reported on June 18, 2009, that the Government
had discovered that there were 260 seminaries
in Islamabad, out of which at least a dozen were
altogether illegal.
Saleem
H. Ali of the University of Vermont, in an empirical
study of madrassas in Pakistan (under a
grant from the United States Institute of Peace),
conducted a survey of every single madrassa
in one district of rural Punjab, Ahmedpur,
and found that only 39 out of 363 surveyed madrassas
were registered with the Government. This
study also found evidence of a link between a
large number of seminaries and sectarian violence,
particularly in rural Punjab. Analysis of Police
arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias
and Sunnis clearly shows that "sectarian
activity in areas of greater madrassa density
per population size was found to be higher, including
incidents of violent unrest." Furthermore,
the number of madrassas has increased over
a ten year period by around 30 per cent, and in
some areas they are competing with Government
and secular private schools for enrolment.
In
the Punjab province, there is currently an impasse
between the Auqaf and Education departments and
administrators of five seminary bodies on the
issue of constituting religious boards on the
pattern of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary
Education. Office bearers of the five establishments,
including Tanzim-ul-Madaris (Barelvi), Wafaq-ul-Madaris
(Deobandi), Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Shia), Wafaq-ul-Madaris
(Ahle Hadith) and Rabita-ul-Madaris (Jamaat-e-Islami),
are insisting that they be given the status of
a secondary board to conduct exams by themselves
and issue certificates/degrees equivalent to Matriculation/SSC
(Secondary School Certificate) without any Government
interference. The Government had offered to allow
the seminaries to continue issuing their own certificates
of religious education like Dars-e-Nizami,
Hafiz Quran and Nazra, The Nation
reported. However, the Government has demanded
that students of these seminaries also study subjects
like Mathematics, English and Pakistan Studies,
and appear in the respective proposed boards for
SSC at par with the students passing examinations
in Government and recognised private schools.
The Government has "also offered teachers’
employment in accordance with Government standardised
scale in the three subjects along with computer
labs. It has also agreed that the appointment
of teachers will be made in consultation with
the proposed religious boards."
The
consolidation of radical madaris, however,
continues apace. A report in London’s The Telegraph
stated that the proscribed Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
has acquired a 4.5-acre compound outside Bahawalpur
city in Punjab province in addition to the madrassa
named Usman-o-Ali inside the city. While the
local authorities acknowledge that the group has
"spread out of the city, they deny that the
new acquisition is anything more than a cattle
farm to supply milk to the Jaish seminarians."
The city, with a population of 408,395 (1998 Census)
and counting, already has an estimated 1,000 seminaries.
Bahawalpur, where the JeM is headquartered, has
for years been "a centre for ideological
indoctrination and terrorist planning due to its
isolation." Daily Times reported on
September 14, 2009, that the group "openly
runs an imposing madrassa, Usman-o-Ali,
in the centre of the town, where it teaches its
extremist interpretation of Islam to hundreds
of children every year." Jaish's new compound,
approximately five kilometres outside Bahawalpur
at Chowk Azam, on the main road to Karachi, is
much larger, The Telegraph has reported.
It said there is evidence "it could contain
underground bunkers or tunnels, adding that it
has a fully-tiled swimming pool, stabling for
over a dozen horses, an ornamental fountain and
even swings and a slide for children – contradicting
claims by the group and Pakistani officials that
the facility is simply a small farm to keep cattle.
On the inside walls, extremist inscriptions are
painted, including a warning to "Hindus and
Jews", with a picture of Delhi's historic
Red Fort." Unsurprisingly, the local administration
(Bahawalpur also has a huge cantonment) has chosen
to overlook the issue. Mushtaq Sukhera, the Regional
Police Officer for Bahawalpur, while confirming
that both facilities belong to the JeM, claimed
that "there's nothing over there except a
few cows and horses... No militancy, no military
training is being imparted to students (at Usman-o-Ali),"
he said, adding, "There is no problem with
militancy (in south Punjab), there's no problem
with Talibanisation. It's just media hype."
Some security personnel, however, were quoted
by Daily Times as stating that the new
facility is a "second centre of terrorism"
designed to complement the existing Jaish madrassa
in the middle of Bahawalpur.
Having
failed over the decades to strengthen the mainstream
education system, Governments are now declaring
that the madrassa system is doing great
‘social service’ by providing free education to
more than 1.5 million students in Pakistan, articulating
the dangerous viewpoint that there is no alternative
to the seminary system, both in terms of its large
reach across the country and the state’s own failure
to generate adequate financial and other resources
for a secular and modern education system.
The
failure at reforming the seminary system and the
state’s inability to have a secular pedagogy also
has to do with Pakistan’s power structure. It
is the feudal-cleric bloc which wields enormous
power and patronage across the country and this
bloc has an entrenched vested interest in persevering
with an education system which supports extremism
and militant violence. In addition, the articulation
of Pakistan’s identity in terms of an exclusivist
and dogmatic religious state has, over the years,
consolidated the system of madrassa education.
In
July 2009, the Pakistan Government informed the
United States that it would not close the madrassa
system of education in the country, and it
has become a habit for regimes in Pakistan to
whine about the lack of money for social sector
reforms. However, there is now increasing evidence
that Pakistan clearly lacks intent to reform a
system of education that essentially teaches a
brand of Islam which produces suicide bombers
and militant youth. The Federal Government has
virtually shelved a US-aided, multi-million dollar
plan to reform seminaries considered nurseries
of terrorism, as it has failed to garner the support
of clerics. The Government had initiated the project
in 2002 in an attempt to introduce a secular curriculum
in the seminaries. The project sought to introduce
computer skills, science, social studies and English
into the predominantly religious curriculum at
thousands of madrassas across Pakistan. "We had
a huge budget of Rs. 5,759 million (USD 71 million)
to provide madrassa students with formal
education but we could not utilise it," Education
Ministry spokesman Atiqur Rehman disclosed. The
Government has failed to meet the target of reforming
around 8,000 seminaries within five years. "We
reached 507 madrassas only, spending Rs. 333 million
and the rest of the [money] – Rs. 5,426 million
– has lapsed," Rehman said. "The Interior Ministry
held talks with various madrassas... but
many of them refused to accept the Government’s
intervention," said Mufti Gulzar Ahmed Naeemi,
a senior official of the Sunni clerics’ alliance,
the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat.
There
is a school of thought in Pakistan which fervently
believes that, since Government schools have not
had any comparable measure of success with nation-building,
and since there is also a severe ‘resource crunch’,
madrassas, which purportedly fill
a social void by offering free education and sustenance
for the vast majority of the poor in the countryside,
need to be engaged and also encouraged. The state
appears to have no immediate interest in diminishing
recruitment into the seminaries and has, on the
contrary, decided to engage with the madrassa
system, without any process of internal reform,
to take advantage of its vast physical and financial
infrastructure. That these schools are also the
base of an intense radicalisation of impressionable
minds is knowingly ignored.
For
long considered a nursery for the global jihad,
the madrassa system in Pakistan is closely
linked to the country’s foreign policy objectives
in Kashmir and Afghanistan, which have dominated
the country’s historiography since its creation.
Attempts to control or neutralize the growing
threat from this supply line of extremism would
undermine an entire spectrum of Islamists in their
present positions of power, their memberships
of the national Parliament and State Assemblies,
and their influence across the countryside.
The
failure of madrassa reform has also a great
deal to do with fear. The feudal-clerical elite
(with considerable help from state agencies) have
captured a great deal of grass-root support and,
more ominously, linkages – indeed controlling
interests – in many of the jihadi groups.
There is a latent threat that too hard a push
release even greater terrorist violence than is
already manifested across Pakistan.
The
central problem of curricular reform has been
ignored for decades in Pakistan. Instead of pluralistic
interpretations of Islam, an exclusionary doctrine
is taught in most of the seminaries. These doctrines,
Mustafa Qadri opines, have developed to the extent
that "today the more fundamentalist, puritanical
views of Salafist Islam, while not inherently
synonymous with extremism, are the most organised,
vocal and hence powerful religious voices in Pakistani
politics and society. They have historically been
the greatest apologists for Taliban violence,
especially during their rule in Afghanistan before
September 2001."
Seven
years after its inception, the Madrassa Reform
Project has been an unambiguous failure. While
there is certainly resistance and even confrontation
at the ground level, ambivalence and a reluctance
to implement the reforms dominate the state’s
agencies and initiatives. The collapse of the
seminary reform project is a clear indication
that the power of the extremist infrastructure
across the country has not diminished in the post
9/11 era, and that the state lacks both the will
and the capacity to dismantle this radical network.
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Assam:
A Rebellion in Deep-freeze
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management,
New Delhi; Director, Centre for Development and
Peace Studies, Guwahati
Their
terror-run, which began in March 2009 in a tiny
but rugged 4,890 square kilometre District in India’s
northeastern state of Assam, did shake the nation,
as 63 persons were killed by the group by July this
year. The Jewel Garlossa faction of the Dima Halam
Daogah (DHD-J)
abruptly menaced the region as one of its most lethal
insurgent outfits – the butcher among the 30 or
more active militant groups that keep the Northeast
on the boil.
But
the DHD-J’s three-month rampage received a sudden
jolt, when the Assam Police, as part of a trans-national
offensive codenamed ‘Operation Treasure Hunt’, managed
to capture its chief, Garlossa, in the south Indian
city of Bangalore. Garlossa’s arrest on June 4,
2009, along with two of his associates, had an instant
impact on the group, though no one had anticipated
that it would collapse so quickly, like a pack of
cards, leading to the en masse surrender
of its cadres within three months of Garlossa’s
capture.
The
DHD-J sought to, and had succeeded in, paralyzing
normal life in the North Cachar Hills District —
train services were brought to a halt and a key
highway project was delayed beyond acceptable limits
due to sustained violence. Worse, the situation
degenerated into an ethnic feud between the District’s
majority Dimasa community (from which DHD cadres
are mostly drawn) and the minority Zeme Nagas. Garlossa’s
arrest changed things dramatically. On June 7, 2009,
within 72-hours of his capture, the DHD-J offered
a unilateral ceasefire and expressed its desire
to hold peace talks. The authorities, for a change,
were in no hurry. On July 22, 2009, Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram told the Rajya Sabha (Upper House
of Parliament) that the DHD-J could lay down arms.
A week later, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi said
the group was keen on peace talks.
For
once, the central Government took a tough position.
Home Minister P. Chidambaram rushed Union Home Secretary
G. K. Pillai to personally review the situation,
and later held a meeting exclusively to discuss
the violence in the North Cachar Hills. At this
September 1, 2009, meeting, Chidambaram sent out
a no-nonsense signal — he asked the DHD-J to surrender
by September 15, 2009, adding that the Government
would consider talking peace with the group only
if its cadres laid down arms before that deadline,
and agreed to stay in designated camps, end extortion
altogether, and ensure the presence of all its top
leaders at the talks, as and when they commenced.
The
tough-talking worked. The DHD-J surprised many by
actually adhering to the Government’s diktat. What
began as a trickle on September 10, 2009, (when
12 DHD-J rebels laid down arms with 11 weapons),
quickly turned into a flood. Between September 13
and 14, 2009, as many as 372 rebels laid down their
arms, depositing 136 weapons, including AK-47 and
M-16 rifles, as well as other weaponry, including
rocket launchers and grenades. The authorities have
housed these cadres in two temporary camps at Kapuchera
and Jatinga in the District.
It
remains to be seen whether the DHD-J is actually
putting its rebellion in deep-freeze, or is engaged
in a tactical adaptation to the shock of losing
its top leadership. After Garlossa’s arrest, the
DHD-J had become rudderless, since he had, perhaps
deliberately, not groomed anyone to lead the outfit
in the event of his exit from the scene.
The
big question is, now what? Already, there are reports
that the DHD-J has, in fact, held back a huge cache
of weapons in case its cadres have to return to
the jungles in the event of the failure of the peace
process, though going by record of groups that have
entered into a truce in the past, with their cadres
lodged in Government-run designated camps, it is
never easy to order cadres back to the fight. Not
one of the dozen odd militants groups in the region
who are in a ceasefire with the Government has called
off the truce, so far.
That
is insufficient cause for complacence, though. Already,
there is talk of a new outfit, the Halam National
Liberation Front (HNLF), taking shape in the North
Cachar Hills. The Isak-Muivah faction of the National
Socialist Council of Nagland (NSCN-IM)
is said to be propping up the HNLF to neutralize
the impact of the surrender of the DHD-J. Earlier,
the parent DHD faction headed by Dilip Nunisa, had
entered into a deal with the Government in 2003.
Both the earlier DHD factions were opposed to the
NSCN-IM’s expansionist ideas, seeking to create
a ‘Greater Nagalim’ by incorporating Naga inhabited
territories in States abutting Nagaland, including
areas in the NC Hills. The HNLF’s agenda remains
unclear at present, but may give cause for concern
in the coming days.
The
Government now faces two principal challenges —
one, to make sure no new rebel group manages to
consolidate itself in the District; and two, to
push the peace process forward. Significantly obstacles
exist to both objectives. Tribal rivalries in the
District, which mesh into the wider conflicts of
the region, cannot be wished away, any more than
its backwardness, isolation and poverty can. The
region is densely forested and poorly connected,
creating ideal guerilla county. New adventurers
will certainly attempt to fill the gaps left behind
by the surrendered DHD factions. As for the peace
process, while both DHD factions (DHD-J and the
one headed by Dilip Nunisa, DHD-N) have raised more
or less the same demands – maximum autonomy for
the NC Hills – their leaderships will now be fighting
to occupy the same political space. In this small
District, that can only result in a competitive
escalation of demands, purportedly in the interest
of the land and its people. There is a slippery
slope here, and a risk that the Government will
be sucked into the vortex of internecine conflicts
in the dual negotiations that must, at some stage,
ensue.
The
Government’s standard procedure in the various ceasefires
and peace processes in the region has tended to
rely on delay and protraction to wear out down any
radical demands. Indeed, in many cases in the region,
the Government has preferred to virtually forget
about rebel groups after sealing ceasefire deals
with them. The truce, then, produces new problems
of restive cadres in camps gradually returning to
some illegal activities, particularly extortion,
protected by a curious state of suspension of normal
laws – since they have an ‘understanding’ with the
Government. At the same time, with the ‘political
issues’ remaining unsettled for extended periods,
new insurrections would arise in the jungles of
southern Assam, bringing the situation back to square
on. A ceasefire and a peace process can only be
meaningful within the context of a broader solution
– but there is little evidence that the Government
has any coherent idea of what this is to be.
|
Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
September 21- 27, 2009
|
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
Jammu and Kashmir
|
1
|
4
|
9
|
14
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
7
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
1
|
0
|
12
|
13
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
West Bengal
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
8
|
5
|
33
|
46
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
FATA
|
1
|
0
|
54
|
55
|
NWFP
|
41
|
6
|
23
|
70
|
Sindh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
42
|
6
|
78
|
126
|
SRI LANKA
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Army
won’t be used against Maoists, says Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram: The
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram said on September 25
that the Army would not be involved in the offensive against
Naxals (left wing extremists). "There is no proposal to
involve the Army in the anti-Naxal operations," said Chidambaram,
who was in Ranchi, Jharkhand, to review the security situation
in Jharkhand. He said it was a matter of concern that Jharkhand
had become the "epicentre of left-wing extremism" along
with Chhattisgarh. "Left-wing extremism is the gravest challenge
to our way of life, our republic and our democracy," he
said. "Our policy on left-wing extremism is very clear.
There is no place for violence or so-called armed struggle
for liberation in a republican, democratic form of government.
They believe in armed liberation struggle. We reject that
argument. So long as any one indulges in violence, the State
has to oppose and fight the group." He said the Centre had
made it clear at the recent Chief Ministers’ Conference
in New Delhi that the so-called armed liberation struggle
was unacceptable, and the Police would act against it.
The Home
Minister also said that Naxalites penetration into civil
society is a serious impediment to anti-Naxal operations.
"But his would not stop the Government from taking action
against the Maoists,'' he added. In reply to queries by
media persons, Chidambaram said action would be taken against
any politician found sheltering or patronising Naxalites.
Naming Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh as the epicentres of Maoist
activities, he said the menace, however, was restricted
to six or seven Districts in Orissa. He added that the Centre
would provide full support, including adequate companies
of para-military forces, to these States to fight the Naxalites.
Chidambaram also said, "It is a long drawn fight against
Naxals (Maoists). The centre is totally supporting Chhattisgarh
in its efforts to counter left-wing extremism."
The
Hindu; Times
of India,
September 26, 2009.
Naga
groups make a joint declaration for reconciliation in Thailand:
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K) and Naga National Council made a "declaration of
commitment" to relentlessly pursue Naga reconciliation at
Chiang Mai in Thailand on September 25. "We affirm our total
commitment to work together in the spirit of love, non-violence,
peace and respect to resolve outstanding issues among us.
Therefore, we pledge to cease all forms of offensive activities
in toto," the declaration stated. Telegraph
India, September 26, 2009.
NEPAL
Maoists
to table 'no confidence' motion if compromise does not
emerge by October 7:
The chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(Unified CPN-Maoist) Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias
Prachanda, on September 23, said that his party would
table a 'no confidence' motion in the Parliament against
the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist
(CPN-UML)-led Government, if there was no agreement
to 'rectify' the President's move of reinstating the
then Army Chief sacked by the then Maoist-led Government.
Speaking to reporters at Tansen in Palpa District, Dahal
said the Unified CPN-Maoist would try to reach an understanding
with the CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress till October
7, but it would go for a no confidence motion if the
talks failed.
Meanwhile,
the Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal rejected the Unified
CPN-Maoist proposal for parliamentary debate on the
President’s move to reinstate the Army Chief sacked
by the then Maoist-led Government. Addressing a function
organised by the US chapter of the National Federation
of Indigenous Nationalities in New York, Nepal said
the Constitution has restricted such debates.
Nepal
News,
September 24-26, 2009.
PAKISTAN
54 militants
among 55 persons killed during the week in FATA: Troops
killed 10 Taliban militants and inured several others in
the Nawaz Kot locality of Razmak in the North Waziristan
Agency on September 25. Official sources said that the Taliban
militants fired 12 missiles on the Razmak Army Camp, but
no casualties to the Security Forces (SFs) were reported.
A suspected
US drone strike on premises allegedly operated by an Afghan
militant killed 10 suspected Taliban militants in North
Waziristan, officials said on September 24. Two Taliban
militants were wounded in the attack. According to reports,
all of the dead belonged to the former anti-Soviet resistance
commander Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Haqqani network is a powerful
group based in northwest Pakistan closely linked to al-Qaeda.
A person,
Saddam Hussain, was killed when an artillery shell fired
by Security Forces hit his house in Musakhel area in Khwezai
Baizai subdivision of Mohmand Agency on September 23.
At least
26 suspected militants were killed and several others injured,
when helicopter gunships pounded militant hideouts in the
Spina Tigha and Makeen areas of South Waziristan, Dawn reported
on September 22. In addition, the Tehrik-i-Taliban spokesperson
Azam Tariq claimed that the Taliban killed at least 45 SF
personnel in the attack.
Eight suspected
militants were killed in clashes with the SFs in the Razmak
area of North Waziristan. Sources said a security check
post in Upper and Lower Kofar in North Waziristan came under
attack by some 600 militants. In the ensuing clashes, eight
suspected militants were shot dead. Dawn;
Daily
Times; Times
of India, September 22-28, 2009.
41 civilians
and 23 militants among 70 persons killed during the week
in NWFP: Two suicide
bombers separately rammed their explosives-laden vehicles
into a Police Station in Bannu and a military-owned commercial
bank in Peshawar cantonment area of the NWFP on September
26, killing at least 27 people and injuring around another
200, officials said. At least 10 people were killed in the
attack in Peshawar, while seven, including two Policemen,
were killed in the assault on the Bannu Police Station.
But a Police official in Bannu said 13 people had been killed.
Authorities said the death toll could rise as many among
the injured were in critical condition. Around 94 people
were injured in Peshawar and 64, including 31 Policemen,
in Bannu. Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
claimed responsibility for the Bannu attack and threatened
to unleash bigger attacks on the Government to avenge the
killing of their leader Baitullah Mehsud in a US drone attack
in August.
Troops arrested
13 Taliban militants and 57 others surrendered before them
in Swat on September 25. The Security Forces (SFs) conducted
a search-and-clearance operation in Rema near Bar Shaur
and arrested nine Taliban militants, while another four
were arrested from Imam Dheri.
Suspected
Taliban militants killed seven members of a pro-Government
tribal lashkar (militia) at Janikhel area in the
Bannu District on September 24. The victims of the Taliban
ambush included tribal chief Malik Sultan, who was raising
a militia against the Taliban in the region. In retaliation,
members of the laskhar killed nine Taliban militants.
Two Khasadar (a local Security Force) personnel were also
killed in the skirmishes. Separately, Taliban militants
killed seven tribal heads, according to sources. Their bodies
were found from various parts of Bannu.
Further,
troops killed eight Taliban militants while two volunteers
of a local lashkar were killed during operations
in the Swat and Malakand areas, sources said on September
24. Eight militants were killed by the SFs in the Palai
area near Dargai. Two SF personnel were also injured in
the firing. The Taliban attacked the SF personnel in Sar
Colony and killed two lashkar members.
At least
five militants were killed and four SF personnel wounded
during a clash at Malakand Division on September 23. In
addition, militants killed two members of an anti-Taliban
citizen's group tasked with protecting their community at
Swat on September 23, a local official said. Mayor Mohammad
Ibrar Khan said the assailants struck as members of the
‘peace committee’ slept in Swat's Sertelegram area. Security
Forces engaged the militants in a gun battle and Khan said
several attackers were killed, though no bodies were found.
Police officers
foiled a plan to assassinate the NWFP Education Minister
Sardar Hussain Babak in Tatalai District on September 21,
when they confronted four militants in a gun battle that
ended with a teenage suicide bomber blowing himself up,
Police said. An informant tipped off Police Officers that
insurgents had gathered in a Government High School after
midnight and were planning to kill the Minister and attack
Government installations and the SFs, said Police Officer
Noor Jamal Khan. Police confronted the militants and a fire
fight ensued. A loud explosion rocked the building and three
of the militants managed to escape, including one who was
wounded, Khan said. Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, September 22-28, 2009.
Pakistani
and Iranian spy agencies are supporting Taliban, says US
and NATO Commander Mc Chrystal: Factions of the Pakistani
and Iranian "spy services" are supporting Taliban
that carry out attacks on coalition troops, Washington
Post quoted top US and NATO Commander in Afghanistan,
General Stanley Mc Chrystal as saying on September 23. In
a detailed analysis of the military situation delivered
to the White House, the US military commander said he had
evidence that the Taliban in Afghanistan were being aided
by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the
Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He said they
were contributing to the external forces working to undermine
US interests and destabilise the Government in Kabul. "Afghanistan’s
insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan," Mc
Chrystal wrote, adding that senior leaders of the major
Taliban groups were "reportedly aided by some elements
of Pakistan’s ISI." "There is a mixture of motives
and concerns within the ISI that have accounted for the
dalliances that have gone on for years" with insurgent
groups, Paul Pillar, a former senior CIA counter-terrorism
official was quoted as saying. Mc Chrystal’s report also
said that Tehran was playing "an ambiguous role in
Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance to the Government
even as it flirts with insurgent groups that target US troops".
"The Iranian Quds Force is reportedly training fighters
for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of
military assistance to insurgents," Mc Chrystal added.
Daily
Times,
September 24, 2009.
Taliban
movement stronger than ever, says militant ‘commander’ Qari
Hussain Mehsud: The Taliban movement is stronger than
ever, despite the killing of its top commander and will
stage more suicide attacks if the Army launches another
offensive against it, a top Taliban ‘commander’ Qari Hussain
Mehsud said on September 25. Qari Mehsud, known for training
Taliban suicide bombers, met with an Associated Press reporter
at a secret location in North Waziristan. "Our movement
has gained more strength after the martyrdom of Baitullah
Mehsud," he said, adding, "We are united." Mehsud said he
had been appointed the latest spokesman for Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan’s (TTP) new chief, Hakimullah Mehsud. He acknowledged
leading a group of suicide bombers who, he said, would act
if Pakistan proceeds with offensives in the Tribal Areas.
Daily
Times,
September 26, 2009.
SRI LANKA
LTTE
communication system is still working, says Minister of
Export Development and International Trade G.L. Peiris:
The Minister of Export Development and International
Trade G.L. Peiris at a press briefing held in Colombo on
September 23 said that although the Sri Lankan Government
is able to control all international activities of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the LTTE communication system
is still functioning and continuing acts against the country.
The Minister said that the general public is always ready
to support the Government in its war against terror but
some political parties try to let down war heroes who crushed
the LTTE terrorism in the country. "Pro-LTTE people still
try to summon leaders of the humanitarian mission against
the LTTE to the International Criminal Court," Peiris noted.
Recently a proposal to bring war crime inquiries against
Sri Lanka has been submitted to the United States Congress,
the Minister disclosed. Peiris added that the Government
plans to hold a national level election after the upcoming
Southern Provincial Council election. Colombo
Page, September 24, 2009.
The
South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular
data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional
warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic,
political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. SAIR
is a project of the Institute
for Conflict Management and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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