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Islamist/Other Conflicts: Incidents and Statements involving
Lashkar-e- Toiba (LeT) : 2010
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Date
Incidents
October - 3 
The Centre on October 3, asked all the States to put targets which were recced by the American born Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley alias Dawood Gilani under extra security cover, and step up their overall vigilance in view of
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The Centre on October 3, asked all the States to put targets which were recced by the American born Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley alias Dawood Gilani under extra security cover, and step up their overall vigilance in view of general threats, reports Times of India. Besides alerting all the States, security has also been tightened in 36 markets across New Delhi by deploying additional 1,200 paramilitary personnel along with hundreds of other Police personnel. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs also asked the States to continue their alert during the coming major festivals like Navratra, Durga Puja and Diwali, which attract major gathering.
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October - 15 
The al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had planed to carry out deadly attacks through ‘multiple shoot-outs' targeting the Commonwealth Games (CWG) village, sports venues and a five-star hotel in New Delhi specifically on October 12 and 13, report
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The al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had planed to carry out deadly attacks through ‘multiple shoot-outs' targeting the Commonwealth Games (CWG) village, sports venues and a five-star hotel in New Delhi specifically on October 12 and 13, reports Times of India. Al Qaeda and LeT had chosen these two dates for their strikes using terrorists trained in the region along Afghan-Pakistan border. The plan was to sneak in a number of jihadis simultaneously through India-Nepal or India-Bangladesh borders or from across the India's western border. There was also intelligence input that some others would come from West Asia, using legal channels through proper visas. Government sources said that a Western intelligence agency had tipped off India on October 10 about these specific plans. The Government had immediately enhanced the security of the Games venues and village from three layers to four and brought in additional forces, including armed commandos, to foil any attempt of sabotage even from air. "The input was very specific about the venues and suggested that the terrorists would probably come from West Asia, Nepal or from across India's western border," a source said. Security was also increased in all eight leading five-star hotels in Delhi. There was also information that the terrorists may use paragliders to reach the venues prompting authorities to put in place anti-aircraft guns. "Credentials of all foreign nationals arriving in international airports were checked one-by-one. Twenty Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) were deployed besides keeping ready a special team of 40 army and NSG commandos -- equipped with special weapons capable to shoot down paragliders from a distance -- near the sporting venues, including Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium," said the source. "Though the general threat still exists, the Delhi Police and other security agencies through their meticulous planning and deployment averted any strike specifically during the CWG," the source said. Sources said that the fresh inputs had nothing to do with what the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuJI) ‘commander’ and al Qaeda member Ilyas Kashmiri had threatened a month before the Games. "The latest plan was the brainchild of some other elements/modules within al-Qaeda and LeT," said a source.
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October - 15 
The Rajasthan Police and Karnataka anti-terrorist squad (ATS) on October 15 arrested two alleged Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants from Kasargod (Kerala) and Ajmer (Rajasthan) for their role in the 2008 blasts in Bangalore in which one person was kille
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The Rajasthan Police and Karnataka anti-terrorist squad (ATS) on October 15 arrested two alleged Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants from Kasargod (Kerala) and Ajmer (Rajasthan) for their role in the 2008 blasts in Bangalore in which one person was killed and over a dozen people were injured, reported Times of India. The suspects were identified as Umar Farooq and Ibrahim Moulvi. "Umar was held in Ajmer and Ibrahim in Kasargod in Kerala," said Bangalore Police Commissioner Shankar Bidari. There were reports that an accomplice of Farooq was also caught in Ajmer, but it could not be confirmed. The Police have named 32 people in the chargesheet in the blasts case. Sources said Farooq was arrested from the railway station, where he had gone to receive a guest. Farooq and another suspect had been staying in Nala Bazaar area of Ajmer for two months and were under Karnataka ATS surveillance. Farooq is also accused of recruiting youth for militant activities in the Kashmir Valley. The case surfaced following the death of four Malayalee youth in an encounter with Security Forces in Kashmir. He is also said to be the key conspirator in the September 2005 case of burning of a bus belonging to the Tamil Nadu State Road Transport Corporation in Aluva near Kochi. This was to protest the TN Government's decision to oppose the bail plea of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) leader Abdul Nasser Madani, who was then in jail for the 1998 Coimbatore serial blasts. Farooq belongs to Prappanangadi in Malappuram District. Police sources said Ibrahim Moulvi was arrested from Badiyadukka in Kasargod District, where he worked as a cleric in a mosque using a fake identity. Moulvi had also played a significant part with LeT south India operative T. Nasir in recruiting Malayalee youth for terror training across the border. Farooq and Moulvi are suspected to be linked to 26/11 plotter Tahawwur Hussein Rana through Sabir, a LeT operative believed to be hiding in the Gulf.
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October - 15 
The wife of a key figure in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11) warned US federal agents three years beforehand that her husband was training with a Pakistani militant group, the Washington Post reported on October 15
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The wife of a key figure in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11) warned US federal agents three years beforehand that her husband was training with a Pakistani militant group, the Washington Post reported on October 15. Citing sources close to the case, the daily said the wife of David Coleman Headley warned Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in August 2005 that her husband had undergone intensive training with Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and was in contact with extremists. Headley's wife, who was not named in the report, called a terrorism hotline after getting into a fight with him in August 2008, the Post said. The FBI agents followed up, and interviewed her three times, the newspaper reported in a story co-authored with journalism foundation Pro Publica. She told agents that her husband "was an active militant in the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba, had trained extensively in its Pakistani camps, and had shopped for night vision goggles," the Post reported. Despite the warning, Headley was able to continue moving freely, travelling to Pakistan, India, Dubai and Europe in 2006, gathering information and material that made the attack possible. US anti-terrorism agencies did warn Indian counterparts about a possible LeT plot to target Mumbai in 2008, but it was unclear whether the warnings were based on Headley's wife's tip-off two years earlier. Headley was reportedly also bragging about being a US Government informant before the attacks, telling his wife and others that he is working for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and FBI. Headley did work as an informant for the DEA in the 1990s when he was known by his birth name Daood Gilani and had been arrested for smuggling heroin from Pakistan. After a second arrest and more work for the agency, he went to Pakistan, where he became radicalized, the Post reported. Then, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, he began telling people he was working for a joint DEA-FBI project. But FBI officials told the Post they did not believe Headley, who changed his name in 2006, had ever worked for the FBI. Headley, the son of a former Pakistani diplomat and a white American woman, is being held in the United States. He confessed to plotting the attacks and in exchange for pleading guilty, US prosecutors agreed he would not face extradition to India or the death penalty.
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October - 16 
Despite a probe by its defence authorities, Sri Lanka has found no evidence to suggest that its territory is being used by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) to train terrorists, Times of India (TOI) reports. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister G. L. Peiris, who is o
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Despite a probe by its defence authorities, Sri Lanka has found no evidence to suggest that its territory is being used by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) to train terrorists, Times of India (TOI) reports. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister G. L. Peiris, who is on a four-day visit to India, on October 16 said that there is no merit in such claims. "The matter was brought to our notice. It was examined by our defence authorities but we have not found anything to establish it," Peiris told TOI, adding, that the two countries were involved in an intelligence sharing mechanism to prevent any such activity. As reported earlier, one of the accused in the Pune (Maharashtra) bakery blast case had said LeT operatives were being trained in Sri Lanka. Though the training was said to have taken place in an area close to Colombo, Sri Lankan authorities denied this citing heavy presence of Security Force personnel in the area.
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October - 17 
Two of the three wives of Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley forewarned the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11), the US media reported, according to The Hindu. Headley's
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Two of the three wives of Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley forewarned the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11), the US media reported, according to The Hindu. Headley's American wife had given the FBI in New York a tip-off on his Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) links in 2005, while his Moroccan wife, Faiza Outalha, had told authorities in the US embassy in Islamabad, less than a year before the Mumbai attacks, that Headley was plotting a terror strike. Faiza Outalha, claims she even showed the US embassy officials in Islamabad a photo of Headley and herself in the Taj Mahal Hotel, where they stayed twice in April and May 2007. “Hotel records confirm their stay,” the New York Times (NYT) reported. Outalha said that in two meetings with officials at the US embassy in Islamabad, she told them that her husband had many friends who were known to be LeT members. “Despite those warnings by two of his three wives, Headley roamed far and wide on Lashkar'sbehalf between 2002 and 2009, receiving training in small-calibre weapons and counter surveillance, scouting targets for attacks, and building a network of connections that extended from Chicago to Pakistan's lawless north-western frontier,” NYT said. Meanwhile, Mike Hammer, spokesman of the National Security Council, White House, told PTI, “Had we known about the timing and other specifics related to the Mumbai attacks, we would have immediately shared those details with India.” He said the US “regularly provided threat information” to Indian officials in 2008 before the attacks in Mumbai, adding, “It is our Government's solemn responsibility to notify other nations of possible terrorist activity on their soil.” He made the remarks when asked about an investigative report on the Mumbai attacks published by Pro Publica, an independent, non-profit newsroom that produces investigative journalism in the public interest.
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October - 18 
Delhi could escape a major terror attack in 2009 when one of the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s (LeT) terrorists from Rawalpindi in Pakistan, who tried to come in through the legal channel, was denied an Indian visa, Times of India reported on October 19. The te
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Delhi could escape a major terror attack in 2009 when one of the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s (LeT) terrorists from Rawalpindi in Pakistan, who tried to come in through the legal channel, was denied an Indian visa, Times of India reported on October 19. The terrorist was supposed to be in Delhi to carry out an attack on the National Defence College (NDC) at Tees January Marg -- a target recommended by Pakistani-American LeT operative David Coleman Headley to his bosses on the basis that a strike on the institution would have killed more Indian Army officers than those who died in all Indo-Pak wars put together. The NIA interrogation report quoted Headley as saying about the LeT's Delhi mission, "Abdur Rehman (Lashkar operative) told me that a man from Rawalpindi was ready to carry out the attack (in Delhi) but he had trouble to get visa for India." Referring to Rehman, Headley explained that the Rawalpindi man's visa application was turned down because "he had a long beard". "Abdur Rehman told him to shave his beard and he had reapplied for visa," the report said quoting Headley. During his interrogation, Headley, also disclosed Rehman's network in Nepal, which was activated to help the Rawalpindi man once he would reach Delhi for his mission. It appears from the interrogation report that the LeT operatives were more interested in attacking the NDC than other targets in Delhi. "I gave him (Abdur Rehman) the reconnaissance videos and we discussed each and every target in detail. I told Rehman that we could kill more Indian military officers in an attack on NDC than had been killed in all the wars between India and Pakistan," Headley told his interrogators, adding Rehman seemed to be more interested in attacking NDC. That Delhi was perilously close to being attacked by the LeT, figures in the disclosures Headley made to the National Investigation Agency's (NIA) interrogators, who questioned him in Chicago in June 2010. In his statement to the NIA, Headley essentially repeated what he had earlier told the US's Federal Bureau of Investigation. As reported earlier, Headley had recceed several targets in Delhi -- the Sena Bhawan, Raksha Bhawan, Vice-President's residence, Israeli embassy and Chabad House in Paharganj area.
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October - 18 
The Maharashtra Government opened arguments in the Bombay High Court on October 18 on confirmation of death sentence to Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist involved in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks (also k
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The Maharashtra Government opened arguments in the Bombay High Court on October 18 on confirmation of death sentence to Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist involved in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11), reports PTI. The arguments began in court 49 before Justice Ranjana Desai and Justice R V More through video conference to enable Kasab hear the proceedings from the Central Jail where he is imprisoned in the high security bomb and bullet proof cell. On May 6, 2010, the trial court had awarded death sentence to Kasab. In accordance with law, death penalty was referred to the High Court for confirmation.
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October - 19 
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, played a major role in helping prepare the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11), one of the planners of the attacks has told Indian interrogators, a rep
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The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, played a major role in helping prepare the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks (also known as 26/11), one of the planners of the attacks has told Indian interrogators, a report said on October 19 (today), according to Times of India. Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley, who confessed to surveying targets for the attacks that left 166 people dead, made detailed claims about support from the ISI, said Britain's Guardian newspaper. Headley described dozens of meetings between officers of the ISI and senior militants from Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), said the paper, citing a 109-page Indian Government report into his interrogation. Guardian said Headley claimed the ISI was attempting to strengthen militant organisations with links to the Pakistani State which were being marginalised by more extreme groups. Headley claimed that at least two of his missions were partly paid for by the ISI and that he regularly reported to the spy agency, said the British daily. "The ISI... had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India," Headley is cited as telling the Indian investigators, who reportedly interviewed him over 34 hours in the US in June. The documents suggest, however, that the ISI's supervision of the militants was often chaotic and that most senior officers in the agency may have been unaware of the scale of the attacks before they were launched, added the paper. Headley, who changed his name from Daood Gilani, confessed to his role in plotting the attacks after being arrested in the US. In exchange for pleading guilty to the attacks, US prosecutors agreed he would not face extradition to India or the death penalty.
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October - 19 
Pakistan’s intelligence agency Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) played a major role in helping prepare the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India, David Headley, one of the planners and main accused told Indian interrogators on October 19, reports The News. D
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Pakistan’s intelligence agency Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) played a major role in helping prepare the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India, David Headley, one of the planners and main accused told Indian interrogators on October 19, reports The News. David Headley, who confessed to surveying targets for the attacks that left 166 people dead in November 2008, made detailed claims about support from the ISI. Headley described dozens of meetings between officers of the ISI and militants from Laskhar-e-Toiba (LeT), citing a 109-page Indian Government report into his interrogation.
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October - 21 
Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley, the mastermind in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11) videotaped the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and its large residential colony in Mumbai for the Pakistan’s externa
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Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley, the mastermind in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11) videotaped the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and its large residential colony in Mumbai for the Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), reports Times of India. This video, Headley revealed, was not given to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). During his interrogation by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in Chicago, Headley said, "(in March 2008) Major Iqbal (who he described as his "handler" in the ISI) asked me to explore BARC in Mumbai and specially its staff colony as a target. He gave me the mobile phone camera (and) some counterfeit money." After he returned, Headley gave the video to Iqbal but did not give it to his LeT colleague, Sajid Majid.
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October - 21 
The Rajasthan Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) on October 21 arrested three suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants, Babu alias Nishachandra Ali of Bikaner, Arun Jain of Nagaur and Hafiz Abdul Majid of Jhalawar, allegedly involved in luring youths in ter
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The Rajasthan Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) on October 21 arrested three suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants, Babu alias Nishachandra Ali of Bikaner, Arun Jain of Nagaur and Hafiz Abdul Majid of Jhalawar, allegedly involved in luring youths in terror activities and sending them to Pakistan for training, reported Times of India. They were under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967. Preliminary investigations have revealed that the LeT ‘commanders’ based in Pakistan were planning to carry out anti-India activities through the Indians trained as terrorists on Pakistani soil, according to an official release of Criminal Investigation Department. The anti-India activities included bomb explosions, circulation of counterfeit Indian currency, smuggling of arms and ammunition, fuelling communal riots and violence in the country and also working to ensure release of Pakistani terrorists from Indian prisons. During the course of investigations it has also come to light that the imprisoned Pakistani terrorists used to take other jailed Indian criminals into their confidence and involve them in terror activities. After their release, these criminals used to indulge in terrorist activities on the directives of the LeT ‘commanders’ of Pakistan, the release said. During the probe, it was also found that Pakistani spy Asgar Ali, who is being held in Jodhpur jail, used to lure Indian inmates to undergo training in Pakistani training camps and perpetrate terror in the country on the behest of Pakistan-based LeT ‘commander’ Wahid alias Vikki Bhai. Among those who were lured by Asgar were Nisha Chandra Ali and Arun Jain. Both Ali and Jain had direct interaction with Vikki and plans were afoot to hand over huge quantity of counterfeit Indian currency to both of them, the release said. Efforts were made to obtain Indian passports for Ali and Jain and send them to Pakistan. However, as a number of criminal cases were pending against both of them, the passports were not issued, the release said. Plans were also made to send both of them to Pakistan through Nepal but it could not materialise, the release added. However, the LeT ‘commanders’ were successful in inducting Hafiz Abdul, who used to teach in a madrassa (seminary).
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October - 25 
The Pakistani American Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley revealed to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in June 2010 about the existence of the `Nepal set-up' of Pakistani spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which ha
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The Pakistani American Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley revealed to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in June 2010 about the existence of the `Nepal set-up' of Pakistani spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which has its network in India, to aid ISI as and when needed, Times of India reported on October 26. The basic component of the set-up is to use the network of Nepalese Muslims through their friends and relatives in India. Headley told his interrogators that a retired Major of Pakistan Army named Abdur Rehman had a set-up in eastern part of Nepal which has sizable Muslim population. According to Headley there was close coordination between the ‘Karachi set-up' and 'Nepal set-up', both run by Rehman (at the behest of ISI)." Sketchy details of the ‘Nepal set-up' have been compiled by NIA in Headley’s 106-page interrogation report.
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October - 27 
The Government apprehends that Pakistan-based terror groups may try to replicate Chhittisinghpora-type attack on civilians and put the blame for such an incident on the Indian Army to attract global attention to Kashmir in run-up to US President Bara
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The Government apprehends that Pakistan-based terror groups may try to replicate Chhittisinghpora-type attack on civilians and put the blame for such an incident on the Indian Army to attract global attention to Kashmir in run-up to US President Barack Obama's visit to India (November 6-8). Union Home Secretary G K Pillai said on October 27: "We do believe that the visit of US President to India is, shall I say from the publicity point of view, large enough to try and create something even if it is not in any place nearby where President Obama would be. But it could be somewhere else and therefore we would take all precautions." "That's the type of fear that we have that innocent civilians will be killed and then the blame would be put, like the last time, on the Indian Army. All indications are that the propaganda machinery would be out to do the same. Therefore, we are being careful," Pillai told a TV news channel. Asked whether he sees it as an attempt to internationalise the Kashmir issue during Obama's visit, the Home Secretary said: "I don't think it is a question of internationalising as such because Americans have made their position very clear. But definitely they would like to try and at least the militants would like to see if they can have any spectacular incident which they could then get world-wide attention on." Pillai, however, made it clear that the Indian agencies do not have any specific intelligence about such an attack. He was replying to a question on whether he apprehended the kind of attack India witnessed during former US President Bill Clinton's visit in March 2000. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists in Indian Army fatigues, led by the outfit's ‘commander’ Muzammil, had killed 35 Sikhs in March 2000. The role of Muzammil in the Chhittisingpora incident was also revealed by Pakistani-American LeT David Coleman Headley to the NIA during his questioning in Chicago in June.
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October - 28 
The Hindu reports that Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai on October 28 said that counter-terrorism cooperation between India and the United States (US) was far more broad-based than it was earlier. "Intelligence sharing has definitely improved in rece
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The Hindu reports that Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai on October 28 said that counter-terrorism cooperation between India and the United States (US) was far more broad-based than it was earlier. "Intelligence sharing has definitely improved in recent months with the signing of the counter-terrorism security initiative. The cooperation between India and U.S. is now far more broad-based," he told journalists in New Delhi. Earlier, on October 27, Pillai had said that Indian agencies were "disappointed" at not being provided specific information by the US on Pakistani American Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley either before or after 26/11, else he could have been arrested when he visited India in March 2009 as a LeT operative, four months after the Mumbai attacks.
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