South Asia Terrorism Portal
Jammu and Kashmir Failure of Imagination
The imposition of President’s Rule in Jammu & Kashmir is an index of the abject failure of the current regime’s policies in the State. Recourse to this desperate measure has been necessitated after over 22 years. The last time President’s Rule was in place was in 1996, at a time of enveloping chaos in the State. 1996 saw as many as 2,903 terrorism linked fatalities in J&K, the highest figure till that point (the situation was to worsen further in 2001-2003). While fatalities have been rising steadily since a low of 117 in 2012, the State is nowhere near conditions of breakdown that could have justified this move. It is nothing but a chain of partisan political mischief that has brought this about.
Other indices of failure are in evidence. With 440 already killed (all data till December 20) in terrorism-linked violence, this is the highest number in a decade (the figure was last exceeded in 2008, with 541 killed). Civilian fatalities at 86 are the highest this year, since 2007, when 164 civilians were killed. While the Government is eager to project the rising terrorist fatalities in the State, 259 killed this year, the cost in Security Forces’ (SFs) lives has been high, with 95 personnel killed in 2018. The SF: terrorist ratio of fatalities in 2012 had dropped to 1:4.94 in favour of the SFs; in 2016, it had worsened to 1:1.87. There has been some improvement since, with the 2018 ratio at 1:2.73. Even in ‘high intensity conflict’ (more than a thousand fatalities per year) period between 1990 and 2006, this ratio averaged 1:3.75.
Lest these fatality figures be interpreted as justification for the imposition of President’s rule, it is useful to note, first, that this escalation has been substantially provoked by intentionally polarizing politics in the State and, more importantly, that J&K is far from any situation of crisis comparable to the pre-2006 period on this count. Absolute numbers of fatalities are a clear demonstration of this – with the current and escalating fatalities a mere fraction of the numbers killed each year in that era. Indeed, terrorist activities, as well as the street mobilization of stone-pelting gangs, have been extremely localized. 40 of J&K’s 82 tehsils (revenue sub-districts) have recorded any terrorism-linked fatalities in 2018 – most of them in ones and twos. Of these, the five worst affected tehsils account for nearly 49 per cent of all fatalities in the State: Shopian (86), Pulwama (39), Kulgam (33), Kupwara (32), and Srinagar South (29). Crucially, of the 50 fatalities in stone pelting incidents – markers of the most violent demonstrations – 38 (76 per cent) have occurred in just three tehsils: Kulgam (15); Shopian (13); and Pulwama (10). Three have been killed in Srinagar South, and one each in another nine tehsils.
The sheer scale of SF successes, despite their costs, is another positive. It is not only the absolute numbers, but the narrow targeting of the terrorist leadership in the State that is of significance here. Since the killing of Burhan Wani on July 9, 2016, which marks the commencement of a sharp escalation, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has lost at least 22 of its top ‘commanders’ in J&K; the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), 10; and the Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (HM), eight. These losses, all in narrowly targeted operations, are an indication of the sheer volume and precision of intelligence flowing to the SFs from the local population – a pointer to the progressive distancing of large sections of the people from the terrorist-separatist agenda. Brutal executions of locals, accused of collaborating with SFs, by the terrorists confirm this trend. In combination with the patterns of the narrow distribution of violence in J&K, these demonstrate clearly the tremendous opportunities for political and administrative consolidation that have come into existence in the State.
Instead of capitalizing on these opportunities, New Delhi has chosen, instead, to marginalize constitutional political parties in the State, and to push them into unnecessary confrontations, both within regions of the State, and with the Centre. Polarizing rhetoric is now rising, and the political parties of the Muslim majority Valley and of the Hindu majority Jammu region are gravitating towards immoderate positions. National Conference leader Farooq Abdullah has declared that, if elected, his party would move a resolution for autonomy of the State – a controversial and long-pending proposal based on the Report of the Regional Autonomy Committee of 1999, which recommended, inter alia, that the three regions of the State be divided into eight autonomous units on ethnic-religious lines, a move that can only serve a divisive communal agenda. With General and State elections approaching, polarizing and inflammatory positions can only be expected to intensify.
There are strong indications of disillusionment with the separatist-terrorist cause in the State, and particularly in the Valley. To have sacrificed the opportunities these created, to a misconceived (and certainly counterproductive) partisan political calculus, is nothing less than strategic folly.
Ajai Sahni Publisher and Editor, Second Sight
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