India Assessment – 2006

2221 people have died in terrorism-related violence in India during year 2006 (till October 1). A review of the data indicates that nearly 45 per cent of all such fatalities occurred in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alone as a result of the separatist proxy war in that State. 23 per cent were accounted for by insurgencies in the Northeast. Approximately 32 per cent of fatalities resulted from Left Wing Extremism (Maoist/Naxalite) in some areas of the States of Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Karnataka.

In comparison to the year 2005, when 3236 people had died in terrorism-related incidents across the country, there is a definite decrease in the fatality index of year 2006.

Approximately 192 of the 608 districts are currently afflicted, at differing intensities, by various insurgent and terrorist movements. Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (12 districts), in different States of the Northeast (54 districts) and the challenges posed by left-wing extremism (affecting at least 126 districts in 14 States) continue to pose serious challenges to the security framework. In addition, wide areas of the country appear to have ‘fallen off the map’ of good governance, and are acutely susceptible to violent political mobilization, lawlessness and organized criminal activity.

Jammu and Kashmir

Since 2002, terrorism-related fatalities have demonstrated a secular decline in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Although the State continues to suffer from a substantial degree of violence and subversion, the military regime in Pakistan which was forced to scale down its proxy-war under intense international scrutiny momentarily has shown no indication of dismantling the vast terrorist infrastructure on its soil. Amidst the hype on people-to-people contacts and confidence-building measures (CBMs), the fact remains that the reduced levels of violence is primarily tactical. In the India-Pakistan calculus, there always exists a possibility of Islamabad seeking to up the ante in order to extort concessions from India.

There were 1732 terrorism-related deaths in J&K during 2005. Continuing with decline in violence, 873 people have died in year 2006 (till October 1). More than 40,000 people have lost their lives in the conflict since 1989, and even at present, an average of 100 lives is lost each month in J&K.

Even as talks between India and Pakistan continue under the aegis of the Composite Dialogue, terrorist violence in J&K, and sporadically in other parts of the India continue, even as Pakistan complains bitterly about the slow pace of ‘progress’ towards the goals it seeks to secure on the negotiating table, having failed to achieve these through a vicious campaign of terrorism over 17 years.

In realistic terms, it is clear that the process is headed nowhere and there is every likelihood of an eventual breakdown, transient or permanent. The reasons are not far to seek. First, the peace process remains, in substantial measure, tactical rather than substantive, with Pakistan in particular treating the negotiations as a parallel instrument to terrorism to exert pressure on India. Further, the hiatus between the rival positions on Kashmir is unbridgeable, and it is unsurprising, consequently, that the two sides are yet to commence substantive discussions on this issue. The restoration of communication links, people-to-people exchanges, Track Two diplomacy and a range of confidence building measures have all gone smoothly and have largely been successful. The Indian High Commission in Islamabad, for instance, issued 90,000 visas to Pakistanis in the year 2005 in comparison to 60,000 in 2004, a reflection of rising popular bonhomie. In particular, the bus services (Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Amritsar-Lahore) and coordinated relief efforts in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake have been received well by people of both the countries. The ground situation in J&K, however, remains a cause for concern, with terrorism related killings and a continuous stream of infiltrators across the Line of Control (LoC) and international border, though the secular decline in levels of violence, which commenced after the 9/11 attacks in the US, has been sustained – albeit only marginally between 2004-2005.

Worse, terrorist attacks by Pakistan-backed groups have occurred in places as far as Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore and Varanasi. Furthermore, arrests and seizures connected with Pakistan-backed terrorist groups across India, outside J&K and the Northeast, numbering at least 76 modules during the 2004-06 period indicate the level of penetration and subversion. These modules have been neutralised in locations that extend from Uttaranchal in the North, to Andhra Pradesh in the South, and from Gujarat in the West to West Bengal in the East. These terrorist modules were tasked to target security and vital installations, communication links, and commercial and industrial centres, as well as to provoke instability and disorder by circulating large quantities of counterfeit currency and by drug trafficking.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, announced on May 25, 2006, the formation of five Working Groups to discuss various issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir. Addressing a press conference at the end of the two-day Roundtable Conference in Srinagar, he said that setting up of the Working Groups was the "best way to move forward and ensure that the views of different segments are incorporated." The Groups will deal with improving the Centre's relations with J&K, furthering the relations across the Line of Control (LoC), giving a boost to the State's economic development, rehabilitating the destitute families of militants and reviewing the cases of detainees and ensuring good governance. The Prime Minister also declared his Government’s readiness to talk to terrorist groups if they gave up the path of violence. "Anybody who shuns violence and gives up the path of terror, we are willing to find ways and means to interact with all such groups," he said. On the issue of alleged human right violations by the security forces, he said, "our armed force is not an armed force of occupation.... They have a proud record, though there could be some aberrations, but these aberrations cannot be allowed. There should be zero tolerance for human rights violations for all our security forces."

Insurgencies in the North East

Certain States of the Northeast have shown remarkable signs of recovery in recent years in their fight against insurgency. Tripura, once considered to be one of the most violent States of the country, recorded less than 75 insurgent-related fatalities in 2005. In 2006 (till October 6), there have been 48 insurgency-related deaths in Tripura. Similarly, the fight against insurgency in Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh has been largely successful. At the same time, Manipur and Assam continue to remain affected by militancy, despite operations by the security forces. Nagaland, where both the militant outfits are in cease-fire agreements with the Government, continues to witness fratricidal clashes, large-scale extortion and abduction. Indeed, Governments in such States have been held hostage to the diktats of the outfits.

The demands of various groups engaged in violence in the Northeast have varied from autonomy to secession. In view of the chronic nature of the violence in the region, largely exacerbated by external manipulation and support, the society and politics of the region have been victims of a sustained culture of violence. This culture of violence has assumed an autonomy of its own and a subversive style of politics. In spite of the Government’s efforts in bringing the militant outfits to the negotiating table, the region continues to remain disturbed.

The militant outfits operating in this region in various provinces have usually found refuge in the neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar. Fencing along the 4096.7 kilometer long border with Bangladesh, suggested as a remedy to the problem of militancy, has not been completed and that provides easy entry and exit points to the militants. Similarly, a number of the militant outfits in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur have taken shelter in Myanmar.

Manipur remains the most violent state in the region next only to Jammu and Kashmir. According to the Annual Report 2005-06 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 410 fatalities were recorded in 2005 in militancy-related activities in Manipur, a huge leap over the corresponding figure of 258 in 2004. While a number of other States in the Northeast have or are being reclaimed from protracted insurgencies, Manipur’s rendezvous with militancy appears to be an unending affair. According to the Institute for Conflict Management data, sustained terrorist violence in 2006 has claimed 235 lives in the State (till October 6). Unabated extortion and its impact on ordinary lives, as well as those of people at the helm of affairs are symptomatic of the complete administrative breakdown in the State. Assam too remains a disturbed state with 398 militancy related incidents in 2005 compared to 267 such incidents in 2004.

Left-Wing Extremism

From nearly a sixth of the total fatalities in J&K in 2002, Maoist fatalities had risen above the half-way mark by year 2005. Maoists, today, exercise dominance over a huge spread of the country’s territory, carry out attacks on security forces and symbols of governance at will. Chhattisgarh has now emerged as one of the principal centres of a co-ordinated movement of left-wing extremism. While the number of Maoist-affected States in the country is currently pegged at 14, the movement has demonstrated the intent and potential to spread across the length and breadth of the country, constituting what Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh rightly remarked is the “single biggest internal security challenge.”

The Maoist threat appears to have overtaken all other insurgencies in the country – at least from the geographical spread point of view. At least 165 districts in 14 States, out of a total of 602 districts in the country, are currently affected by various levels of Maoist mobilisation and violence. Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir affects 12 districts, while the combined influence of the multiple insurgencies in India’s Northeast afflicts, in various measures, 54 Districts. Over the past years, moreover, while fatalities in various other insurgencies have tended to decline consistently (with the exception of Manipur) fatalities as a result of the Maoist conflict have continuously been augmented.

A total of 628 persons have died in Maoist-related violence across the country in 2006 (till October 1).

Maoists increased their activities dramatically in 2005, with 717 persons killed (281 civilians, 150 police personnel and 286 Maoists), compared to 566 deaths in 2004. Chhattisgarh in 2005 emerged as the worst affected state after Andhra Pradesh — displacing Bihar and Jharkhand — and Dantewada district is by far the worst off in the State.

The threat of the Maoists is not limited to the areas of immediate violence, nor does this threat vanish if violence is not manifested at a particular location for a specific period of time. It is in the complex processes of political activity, mass mobilisation, arms training and military consolidation that the Maoist potential has to be estimated.

The Maoist menace continues to expand, except where it has been confronted by coherent use of force – as is presently and substantially the case in Andhra Pradesh, where area domination exercise under the leadership of the local Police, backed by the armed reserve forces and the Grey Hounds, and a well-developed intelligence network has succeeded in beating back the Naxalites to a large extent, and has forced their leadership into flight. The Andhra Pradesh Police has long prepared for this confrontation and has consistently developed its capacities to engage with the Maoists in their ‘strongholds’, though it has been repeatedly inhibited by political constraints from effective action. These constraints appear, for the moment, to have been lifted.

Other States, however, remain far from prepared. Indeed, a consistent feature across all the major Maoist-affected States is that they have extraordinarily poor policing capacities. As against a national average of 122 police personnel per 100,000 population, and some peaceful States with ratios as high as 854/100,000 (Mizoram) and 609/100,000 in Sikkim, Bihar has just 57, Jharkhand – 85, Chhattisgarh - 103 and Orissa – 90, and even Andhra Pradesh, just 98 per 100,000 population. Worse, there is ample evidence that large proportions of the Central allocation for police modernisation and up-gradation remain unspent or are being diverted or mis-spent. Utilization of funds is particularly poor in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

The rampaging Maoist movement has violently drawn attention to itself with a succession of daring and bloody attacks that go to the very core of governance, the credibility of administration, and the sagacity of political leadership across extended areas of the country. The growing audacity of the Maoists has been reflected in actions involving hundreds, and occasionally thousands, of cadres in operations that increasingly mimic the now-established tactics of their Nepali counterparts, involving coordinated attacks on police stations and posts, as well as on administrative headquarters and well-guarded Government establishments.

Terrorism outside J&K and the Northeast

According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, at least 76 Inter-Services Intelligence-Jihadi modules have been disrupted just over the years 2004-2006, leading to hundreds of arrests across India – outside Jammu and Kashmir and the troubled Northeast – in locations that extend from Uttaranchal in the North, to Andhra Pradesh in the South, and from Gujarat in the West to West Bengal in the East. Further, official sources indicate that, between 1998 and 2003, security agencies had neutralized more than 180 ISI-backed terrorist modules across the country (excluding J&K and the Northeast), who had been tasked to target security and vital installations, communication links, and commercial and industrial centres, as well as to provoke instability and disorder by circulating large quantities of counterfeit currency and by drug trafficking.

Terrorist attacks in places like Mumbai (July 11, 2006), Varanasi (March 7, 2006) Bangalore (December 28, 2005) and New Delhi (October 29, 2005) are only the more visible evidence of a long-term war of attrition by Pakistani state agencies and their Jihadi surrogates, intended to undermine India’s political stability, increasingly by attacking its economic, scientific and technological strengths. These incidents only confirm the strategic continuity of Pakistan’s broad orientation towards India, and its sustained enterprise of encirclement, penetration and subversion, with an objective to do as much damage as is opportunistically possible, under the cover of (no doubt diminishing) credible deniability. The objective is to gradually undermine India’s capacities for growth, as well as to weaken international confidence in the country and to create an atmosphere of pervasive terror over wide areas that would dampen the country’s capacity to attract foreign investment.

The frequency, spread and, in some cases, intensity of these operations has seen some escalation in the past years, as international pressure on Pakistan to end terrorism in J&K has diminished levels of ‘deniable’ engagement in that theatre, and as violence in that State demonstrates a continuous secular decline since the events of September 11, 2001 in the US.

It is important to note, however, that despite occasional and inevitable ‘successes’, this relentless strategy – which has targeted virtually every concentration of Muslim populations in India for decades – has overwhelmingly failed to secure a base within the community, beyond a minuscule radical fringe. Further, the record of intelligence and security agency successes against such subversion and terror, although lacking the visibility and drama of a terrorist strike, is immensely greater than the record of the successes of this strategy.