Transcending
the Past
Over four years of constructive
US engagement with Pakistan’s military dictatorship, since the
catastrophic 9/11 events, have failed to produce the fundamental
and necessary transformations in Pakistan that would justify continuation
of such a policy. It is significant that these four years of continuous
effort and massive investment in Pakistan – while they have helped
‘turn around’ the economy, with large benefits accruing to the
dominant elite in the country – have only seen a spread of disorder
in the country, a further erosion of institutions and the structural
foundations of democracy, and a failure to implement the most
basic reforms necessary to effect a political turnaround, and
to expand democratic spaces. Indeed, there is mounting evidence
of a consolidation of authoritarian tendencies and a proclivity
to use excessive military force against increasingly restive populations
– who have benefited little from the generous flow of international
aid – in wide areas of the country, particularly in Balochistan,
the North West Frontier Province and Gilgit-Baltistan.
There is also strong and cumulative
evidence that the Pakistani power elite, located in the regressive
military-mullah-feudal combine, is yet to abandon terrorism
as a tactical and strategic tool to secure what it perceives as
the country’s quest for ‘strategic depth’ in the region. Despite
the numbers of ‘al Qaeda terrorists’ arrested and handed over
to the US – a large majority of whom have proven to be of ‘zero
value’ – and the fact that the Pakistani state and Army have taken
selective action against particular groups of Islamist terrorists,
particularly those who have turned against the state, who have
attacked President Pervez Musharraf and senior Army and Government
functionaries, and who have engaged in sectarian terrorism within
the country, it is the case that Pakistan continues to support
and encourage the activities of a wide range of terrorist and
Islamist extremist organisations. This is particularly the case
with organisations that are active in Afghanistan – including
remnants of the Taliban – and in India. Moreover, Pakistan continues
to exploit Islamist extremist mobilisation to secure its perceived
objectives in the wider Asian region, notably in Central Asia.
Despite cosmetic policy changes
and some tokenism – including formal bans on a number of terrorist
organisations (overwhelmingly unenforced) – many prominent Islamist
terrorist organisations continue to operate with a high measure
of freedom in and from Pakistan. Further, the processes of Islamist
radicalization, both through the Madrassa (seminary) and
the school education system[1], continue apace,
and none of General Musharraf’s promised reforms have reached
effective fruition.
Pakistan has also played an active
and prominent role in the growth of Islamist radicalism and terrorism
in and from Bangladesh, another theatre of urgent concern in the
South Asian region. There is increasing evidence, moreover, of
a rising trend in operational cooperation between Pakistani and
Bangladeshi intelligence agencies and jihadi organisations,
particularly in their efforts to target India. A number of recent
terrorist attacks and arrests in different parts of India, including
the suicide attack at Hyderabad on October 12, 2005, the attack
at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore on December 28,
2005, the Diwali bombings in Delhi on October 29, 2005, and the
Mumbai serial bombings of July 11, 2006[2], among
others, have
exposed evidence of joint Pakistan-Bangladesh operations and terrorist
modules. This pattern of collaboration and networking compounds
the dangers within the region, and acts as a force multiplier
for Islamist terrorist organisations seeking to project their
capacities internationally.
There is, consequently, a need
to ‘reverse lines of action based on earlier views’, and to radically
revise US policy on Pakistan in particular, and South Asia in
general, to bring it in line with evolving US geostrategic perspectives
and thinking. It is important to recall, within this context,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s observation (in the context
of the Middle East) that "we must transcend the doctrines
and debates of the past and transform volatile status quos
that no longer serve our interests", to create "a
balance of power that favours freedom." Secretary Rice rightly
notes that "stability without democracy will prove to be
false stability", and argues that "the fundamental character
of regimes matters more today than the international distribution
of power… In these societies, it is illusory to encourage economic
reform by itself and hope that the freedom deficit will work itself
out over time[3]."
There is urgent need, today, to
bring US policy to bear directly on the objectives of altering
the ‘fundamental character’ of the regime in Pakistan, and of
transforming the ‘volatile status quo’ there.
Pakistan’s Destructive Dynamics
It is useful, within this context,
to recognize certain aspects of the essential character and dynamic
of the state and power structure in Pakistan, as well as its underlying
and deeply entrenched social, political and cultural pathologies.
There is an increasing realization
among informed experts – including many who are sympathetic to
Pakistan – that "There are compelling reasons why Pakistan’s
comprehensive strategic makeover will not happen."[4]
Chris Fair, for instance, notes, among other factors, the dilatory
approach to the collection of firearms, failure to suppress financing
of terrorism, highly selective targeting of terrorist organisations,
and extremely half-hearted efforts on education, including Madrassa
reform; and a host of liabilities arising from Pakistan’s
fiscal weakness and pervasive dearth of resources, including human
capital, facilities, infrastructure, and effective bureaucratic
culture.[5] Ashley Tellis has underlined the
sheer sweep of transformations that would be required for the
"transformation of Pakistan as a state." This would
require, he notes, "not only strategic, economic, and political
reform but also the revitalization of Pakistani society… (to include)
correcting gender inequalities, containing ideological mobilization,
improving civil society, and selectively expanding state control."[6]
Robert Wirsing rightly notes that "Transformations on this
scale have been witnessed in few, if any of the world’s fifty-odd
Muslim states; and the societal overhauls implicit in them have
almost never been realized – certainly not in a time span reckoned
in anything less than decades – anywhere else in the non-Western
world."[7] Wirsing concludes that it is,
consequently, necessary to "brace for continuity in Pakistani
behaviour, to take a more sceptical view of Pakistan’s commitment
to reform…[8]"
It is useful, here, to briefly
list some of the most significant elements of the causal dynamic
that yields this assessment.
-
The first and most significant of these is
the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ and the nature of the military-mullah-feudal
combine that has dominated the power structures of the country
virtually since the moment of its creation. The seeds of Pakistan’s
difficulties are located in the very circumstances of its creation,
and its construction of national identity out of an ideology
of religious exclusion and hatred of others.
-
These ideological proclivities have been infinitely
compounded by the patterns of political mobilisation and institutional
transformation that have taken root in Pakistan, and their exponential
escalation under the policies followed since the Zia-ul-Haq
regime. Today, a radical Islamist ideology has become central
to the Pakistani Army, the country’s educational system – not
just the Madrassas, but also the state prescribed ‘public
school’ and university curricula – governance, law, political
mobilisation, society and culture. To reiterate, moreover, terrorism
and the ideologies that breed it, thrive within closed and authoritarian
societies. To the extent that these prevail, they systematically
undermine and destroy the very potential for the emergence of
democratic institutions and processes.
-
Despite the illusion of an 8 per cent growth
rate, Pakistan’s economic vital statistics remain fragile. The
savings rate, at around 15 per cent of GDP, compares adversely
to the average of 20 per cent for developing countries. The
economy is overwhelmingly agrarian, with the manufacturing sector
contributing barely 17 per cent to the GDP. Despite the infusion
of significant foreign aid, the Government remains in chronic
deficit to the tune of about 10 per cent of the GDP. It is useful,
moreover, to recall that current aid is future debt. Present
growth figures, further, do not translate into any significant
augmentation of national production capacities and do not address
the profound structural infirmities of the Pakistani economy.
Per capita income and poverty figures do not reflect the actual
reality of the ground in Pakistan. Mahbub-ul-Haq’s Human
Development Report in South Asia had noted that, while less
than one-third of Pakistan’s people are income-poor, nearly
one-half suffers from serious deprivation of basic opportunities
of life.[9]
-
Absent a dramatic, indeed stupendous, expansion
of production capacities – contingent on a radical restructuring
of the entire political economy, including the culture of governance,
the dominance of and cornering of national resources by the
Army, the patterns of extremist political mobilisation – and
a colossal extension of infrastructure, it must be clear that
the Pakistani economy will abjectly fail to absorb the addition
of nearly 90 million to its population by year 2020 to its current
population of over 160 million.
-
To reiterate, the heart of Pakistan’s failure
lies in the persistence of the militarized Islamist-fundamentalist
and quasi-feudal state in Pakistan and this problem cannot be
resolved by any process of negotiated reforms, or liberal funding
of developmental programmes. Rather, given the structure of
power and the collusive institutional framework that prevails,
each dollar of aid or relief to Pakistan releases a dollar of
domestic resources for further militarization, radicalization
and extremist religious mobilization.
Addressing Enduring Pathologies
Given these circumstances, the
broad contours of a strategy to secure US interests in the South
Asian region would need to include some of the following lines
of approach.
-
The first principle that needs to be abandoned
is the idea that democracy can be engineered or orchestrated
through the agency of a military dictatorship – however well-intentioned
or efficient such a regime may be. In this context, John Stuart
Mill’s reminder is key: "Evil for evil, a good despotism…
is more noxious than a bad one…[10]"
All ‘despotisms’ or forms of authoritarian rule are crippling
to the spirit of a nation and a people, and militate directly
against the capacities for democracy, including the institutional
underpinnings of democracy. There has been a steady erosion
of the institutional structure of democracy in Pakistan under
the Musharraf regime through the packing of the administrative
and educational structure with military personnel, the intimidation
and manipulation of the judicial system, the rigging of elections,
the systematic decimation of popular political parties, and
the opportunistic and malignant alliance between the Army and
Islamist extremist political formations. Worse, the sphere of
violence and intimidation in politics has been steadily extended
across the spectrum: Islamist extremist violence, anti-state
political and sub-nationalist violence, sectarian, social and
gender violence, and increasing state repression.
-
Democracy itself is the only preparation or
training a people may have for democracy, and it is under freely
elected governments that the skills and capacities for such
governance are developed. Any measures that help ‘stabilize’ or strengthen the Musharraf regime, or any successor military
regime, consequently, directly undermine the possibility and
potential for democracy in Pakistan.
-
Democracy in Pakistan, however, has never escaped
the stranglehold of military domination, and the mere restoration
of democratic form will go no distance in neutralizing the social
and political pathologies that underlie the structure of power
in the country. It is useful to recall, for instance, that the ‘democratic’ Governments of the post-Zia-ul-Haq era have been
as supportive of terrorism within the region as have been the
preceding and succeeding military regimes, and the broad and
predatory nature of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies
has never been substantially altered, nor has any regime sought
to bring about reforms that would secure a greater measure of
equity and a wider sphere of rationality in education and politics,
and that would dismantle the existing feudal order in the country.
Significantly, moreover, Pakistan has always sought to achieve
its foreign policy objectives within the neighbourhood through
the deliberate and pre-planned use of force, including terrorism.
-
The Islamist extremist ideology is the central
pillar of the military-feudal-fundamentalist combine that has
ruled Pakistan since its creation. The problem of religious
extremism and terrorism in Pakistan can only be resolved through
the ‘deconstruction’ of the present Pakistani state, and by
disempowering this combination of forces through a fundamental
‘regime change’ that goes well beyond a change of leadership,
and comprehends a change of ideology and systems of governance.[11]
-
Pakistan has harvested an enormous price for
its supposed ‘cooperation’ with the US in the war on terror,
and in this it has combined deception and blackmail – including
nuclear blackmail – to secure a continuous stream of concessions.
As one study notes, "The US war on terror has effectively
legitimized a rent-seeking military regime that has given its
support, tacit or otherwise, to terror activity…"[12]
The pattern of US support to Pakistan in the post-9/11 period,
while it may have secured certain limited short-term US objectives,
has gone far in deeply undermining long-term US goals in the
South Asian region.
Strategic Coherence
If this trend is to be reversed,
short-term US policy must be consistently reconciled with a coherent
projection of long-term objectives.
Current US policy on Pakistan
seeks incremental changes in various components of the system,
working towards ‘greater democracy’, containment of Islamist extremist
forces, and a diminishing role for the military. The policy ignores
the fact that, not only are civil institutions in Pakistan weak,
the Army has powerful incentives to keep such institutions weak,
and has entered into a long-standing arrangement with Islamist
extremist forces to consolidate its hold over the affairs of the
country. Repeated assurances and some symbolism notwithstanding,
this process has continued into the more than six years under
the Pervez Musharraf regime – and for over four years since the
9/11 attacks. Over this period, Musharraf has emerged as a ‘minimal
satisfier’, meeting the formal requirements of compliance with
the US and international community’s demands on democratization
and the containment of extremism and terrorism, even as he ignores
their substance. In some measure, the very nature of such demands
is problematic, since their content is substantially subjective,
"leaving room for endless arguments about what constitutes
compliance and how it is to be measured".[13]
More significantly, many of the objectives simply do not lend
themselves to ‘incremental reform’.
There can, for instance, be little
possibility of ‘incremental reform’ of the Islamist extremist
and terrorist forces in the country. Any effort to absorb them
into the ‘mainstream’ political system results in an increasing
radicalization of that system, rather than a moderation of the
radical elements. The case of the Madrassas is comparable.
Adding science, English language, and computer courses to their
existing curricula – itself a task that Musharraf has failed to
achieve – will not result in the blossoming of a scientific and
rational mindset among their students. Rather, to the extent that
the radical Islamist content of these curricula remains unaffected,
this would produce a stream of English speaking and progressively
technically competent cadres for Islamist terrorist organisations,
infinitely compounding the dangers to the West, and particularly
to the US. It is important to note, here, that the Madrassa
alumni, while they do contribute significantly to the violence
within the South Asian region, are yet to make their mark on Western
theatres of Islamist terrorism, simply because the Madrassa
graduate lacks the skills, the knowledge and the capacity to function
in these alien cultures. To the extent that this ‘competence gap’
is bridged, increasing numbers of Madrassa graduates will
become available for operation in Western theatres. Liberal funding
for ‘Madrassa reforms’, consequently, contributes directly
to Western vulnerabilities to Islamist extremist terrorism.
Efforts at ‘incremental reform’
of various component systems within the broad dynamic of the Islamist
extremist and militarized politics of Pakistan fail to accommodate
the sheer size and complexity of the system, and the impossibility
of monitoring compliance. US compellent strategies must, consequently,
target the "enduring strengths and weaknesses"[14]
of the larger system, to secure clearly defined objectives that
comprehend the fullest restoration of democracy, complete military
subordination to civil authority, constitutional government and
rule of law, and the dismantling of the Islamist terrorist infrastructure
and its feeder mechanisms – the Madrassas, components of
the school and university curricula, the wider network of radicalized
social and cultural institutions, laws and practices that have
systematically promoted religious fanaticism and hatred throughout
society. Such a strategy would require:
-
The targeting of the Army and the Jihadi-fundamentalist
complex, as well as the feudal elite that constitutes the primary
support-base for these, as the direct objects of a sustained
strategy of compellence.
-
An end to the system of concessions and aid
that has unintentionally but systematically rewarded predatory
and irresponsible policies on the part of successive Pakistani
regimes, and particularly the current Musharraf regime.
-
The imposition of unbearable costs on Pakistan – and particularly targeting its power-elite – for policies
and practices that fail to adhere to norms of civilized governance,
that encourage or support terrorism and extremism, and that
lead to the expansion of the sphere of authoritarian and unaccountable
governance. The ‘denial of deniability’ must be an integral
aspect of assessments and policies in this regard, and, given
the country’s past and ongoing record in promoting Islamist
extremism and terrorism, a presumption of continued involvement
in such activities would be justified unless overwhelming and
unambiguous evidence to the contrary is manifestly available.
-
The progressive demilitarization of Pakistani
governance, politics and society, and a continuous and measurable
extension of democratic spaces. This will require a staged process
within which a collapse of the power of the military in the
country is engineered, and will not be achievable as long as
such power survives in sufficient measure to dominate the system.
Crucially, it must be recognized that demilitarization and democratization
cannot be secured through the agency of an all-powerful Army
in Pakistan.
-
The imposition of greater rationality on Pakistan’s
power projections. Pakistan has, for too long, harboured expansionist
ambitions both to its North and its East, and has enormously
encouraged the American misconception that the region cannot
be stabilized without Pakistan’s cooperation and active support.
There is need for an intensification of the US strategy for
the stabilization of Afghanistan, and a rejection of the idea
that the country cannot be stabilized without Pakistani cooperation;
indeed, it is Pakistan that is directly undermining Kabul’s
authority and stability, and will continue to do so indefinitely,
since a stable Afghanistan has immediate implications for the
stability and status of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province
(NWFP), over which Afghanistan has never formally accepted Pakistan’s
rights. A strong Afghanistan, consequently, would directly augment
the existential threat confronting Pakistan; subverting Kabul’s
authority, therefore, remains a survival imperative for Pakistan.
By imposing prohibitive costs on Pakistan for its support to
terrorist and subversive activities in Afghanistan, the US would
secure three crucial objectives: stabilize Afghanistan; speed
up the end of terrorism and warlordism in the region; force
Pakistan to abandon its duplicitous policy on terrorism.
-
Pakistan’s utility in the Global War on Terror
is progressively diminishing, despite the continued presence
of surviving al Qaeda and Taliban forces on its soil. Further,
Pakistani ambiguity in taking action against terrorism and a
continuous strategy of deceit on this account undermine the
significance of any future Pakistani role in this War. Moreover,
al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have progressively lost their centrality
in global Islamist terror – though they retain their iconic
status and possibly the residual capacity to execute singular
and catastrophic terror strikes – and there is limited justification
for continued and overwhelming investment in Pakistan on this
basis; the continuance of such investment would, consequently,
require assessment on other grounds. Pakistan’s status as a
‘frontline state’ and a strategic partner in the Global War
on Terrorism should, in the immediate future, be brought under
review. If such compulsion does not secure greater compliance
on US objectives, such status – and the benefits that have arisen
out of it – should be incrementally revoked.
-
Within this context, the underlying premise
of the current US approach to the Kashmir issue is that, since
Pakistan has repeatedly initiated violence, it evidently invests
far greater significance to this issue, and to the people of
the disputed region, than does India – the status quo power – and must, consequently, be appeased with some concessions.
A reassessment of this position is now in order, and would have
significant salutary impact as a compellent strategy against
Pakistan. Crucially, Pakistan’s claims over the territory occupied
by it – despite the denial of basic political and human rights
in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan – have
never been contested, and the dispute has, in US perceptions,
largely been limited to the areas under Indian administration.
The question of the legal status and the rights of the people
of the Pakistan administered areas of Kashmir – specifically
what is referred to as Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas – needs to be taken up with the Government of Pakistan.[15]
-
One Pakistani commentator has noted that, "In
the final analysis, it is the internal consolidation of state
and society that would restore self-esteem" [16]in
Pakistan, and diminish the role of the extremist and authoritarian
forces in the country. The possibility of such ‘internal consolidation’
has been visibly receding over the more than six years under
the present regime and powerful correctives are now overdue.
It is useful to recall, in this context, that when the power-elites
in Pakistan – under the present regime – were presented with
an existential choice after the 9/11 events, they had little
difficulty reversing a long-standing policy on Afghanistan.
The failure of present ‘carrot and soft stick’ policies on Pakistan
is rooted, not in the incapacities of the regime in the country
to secure certain ‘unpopular’ objectives, but rather on the
failure of US policy makers to unambiguously define the ends
they seek and the ambiguity that has been permitted to surround
the indices of their attainment. Future compellent strategies
must address these lacunae, denying spaces for the current tactic
of formalism and minimal satisfaction which have been used as
a cover for the persistence and consolidation of pathological
policies and trends within the Pakistani establishment.
Escaping ‘Ugly Instability’
The ‘ugly instability’ that currently
prevails in South Asia jeopardizes critical US interests in the
region, and cannot be allowed to persist indefinitely. This instability
is accentuated by the international proclivity to impose a contra-factual
parity between Pakistan and India, and efforts to secure a ‘balance’
between the two. Such a perspective militates against the realities
of the ground, and also undermines the increasing sphere of convergent
interests between the US and India; this is of particular significance
in view of China’s growing power in the Asian region, including
its dramatic thrust into Central Asia. A visible US ‘tilt’ in
India’s favour would have powerful compellent effect on Islamabad,
and would impose a far greater measure of rationality and realism
there than any set of incentives and concessions possibly could.
The emerging strategic partnership with India is securely based
on a multiplicity of shared values and interests – unlike the
opportunistic alliance of the unwilling that is the current arrangement
with Pakistan.
The radical transformation that
is necessary within Pakistan’s power structure – both for the
country’s own future and for the South Asian region in general
– cannot be secured unless the Pakistani leadership and elite
are convinced that their present course of action is unsustainable
and will confront them with a proximate existential choice regarding
the country’s future. US compellent strategies should seek to
convey precisely such a choice in the immediate future, predicated
on the demands for the restoration of democracy, the dismantling
of terrorist and extremist networks, and the subordination of
the military to civil authority. As long as the US seeks to retain
a client-patron relationship with Pakistan, such a strategy cannot
be implemented, and present contradictions will persist.
While it is the US that would
need to design and initiate such a compellent strategy, it is
not the case that the entire onus for transformation must fall
upon America. Indeed, the building up of a coalition and coordination
with other countries that can be prevailed upon to share this
vision would be an integral element of the compellent strategies
envisaged. American leadership in any such initiatives would,
however, remain an imperative, in the absence of any other influential
nation or bloc evolving such a strategy, as also in view of the
centrality of US interests and influence in the region.
Finally, action in this direction
has generally been impeded by a number of false dichotomies –
‘Musharraf or the Taliban’, the military or anarchy, etc. – and
the imagining of scenarios of collapse, chaos, and worse, an Islamist
terrorist takeover of the country and more dangerously of its
nuclear assets. These doomsday scenarios are based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the processes of transition, which are generally
conceived of as a one-time event, rather than the gradual re-engineering
of the structures of power in Pakistan envisaged by the notion
of targeting the "enduring strengths and weaknesses"
of the larger system. The ‘one-time’ approach takes the structure
and equations of power as a given; the ‘process’ orientation targets
these structures and equations, seeking to alter the balance of
power in favour of a schema that is consistent with US strategic
objectives and goals, on the one hand, and norms of civilized
international discourse and internal democracy, on the other.
To be sure, the latter approach has its own imponderables and
uncertainties, but these are far removed from the false dichotomies
and catastrophic projections that characterize the ‘singular event’
approach.
-
Dr.
Ajai Sahni is Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict
Management, New Delhi; Executive Editor of Faultlines:Writings
on Conflict and Resolution; Executive Director, South Asia Terrorism
Portal (www.satp.org); Editor,
South Asia Intelligence Review.
- See, Ajai Sahni, “Why do they hate us?” South
Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 38, April 5, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_38.htm;
The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks
in Pakistan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad,
www.sdpi.org; Yvette Claire Rosser, Islamisation of Pakistani
Social Studies Textbooks, New Delhi: Rupa, 2003.
-
See Kanchan Lakshman, “India: Darkness and
Light,” South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 25, January
1, 2007, www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5_25.htm;
Kanchan Lakshman, “Mumbai: Terror Tuesday,” South Asia Intelligence
Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, July 17, 2006, www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5_1.htm#assessment1.
-
Condoleezza
Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom
is the Only Realistic Path to Security”, The Washington Post,
December 11, 2005. Secretary Rice notes further, “How could
it have been prudent to preserve the state of affairs in a
region that was incubating and exporting terrorism; where
the proliferation of deadly weapons was getting worse, not
better; where authoritarian regimes were projecting their
failures onto innocent nations and people?” Secretary Rice
was writing in the context of the Middle East, but her observations
apply equally and acutely to Pakistan.
-
-
-
Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation",
The Washington Quarterly – Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter 2004-05,
pp. 97-116.
-
Wirsing, “Pakistan’s Transformation: Why
it will not (and need not) happen.”
-
-
Mahbub-ul-Haq and Khadija Haq, “Human Development in South
Asia,” Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 17.
-
John
Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,”
1861.
-
K.P.S.
Gill, Brief on Islamist Extremism & Terrorism in South Asia,
January 2004, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi,
pp. 5-6.
-
“A New US Strategy for South Asia: Going
Beyond Crisis Management”, The Stanley Foundation, Draft Report
of the Detailed Discussions of the 44th Strategy for Peace Conference,
October 16-18, 2003, Airlie Center, Warrenton, VA.
-
Gregory F. Treverton, Framing Compellent
Strategies, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, p. xiv.
-
David
J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach against Proliferation,”
in Henry D. Sokolski, Ed., Prevailing in a Well Armed World:
Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Undated,
p. 8.
-
Ajai
Sahni & Saji Cherian, “Gilgit-Baltistan: The Laws of Occupation”,
Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution, New Delhi,
Vol. 18, January 2007, pp. 155-84.
-
Tanvir
Ahmad Khan, “Challenges Ahead”, The Dawn, Islamabad, January
2, 2006.
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