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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 5, August 18, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Tripura: In the Rebels' Firing
Line
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
Separatist
rebel groups in India, which exist by the dozen, have always
been targeting symbols of governmental authority, attacking
men of the security forces, people in authority or vital
installations. In recent memory, rebels belonging to these
militia groups have been particularly active during or after
important days in the country's national calendar - Republic
Day on January 26 and Independence Day on August 15 being
of particularly symbolic significance. This has been the
case whether it is in Jammu & Kashmir or any of the seven
insurgency-wracked States in the Northeast, including Assam,
Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland. This Independence Day, it
was Tripura's turn to bear the brunt of a sudden spurt in
insurgent violence on the eve of Independence Day, although
the rebels struck with ease in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh
as well.
That insurgents hold sway in large parts of Northeast India
despite a sustained counter-insurgency offensive in several
States in the region, was proved once again on the night
of August 14, when two hit-squads of the outlawed All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF)
woke up sleeping villagers in two different hamlets in West
Tripura district and shot 30 of them dead, besides inflicting
injuries on at least a dozen others. The attacks at village
Borolunga, under Teliamura police station, and Daspara,
near Tutabari, both located about 50 kilometres north-east
of the State capital, Agartala, took place between 9.30
and 10 pm. D. Gautam, Superintendent of Police (Operations),
told this writer on telephone from Agartala that all those
massacred were non-tribal Bengalis, and that both the attacks
were a clear case of selective killings by the ATTF. "Both
the ATTF groups comprised between 10 to 15 men each, and
they indiscriminately fired from automatic weapons as soon
as they descended on the villages, killing men and women
who woke up from their sleep and didn't know what was happening,"
Gautam said.
The cold-blooded murder of innocent civilians in Tripura
might be shocking, but it certainly was not exceptional,
as anyone familiar with insurgent politics in India's Northeast
would vouch. With as many as 11 separatist rebel groups
(the ATTF included) in the region calling upon the people
to boycott Independence Day celebrations and announcing
general strikes in the States where they are active, violence
was widely expected. As a matter of routine during such
important events, the authorities across the Northeast had
deployed troops, besides putting the police and the paramilitary
on a high state of alert. If it is humanly not possible
to man every inch of a generally rugged and treacherous
territory, extending across State boundaries and international
borders, as in the case of Tripura (it shares an 856 kilometer
long porous and largely unfenced border with Bangladesh),
it is certainly difficult to contain, or even tackle, insurgencies
- especially where these have deep political linkages.
Tripura has two main insurgent groups, the National Liberation
Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and the ATTF. Formed in December 1989 with the rather unclear
demand for a 'free holy land of Tripura' cleansed of the
Bengali settlers from the plains, the NLFT is an offshoot
of the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV), the State's first
rebel outfit led by Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl. The TNV signed
a deal with the Government on August 12, 1988, during Rajiv
Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister, and Hrangkhawl with his
men 'gave up arms.' But, a sizeable chunk of the surrendered
TNV cadres once again decided to turn to the gun and floated
the NLFT. The NLFT is accused of directly backing the Indigenous
Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) - which is headed by
Hrangkhawl - an ally of the opposition Congress in the State.
If we look at the main grievance of the NLFT and compare
it with the objectives for which the INPT claims to fight
for, we find a commonality of interest - both seek to restore
the 'rights and privileges of the tribals' in Tripura, who
have been reduced to a minority by waves of migration from
present-day Bangladesh. The NLFT has always been seen as
a group soft towards the Congress and its one-time tribal
ally, the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), which has
since merged with the INPT.
The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) that has been
ruling Tripura for years now, alarmed by the emergence of
the NLFT, is said to have supported the creation of the
ATTF in May 1990, to protect the tribal-compact areas. Targeting
Congress-TUJS members and supporters, the ATTF was fast
turned into a rebel outfit. After the fourth Marxist-led
Left Front Government came to power in Tripura in April
1993, the ATTF cadres surrendered en masse. However,
just as some TNV cadres chose to stick to arms, a section
of ATTF rebels under Ranjit Debbarma remained underground
and re-christened their group as the All Tripura Tiger Force.
Thus, if the NLFT shares its political objectives with the
INPT-Congress combine, the ATTF is out to protect the CPI
(M)'s tribal base, with both claiming to protect the interests
of the State's minority tribal population.
Why it is the ATTF, and not the NLFT, that has suddenly
become active is perplexing. Tripura Chief Minister Manik
Sarkar, during a telephone conversation with this writer
on Sunday night, disputed this perception, pointing out
that the NLFT was 'equally active.' He said: "On the eve
of Independence Day, there was a massive gun-battle between
the NLFT and troops belonging to the Border Security Force
(BSF) on the Tripura-Mizoram border. It was not widely reported
because the casualties, unlike the ATTF massacre, were not
high. Five BSF troopers were wounded."
There is, however, evidence of increasing ATTF activities
in recent weeks. A little-noticed political development
is attributed to be one of the reasons for the ATTF stepping
up its 'domination drive.' The INPT-Congress combine that
was in power at the 30-member Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous
District Council (TTAADC) suffered a jolt in July 2003,
when seven INPT members defected and formed a new group
called the Nationalist Socialist Party of Tripura to capture
power in the Council with the backing of the 10 CPI(M) members.
This means that, once again, the CPI (M) is back in the
direct administration of Tripura's tribal areas through
the TTAADC. For the CPI (M), holding the 20 State Assembly
seats (out of the total 60) located in tribal dominated
areas under its sway is crucial from the point of view of
winning State elections. And, if one is to accept that there
is indeed a nexus between the CPI (M) and the ATTF, it is
only natural to see a spurt in the ATTF's activities as
the local district council has once again come to be ruled
by the Marxists.
Besides, the suddenly stepped-up violence by the ATTF is
very much a part of the ongoing turf war between it and
the NLFT. As things stand today, it is advantage ATTF, as
the NLFT suffered a split last year with a faction led by
Nayanbashi Jamatia said to have reached an understanding
with the ATTF. However, the main NLFT faction headed by
Biswamohan Debbarma is still active and has a strength of
up to 700 hardcore fighters. The NLFT, too, has targeted
non-tribals directly, but the extent of selective killings
of non-tribals by the ATTF has, indeed, been high. In November
1996, the ATTF mowed down 28 Bengalis during a massacre
at Bazar Colony in West District. Again, in early 1997,
ATTF rebels killed more than 60 non-tribals, mostly Bengalis,
in five different strikes. This had led to an exodus of
Bengalis from the Khowai sub-division in West District,
besides a feeble retaliation by the non-tribals. Earlier
this year, on the night of Republic Day (January 26), ATTF
militants killed 11 Bengalis near Mandai Chowmani, once
again in its stronghold of the West Tripura district.
If there is some sort of bonhomie between the rebels and
political forces in Tripura, that only makes things all
the more murky. Political considerations appear to be the
key reason for New Delhi's failure to heed Chief Minister
Sarkar's persistent pleas for deployment of the Army to
combat the rebels, or to increase the strength of the BSF
to man the border with Bangladesh more effectively. The
Chief Minister emphasized the crucial significance of the
Bangladesh border in this context: "The ATTF seems to have
acted at the behest of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence.
The ATTF, as also other groups, are being nurtured and guided
by the ISI from across the border. It is not just J&K, the
ISI seems bent on setting the Northeast ablaze by aiding
the insurgent groups in the area". Some statistics provided
by the beleaguered Chief Minister are interesting. He disclosed
that, by the BSF's own estimate, a total of 22 battalions
are required to properly patrol the border with Bangladesh,
while the force currently has to make do with just nine
battalions. "The border fence is not complete yet and there
is no Army presence whatsoever in my State," the Chief Minister
said, almost helplessly, during his telephonic conversation
with this writer.
Under the circumstances, what is certain is that Tripura
is bound to remain in the rebels' firing line, and it is
difficult is to guess for how long.
The Sectarian Menace
Guest Writer: Dr. Iffat Idris
Islamabad-based political
analyst
Sectarian
violence is an unpredictable menace in Pakistan: for weeks,
even months at a time, nothing happens; then all of a sudden
there is a sectarian massacre. No one can tell when or where
the sectarian menace will strike next.
On July 4, 2003, it struck a Shi'a imambargah (mosque)
in Quetta, the capital of the Balochistan province. Worshippers
at the Asna Ashari Hazara Imambargah were in the middle
of Friday prayers when two men entered and opened fire with
automatic weapons. A third assailant then set off a suicide
bomb. Dozens of worshippers were killed on the spot, while
others died later in hospital. The total death toll was
over 50. All those killed were Shi'as of the Hazara community.
Earlier, on June 8, Shi'a police recruits, also from the
Hazara community, were gunned down as they were being driven
back to their barracks in Quetta. Prior to this, the last
major sectarian attack in Pakistan had occurred in Karachi
in February, when nine Shi'as were gunned down as they prayed
in a mosque.
As all these incidents indicate, the primary victims of
sectarian violence are members of the minority Shi'a community.
Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, has been an especial site
of sectarian Shi'a killings. Such is the scale of the problem
there that hundreds of professional Shi'as have packed their
bags and moved abroad, though Sunnis have also been targeted
by extremist Shi'as. Furthermore, the sectarian menace has
gradually spread from Karachi to other provinces - notably
Punjab, and now Balochistan. Across the country, the total
death toll in sectarian killings over the past decade runs
into several thousand.
While seeking an explanation for Pakistan's sectarian menace,
it is noteworthy that, for decades, the country's Shi'as
and Sunnis lived side by side without any major problems.
Sectarian killings are a relatively recent phenomenon in
Pakistani society. Their roots, thus, lie not in religious
differences, but in political and social developments within
Pakistan and the region. They are intimately tied up with
the country's wider problem of militant extremist Islam.
The origins of sectarian violence in Pakistan can be traced
back to the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
American funding and Pakistani assistance promoted the proliferation
of a huge number of militant Islamist groups and madrassahs
(seminaries) inside Pakistan. Washington needed the
Islamists to 'wage jihad' against the Soviets in
Afghanistan, while Islamabad needed them to bring in billions
of American dollars. Hence both turned a blind eye to their
radical ideology and methods.
The shortsightedness of that thinking became apparent immediately
after the Soviet Union's exit. While radical Islamists in
Afghanistan formed the Taliban,
their brethren in Pakistan turned their attention towards
Indian Kashmir or to sectarian opponents inside Pakistan.
Each act of sectarian killing provoked a cycle of revenge
killings. Civilian Governments failed to curb the menace,
either because they wanted the militants to fight Pakistan's
corner in Indian Kashmir, or because they lacked the will
and the strength to do so. That failure in turn allowed
the religious militants to flourish and grow in strength.
External factors other than Kashmir also promoted sectarianism.
For a period, Shi'a and Sunni sectarian groups were sponsored
by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively. These two rivals
fought a proxy war in Pakistan. Their support abated as
relations between Tehran and Riyadh improved, but the sectarian
groups found other sources of sustenance. They derived ideological
inspiration (not to mention a base from where to train and
launch their operations) from the ultra-orthodox Taliban
that came to power in Afghanistan. The Taliban had strong
links with madrassahs in Pakistan, so it was little
wonder their hard-line thinking influenced people there.
The end-result of all this was that when Musharraf seized
power in October 1999, he faced a formidable foe: well-armed,
well-trained and well-financed Islamist-sectarian organizations,
with a huge resource pool of recruits in the country's thousands
of religious madrassahs. Dealing with such a foe
was never going to be easy.
His task was made somewhat easier by 9/11
and the worldwide backlash against terrorism and extremist
Islam (not to mention the Taliban) that it unleashed. Musharraf
could strike against sectarian groups knowing that public
opinion was mostly on his side. Religious parties, who would
normally be expected to mobilize massive street protests
against any Government attempt to curb religious activism,
were now unable to do so.
Pakistan's decision to cut support for the Kashmiri separatist
movement also boosted its drive against sectarianism. As
seen, many sectarian groups emerged or were tolerated because
of their connections with groups fighting in Indian Kashmir.
Once Islamabad decided to abandon the latter, it no longer
had to put up with the former.
The first clear sign of a shift in the Government's attitudes
came in a televised speech by General Musharraf to the nation
on 12 January 2002. The Chief Executive announced a campaign
to eradicate the sectarian menace. He banned three sectarian
groups, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),
Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP),
and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM),
and put the Sunni Tehrik on notice. He also announced a
reform programme for religious madrassahs - breeding
grounds for religious extremism and sectarianism.
Implementing the anti-sectarian drive, however, has been
easier said than done. As a leading English daily pointed
out in its editorial the day after the Quetta killings:
"Mere condemnations and resolve of the kind expressed by
the President and Prime Minister are not enough. They should
prove by deeds that they are capable of rooting out the
menace of terrorism, especially of the sectarian variety."
Aside from the massive scale of the task - there are thousands
of madrassahs, tens of thousands of unregulated arms
- there are very real problems with regard to the capacity
of the security forces. Whenever an incident like that in
Quetta takes place, police are quick to make arrests - but
those detained are usually scapegoats. Very few of the people
actually responsible for sectarian killings have been captured
or convicted. Improving the dismal record of the intelligence
and security forces requires a huge investment in equipment
and training - not easy for a country like Pakistan with
limited resources.
The other knee-jerk reaction among many Pakistanis, especially
those in authority, is to blame a 'foreign hand' for sectarian
violence. The July Quetta massacre, for example, was initially
blamed on Afghan nationals. Accusing outside forces is a
convenient way of deflecting attention (and criticism) from
the authorities' clear failings. But it does not help deal
with the actual problem, which is primarily domestic in
origin.
There is also a growing suspicion that the Government's
strategy could be fundamentally flawed. Banning groups does
not render them ineffective - rather, it drives them underground
and makes them even harder to trace and curb. As the attack
in Quetta showed, it only takes a handful of dedicated extremists
to wreak wide-scale carnage and destruction. Unless the
Pakistan Government can find a way to deal with these dedicated
sectarian killers, the threat of sectarian violence will
continue to cast a dark shadow over Pakistani society.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
August 11-17, 2003
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Civilian
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
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Total
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BANGLADESH
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3
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0
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2
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5
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INDIA
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Assam
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0
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0
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7
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7
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
14
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15
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32
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61
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Left-wing
Extremism
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2
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0
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5
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7
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Manipur
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7
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0
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1
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8
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Mizoram
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0
|
1
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0
|
1
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Tripura
|
30
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10
|
1
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41
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Total (INDIA)
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53
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26
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46
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125
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NEPAL
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0
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2
|
8
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10
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SRI LANKA
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2
|
0
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0
|
2
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
11 Bangladeshis
among 21 terror suspects arrested in Saudi
Arabia: Police in Saudi Arabia arrested
21 terror suspects, including 11 Bangladeshis,
from a house in the southern province of
Jazan on August 15, 2003. Approximately
93 Bazooka rockets, 50 hand grenades, a
number of firearms, a large quantity of
ammunition, chemical substances and detonators
were also seized from their possession.
Commenting on the arrests, a spokesperson
of the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs
said, "We have come to know about the incident
in Saudi Arabia from an unofficial source
and asked our mission in Riyadh to send
a detailed and elaborate report on it immediately".
Daily
Star , August 18, 2003.
INDIA
ATTF
terrorists kill 30 persons
ahead of Independence Day
in Tripura: Suspected
All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF)
terrorists killed 30 persons
in two separate attacks
at Totabari and Baralunga
villages of West Tripura
district on August 14, 2003,
a day ahead of Independence
Day. Press
Trust of India,
August 16, 2003.
British national with
suspected links to Mumbai
mafia arrested in USA: A
British national with suspected
links to an unidentified
mafia group in Mumbai was
arrested in Newark, New
Jersey, US on August 12,
2003, by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) for
allegedly agreeing to supply
surface-to-air Russian missile
system to a decoy FBI personnel.
The accused had reportedly
agreed to sell a Russian
SA-18 Igla missile to an
undercover FBI agent posing
as a terrorist. The
Hindu, August
13, 2003.
Pakistan President's
cease-fire proposal is propagandist,
says Foreign Ministry:
Responding to the Pakistan
President Pervez Mushararf's
proposal for a conditional
cease-fire between India
and Pakistan along the Line
of Control (LoC) and reducing
the strength of Indian security
forces in the Kashmir Valley,
External Affairs Ministry
spokesperson Navtej Sarna
said, on August 12, 2003,
that there was "nothing
new" in these suggestions.
He said, "They have not
been found effective in
the past because Pakistan
has continued to sponsor
terrorism directed against
India and provided support
to cross-border infiltration.
Once terrorism in the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) is stopped and Pakistan-aided
terrorists stop crossing
the LoC, the level of firing
would naturally go down."
Instead of "propagandist"
statements, Pakistan should
take effective and long-term
oriented measures to dismantle
the infrastructure of terrorism,
he added. Times
of India,
August 12, 2003.
PAKISTAN
President
Musharraf offers cease-fire along Line of Control: President
Pervez Musharraf on August 12, 2003, offered an immediate cease-fire
along the Line of Control (LoC), and also indicated his willingness
to 'facilitate' it in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) if India reciprocates by releasing Kashmiri prisoners,
allowing free movement of Kashmiri leaders and reducing security
forces' deployment. On the issue of 'facilitation', he claimed
that no assurance is possible since it is not in his control.
However, he added that the influence of 'various elements' can
be used to persuade the 'freedom fighters' to respond if India
assures reciprocal measures. This was stated by him during a
meeting with the visiting Indian parliamentarians, experts,
editors and office-bearers of the South Asian Free Media Association
(SAFMA) in Islamabad. Jang,
August 13, 2003.
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The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
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for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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