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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 7, September 1, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Tide of Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
For years
now, the Institute for Conflict Management has built
the case that the conflict in Kashmir is not about Kashmir;
that it reflects, rather, an irreducible conflict between
the ideology of religious exclusion and hatred that underlies
the creation, existence, politics and strategic perspectives
of Pakistan, and India's secular, pluralistic democracy;
and that it has, at its heart, objectives that go far beyond
the apparent territorial dispute over Kashmir, and that
are intrinsically linked to the current 'global jehad'
by a wide and interconnected network of Islamist terrorists.
The dramatic succession of incidents, arrests and seizures
over an extended geographical area across India in the seven
days past, virtually encapsulate the broad underlying dynamic
that fuels the Islamist extremist jehad in South
Asia, and its roots in the ideological and political pathology
that lies at the core of the Pakistani state.
The week began with by far the worst of these incidents
on August 25, in Mumbai, India's financial capital, where
two coordinated bomb blasts killed 52 persons and injured
another 148 in the vicinity of the historical landmark,
the Gateway of India and at the crowded Zaveri Bazaar. While
definitive identification of the perpetrators is still to
come, forensic patterns and recent history - at least five
similar explosions have occurred in different parts of the
city since December 2002 - point the finger at cadres of
Pakistan-based terrorist groups, particularly the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT),
and their local affiliates, the proscribed Students Islamic
Movement of India (SIMI)
and the Kashmir-based militant Islamist women's organization,
the Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM).
Hours after the blasts, more than 100 detonators were found
inside a railway tunnel at Ghatandevi near Igatpuri, approximately
60 kilometers from Nashik in Maharashtra, just an hour before
an express train carrying a large number of pilgrims was
to pass.
On August 27, while the Inter-State Council was meeting
at Srinagar, with several Chief Ministers and Union Cabinet
Ministers in attendance, and presided over by Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee, two terrorists entered Hotel Greenway
- under three kilometers away from the venue of the Council
- and engaged in an exchange of fire with the security forces
(SFs) for approximately 12 hours. The encounter ended during
the early hours of August 28, with five persons - including
the terrorists - dead and an unspecified number injured.
National Conference leader Javed Shah, a former militant
and legislator, was among those killed. Al-Mansooran, a
front organization of the LeT, claimed responsibility for
the incident.
On August 30, acting on a tip-off, the Border Security Force
(BSF), engaged with two terrorists - including, crucially,
Shahnawaz Khan @ 'Ghazi Baba', the operational chief of
the Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
in the Noorbagh locality of Srinagar. Three persons - including
a BSF soldier and the two terrorists, were killed, though
the JeM has claimed that Ghazi Baba was not among the dead.
The operation is extraordinary in its significance, and
could mark the unraveling of an India-wide terrorist network
directly controlled by Ghazi Baba, who was one of the key
accused in the attack on India's Parliament at Delhi on
December 13, 2001; the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative
Assembly on October 1, 2001; the Akshardham Temple attack
in Gujarat on September 24, 2002; the hijacking of IC 814
on December 24, 1999; the 1998 massacre of 25 Kashmiri Pandits
(descendants of Hindu priests) at Wandhama in Anantnag,
Kashmir; the abduction of six Western tourists, one of whom
was beheaded, and another four of whom are yet to be traced
and believed dead (one American tourists managed to escape),
by the Al Faran in July 1995; and a succession of high profile
fidayeen (suicide squad) attacks on security force
establishment in Jammu & Kashmir.
On August 30, again, two terrorists - a Pakistani and a
Delhi resident - of the JeM were killed in an encounter
at the Indraprastha Millennium Park in Delhi. The encounter
occurred after the Police had intercepted a truck containing
a large quantity of explosives, arms and ammunition, including
Under Barrel Grenade Launchers, from a truck, and arrested
three terrorists. On interrogation, the arrested terrorists
had disclosed that the weapons and explosives were intended
to engineer major incidents in the capital, and that they
were to be received by the terrorists at the Millennium
Park. In another incident on the same day, the police found
148 sticks of gelatin explosives at the New Delhi railway
station in an unclaimed bag.
In follow-up operations after the Delhi arrests and encounter,
further arrests of two JeM terrorists took place in Bulandshahr
in the State of Uttar Pradesh on August 31. 23 electronic
detonators and three remote control devices were also recovered
in this incident.
Despite the geographical spread of these various incidents,
and the firepower expended or recovered, this is barely
the tip of the iceberg of Pakistan sponsored Islamist terrorism
in India. In the wake of the Mumbai blasts, a great deal
of poorly informed 'analysis', both in the Indian and the
international media, sought to link the incidents to proximate
triggering events - including, among others, the Gujarat
riots last year, and the disclosure of a report by the Archaeological
Survey of India, on the very morning of the twin explosions
in Mumbai, which claimed that a 10th Century Temple lay
under the foundations of the disputed Babri Masjid (mosque)
site in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. These analyses fail to comprehend
the sheer enormity of the Islamist extremist enterprise
in South Asia, the continuity of motives that underlie a
long succession of incidents, and the complexity and number
of cells and networks that have been established across
the country to secure a sustained and subversive strategic
agenda. For one thing, for each terrorist conspiracy that
manifests itself in a successful operation, there are literally
scores that are discovered and pre-empted. In just the past
four and a half years, since mid-1998, over 250 Pakistan-backed
Islamist terrorist cells have been discovered and disrupted
across the length and breadth of India outside Jammu
& Kashmir. Hundreds of arrests occur, and literally thousands
of kilograms of explosives and numberless weapons are seized
each year. In private conversations, General Hamid Gul,
the former Director General of Pakistan's Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI), is reported to have recently boasted
that this Agency had established at least another 300 operational
cells across India, that these had been charged with the
responsibility of recruitment and mobilization of local
cadres, and that these could be activated on command.
Even a surface acquaintance with the motivating ideologies
of the groups involved in the Islamist extremist enterprise
in South Asia exposes the essential logic and dynamic of
their operations. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of the
LeT, for instance, writes that jehad is imperative
until "the way of life prescribed by Allah dominates and
overwhelms the whole world… Fighting is also obligatory
until the disbelieving powers and states are subdued and
they pay jizya (capitulation tax) with willing submission."
Similarly, the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin's Fazl-ur-Rahman declares,
"Delhi, Calcutta, Mumbai and Washington are the real targets
of militants. Muslims should cooperate with militants for
dominance of Islam in the world." SIMI's manifesto rejects
democracy, but resolves to exploit its processes to "expose
the nature of the system, democracy, socialism, secularism,
nationalism, etc., and ask the people to boycott the election
and march for the Islamic revolution." Significantly, despite
the fact that SIMI draws its cadres from within India, its
concerns are not integrally linked to local Muslim grievances.
Of the nine major demonstrations organized by SIMI, and
listed on its now-defunct website, only two related to communal
violence in India. The last on the list was organized to
protest the Saudi Arab Government's 1996 decision "to allow
American troops to enter Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) in direct
violation of the instruction of Prophet Mohammad." SIMI
has integral and demonstrable links both to the ISI and
a number of Pakistan-based terrorist groups, and substantially
derives its inspiration from Osama bin Laden - who it iconizes
as an outstanding example of a 'true mujahid' (holy
warrior) and a 'champion and true savior of Islam.'
With their abiding ideological underpinnings, it must be
clear that these groups are not swayed by local events,
though they exploit local grievances to extend the resource
pool of potential recruits. Groups like the LeT, JeM and
SIMI will, consequently, continue to target India as long
as they retain their capacities to strike, and as long as
they continue to receive the enormous material and logistics
support from, and safe-havens in, Pakistan.
While the dramatic incidents of the past week do focus attention
on the enormity of the conspiracy that is being executed
in South Asia, they tend to detract from the equally important
'bleeding war' that is integral to its realization. In Jammu
& Kashmir alone, each month and on the average, well over
200 persons are killed in the ongoing campaign of cross-border
terrorism, even as Pakistan engages in, and secures legitimacy
from, the pretence of participation in a 'peace process'
with India. Unless a far greater measure of realism and
consistency attends the world's perceptions and assessments
of the Islamist extremist enterprise, and Pakistan's unrelenting
and central role in its advancement, the footprint of terror
will continue to enlarge itself, not only in South Asia,
but across the world.
Return to Bloodshed
Guest Writer: Yubaraj Ghimire
Editor, Kantipur
All hopes
and wishes for a peaceful resolution of the Maoist
conflict were razed to the ground last week when Maoist
'supremo', Prachanda, called off the peace process and the
truce which had been in effect for the past seven months.
Prachanda's call was implemented by his armed guerrillas
in the capital city of Kathmandu and in far flung areas,
provoking the government to declared the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoists) a terrorist organization, giving a liberal
mandate to the security agencies to deal with them.
The Maoists seemed well prepared, at least for the time
being. On Thursday, three armed Maoists shot and killed
one of the country's most celebrated Army Officer - Col.
Kiran Bahadur Basnyat in Kathmandu - as he was about to
get into his jeep. Basnyat was being tipped to shortly head
a battalion charged with looking after security arrangements
in the capital and keeping a tab on Maoist activities, after
his promotion to the rank of Brigadier General,. Three bullets
pierced his temple and other vital organs, and Basnyat was
declared dead in the Army hospital.
But the list of those attacked does not end with Basnyat.
Another army officer, Colonel Ramindra Chhetri, who used
to run the army propaganda directed against Maoists on the
Government owned Television; Devendra Raj Kandel, a former
Minister of State for Home and a die-hard anti-Maoists were
hit and wounded, while the ancestral house of Prakash Chandra
Lohani, the present Finance Minister and Chief Negotiator
in the failed dialogue process, was set ablaze.
The Maoists seem to have adopted urban guerrilla warfare
and hit and run tactics, giving a tough time to the equally
committed armed forces, who have been supplied with more
sophisticated automatic weapons by the Government. Nevertheless,
Kathmandu's future is uncertain and lies in the shadow of
terror. According to official assessments, the Maoist decision
to target the senior level Army officers is solely intended
to reject all possibilities of a peace process, even in
future.
Nepal's unstable politics currently revolves around three
poles, and its consequent direction is hard to predict.
King Gyanendra, who is away in London for a routine physical
check-up, does not enjoy a harmonious relationship with
the major political parties, which have been agitating ever
since he dismissed the Government headed by Sher Bahadur
Deuba on October 4, 2002. Arguing that the King had no right
to dismiss the Prime Minister, these parties want Madhav
Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist, CPN-UML) installed as the
Prime Minister as a precondition for the restoration of
the relationship with the King. They have refused to recognize
the legitimacy of Prime Minsiter Surya Bahadur Thapa's Government
- the second since royal takeover in October - although
the King made it clear two months ago that the power he
appropriated in October duly lies with the new council of
ministers.
Nevertheless, in a country where royalty has been revered
and backed in the past, the institution continues to be
recognized as a force to reckon with, both by the agitating
political parties, as well as the Maoist rebels who were
insisting till recently that they 'would hold talks only
with the king who represents the old regime', claiming that
the Maoists themselves represented the 'new or future regime'.
But the distance between the three poles - the King and
his Government, the political parties, and the Maoists -
is ever-increasing and that is what is creating a problem
for the country.
The selective targeting of senior Army officers and politicians
has, however, injected fear among politicians - both in
the Government and those opposing it. It was in this context
that Prime Minister Thapa appealed to the political parties
on Friday, August 29, to put off their ongoing agitation,
which is to enter a new phase with proposed 'mammoth rallies'
in the capital in support of their demand to have their
nominee, Madhav Nepal, installed as the new Prime Minister.
The lack of a security environment has increased the possibility
of politicians or the proposed rallies being targeted by
the Maoists, on the one hand, or by the security forces
under provocation. That is something that political parties
may have to consider seriously before rejecting the Prime
Minister's appeal.
What remains far more important, however, is that a durable
peace cannot be brought back unless the Maoists are either
defeated decisively in a military action, or a fruitful
peace process is initiated. An extended spell of Emergency
Rule between November 2001 and July 2002 - in the wake of
collapse of the first ever peace dialogue during the Sher
Bahadur Deuba Government - was a proof that military action
alone cannot defeat the guerrillas, who now have better
arms and safer and strategic hiding places.
Why did the peace process collapse? The Government and the
Maoists are blaming each other. According to Information
Minister Kamal Thapa, who was also one of the negotiators
from the Government side, the Maoists were simply using
the peace process to consolidate their tactical and military
strength. "The Government was flexible and willing to discuss
any political demand put forth by the Maoists. But they
insisted that the Government should outright accept the
demand for the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft
the new Constitution."
Were the Maoists actually in a hurry to be part of the Constitutional
process? The rebels have not explained their position, but
abruptly calling off the peace process and resuming violence
does not suggest a serious intent in this direction. "They
simply wanted to put the onus for the break-down of the
peace process on the Government", a senior Army Officer
said, adding that this would be an opportunity lost for
the rebels. With the latest round of violence by the Maoists,
they are, perhaps, more feared, but are gradually losing
respect as a 'political force'. They have, no doubt, acquired
power and a certain status through the barrel of their guns.
But the Maoists will eventually need to have their legitimacy
and status endorsed by the people through a peaceful electoral
process. The current round of violence is only blocking
the process of their legitimization.
Nagaland: Chastising Insurgency
Sashinungla
Research Assistant,
Institute for Conflict Management Database and Documentation
Center, Guwahati
In Sungkomen
ward of the north-western town of Mokokchung in Nagaland,
on August 24, 2003, two senior cadres of the Khaplang faction
of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-K),
the Secretary and the Chairman of the outfit for the Lotha
region, Wobemo and Chumthungo, decided to celebrate the
death of a cadre of their rival NSCN-IM
(the Isak-Muivah faction) in the adjacent district of Wokha
the previous day. They took out their guns and started firing
in the air, causing great panic among the people. As residents
repeatedly asked these cadres to stop disturbing their children,
who were preparing for their examinations, the insurgents
turned their guns on the residents, leading to the death
of a student. What followed was unprecedented in the history
of insurgency in the State of Nagaland.
Irate residents of Sungkomen, one of the fifteen wards in
Mokochung town, lynched the two militants responsible for
the killing. The reaction did not stop there. On the next
day, August 25, a mob joined by residents of other wards
went on to set afire eight houses of top NSCN-K leaders,
including that of the organisation's General Secretary,
Ketovi Zhimomi, as well as 22 vehicles belonging to the
militant group. It was nothing sort of a little revolution,
which cleaned out Mokokchung of the menace of the NSCN-K.
What is so symbolic about the 'little revolt' in Mokokchung,
the bastion of the Ao tribe? Most of the top ranking leaders
of the NSCN-K faction, kilonsers (ministers) in the
outfit's parlance, have their residences in Mokokchung and,
even though the organisation's chief, Khaplang, operates
from his mobile headquarters in the jungles of Myanmar,
Mokokchung is, for all practical purposes, the de facto
headquarters of the NSCN-K. Cadres and middle ranking
leaders are obliged to report at Mokokchung to the kilonsers,
such as Captain Lanu Ao, the second rung leader of the outfit,
'Major' Aheto, Niki Sema, and R. Lotha Mhatsung. A central
intelligence officer, posted at Mokokchung, speaking to
the writer, disclosed, "If NSCN-IM cadres have to come to
Mokokchung, they will come through Wokha district, but not
through the Dimapur-Mokokchung road, because this area is
mostly controlled by the NSCN-K."
After the infamous vertical split in the NSCN in 1988, both
the factions have clearly demarcated areas of operation
in Nagaland's 13 districts. Since those days, the NSCN-IM
gradually built its base in the Manipur Hills among the
Thangkuls, and around Kohima, while the NSCN-K, coming under
pressure from the Myanmarese Army in the Hukwang Valley,
moved to the friendlier Konyak and Ao areas in the Tuensang
and Mokokchung region. Thus, at present, the IM group draws
most of its cadres from the Semas, Thangkuls and Phoms and
is strong in districts such as Zunheboto, Wokha, Ukhrul,
Dimapur, Kohima and parts of Tuensang, while the Khaplang
group is active in Mokokchung, Mon and parts of Tuensang
district, with a sizeable following among the Konyak, Ao
and Burmese Nagas.
The NSCN-K, till the recent incident, carried on with rampant
extortion activities in Mokokchung, with public resentment
increasingly finding expression in complaints to the police.
In July alone, for instance, police arrested a NSCN-K cadre
while extorting money from a shop in the Daily Market area
on the 17th; on July 21, police apprehended two NSCN-K militants
who were demanding goods and money from the shops in the
town; again, on July 26 police arrested two NSCN-K cadres
extorting money from a shop in the Daily Market, and recovered
a pistol with six rounds of ammunition.
The lynching incident and the violence that followed, threatens
the very existence of the NSCN-K in the area. So great has
been the anger of the people - who have not only tolerated
the outfit's presence in their area but also provided the
cadres with 'tax' regularly, albeit under the point of gun
- that local organizations have taken up the responsibility
of teaching the insurgents a lesson. Under the initiatives
of local organisations like the Ao Senden (Hoho or Tribal
Council), the Town Ward leaders, and the Ao Students Conference
(Ao Kaketshir Mungdang, AKM), people of the area have decided
to stop paying 'tax' to the outfit. The sizeable income,
which the outfit used to make from all wards and villages
of the district, could, consequently, now simply dry up.
Further, under the aegis of Ao Senden, the AKM, the Village
Councils and the Town Ward leaders, a public general meeting
was held on August 29, where citizens of the district decided
that no payment of 'tax' would henceforth be made to either
faction of the NSCN; and that the NSCN-K cadres, who used
to stay overnight at villages and the district headquarters,
would not be allowed to do so in future.
This is a serious setback for the NSCN-K, which lost one
of its great patrons when the previous Chief Minister, S.C.
Jamir, was ousted in the State Assembly Elections in February
2003. Speculation is rife that the present Chief Minister,
N. Rio, with an alleged pro-NSCN-IM, stance, may be behind
the Mokokchung violence. Evidently, in a State, where hardly
any leader exists without some sort of links with either
of the factions, the marginalisation of the Khaplang group
would serve the present regime in no small way. There is,
however, a dominant feeling in Mokokchung that the violence
did not, in fact, point significantly to the role of 'interested'
politicians, but is, rather, an outburst of the people's
anger against 'unnecessary harassment' by the insurgents
who had 'threatened peaceful existence through their unjustified
action'.
The incident also appears to have had dramatic reverberations
on the NSCN-IM, with a copycat lynching at Tuensang town
on August 28. The Tuensang incident occurred during a meeting
between NSCN-IM cadres and leaders of the Tuensang and Mon
Students' Federation (TMSF), to settle a dispute over the
assault on two of the Federation's leaders on August 21.
The lynching took place during a 12-hour bandh (general
strike) called by leaders of the TMSF and the Tuensang Mon
Public Organisation (TMPO) to register their protest against
the assault and harassment of the two leaders by the NSCN-IM
militants. Tempers flared during the meeting, and a large
crowd beat up Raising Tangkhul, one of the two NSCN-IM cadres
who had allegedly assaulted the student leaders on August
21. Raising Tangkhul died of his injuries, while his companions
managed to escape. In a hurried reaction to the incident,
the NSCN-IM announced a 'code of conduct' for its cadre,
which warned them against harassing members of the public
and also banned the collection of 'tax' from any individual
or organization - in the process conceding what it had long
denied, that widespread extortion by its cadres has long
been the norm.
The lynching and mass protests will certainly force some
rethinking within the leadership and ranks of both the factions
of the NSCN. However, those who hope that this may be the
beginning of a larger mass movement for peace in the State
need to accept there are still many miles to traverse before
such an eventuality can be realized. The five-decade-old
insurgency in Nagaland has created its own networks and
complexities, and these are too strong to be broken by such
impulsive and sporadic reactions by the people. It can,
however, reasonably be expected that such unprecedented
jolts from the suffering public will impose a measure of
sobriety on the armed cadres of both groups, who have long
subjected the people to indiscriminate bullying, harassment
and extortion.
Catch 22 in Dhaka
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute
for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The
Sentinel, Guwahati
Bangladesh
may not be Pakistan, but it is another South Asian neighbour
with whom India has an uneasy blow-hot-blow-cold relationship,
despite the extraordinary support extended during its fight
for freedom 32 years ago. And, with the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP), which has always thrived on shrill anti-India
rhetoric, leading the present coalition Government in Dhaka,
any move that may have even a slight bearing on New Delhi
is closely monitored, analyzed and dissected.
It is against this backdrop that the Bangladesh Government's
decision on whether or not to grant political asylum to
Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua is keenly awaited. Chetia
is the detained general secretary of the outlawed Northeast
Indian separatist group, the United Liberation Front of
Asom (ULFA).
New Delhi and Dhaka do not have an extradition treaty in
place yet, but India would expect Bangladesh to hand over
the ULFA leader to it once he is released from jail.
Chetia completed his six-year jail term at the high-security
central prison in Dhaka on Monday, August 25. Technically,
he should have been a free man that day. But, his detention
has been extended by another six months, as he failed to
pay a fine of Bangladesh Taka 10,000 ($172). This extension,
in fact, has come as a breather to Premier Khaleda Zia's
BNP government as the Bangladesh High Court had, on August
23, ordered authorities in Dhaka to decide on Chetia's plea
for political asylum within four weeks. The Bangladesh High
Court's order came in response to a petition moved by the
Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights (BSFEHR),
a frontline rights group in that country, seeking the court's
intervention on the asylum pleas by Chetia and 21 others
belonging to countries ranging from Sri Lanka to South Africa.
Chetia, now 52, was arrested by Bangladesh immigration and
security officials from downtown Dhaka's North Adabor locality
on December 21, 1997. The main charges against the Indian
separatist leader was illegal entry into Bangladesh, possession
of two forged Bangladeshi passports (No 0964185 and 0227883),
possession of an unauthorized satellite telephone and illegal
possession of foreign currency of countries as diverse as
the US, UK, Switzerland, Thailand, Philippines, Spain, Nepal,
Bhutan, Belgium, Singapore and others. Two of Chetia's accomplices,
Babul Sharma and Laxmi Prasad Goswami, were also arrested
along with Chetia the same day. Chetia had earlier pleaded
guilty on the charge of illegal entry into Bangladesh, telling
the court that he was fighting a 'freedom struggle' in Assam
and had to flee to that country to escape the Indian security
forces. The ULFA, formed in April 1979, is fighting for
a 'sovereign, socialist Assam' and is engaged in a bush-war
against the Indian state. New Delhi has declared the group
an outlawed organization.
Dhaka is indeed in a Catch 22 situation. Granting political
asylum to Chetia, who still continues to be the ULFA's General
Secretary, would amount to openly facilitating this Indian
rebel group to establish a representative in Bangladesh
with Dhaka's consent. This would, once again, bring into
sharp focus New Delhi's authoritative claim that top ULFA
leaders, including the outfit's 'chief of staff', Paresh
Barua, have been operating out of Bangladesh, and that the
rebel group from Assam was receiving the backing of sections
in the Bangladeshi intelligence community, in collaboration
with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). On the
other hand, refusal to grant political asylum to Chetia,
from the BNP's point of view, would go against the party's
stated position on the ULFA and 'human rights'.
As Opposition leader in May 1998, within six months of Chetia's
arrest, Ms. Khaleda Zia had told this writer during an interview
at the BNP headquarters in Dhaka, that her party regarded
the ULFA cadres as 'freedom fighters', just as the Bangladeshi
Mukti Bahini were freedom fighters. She had then also expressed
her gratitude to the people of Assam and Meghalaya for sheltering
the Mukti Bahini during the Bangladeshi freedom struggle,
indirectly implying that there was nothing wrong in some
ULFA men taking shelter inside Bangladesh. That, obviously,
may not be the BNP or Premier Zia's official position now,
particularly after 9/11, when the world has declared a 'global
war' against terror.
Moreover, Dhaka's strong denials notwithstanding, international
attention is certainly focused on Bangladesh following western
media reports that the country has become a new hub of Islamist
terrorist groups and elements linked to Al
Qaeda. Curiously enough, some of these reports
had said that the ULFA, too, had sent its representatives
to attend a meeting of radical Islamist outfits at a secret
rendezvous in Bangladesh last year. Charges of the BNP being
soft on some such forces or the ULFA attending such a meeting
cannot be definitively confirmed or refuted. What cannot
be ignored, however, are the discussions in intelligence
circles of a local terror group, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
(HUJI), with an estimated strength of 2,000, currently active
in Bangladesh, with direct links with Al Qaeda. When New
Delhi raises its oft-repeated charge that Dhaka was not
doing much to halt Northeast Indian separatists from operating
out of that country, it touches a sympathetic cord among
those who watch international terrorism and cross-border
insurgencies.
Considering various aspects, Dhaka may finally reject Chetia's
asylum plea, but is unlikely to hand the ULFA leader over
to India. What happens then? In a conversation with this
writer from Dhaka on August 29, Sigma Huda, secretary general
of the BSFEHR, the rights group that has taken up Chetia's
case from the beginning (ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa
had, in fact, thanked BSFEHR for taking up the Chetia case
through a letter dated February 4, 1998), said that if the
ULFA leader is denied asylum by Bangladesh, he has to be
given a chance to opt for asylum in another country. "According
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by
the United Nations on December 10, 1948) and other conventions
on political asylum seekers and refugees, Dhaka is not supposed
to send Chetia back to the country of his origin and, instead,
let him give names of three other countries of his choice
before negotiations on those destinations could begin,"
Huda said. Bangladesh may not grant asylum to Chetia, but
could well cite existing UN provisions to let him first
try for shelter in a third country.
The ULFA too is expected to use all resources at its command
to try and prevent Chetia from falling into the hands of
Indian authorities. The outfit has faced some major reverses
in recent months in the wake of a sustained counter-insurgency
offensive by Indian security forces, and with the Royal
Bhutan Government mounting pressure for the ULFA to pull
out its cadres from at least nine well-entrenched camps
inside the kingdom in a peaceful manner or face 'military
force.'
To add to its woes is the recent sentencing of two detained
ULFA cadres to life imprisonment by a Guwahati court on
charges of being involved in the kidnapping and murder of
well-known social activist Sanjoy Ghose at the eastern Assam
river-island of Majuli in July 1997. The court, acting on
submissions made after the probe into the Ghose murder by
the Central Bureau of Investigation, India's apex criminal
investigative agency, found 11 ULFA cadres guilty of the
crime. Significantly, this includes ULFA 'chief of staff'
Paresh Barua, who Indian authorities are convinced, is operating
from within Bangladesh. Both Dhaka and the ULFA may deny
that the rebels were operating out of bases inside Bangladesh.
However, the Chetia case and the BNP-led Government's handling
of it in the days to come will once again inevitably shift
the spotlight on the issue of separatists from Northeast
India using Bangladesh as a secure staging arena for their
campaigns of terror.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
August 25-31, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
4
|
0
|
1
|
5
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
Delhi
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
13
|
9
|
27
|
49
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
5
|
6
|
12
|
Maharashtra
|
52
|
0
|
0
|
52
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
4
|
6
|
Nagaland
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
Tripura
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
69
|
15
|
48
|
132
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
11
|
31
|
44
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
ULFA leader
Anup Chetia to remain in Kashimpur jail
for failure to pay fine: Official sources
were quoted as saying that Anup Chetia,
'general secretary' of the proscribed Indian
terrorist group United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA),
will remain in the Kashimpur Jail for another
six months as he failed to pay the fine
of Taka 10,000 (approximately 172 USD).
Chetia was arrested along with his associates
Babul Sharma and Laxmi Prasad Goswami from
the North Adabor area in Dhaka on December
21, 1997. A Dhaka court sentenced him in
year 2002 with the jail term and fine for
possessing a satellite phone. Daily
Star, August 26, 2003.
INDIA
Parliament
attack mastermind Ghazi
Baba killed in Srinagar
encounter: Two terrorists,
including Shahnawaz Khan
alias Ghazi Baba, 'operational
chief' of the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
in Jammu and Kashmir and
a key accused in the December
13, 2001 Parliament attack
case, were killed in an
encounter with the Border
Security Force (BSF) in
the Noorbagh locality of
Srinagar on August 30, 2003.
One BSF personnel was also
killed and eight BSF personnel
were injured during the
encounter. Speaking to the
media, Inspector General
(IG), BSF, Kashmir Frontier,
Vijay Raman said, "We have,
I repeat, we have Ghazi
Baba dead". He said that
BSF had overnight apprehended
a person in north Kashmir
who identified the Jaish
hideout in the locality.
BSF laid siege to the house,
owned by one Mohammad Shafi
Dar, and killed two terrorists,
including Ghazi Baba, in
a prolonged encounter. Two
AK-56 rifles, 15 hand grenades,
two wireless sets and four
rocket launchers were recovered
from the encounter site.
However, the JeM denied
Ghazi Baba was among those
killed in the encounter.
"Ghazi Baba was not even
in the vicinity of Noorbagh
area," the outfit's spokesperson
Abu Muslim said in a statement
to a local news agency.
Two JeM cadres were killed
while five others escaped
with one of them in injured
condition, he added. Daily
Excelsior,
August 31, 2003.
Two ULFA terrorists sentenced
to life in Assam in Sanjoy
Ghosh murder case: On
August 27, 2003, a Court
in Assam's Kamrup district
sentenced to life two United
Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA)
terrorists convicting them
in the Sanjoy Ghosh abduction
and murder case. Ghosh,
a social worker, had been
abducted on July 4, 1997,
from the Majuli area and
was subsequently killed.
Pronouncing the judgment,
the judge also held nine
more ULFA terrorists, including
ULFA 'commander-in-chief'
Paresh Barua, guilty on
the same account. While
six of them are yet to be
arrested, three others have
since been killed in various
incidents. Sentinel
Assam, August
28, 2003.
Union Government to intensify
peace process, says Prime
Minister Vajpayee: Speaking
at the eighth Inter-State
Council meeting in Srinagar
on August 27, 2003, Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
said that the Union Government
would further intensify
efforts to advance the dialogue
process by "opening the
doors" to all those who
reject terrorism and extreme
positions. "I assure the
people and the Government
of Jammu and Kashmir that
we will give them maximum
help in consolidating the
recent gains," said Vajpayee
while inaugurating the meeting,
being held for the first
time outside the national
capital of Delhi. The meeting
of India's apex forum of
co-operative federalism
in Srinagar "gives yet another
clear message that the situation
in the State is changing,"
Vajpayee added. However,
addressing a press conference
in Jammu on August 29, the
Premier reiterated that
talks with Pakistan would
be 'meaningless' if terrorist
attacks continued. He said,
"We want a meaningful dialogue
with Pakistan. But it would
not be possible if terrorism
continues." Daily
Excelsior,
August 30 & 28, 2003.
52 persons killed and
148 injured in twin bomb
blasts in Mumbai: 52
persons were killed and
148 others injured, in twin
bomb blasts in Mumbai, capital
city of Maharashtra, on
August 25, 2003. The first
bomb exploded around 1.07pm
(IST) near the Gateway of
India and the second one
at 1.30pm (IST) in the Zaveri
Bazaar area. In both the
blasts, high explosives
were kept inside two taxis,
which were used by the terrorists
to reach the incident site.
The city Police Commissioner,
R. S. Sharma, said that
the blasts could have been
carried out by "a jehadi
group", possibly the proscribed
Students Islamic Movement
of India (SIMI)
or the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
which "have several modules
in the city and around".
"We have worked on this
suspicion before and even
now, we suspect them but
it is too early to pinpoint
who (is responsible for
the blasts)", he said. Meanwhile,
Maharashtra Minister of
State for Home Kripashankar
Singh said on August 31
that five persons had been
detained for questioning
from different parts of
the State in connection
with the explosions. Indian
Express ,
August 13, 2003; Times
of India,
August 26, 2003.
NEPAL
Maoist
insurgents call
off cease-fire:
Maoist
insurgents
unilaterally and
"temporarily" pulled
out from the seven-month
old cease-fire with
the Nepalese Government
on August 27, 2003.
Maoist chief Pushpa
Kamal Dahal alias
Prachanda in a statement,
reportedly posted
on the Maoists'
web site, held the
Government responsible
for the decision.
He said, "The rationale
for cease-fire,
code of conduct
and talks process
is now over for
the time being."
He cited the killing
of 17 Maoist insurgents
at Ramechhap district
on August 17 and
the Government's
alleged rigid stand
on the political
agenda as the main
reasons for the
"withdrawal". The
third round of peace
talks were held
on August 17 in
Nepalganj. Separately,
on August 28, the
Government declared
the Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist
(CPN-M) as a terrorist
group and said that
outfits linked to
it would also be
treated in a like
manner. Opposing
this announcement,
the Maoists have
given a three-day
general strike call
starting on September
18, 2003. Nepal
News ,
August 28 & 27,
2003.
PAKISTAN
Army
officers
being
probed
for
alleged
links
with
extremists,
says
spokesperson:
Inter-Services
Public
Relations
(ISPR)
spokesperson
Major-General
Shaukat
Sultan
said
on
August
31,
2003,
that
"three
to
four"
Pakistani
Army
officers
were
under
investigation
for
their
alleged
links
with
an
unnamed
extremist
organisation.
"There
are
about
three
to
four
officers
below
the
rank
of
lieutenant-colonel.
They
are
under
investigation
for
alleged
possible
links
with
some
extremist
organisation,"
said
Sultan.
Jang,
September
1,
2003.
Al
Qaeda
remnants
might
be
hiding
in
Pakistan's
tribal
areas,
says
US
Ambassador:
US
Ambassador
Nancy
Powell
was
quoted
as
saying
that
Al
Qaeda
remnants
may
be
hiding
in
Pakistan's
remote
tribal
areas
bordering
Afghanistan.
This
was
stated
by
US
Embassy
spokesperson
Bruce
Kleiner
on
August
27,
2003.
Meanwhile
some
media
reports
had
quoted
Powell
as
telling
reporters
a
day
earlier
that
a
strong
possibility
was
there
that
Osama
bin
Laden
had
sought
refuge
in
the
mountainous
tribal
regions
in
northwest
and
southwest
Pakistan.
Commenting
on
these
reports,
Kleiner
said,
"She
didn't
mention
Osama
bin
Laden
by
name.
She
only
mentioned
that
some
al-Qaeda
people
might
be
hiding
in
the
tribal
areas."
Jang,
August
28,
2003.
|
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The South
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
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and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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