SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 7, No. 51, June 29, 2009

Jharkhand: Steady Erosion
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

At the height of the crisis at Lalgarh in West Bengal, the State’s leadership declared that its problems were flowing from neighbouring Jharkhand. For instance, on June 18, Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee told the ruling Left Front partners that 500 Maoists – 100 of them fully trained in combat and others semi-trained – had sneaked into Lalgarh from neighbouring Jharkhand. While part of this can simply be dismissed as passing the buck – West Bengal does have a significant and growing Maoist problem of its own, and in areas that are far from its border with Jharkhand. It is, nevertheless, the case that Jharkhand has emerged as one of the regions of significant Maoist dominance, and there is a significant flow of cadres and leadership across its borders into neighbouring States.

Jharkhand has, indeed, established the dubious distinction – for the third year running, halfway through 2009 – of being the Indian State with the second highest fatalities in Left Wing extremism (LWE) related incidents (after Chhattisgarh). The State has already recorded a total of 117 fatalities in 2009 (till June 23) and, worse, with 28 deaths in a single week between June 10 and 16, fatalities among Security Forces (SFs) have already crossed the total for any previous year.

Jharkhand- LWE related fatalities 2007-09

	Incidents	Civilians	SFs	Maoists	Total
2007	482	149	08	13	170
2008 January-August* September-December** Total	313 73 386	109 24 133	31 6 37	43 14 57	183 44 227
2009**	126	35	48	34	117

11 personnel of a joint team of the para-military Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Jharkhand Police, returning from a two-day long-range patrol in the Saranda Forest in West Singhbhum District on June 10, died in a landmine explosion, suspected to have been carried out by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres between Serengda and Aruanga villages. Among the dead was a CRPF Inspector. Six others sustained injuries in the attack.

Before the State Police could recover from the shock, the Maoists struck again on June 12. In a meticulously planned attack, about 50 armed Maoists, reportedly led by their area commander Navin Manjhi, attacked the State Bank of India’s Phusro Bazaar Branch in Bermo, Bokaro District, minutes after INR 10 million was deposited in the bank by the Damodar Valley Corporation, a Public Sector Undertaking. Resistance put up by the security guards at the bank foiled the attempt by the Maoists to decamp with the money. The Maoists, however, killed two security guards and triggered a blast near an abandoned vehicle, causing panic in the crowded market. The news of the attack and an SOS call from the Police, led to the movement of a team of Special Task Force (STF) personnel from the nearby Nawadih Police Station in an anti-landmine vehicle. An explosion, however, blew up the vehicle near the dense Sarubera Forest killing 11 STF personnel.

Four days later, in the afternoon of June 16, the Maoists struck again in Palamu District. Acting on a tip-off, a Police team raided a Maoist hideout near Baherakhad village where a gun battle ensued. Seven Policemen were injured, and four of them died on the way to hospital.

After the June 10 incident, Director-General of Police (DGP) Vishnu Dayal Ram, explaining the high casualty, stated that the SF personnel had ignored basic rules of patrolling in Maoist strongholds, which advocate avoiding the use of vehicles while patrolling difficult terrain. "The incident once again bares non-compliance with orders. Had the policemen followed patrolling guidelines to the letter, there would not have been blood spilt. They would not have fallen prey to traps laid by the rebels," Ram asserted.

Failure to comply with standard operating procedures (SOPs) was further confirmed when post-mortems conducted on the victims of the June 12 landmine blast confirmed that all the 11 STF personnel had died of head injuries. According to the SOPs governing counter-Maoist operations, SF personnel are to wear helmets and use seatbelts even while they travel in an anti-landmine vehicle. But none of those who died wore helmets, and seatbelts were probably not strapped on. Under the impact of the blast, the vehicle was tossed in the air, fell and rolled over before standing upright again. Investigations revealed, further, that the air-conditioner in the vehicle was not working, and troopers possibly avoided wearing helmets to escape the heat.

While the violation of SOPs can explain higher fatalities in some cases, however, the reality is that the continuous stream of SF deaths are more an index of irrational Force deployment and the haphazard way in which counter-Maoist operations are being conducted in Jharkhand. Between 2005 and 2008, 119 SF personnel were killed in the State, over 80 per cent of them in landmine explosions, according to one estimate.

Jharkhand does not have a specialised commando unit, and Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP) and Jharkhand Police (JP) personnel participate in the anti-Maoist operations along with the para-military personnel drawn from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, of whom 30 companies are deployed in the State. The JP and JAP personnel are yet to be trained in jungle warfare techniques. Worse, while SOPs require an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police to lead a raiding party, it is invariably, Inspectors and sometimes, even Sub-Inspectors who lead such teams, resulting in poor discipline (and possibly judgement) and the neglect of SOPs. In a statement after the June 12 incident, consequently, the Jharkhand Police Association claimed that junior personnel were being sacrificed in the fight with the Maoists, since senior Police officers were simply afraid to take part in operations.

The reality is that SF and Police capacities in Jharkhand are far from what is required to confront the Maoist threat, and this, rather than incidental lapses on the part of SF personnel, is the principal case of the accelerated rise of Maoist dominance since 2007.

The State has a ratio of 136 Policemen per 100,000 of population, higher than the national average, but well below any rational assessment of the requirement. There is, however, a deficit of 20.82 per cent between actual and sanctioned strength – yielding an effective strength of just about 108 per 100,000. There is, moreover, a crisis of leadership in the Force. At the level of Superintendent of Police (SP), Jharkhand has a deficit of 51.17 percent, while at the rank of Inspector vacancies stand at 17.89 percent.

Six LWE outfits, of which the CPI-Maoist is the most significant, with an estimated combined cadre strength of 4,000 dominate 23 of Jharkhand’s 24 Districts. And the Police, in spite of its claims of improvement, have simply not been able to cope with the rising challenge. The LWE groupings inflict a widespread regime of extortion across the State, particularly targeting businesses connected with the strong mining industry in the State. Estimates indicate that the Maoist extortion revenues total up to INR Three billions per year in Jharkhand alone. LWE dominance in the State is also reflected in numerous bandhs (shutdowns) periodically enforced by the Maoists. In 2009 alone, 13 Statewide calls for a bandh have already been imposed, each paralysing the State completely. During the most recent of these, on June 22 and 23, trading activities came to a halt in Maoist-hit Districts such as Palamu, Gumla, Lohardaga, Latehar, Chatra, Simdega and Giridih, with both rural and urban markets shutting down. West Singhbhum Deputy Commissioner Sunil Kumar, disclosed that not a single heavy vehicle could ply during the 48-hour bandh and that "about 500 vehicles that carry iron ore from the region to different destinations were stranded." Suresh Sonthali of the Singhbhum Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted, further: "Mining activities in all mines of Singhbhum region have come to a standstill. Not a single ounce of iron ore has been lifted. Truck and trailer operators have stopped lifting ore and finished products from over 700 small and medium scale units located in Aditypaur industrial area."

During his visit to the State on January 31, 2009, Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram had stated, at State capital Ranchi, that there was urgent need to fill 1,500 vacancies in the special branch – the intelligence unit – of the Jharkhand Police. The Special Branch gathers local intelligence and is expected to coordinate and share information with Intelligence Bureau (IB). Chidambaram also indicated that 145 Police Stations out of a total of 339 in the State were Maoist affected and over 25 blocks did not have Police Stations. Subsequently, on February 20, the State Government agreed to open 61 new Police Stations in the State. The advisory committee to the Governor also approved the creation of an additional 4,608 posts for these Police Stations.

Given Jharkhand’s past record, however, it remains to be seen how soon and how efficiently these promises are acted on, and what real impact they have on the State’s campaign against the Maoists. Significant administrative irregularities, especially in the implementation of Police modernisation programme, have been highlighted by the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2008. The report notes that, during the survey period 2000-04:

• The District Composite Control rooms remained non-functional despite an expenditure of INR 20.9 million on building, vehicles, etc, for want of manpower.
• 1,470 SLRs were purchased for two battalions of Jharkhand Armed Police, which had just 135 combat personnel.
• 114 vehicles were purchased for two Armed battalions of the State which had only 120 personnel. Only twenty-three of these vehicles were retained within these battalions, while the rest were diverted elsewhere.
• An amount of INR 19.6 million received under the Centre’s Modernisation of Police Force scheme during 2000-01 was diverted to purchase vehicles for the Chief Minister cavalcade (Rupees 11.6 million) and to anti-Maoist operations (INR Eight million), outside the scope of Police modernisation.

Years of neglect and myopic policies of the Government have pitched the State Police into an unequal fight with the Maoists, and this is creating a rising sense of desperation and an propensity to fake ‘successes’. The April 15 incident in the Latehar District is a grim reminder of such degeneration. The Maoists had triggered a landmine blast at Barhania Ghati in the hilly tracts of Barwadi, blowing up a bus ferrying CRPF personnel. Two CRPF personnel and a civilian driver were killed. The Police claimed that, in the subsequent exchange of fire, five Maoists were killed. A subsequent inquiry, ordered after a series of protests, proved that those killed were not Maoist cadres, but innocent villagers.

Jharkhand announced a surrender and rehabilitation policy in May 2009, which it says would help in bringing the extremists back into the mainstream. According to DGP Ram, "This is the most attractive and ambitious rehabilitation offer made to the Naxalites ever." The scheme offers:

• INR 250,000 in cash – INR 50,000 at the time of surrender and the balance in two annual instalments;
• INR 100,000 for a rocket launcher/LMG
• INR 75,000 for an AK-47/AK-56 or sniper rifle
• INR 15,000 for a .303 rifle/pistol/revolver
• INR 6,000 for remote–controlled devices
• INR 2,000 for each grenade/hand-grenade
• INR 2,000 to 10,000 for each wireless sets, depending on range
• INR 6.000 for IEDs
• INR 2,000 per kilogram for explosives.

The Government has also decided to provide vocational training to surrendered Maoists for a year at a cost of INR 3,000 per insurgent per month. A life insurance cover for the Maoist and his family and legal assistance in fighting criminal cases in courts are among other aspects in the policy. While no one has surrendered so far, it is still too early to pass judgement on the scheme. The record of surrender schemes in other States, except where the SFs have inflicted dramatic reverses on the rebels, has been far from encouraging, and has often been riddled with fraud.

No scheme has any significant potential for impacting on the worsening trajectory of Maoist violence in Jharkhand, absent a radical reinvention of the Police and intelligence apparatus in the State. Until this fundamental truth is acknowledged and reconciled with State policy, both SF personnel and civilians will continue to fall prey to the Maoist depredations, even as the entire State remains captive to their elaborate network of LWE extortion. To the extent that Jharkhand has emerged as a safe haven for Maoist cadres and leadership, and the source of at least some trouble beyond its borders, neighbouring States cannot, moreover, expect significant relief as long as the deficits and defects in Jharkhand’s security apparatus have not been remedied.

INDIA

Manipur: Timorous Transformations
Sandipani Dash
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

With 262 insurgency related fatalities, Manipur remains the most violent State in India’s Northeast, as the first half of 2009 draws to an end. Assam, the other major theatre of conflict in the region, with 11 times the population and 3.5 times the land mass, stands at second place, with 224 fatalities. There are tentative trends, however, that suggest some gains for the counter-insurgency grid in Manipur, which is beginning to inflict costs on the insurgent outfits, neutralizing significant numbers of their cadres and reducing their areas of dominance.

Insurgency-related Fatalities in Manipur, 2008 – 2009

Year	Civilians	SFs	Insurgents	Total
2008 (TOTAL) 2008 (January-June)	131 82	13 6	341 153	485 241
2009 (January-June)*	45	6	211	262

The first six months of 2009 saw 262 insurgency related fatalities, 21 more than the total for the corresponding period in 2008. This increase, however, primarily reflected increased militant fatalities, to the tune of 38 percent. While the death of Security Force (SF) personnel stood at a low six for both years, a significant 45 percent decrease has been recorded in fatalities among the civilian population.

The insurgent groups have overwhelmingly singled out non-local, Hindi and Bengali speaking targets among the civilian population, even as they have made efforts to consolidate their support base within the indigenous population of the State. Of the 45 civilians killed in 2009, 24 persons belonged to this category – comprising migrant labourers and petty traders who were killed in at least 14 attacks in all the four Valley Districts. In the biggest attack of 2009, unidentified insurgents killed nine non-locals inside the Keibul Lamjao National Park at Khordak Awang Leikai area in Bishnupur District on May 11. Exactly a month later on June 11, four non-local labourers were killed when unidentified insurgents opened fire on them inside the Central Agriculture University campus at Iroisemba under Lamphel Police Station in Imphal West District. Police suspect the insurgents belonging either to the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) or the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) were behind these attacks. Two camps have since been opened by the Manipur Police for the non-locals in State capital Imphal, which house some 250 persons.

Unlike the killings among the non-local labourer classes, which do not register in the imagination and or concerns of the scores of non-governmental organisations and human rights outfits operating in Manipur, one killing that created great sensation was that of Mohammed Islamuddin, a 53 year-old professor of the Imphal based Manipur University (MU), on May 25, 2009. Three gunmen sprayed bullets on Islamuddin, the only professor belonging to the State’s minority Pangal (Muslim) community, killing him on the spot. A day after the attack, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) issued a Press release claiming responsibility for the "public execution". It accused the academician of being a "ring leader of a clique within the MU which was usurping all powers of the University and using it to their selfish ends." A Joint Action Committee of the University, however, refuted the KYKL’s charges as "baseless and unfounded". The People’s United Liberation (PULF), an Islamist outfit, and the Meitei Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) condemned the incident. KCP 'secretary general’ Khamba Luwangcha said it was unfortunate that such a killing should have come at a time when the people were crying out against "state sponsored terrorism".

As argued previously in SAIR, fatalities alone do not exhaust the contours of insurgency. The dominance of the insurgent in Manipur is also strongly reflected in the enveloping regime of extortion that targets Government offices, local self-Government and educational institutions, health centres, commercial establishments and the wider civilian population alike. Thus, in the first week of May 2009, a series of gun attacks were carried out at the residences of the Chief Engineer and three Executive Engineers of the Manipur Minor Irrigation Department following their failure to meet several extortion demands made by insurgent groups operating in both the Hill and Valley regions. Engineers, like other civilians, continue to be soft targets for the militants and are attacked with alarming regularity. The militant groups have also not spared the health sector, and people in capital Imphal have repeatedly faced hardship due to militants’ targeting of pharmacies with extortion demands. Unable to cope with the militant exactions, some 40 pharmacies across the State resorted to a strike on May 13, 2009. Earlier, the pharmacies had shut down under similar circumstances on May 1. On that occasion, however, Police broke the locks and forced the chemists’ shops to open the next day. Reports indicate that the Kangleipak Communist Party [Military Council (MC) faction] had demanded INR One million as ‘tax’ from the pharmacies. Earlier, there were reports that various militant groups had demanded INR 200,000 on an annual basis from each pharmacy.

Another group that has been particularly affected by the militants’ extortion enterprise are the dry fish traders (fermented and dry fish are popular in Manipuri cuisine). Militant groups such as the UNLF, KYKL, PREPAK, KCP and KCP-MC have reportedly demanded INR 800,000 as ‘annual tax’ from the dry fish trading community.

Educational institutions have also been brought under pressure by the extortion network, as a result of which the Kanan Devi Memorial School at Pangei in the Imphal East District was shut down for an indefinite period. Extortion demands have also forced the closure of two Government colleges in capital Imphal.

Apart from damaging the economy, militant extortion has also adversely affected the state’s efforts to restore civil governance and deliver developmental services. Unable to cope with militant demands, members of various Gram Panchayats (village councils) in Imphal West District have fled their homes and taken refuge at the District Rural Development Agency office in the Imphal West Deputy Commissioner’s Complex since May 8, 2009. Groups such as the KYKL, KCP-MC and PREPAK are reportedly demanding 30 per cent of the funds sanctioned under State Finance Commission and 12^th Finance Commission schemes. They have also demanded INR 50,000 from each of the Gram Panchayats. "They even enter our houses and threaten us. We are not able to move out of our houses without fear. That is why we have taken shelter here," said Haojam Lal Singh, the Presidents of one of the village councils, in a June 25 report. These threats and the consequent flight of officials and elected representatives from rural areas have resulted in the collapse of essential services and governance across much of the State.

The Manipur Government has initiated some steps to end the practice of insurgents extorting a percentage of Government employees’ salaries every month. In the past, a proportion of salaries was paid to insurgents out directly from the offices. Since April 2009, the State Government has asked the employees to collect their salaries from banks. The Principal Secretary of the Manipur Government’s Finance Department, A.N. Jha, in a memorandum issued on April 18, 2009, stated that not only salaries but all payments, travel and dearness allowances, provident fund and other entitlements of the employees, would be paid through bank accounts. It is not clear, however, that such a measure would be helpful in preventing the insurgents from collecting their ‘share’ from the Government employees. The Government has also drawn up a list of individuals and business houses that were believed to be contributing regularly to militant coffers. Again, in a situation where the state has failed comprehensively to protect its citizens, it is not clear whether it can effectively stop the flow of extorted revenues by such measures.

The overflow of the insurgency from neighbouring Nagaland continues to trouble Manipur. Major parts of Manipur’s four Valley Districts – Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel – remain affected by the activities of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). There is, however, some indication of a decline in the level of influence the NSCN-IM once exerted in the Hill Districts. While occasional killings – such as the February 13, 2009 incident, in which the NSCN-IM cadres abducted a Sub-Divisional Officer of Khasom Khullen in Ukhrul District and two of his colleagues and later killed them – do continue, their incidence has declined significantly in 2009.

An attempt by the NSCN-IM to establish a permanent camp at Siroy in Ukhrul District in Manipur was foiled in February 2009. After a two week-long standoff, the insurgents, who had already set up the camp, were provided safe passage by the para-military Assam Rifles, and the camp was dismantled. Another three other unauthorised camps – established prior to the 1997 cease-fire between the NSCN-IM and the Government of India in Nagaland – at Bonning (Senapati District), Ooklong (Tamenglong District) and Phungchong (Chandel District), however, remain.

Operation Summer Storm, a counter-insurgency operation jointly launched by the 57 Mountain Division of the Army, para-military Assam Rifles and Manipur Police, involving about 500 SF personnel, was one of the initiatives indicating the State’s growing seriousness in combating the insurgency. The operation targeted PREPAK in the Loktak Lake area and the adjoining Keibul Lamjao National Park of Bishnupur District, located south of capital Imphal, between April 11 and 21, 2009. The 10-day offensive resulted in the killing of 12 militants, the neutralisation of five camps, and the recovery of 10 weapons.

Despite the relatively low costs it imposed on the 500 strong PREPAK cadres, Operation Summer Storm did ensure the rather peaceful conduct of Parliamentary elections in the State. The sanitization of Loktak Lake, in the proximity of capital Imphal, ensured that there was no base for the insurgents to launch their attacks. A healthy 63 percent of voters cast their ballot in Outer Manipur and another 60 per cent in the Inner Manipur constituencies on April 16 and 22 respectively. The NSCN-IM’s support for the candidature of Mani Charenamei of the People’s Democratic Alliance, who was seeking re-election from Outer Manipur, did little to boost his electoral prospects. Charenamei, an avid supporter of the Naga outfit’s formation of Nagalim (greater Nagaland) lost to Thangso Baite of the ruling Congress party. Barring minor attacks on party offices and candidates, the elections were largely peaceful.

Increasing synergy between the Manipur Police and Assam Riffles is beginning to show some results. On January 18, the Assam Rifles retaliated to an ambush by the UNLF, killing five of its cadres at Khenjang in Chandel District. On March 7, a joint team of the Manipur Police and Assam Rifles shot dead the leader of the Azad faction of the PULF and three other cadres of the outfit during a pre-dawn encounter in the foothills of Tekhanbi Kachin in Imphal East District. The slain PULF cadres included the ‘chairman’ of the faction, Mohammed Azad alias Abul Kalam, ‘finance secretary’, Mohammed Sahid alias Raj Khan, Mohammed Firoz Khan, and Mohammed Azad Khan alias Ijaaj Khan.

At least ten militants of Manipur-based outfits were arrested from cities like Bengaluru in the South Indian State of Karnataka and from national capital New Delhi, while engaging in fund raising and gun running activities, during the first half of 2009. On January 17, 2009, for instance, seven top KCP militants were arrested from unspecified locations in New Delhi in Operation Grand Slam conducted by a joint team of the Army, Manipur Police and Delhi Police. Details of the group’s activities and the draft of a Press release intended for publication on January 26 (Republic Day) were recovered from the hideout. Three days later, on January 20, another two militants the same group, including its leader, were arrested by a combined force of the Manipur Police, Army, Delhi Police and Bengaluru Police in Bengaluru city. The militant leader confessed his identity as Naorem Brojen, chief of the City Meitei faction and Mobile Task Force of the KCP. His disclosures led to the arrest of another cadre of the City Meitei faction at Hennur Road in Bengaluru. Again, on March 16, one PULF militant, Mohammed Abdul Noor, was arrested by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police from the Munirka locality of the national capital. He had reportedly come to the city along with accomplices to collect a consignment of arms, explosives and funds. Abdul had joined the PULF in 2006 as a Delhi-based coordinator and was involved in planning the abduction of an assistant engineer with the Public Works Department in Manipur.

After years of vacillation, Manipur appears to be taking small steps towards augmenting counter-insurgency capacities. The Government has also decided to implement a two-point action plan for the reduction of extortion and violence. Sources indicate that the Manipur Government intends to further improve the police-population ratio, which is currently at a very high 627 (the Indian average is 125). In its meeting on May 19, 2009, the State Cabinet agreed to induct 1,600 Police Commandos, in addition to the existing 1,600 Commandos who are currently deployed in the Valley Districts of Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur and Thoubal. The new batch of Police Commandos is to be deployed in the Hill Districts, thus covering the entire State with the trained strike force. Reports of June 10, 2009, stated that a Commando post and an India Reserve Battalion post were opened at Ukhrul and Senapati, respectively, two of the worst affected Districts in the State. Official sources also disclosed that the Cabinet had agreed to add one Company each to the existing six battalions of the Manipur Rifles. The Government has also reportedly decided to recruit 2,400 Police Constables for deployment in the Armed Reserve in all the Districts, except in Imphal West. It has also decided to recruit Village Defence Forces to assist the Police in the four Valley Districts.

The problem in Manipur has not, however, been a deficit of Force, but of political will to confront the insurgents on a sustained basis, within the framework of a coherent strategy. While there are incipient signs that this may be changing (and it remains to be seen whether the change is sustained) re-establishing the writ of the state in Manipur is still a long way of.