SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 21, November 28, 2011

INDIA

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West Bengal: Body Blow
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The early triumphalism in sections of the media after the first news of the killing of Maoist Politburo member Mallojula Koteswara Rao alias Kishanji in Burishole forest in West Midnapore District, West Bengal, during an operation on November 24, 2011, was quickly tempered by statements from Security Forces’ (SF) leaders that this incident was unlikely to alter the course of the Maoist movement in the region and across wider theatres in the country. It is, nevertheless, a tremendous achievement for counter-insurgency (CI) Forces in the protracted war against what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country”. The killing compounds the impact of a continuous succession of intelligence-based operations that has progressively decimated the top Maoist leadership over the past years in a silent war of attrition that has far greater significance than the noisy shuffling about of “massive and coordinated Forces” and the flashy “clear, hold and develop” non-strategy that has been projected as the principal state response in the recent past.

Indeed, with Kishanji’s killing, the 2007 Politburo of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has been brought down from its original strength of 16 to just seven members operating in freedom. These are General Secretary Mupalla Laxman Rao, alias Ganapathy from Karimnagar; Nambala Keshav Rao from Srikakulam; Kattam Sudarshan alias Birenderji from Adilabad; Mallojula Venugopal (brother of Kishanji) from Karimnagar; Misir Besra from Jharkhand; Prashant Bose alias Kishanda from Jadavpur; and Malla Raji Reddy from Karimnagar. Of the remaining Politburo members, Cherukuri Rajkumar aka Azad was killed on July 2, 2010 and Kishanji on November 24, 2011; while Pramod Mishra was arrested on May 11, 2008 from Dhanbad; Akhilesh Yadav alias Jagdish Yadav was arrested on June12, 2011 from Gaya; Amitabh Bagchi was arrested on August 24, 2009 from Ranchi; Kobad Ghandy was arrested on September 21, 2009 from Delhi; Baccha Prasad Singh was arrested on February 9, 2010 from Kanpur; Narayan Sanyal was arrested on January 2, 2006; and Sushil Roy was arrested on May 21, 2005 from Hooghly.

Of equal significance is the fact that the 39 member Central Committee (CC) of 2007 has now been reduced to just 21 members, depleting the resources from which the national level leadership can be drawn. This process has penetrated deep into regional, state and district level leadership structures, forcing the Maoists into a dramatic contraction of their strategic overreach to “extend the people’s war throughout the country”, and this is reflected in current Government estimates that suggest that the 223 Districts variously affected by Maoist activities in 2008 have now reduced to just 180 such Districts. Maoist violence has also diminished dramatically, as the rebels focus urgently on consolidation, recruitment, training and a deepening of influence and infrastructure in their areas of dominance, instead of spreading themselves thin across territories where the ‘revolutionary situation’ is relatively inhospitable, or wasting themselves in unproductive operations against state Forces. Maoist-related fatalities in 2011, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, have dropped to 563 (till November 27), against their peak of 1,180 in 2010, and 997 in 2009. Crucially, the pre-election ‘deal’ with Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress had virtually ended violence in West Bengal – the State that registered the highest number of fatalities in 2010, at 425 – bringing total fatalities there down to just 49 in 2011.

The most significant CI successes have been secured in sustained, cross-State intelligence-led operations, specifically targeting leadership figures, not in blind area domination exercises. Indeed, despite the suspension of operations in West Bengal immediately after Banerjee assumed power, it is clear that SFs continued to intensively and aggressively gather intelligence on Kishenji in full knowledge that the ‘ceasefire’ with the Maoists would, eventually, prove untenable. Senior Police officials attributed this operational success entirely on human intelligence, with Andhra Pradesh intelligence – which has been responsible for a overwhelming proportion of operational successes against the Maoist leadership across the country – claiming that the troops in the Burishole Forest were acting on “a tip-off from within”, and that Kishanji had been “set-up”. The Maoists’ West Bengal State Committee member, Akash is reported to have conceded that Kishanji was aware of infiltration of the Maoist ranks by the intelligence agencies, and had begun to neutralize suspects, but his responses were too little, too late.

Kishanji had been on the run almost continuously since March 29, 2010, when he escaped narrowly after being wounded in a gun battle with SFs in the Lakhanpur Forest in the West Midnapore District of West Bengal, and, despite his high profile projections of the preceding year, had become inaccessible to the media and public since this date. Intelligence agencies and the SFs had, however, stuck close to his heels since, with at least two close escapes in the intervening months, culminating in the fatal encounter on November 24. Indeed, it was the groundwork during the months of ‘ceasefire’ that allowed the SFs to register this quick hit within ten days of the announcement, on November 14, of resumption of anti-Maoist operations in the Jungalmahal area. A Joint Force of some 1,000 troopers drawn from the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and State Police, launched a massive operation on November 22, after getting specific information that Kishanji was in that area along with his trusted aide Suchitra Mahato, the widow of the West Bengal State Committee member Sashadhar Mahato. Suchitra Mahato is believed to have been injured, but escaped, even as the Forces continue to seek out the survivors of the November 24 encounter.

The resumption of SF operations against the Maoists in West Bengal was forced by the November 4, 2011, killing of Jitu Singh Sardar, a local Trinamool Congress (TMC) leader in Balarampur area of Purulia District, by the Maoists. A month earlier, the victim had formed the Jangalmahal Unnayan Birodhi Pratirodh Committee (Protest Committee against anti-development in Jungalmahal), an anti-Maoist forum and vigilante group, in the Ghatbera area of the District. Again, on November 14, 2011, Maoist cadres killed Ajit Singh Sardar and his son Baku in the same area. The victims were, respectively, the father and brother of Rajen Sardar, who had recently left the Adivasi Moolvasi People's Committee, a Maoist front organisation, and joined the TMC. Earlier, the Maoists had killed another two local TMC leaders and the Jharkhand Janamukti Morcha President, who was perceived as close to the TMC.

Within hours of the November 14 killings in Balarampur, Chief Minister Banerjee ordered resumption of Security operations against the Maoists. A day later, a Maoist letter calling off the ceasefire reached media. The letter, signed by Maoist State secretary Akash, was dated October 31, 2011, and was addressed to human rights activist Sujato Bhadra and other members of the six-member interlocutor team set up by the State Government, and declared, "The ceasefire period has ended as neither you nor the State Government kept any of your promises." The SFs secured their first significant success the very next day, when they ambushed the retreating squad responsible for the November 14 incident and managed to kill two Maoists. Two SF personnel were also injured in the incident and one of them succumbed to his injuries on November 19.

As noted by SAIR Banerjee’s u-turn on the Maoists was simply a matter of time, and “the suspension of anti-Maoist operations by the Security Forces (SFs) under an undeclared ‘cease-fire’ is now just waiting to be ‘officially’ declared as withdrawn.” Ironically, the Chief Minister has virtually reconstituted the old team that she had contemptuously disbanded just months ago, to fight the Maoists in Jungalmahal. West Midnapore Superintendent of Police (SP) Manoj Verma had been removed from his post and, to deepen his humiliation, was kept ‘in waiting’, without a new posting. On November 11, 2011, he was appointed as SP Counter Insurgency Force (CIF). Further, the Government has written to the Election Commission seeking its permission to transfer S.N. Gupta, Special Inspector General (IG), Presidency Range, as IG, CIF, before the elections to the Calcutta South Lok Sabha constituency on November 30. Police sources indicate that an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer would be posted at each ‘sensitive’ Police Station in Jungalmahal to oversee CI operations. Land has also been allocated for permanent bases of Central Forces in Jungalmahal. The State has also requested the recall of CoBRA commandos who had been redeployed to Jharkhand after anti-Maoist operations were stalled in West Bengal, and has sought additional force from the Centre.

By all measures, the intensity of operations in West Bengal, and likely in the contiguous States as well, will rise in the immediate future. The Maoists, in the past, also demonstrated fair strength to absorb the shock of falling leaders – losses that are normal and expected in any revolutionary movement. A process of adaptation has been visible. Earlier, for instance, the CPI-Maoist ordered six of its CC members to stay away from a top-level meeting that was convened on the borders of Odisha and Jharkhand in February. The Maoist leadership suspected that these six were under intense surveillance from intelligence agencies, and that their attending the meeting could jeopardize the security of the other CC members. Among the six leaders ordered not to attend were Akkiraju Haragopal alias Ramakrishna, Varanasi Subrahmanyam, Pulendu Sekhar Mukherji, Misir Besra, Malla Raji Reddy and another unidentified person. Incidentally, Varanasi Subrahmanyam, Pulendu Sekhar Mukherji and Vijay Kumar Arya, all CC members, were arrested in Bihar on April 29. There were also reports that SFs had recently almost surrounded a forested area in Odisha, where Akkiraju Haragopal, was believed to be camping, though Hargopal succeeded in evading arrest.

Despite their cumulative losses, and the shock of Kishanji’s loss, the Maoists can be expected to strike back soon enough, and there will be a parallel escalation of their operations, particularly against SFs and TMC cadres in West Bengal, but also across a much wider theatre. The CC has already called for a ‘protest week’ commencing Tuesday, November 29, and a two-day Bharat Bandh (all-India shutdown) on December 4 and 5, 2011, to protest Kishanji’s killing. Past trends suggest that these protests will be marked by significant acts of violence as well. The People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) week, celebrated each year between December 2 and 8, may also witness efforts to orchestrate acts of dramatic violence.

This stage will see inevitable operational reverses for the SFs as well, even as successes may well be registered. Some of these reverses could be dramatic and severely demoralizing. Any ambivalence on the part of the State at this stage, any dilution of the operational focus or of the political will, would only plunge West Bengal deeper into another bloodbath. It remains to be seen whether Chief Minister Banerjee has the vision and the will to see the present confrontation through to its logical end, or whether she relapses into the uncertainty and paralysis that has come to grip other political leaders confronted with the challenge of a sustained Maoist onslaught.

INDIA

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Assam: Fledgling Ensnared
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On November 13, 2011, Security Forces (SFs) arrested nine Hill Tiger Force (HTF) militants, including its ‘commander-in-chief’ Benjamin Jaolin Zaute, ‘finance secretary’ Alex Thiek, from the deep jungles at the Hmar village of Arda under Harangajao Police Station in Dima Hasao District (formerly the North Cachar Hills District) of Central Assam. 15 gelatine sticks, seven single barrel guns, two pistols and two grenades were recovered from the militants.

The HTF has now ‘elected’ N. Gamlien Hmar as its ‘commander-in-chief’ and Nicky as ‘finance secretary’.

Subsequent investigations exposed the outfit’s plans to attack Government properties and abduct senior officials on a large scale in the Dima Hasao District. During interrogation, the arrested militants told the SFs that the group planned to attack Railway and Telecom projects and the East-West transport corridor in the District, and to expand its activities to its bordering areas. They further said that five senior cadres, after completing training in neighbouring Manipur, were training recruits to plant Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) on railway tracks and ambush convoys.

According to Zaute’s disclosures, the HTF, a militant outfit of the non-Dimasa hill tribes in Dima Hasao District, was formed following the ethnic clashes among the Dimasas and the Zeme Nagas in the NC Hills District in 2009. Significantly, these clashes between Dimasas and Zeme Nagas in what was then the North Cachar (NC) Hills District had claimed at least 70 lives. More than 37 persons had sustained injuries, while 614 houses were set ablaze in the clashes, which began on March 19, 2009. The violence continued till July that year. Zeme Council President S. Zeme, on July 31, 2009, stated, "We have told the Union Home Secretary that the move by the Dimasas to change of nomenclature of NC Hills District and the subsequent opposition by us and other communities was the main cause of the unrest." Subsequently, on September 9, 2009, the Government of Assam constituted a Group of Ministers (GoM) Committee under D.P. Goala to look into the renaming of the NC Hills District and to make appropriate recommendations. The GoM Committee submitted its recommendations on February 5, 2010,  giving approval, in principal, to the change in nomenclature.

Other reports, however, suggest that HTF was formed in 2010, following the renaming, on April 1, 2010, of the NC Hills District as Dima Hasao District. The State Government took this decision to pacify the Black Widows (BW) group, which had put forward this particular demand, arguing that the new name would counter the Naga claim over the hill District. Large areas of NC Hills fall into the projected Greater Nagaland map that Naga militants seek to realize. The renaming of the District was followed by protest by various non-Dimasa tribes, who feared that the step would lead to ‘Dimasa hegemony’, and that non-Dimasas would be denied of jobs and other basic facilities. The primary demand of HTF, consequently, was the bifurcation of the North Cachar Hills into two separate Autonomous Districts.

HTF is led by its ‘chairman’ Kapchy Naga. Other prominent leaders include ‘commander-in-chief’ Benjamin Jaolin Zaute, ‘Publicity Secretary’ Lunneh Kuki, and’ ‘finance secretary’ Alex Thiek. With an estimated cadre strength of 150 the outfit is based at Hempeupet in the Dima Hasao District. An unnamed Police official asserted, further, “We think the outfit has cadres hailing from neighbouring Nagaland and Manipur.” Youth from the Hmar, Kuki and Naga communities have also joined the outfit to ‘protect’ their respective tribes, as well as the District, from the Dimasas.

The HTF has been involved in two recorded incidents of killing:

October 16, 2011: Suspected HTF militants killed a civilian, identified as Thaisiring Daolagupu, and injured another three, in an attack at Gaijen village under the Haflong Police Station in the Dima Hasao District.

October 13, 2011: HTF militants killed James Dimasa alias Pronit Haflongbar, leader of the James faction of the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD-J), at Topodisa in Dima Hasao District. Dimasa, former ‘home secretary’ of BW, had formed DHD-J after breaking away from BW in 2009, and later surrendered in the same year.

HTF has been involved in another seven recorded incidents of violence. Significantly, the outfit has carried out three attacks targeting the state infrastructure. On November 3, 2011, the HTF exploded a bomb on a railway bridge near Dittockchera Railway Station. On, October 26, 2011, tracks near the Mahur Railway Station suffered minor damage in a crude bomb blast. And on October 5, 2011, HTF militants fired at a goods train, injuring the driver, at Tularambasti between Lower Haflong and Mahur. The militants also set ablaze the train’s engine. Meanwhile, on October 14, 2011, HTF militants set ablaze eight huts in the Dimasa village of Chota Langren, located 10 kilometers from Haflong.

At least another two attacks have been thwarted by the SFs. On November 8, 2011, SFs recovered and defused three IEDs planted by HTF cadres on railway tracks between the Mahur and Paiding Stations. On October 19, 2011, SFs recovered a hand grenade, left behind by HTF militants, from a fuel station in Haflong town.

The Dima Hasao District is a sparsely populated area extending across 4,890 square kilometers, with a population listed at 213,529. It has extensive unguarded borders with the insurgency-affected States of Manipur and Nagaland, making HTF operations easier. The thin spread of SFs in the area has further emboldened the HTF. Indeed, Northeastern Frontier Railway Workers Union organizing secretary Bhajan Dey, on October 11, 2011, commented that SF contingents withdrawn during the last Assembly Election [April 4 & 11, 2011] from the Dima Hasao areas, had not been redeployed, and this had led to a rise in militant activities in the area. He claimed that extremists were perpetrating terror among railway employees and workers by demanding extortion money and threatening their lives.

The HTF is linked to the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland. On October 20, 2011, Vinod Kumar, the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police (Southern Range), disclosed that confessional statements of persons arrested following the arson and killing (between October 13-16, 2011) indicated that cadres of the NSCN-IM came to Dima Hasao District on the eve of the clashes and instigated the non-Dimasa people and cadres of the HTF. He further asserted that the NSCN-IM helped in the formation of HTF and provided its cadres both weapons and training.

Police have also found evidence suggesting links of some activists of the Indigenous Students’ Forum (ISF), the student wing of the Indigenous People’s Forum (IPF)/ NC Hills Indigenous People’s Forum (NCHIPF), with the HTF. Indeed, the IPF/ NCHIPF, an organisation of non-Dimasa tribesmen, along with the Zeme Council [apex body of Zeme Naga tribe in Assam] jointly opposed the renaming of the NC Hills District and demanded the bifurcation of NC Hills. IPF has, since then, been spearheading a movement for the bifurcation of the District, leading to several bandhs (general strikes/ shut-downs). IPF/NCHIPF general secretary Ngaidam Puruolte has declared that, in any new compromise settlement on the nomenclature issue, the Haflong subdivision, where the bulk of non-Dimasa tribals are concentrated, will continue to be known as NC Hills District, while the Maibong subdivision, the granary of the District in the northeastern flank and a bastion of the Dimasa population, would be named Dima Hasao District.

However, arrested ‘commander-in-chief’ Benjamin Jaolin Zaute, during interrogation, claimed that HTF had no links with NSCN, and had no firearms in its possession. Further, he asserted that HTF had no links with IPF and ISF.

The arrest of top leaders of HTF is bound to impact adversely impact on the group’s operational capacities. The District Police is already scouting out some 50 to 60 ‘boys’, mostly hailing from areas like Mahur, Nadi Basti, Laichung and other backward places of the District, who have been engaged by the HTF over the past months. An unnamed senior Police official stated, “These boys are in the age group of 14 to 20. They are mostly unemployed and school dropouts. Some have even planted crude bombs on railway tracks, while others have delivered demand notes (for extortion).” HTF reportedly pays these youth on assignment basis.

With Assam on the path to normalcy, neutralizing emerging threats, such as Karbi Peoples Liberation Tigers [KPLT] earlier, and now the HTF, will have far reaching impact in dealing with residual militancy, and will go a long way in containing the trend of mushrooming terror groups in the entire northeast.