Gilgit-Baltistan: Orchestrated Strife | Terror by Abduction | South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 10.40
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Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 40, April 9, 2012

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South Asia Terrorism Portal


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Gilgit-Baltistan: Orchestrated Strife
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) has been an area of enduring darkness and oppression since its occupation in 1948, in the wake of India’s bloody Partition, and is, again, reeling under a renewed cycle of acute violence. The current troubles commenced with the killing of 18 Shias in the Kohistan area of neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on February 28, 2012, and took an uglier turn on April 3, 2012. At least 24 people have died and several others have been injured, in incidents across GB, since the morning of April 3 (till the time of writing). Unconfirmed reports put the number of dead at more than 250.

Giving his account of the escalation, GB Police officer Basharat Ali noted that the violence within the region commenced on April 3, when five persons were killed in Gilgit city in clashes between the Police and protesting cadres and sympathizers of the recently banned Sunni formation, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a reincarnation of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The outfit had called for a strike in Gilgit, to press the Government to release its ‘deputy secretary general’, Maulana Ataullah Sadiq, who was arrested on March 28, 2012, in connection with firing on a Shia procession on March 4, 2012. The March 4 procession had been organized to protest against the February 28, 2012, Kohistan killings.

On April 3, angry protesters burnt tyres and forced shopkeepers to shut down their shops. Meanwhile, an unidentified person hurled a grenade at the protesting ASWJ cadres, killing at least seven protestors. Subsequently, mosques in the Kashroot area of Gilgit made announcements to retaliate against the Shias in the Diamer District of GB and the Kohistan District of KP. Unsurprisingly, 12 Shias were killed when unidentified assailants opened fire on buses on Karakoram Highway (KKH) near Gonar Farm in Chilas, headquarter of Diamer District, on April 3. According to eye witnesses, miscreants also set ablaze four buses. In a number of attacks on public transports, some 300 passengers were reported missing, and their whereabouts are yet to be ascertained. Fresh lashkars (armed groups) were reported to have embarked from the Chilas, Diamer and Kohistan areas towards Gilgit and its outskirts, to take the ‘revenge’ for the grenade attack on the ASWJ protestors, but were prevented from entering the town by locals in the outlying villages.

Curfew was imposed in Gilgit and its adjoining areas on April 3, 2012, and the Army was out on the streets to control the law and order situation. All transport, including flights, into GB, have been suspended, already resulting in an acute shortage of essential commodities, including food and medicines, in a region that depends overwhelmingly on supplies from outside.

In related incidents thereafter, two Shias, Akbar Ali and Ali Raza, from Gilgit-Baltistan, were shot dead by unidentified assailants on Mecongi Road in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, on April 3, 2102. On April 6, 2012, again, a Shia student, Ahmer Abbas, hailing from Gilgit, was shot dead in Karachi.

For once, the authorities have not blamed their favoured straw man, the ‘foreign hand’. Indeed, GB Inspector General of Police, Hussain Asghar, on April 7, 2012, explicitly denied foreign involvement in renewed cycle of violence in the region, preferring to blame limited job opportunities and a high literacy rate among the resident youth for fueling dissatisfaction that was feeding the rise in sectarianism. He argued,
I don’t think there is any foreign hand involved in the sectarian riots. The key thing in my understanding is the high rate of literacy without employment opportunities, which allows the frustrated youth to be easily used by some elements. GB has among the highest literacy rates in the country, but few employment opportunities. Such a situation frustrates the youth.

There are others, however, who have blamed “state engineered sectarianism” for the current conflagration, in line with past cycles. Several reports, both in the past and the present, have given ample evidence of Islamabad’s role in fuelling the sectarian divide in GB. A March 12, 2012, Daily Times report criticized Islamabad’s reluctance to act, despite ample warnings that the situation in GB could erupt at any time, triggering large-scale violence. The report claimed that large amounts of illegal arms and ammunitions had reached GB, traversing three-hundred kilometers of heavily securitized territory, passing through numerous check posts and pickets set up by the law enforcement agencies. The report also highlighted that a large number of locals from various areas of GB had been trained for militant activities in camps at Diamer and Mansehra. Past reports have indicated that terrorist training camps have been established, or have run at different points of time, in various locations within GB, including Tangir and Darel, Astore, Darul-Uloom, Juglote, Gilgit, Madrasa Nusratul-Islam, Konodas, Skardu city, and Ghowadi village near Skardu. 

Significantly, Islamabad has turned Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) – including both Azad Kashmir and GB – into a hub of Islamist extremism and terrorism since the 1990s. Militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and many others have been facilitated in creating bases and training camps in the region. These terror camps are ‘global in nature’ – including terrorist formations that have an international agenda. India maintains that “42 terror training camps were very much alive and kicking in PoK”. On April 6, 2012, China indirectly alleged that insurgents of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) were trained at camps in PoK. Significantly, a British court, on February 9, 2012, sentenced nine persons, including one of Pakistani origin, for plotting to bomb the London Stock Exchange and build a terrorist training camp in PoK. Three of these men, Mohammed Shahjahan (27), Usman Khan (20) and Nazam Hussain (26), had planned to raise funds for a terrorist camp in PoK and recruit Britons to attend.

Crucially, while naturally maintaining a studied silence on the role of state agencies, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik, on April 4, 2012, stated that the conflict in GB was not ‘sectarian’ in nature, and that some “hidden forces are involved”. Sub-nationalist groupings in GB have alleged, further, that there were no sectarian tensions among the ‘natives’ in the region, and that local Shia and Sunni groups had united in their demand for the reinstatement of the State Subjects Rule, which offers particular protection to ‘natives’, on the issue of travel and trade towards Ladakh (in India), and on the issue of ‘no taxation without representation’. The current violence, they allege, has been orchestrated by outsiders acting at the best of ‘hidden agencies’ who seek to disrupt this local unity, in order to perpetuate the inequitable conditions that prevail in the region.

Gilgit-Baltistan remains the poorest and most backward area in Pakistan, and is acutely lacking basic development and infrastructure. Instead of improving the situation, state agencies have sought to divert public attention from these issues and the political demands of the local population, by encouraging a rivalry between sects and political groupings, even as a concerted effort has been made to alter the demographic equation in the region by an orchestrated effort to bring in large numbers of ‘outsiders’ from KP, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Punjab.

Ruled under the Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order 2009, passed on September 9, 2009, GB is administratively divided into two divisions, Gilgit and Baltistan. These, in turn, are divided into seven Districts, including the five in Gilgit – Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore, and Hunza-Nagar; and two in Baltistan – Skardu and Ghanche. Unlike Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), which, along with GB, constitutes PoK – GB had no legal existence or protection till the passage of the September 2009 order. It is still excluded from any constitutional status, despite clear directives from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, resulting in the denial of constitutional rights and protection to the population. It is widely believed that a principal motive of such discriminatory legal and constitutional treatment arises out of the fact that GB is Pakistan’s only Shia-dominated region, unlike AJK, which, like rest of Pakistan, is Sunni dominated. Though Islamabad has succeeded in substantially re-engineering the regional demography, Shias, accounting for 39 percent of the inhabitants, still dominate the region. Other denominations include 27 per cent Sunni, 18 per cent Ismaili and 16 per cent Nurbakhshi. By January 2001, the old population ratio of 1:4 non-locals to locals had already been changed to 3:4 non-locals to locals. No estimates of the current ratio are available, but it is expected to have been altered further to the disadvantage of the locals.

Ethnic ties and tribal loyalties conventionally surpassed sectarian identities in GB, with people engaging in many inter-ethnic and inter-tribe marriages. Indeed, GB remained immune to any manifestation of sectarianism till 1974, when Islamabad initiated a number of divisive measures to create a wedge between various denominations. In one such measure, Islamabad banned the annual Muharram procession in Gilgit in 1974, expecting sectarian clashes and a resultant divide. Clashes did occur, and were the beginning of repeated cycle of sectarian strife in the region. An extended controversy over the alteration of school curricula, with increasing emphasis on Sunni practices, provoked one of the longest periods of violence in GB. Despite this sustained, state-orchestrated, mischief, however, no permanent sectarian divide between local communities has resulted. Contrary to frequent official projections, there is no tension between local Shias and Sunnis, but rather a deliberate effort from the outside, part of a long-drawn campaign, to sustain tensions in the region.

Violence has, consequently, been predictable and recurrent in the region. According to a May 2011 Pakistan Institute of Legislature and Transparency report “since 1998 to December 2010, 117 sectarian cases (of murder) have been registered, 74 were challaned, 15 cancelled, 10 remained untraced, and 15 are pending investigation. This tally does not include attempted murder which has so far numbered 170. Perhaps a thousand people were killed during the 1990s.” Other reports suggest that there have been more than 600 killings over last five years. One unofficial estimate earlier suggested that over 30,000 Gilgit residents have fled the city and its suburbs since 2000, in the wake of orchestrated incidents of sectarian strife, followed by discriminatory and repressive action by the state Forces. Aziz Ali Dad, in an article on December 22, 2011, observed that Gilgit city and its suburbs were experiencing a new element of violence in the shape of target killings, which have virtually turned Gilgit into a ‘no go’ area. Every week, Dad claimed, several people fell prey to target killings.

A devastating report by the European Union Rapporteur, Baroness Emma Nicholson, adopted by the European Union on May 24, 2007, deplored “documented human rights violations by Pakistan”, and declared, unambiguously, that “the people of Gilgit and Baltistan are under the direct rule of the military and enjoy no democracy”. Nicholson’s report was scathing on the sheer oppression of the people, on the complete absence of legal and human rights and a constitutional status, as well as on the enveloping backwardness that had evidently been engineered as a matter of state policy in the region.

Any voice of dissent in GB is routinely and brutally suppressed. Abdul Hamid Khan, chairman of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF), a nationalist political party in the region, in his statement in United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) 13th Session in Geneva on March 16, 2010, noted:
Human rights abuses are widespread and common in Gilgit Baltistan for many decades, but (the) unfortunately absence of local media (and) independent judiciary, (and the) misrepresentation and distortion of facts, have helped Islamabad to hide its illicit practices, normally carried out in the disguise of political authority. Large population faces severe human rights abuses that encompass political, religious, gender, ethnic and economic (dimensions). Area faces serious and widespread discrimination in the form of economic, social and political spheres (sic). More than 200 political activists and leaders of this land, including me, are facing death sentence in sedition charges, because we dared to protest against Pakistani occupation in peaceful public gathering (sic).

More recently, Mumtaz Khan, Executive Director, Centre for Peace & Democracy, has noted “that challenges to human rights lie in the nature of control Pakistan exercise on Muzaffarabad (Azad Kashmir) and Gilgit Baltistan, that includes constitutional and extra-constitutional, and direct and indirect (control) over political, financial and cultural affairs of these Areas.” Noted Author Tarek Fateh has stressed, further, that “a country that discriminated (among) its own citizens based on color, language and ethnicity has no moral, political and legal claim on any part of Kashmir.”

The present volatile situation in GB appears to be part of Islamabad’s continuing design to undermine any unity among the people of this region, and to perpetuate its ‘divide and rule’ policy. This stratagem has worked well for decades, but is becoming, on the one hand, increasingly transparent and, on the other, progressively intertwined with wider terrorist movements in Pakistan, at least some strains within which are beginning to escape the control of their progenitors and handlers in the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). While these trends presage untold and greater future suffering for the people of GB, they constitute an imminent existential threat to Pakistan itself. 

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Terror by Abduction
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Terrorist and extremist outfits in Pakistan have deepened their involvement in organised crimes, particularly including abduction-for-ransom and extortion, both to increase revenues and to push various illegitimate demands. A rampage of both high and low profile abductions across the country has provided the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, along with their various affiliates, with new ‘resources’ to fuel their politically and religiously motivated ‘jihad’, both within the country, and against the West and other ‘infidel’ states. According to information retrieved from slain al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound, for instance, al Qaeda in Pakistan had turned to abduction-for-ransom to offset dwindling cash reserves.

Reports indicate that all of Pakistan’s provinces are now under attack from armed abductors, with women and children, becoming the easiest targets.  A report published by the Human Rights Commission South Asia (HRCSA) on February 19, 2012, estimated that some 7,000 children had been abducted in 2011 and, of this total, the largest number belonged to Karachi (Sindh). The report noted that kidnappings noticeably increased in 2011.

The Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has suggested military operations in militant strongholds have a trickledown effect, spurring abductions and extortion in other parts of the country, with particular focus on Karachi, one of Pakistan’s most volatile cities, owing to the sophisticated network of jihadi and criminal gangs in the country’s commercial capital. Similarly, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) Director Amir Rana argues that Pakistan’s ‘military successes’ in tribal areas have “probably led to resources becoming closed for TTP, and smaller groups that affiliate themselves with the TTP and al Qaeda might be responsible for raising resources in cities across Pakistan, including Karachi.”

The problem, however, goes way beyond Karachi. A March 22, 2012, media report indicated a swift rise in the number of abductions-for-ransom in the Lahore District of Punjab Province. According to the figures available in the report, at least 400 cases of abduction had been registered in the District in 2012, till March 20. Some 2,954 abductions were reported in 2011, while 2010 saw 2,831 abductions. The CPLC categorised the abduction gangs in Lahore into two groups – those operating from southern Punjab and affiliated with various terrorist outfits and others gangs operating principally on criminal-financial motives.

Similarly, a fact finding report compiled by the Balochistan National Party-Awami (BNP-Awami), highlighting the plight of the Baloch people, released on March 22, 2012, alleged that as many as 1,047 people had been abducted in the Province over the preceding four years. Provincial Agriculture Minister Asadullah Baloch of BNP-Awami observed, “Abduction for ransom has become a lucrative business in Balochistan and people are joining this business en masse as Police and Law Enforcement Agencies have failed to book a single culprit.” There are also strong charges of political and establishment collusion in this rash of abductions and, on March 20, 2012, during the Balochistan Assembly session, provincial Ministers demanded that Home Minister Mir Zafarullah Zehri and the law enforcement agencies disclose the names of Ministers allegedly involved in abductions in the Province.

According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 664 persons were abducted between January 1, 2010, and April 8, 2012. 2010 recorded 242 abductions, 2011 and 2012 witnessed 328 and 94 respectively. During this period, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) witnessed the highest number of abductions (251) followed by Balochistan (183), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (179), Sindh (43) and Punjab (8). These figures are likely to be a sever under-estimate, as lesser incidents of abduction, involving low profile individuals and small numbers, have become quotidian occurrences, and often go unreported.

The state’s negligence and complicity have led the entrenchment of major criminal- militant combines and their lesser affiliates. A January 2012 report by journalist Zia-ur-Rehman noted that the enforcement agencies in Karachi had discovered that several previously unknown militant outfits operating in the city were linked to TTP, and these provided access to local level logistics and manpower support to Pakistan’s major domestic terrorism combine.  The head of Karachi’s Anti-Extremism Cell (AEC) Chowdhry Aslam, disclosed that one such group, al Mukhtar, basically a splinter cell of TTP's Badar Mansoor group, was specially deployed in Karachi to collect extortion funds, carry out bank heists and abductions-for-ransom, as well as for terrorist activities and attacks. Sources in CPLC noted that abduction for ransom had become an easiest way to collect large sums of money.

The terrorists have also found their targets among foreigners in the country, as well as across international borders, in Afghanistan. A huge ransom was paid in Pakistan, for instance, for the release of two French journalists, Herve Ghesquiere and Stephane Taponier, who were abducted on December 30, 2009, by the Qari Baryal Afghan Taliban faction in Afghanistan’s Kapisa Province. An Afghan Taliban militant close to the group’s central command revealed, on condition of anonymity, “A ransom was paid — an enormous amount — millions of dollars. The money was handed over in Pakistan.” Significantly, the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban work in close collaboration with TTP, both to launch terror attacks and in activities like abduction-for-ransom.           

Similarly, on July 1, 2011, TTP abducted a Swiss couple, Olivier David Och and Daniela Widmar, coming from Dera Ghazi Khan District in Punjab towards Quetta, Balochistan’s provincial capital, in the Killi Nigah area in Loralai District. The couple was taken to the neighbouring South Waziristan Agency of FATA. TTP ‘deputy chief’ Waliur Rehman demanded they be exchanged for Pakistani scientist, Aafia Siddiqui, jailed in the US. On March 15, 2012, the Swiss couple was reported to have ‘escaped’ from captivity. However, a March 30, 2012, media report claimed that a massive ransom of PKR 1 billion was paid to the abductors for the release of the two Swiss tourists.

Several cases involving foreigners, moreover, remain currently unresolved. The most significant among these include:

January 19, 2012: Two Europeans, identified as Giovanni and Bernd, working with the Welthungerhilfe, a German International Non-Governmental Organisation for food rehabilitation, were abducted from Western Fort Colony of Qasim Bela area in Multan District of Punjab while returning from Kot Addu tehsil of Muzaffargarh District. The TTP claimed responsibility for the abduction and said that the two were being kept hostage near the Afghan border. Punjab Police Inspector General (IG) Javed Iqbal claimed that the aid workers were being held for ransom.

January 5, 2012: Unidentified militants abducted a British official of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), identified as Doctor Khalil Ahmed Dale, from the Chaman Housing Society in Quetta. Later, the Police arrested up to 50 suspects for questioning in connection to the abduction, but to no avail.

August 13, 2011: An American aid expert, identified as Warren Weinstein, was abducted after unidentified assailants stormed through the backdoor of his house in the Model Town area of Lahore and overpowered his guards. On March 16, 2012, al Qaeda chief Ayman Al Zawahiri declared, “He (Weinstein) will not return to his family, by the will of Allah, until our demands are met, which include the release of Aafia Siddiqui, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the family of Shaikh Osama bin Laden, and every single person arrested on allegations of links with al Qaeda and Taliban.”

Currently unresolved cases of abduction include two prominent Pakistanis as well.

August 26, 2011: Shahbaz Taseer, son of assassinated Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer, was kidnapped in broad daylight by armed abductors from Lahore District. Accusing TTP of being behind the crime, his brother Sheryar Taseer told the media a day after the abduction, “Our family has been receiving threats from the Taliban and extremist groups.” On October 17, 2011, Interior Minister Rehman Malik said that the abductors were keeping Shahbaz Taseer in areas near the Pak-Afghan border and that he was alive. No demand letter has been received and his whereabouts are still not known. It is believed that Shahbaz Taseer is being held to force the family to accept a token financial compensation under Pakistan’s (Islamic) Diyyat law, so that the death sentence against his father's assassin, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, is not executed.

September 7, 2010: Doctor Ajmal Khan, the Vice Chancellor (VC) of the University of Peshawar, was abducted by TTP. Several videos have been released over the long period of one and half years, including footage of the VC making appeals for an acceptance of Taliban demands for his release, the latest of which was released on March 7, 2012. In response, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain stated that the Government was ready to concede the “just demands” of the TTP, but could not accept “unjust demands”, adding that conceding at this point would only encourage abductors to ‘lift’ more people for ransom, or for the fulfillment of other demands.

Abduction with the motive of fulfilling demands, other than the payment of ransom, is another facet of the rising current trend. In one of the most prominent incidents of this nature, the TTP faction led by Maulana Faqir Muhammad abducted 30 children, on September 1, 2011, from the Mamoond tehsil of Bajaur Agency in FATA. The children were held against demands which included the release of women and children languishing in various Pakistani prisons, ending state instigation of tribesmen to form anti-TTP lashkars (tribal militia), and the disbanding of such lashkars and ‘peace committees’ in the Bajaur Agency of FATA.  On October 30, 2011, two boys, identified as Amanullah and Abdullah, managed to escape and returned home more than 40 days after being abducted. Subsequently, after holding them captive for another three months, on January 4, 2012, TTP released 17 boys. Bajaur Administration official Islam Zeb noted, “Today, Taliban has released 17 of them; some 8-10 are yet in their custody.”

More worryingly, children have been abducted to create ‘a trained breed of jihadis’, and to serve as ‘live bombs’. The US State Department report, Trafficking in Persons, dated June 27, 2011, also noted that militant groups in Pakistan used children to act as spies, to fight and to carry out suicide bombings:  “Non-state militant groups abduct children or coerce parents with fraudulent promises into giving away children as young as 12, to spy, fight, or die as suicide bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” The report also noted that militants often sexually and physically abuse the children and use psychological coercion to convince them that the acts they commit are justified. In one such case, on June 20, 2011, Police said that terrorists abducted a nine-year-old girl, Sohana Jawed, on her way to school and forced her to wear a suicide bomb vest. Quoting the rescued girl, the Police claimed that she managed to escape her captors when they directed her to attack a paramilitary checkpoint in Timergarah town of Lower Dir District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Abductions have also overlapped sectarian faultlines in Pakistan, and on March 25, 2011, for instance, at least 33 Shias belonging to the Turi tribe were abducted by TTP militants in an attack on a convoy of passenger vehicles in the Kurram Agency of FATA. Later on April 25, 2011, one of the abducted tribesmen, Haji Asghar Hussain Turi, was released after the militants received PKR 5.4 million as ransom. Three months later, on June 22, 2011, another 22 were released after paying a ransom of PKR 30 million. According to media reports, the remaining 10, who were in the custody of a local TTP commander ‘Noor’, had been killed and buried somewhere near the Pak-Afghan border. Their coffins, with the names of the dead inscribed on them, were sent to Parachinar two months later.

Adding to the growing threat of terrorism is the state’s negligence, collusion and consequent impunity with which the terrorists act. In one prominent case, a key al Qaeda operative and former Pakistan Army commando, Major Haroon Ashiq, accused in several cases of murder and of abduction-for-ransom, was set free from Rawalpindi Jail on March 21, 2012 because witnesses withdrew their testimonies for fear of reprisals, and the prosecution failed to furnish any further material evidence. According to media reports, Haroon is a close associate of Illyas Kashmiri, the founder of Brigade 313, later an operational arm of al Qaeda, and a member of the jihadist outfit Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). With such coloured action, and the visible impotence or collusion of state agencies to act effectively against the perpetrators of the current and rising epidemic of abductions, as well as against the wider acts of terrorism that create its context, it is unlikely that the people of Pakistan – across all Provinces – will secure any early relief from this scourge.


Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
April 2-8, 2012



Security Force Personnel







Jammu and Kashmir




Left-wing Extremism










Total (INDIA)













Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


Pakistan has enough evidence to detain Hafiz Saeed, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on April 3 said that Pakistan has enough evidence to detain 26/11 mastermind and Jama'at ud Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Chidambaram said that India had handed over a complete dossier on Saeed, including compact discs containing his anti-India speeches and sought his voice samples. Zee News, April 7, 2012.

Terrorists still operating from Bangladesh, says Prime Minister's special envoy: The Prime Minister's special envoy, Satinder K Lamba, said some of the terrorist groups and their associated agencies continue to have their hideouts and the network of fake Indian currency notes (FICN) in Bangladesh. He added that while India appreciated the efforts of the Bangladesh Government of taking actions against the elements inimical to India, there was a need to do more, including finalizing the extradition treaty. DNA, April 6, 2012.

Pakistan routing FICN through Southeast Asian countries, says report: The recent arrest of a Vietnamese woman in possession of fake Indian currency notes (FICN) worth INR 9.8 in Kathmandu (Nepal) on April 3 has become a cause for concern for Indian intelligence agencies, revealing that Pakistan is pumping in FICN through Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia rather than the traditional routes of Bangladesh and Dubai. As part of the tactical switch, Pakistan is also using nationals of the South-east Asian countries to avoid detection. Times of India, April 6, 2012.

Several ANVC cadres had skipped Government's attention at the time of signing of CFA in July 2004, admits Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul Sangma: Chief Minister Mukul Sangma on April 3 admitted that several Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) cadres had skipped the attention of the then Government when the ceasefire agreement (cfa) was signed with the outfit in July 2004. Referring to the reported split in the ANVC, Sangma said, "There were deficiencies and the ceasefire process was not done properly." Shilong Times, April 4, 2012.


37 civilians and four SFs among 43 persons killed during the week in Sindh: At least 11 more persons were killed in Karachi on April 7.

Six persons were killed in Karachi on April 6.

A suicide bomber targeted a senior Police Officer, Superintendent of Police (SP) Anwar Ahmed Khan, said to be a leading name in the crackdown on militants, killing four passers-by and injuring 17 others in the Malir area of Karachi on April 5. Earlier in a pre-dawn attack, three Policemen were shot dead in PIB Colony. Four more people were killed in different parts of Karachi.

Five people, including an activist of Awami National Party (ANP), were killed in separate acts of target killing in Karachi on April 4.

As many as six persons lost their lives and another 28 were injured on April 2 during a daylong clash between protesters and Police in Lyari area of Karachi. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, April 3-9, 2012.

24 militants and nine civilians among 39 persons killed during the week in FATA: Army gunship helicopters pounded militant positions in Mamozai area of Orakzai Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on April 8 and killed 14 militants.

Seven people were killed and three others injured when a passenger van was blown up in a roadside bomb blast at Shah Kas area in Jamrud tehsil (revenue unit) of Khyber Agency on April 4.

Five Security Force (SF) personnel were killed when a group of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants from across the Afghanistan border attacked a security post at Olai checkpoint in Mohmand Agency on April 2. At least eight militants died when Security Forces (SFs) retaliated. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, April 3-9, 2012.

24 persons killed in the sectarian violence in Gilgit-Baltistan: As many as 24 people lost their lives and another 55 were injured in a fresh wave of sectarian violence across Gilgit-Baltistan, which erupted after clashes between Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) and Police in which five persons were killed in Gilgit city on April 3. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, April 3-9, 2012.

No difference between human being and animal in Balochistan, says Supreme Court: The Supreme Court (said on April 6 there was no difference between a human being and animals in Balochistan where mutilated bodies were found on a daily basis. Following the chief justice's directive, Quetta Police produced four of seven 'missing' people of the Marri tribe in the court. Daily Times, April 7, 2012.

Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalise militants, claims Pakistani official: An unnamed Pakistani counter-terrorism official said that Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed has been helping Pakistan de-radicalise militants under efforts to stabilise the strategic US ally. "Hafiz Saeed has agreed with the Punjab Government programme of de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of former jihadis and extended full cooperation," the official said under the condition of anonymity. Times of India, April 7, 2012.

We are serious about Hafiz Saeed but need evidence, says Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on April 8 acknowledged that the case of Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed was an "issue" between Pakistan and India but said Islamabad needs "substantial" evidence against him to try him in a court of law. "We are serious on the issue of Saeed but the question is how to proceed against him without evidence. Courts here are independent and we need substantial evidence against him," Gilani said. Indian Express, April 9, 2012.

FATA origin of half of terrorism-related stories, says report: Half of the terrorism-related stories published in the country's key national newspapers originate from the border region in Pakistan's northwest, says a new study released by a local media development organisation on April 5. "Almost 50 percent of terrorism stories come from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)," says the study. Daily Times, April 6, 2012.

ISI should have no role in Pakistan's politics, says Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on April 8 said the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) should have no role in country's politics. "The ISI should have no role in the country's politics," he said. Times of India, April 8, 2012.

20 million Pakistani children not in school, says UNICEF: Around 20 million children in Pakistan, including an estimated 7.3 million of primary school age, are not in school, said a statement issued by United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on April 6. "Investing in children and their education is vital due to the positive impacts it has on so many socio-economic dimensions. It is therefore imperative that all children in Pakistan, both boys and girls, have the opportunity to attend and complete their schooling," the statement said. Daily Times, April 7, 2012.

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