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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 6, August 13, 2012
 
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Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Assam:
Demographic Invasion
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict
Management
More than
three decades of ethnic and communal strife, as well as
multiple insurgencies, in Assam, have never seen a significant
echo outside the Northeast, other than the occasional
arrest of, or incident involving, a militant hiding out
in some distant part of the country. Indeed, the violence
of India’s wider Northeast has remained almost hermetically
sealed within the region since its beginnings in 1951,
with the Naga insurrection.
Abruptly,
a local – albeit sizeable – conflagration in the Bodoland
Territorial Administrated Districts (BTAD) of Assam has
found violent reverberations in Mumbai and Pune in Maharashtra,
Ranchi in Jharkhand, as well as parts of Andhra Pradesh
and West Bengal… even as communal organizations from Delhi
and other parts of the country send ‘fact finding missions’
into the affected areas in Assam, to conclude that a great
conspiracy against the State’s ‘Muslim citizens’ is afoot.
The purported ‘Muslim anger’ over developments in the
Bodo areas has congealed with apparent distress over the
treatment and violent displacement of Rohingya Muslims
in Myanmar. India’s ‘failure’ to ‘do enough’ for the Rohingyas
was one of the supposed triggers for the ‘protest’ in
Mumbai and Ranchi, which culminated in pre-planned rioting
on August 11, 2012.
Curiously,
little notice has been taken here of Muslim-majority Bangladesh’s
inflexible position that Rohingya refugees would receive
neither admission into nor shelter on, Bangladeshi soil.
Indeed, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina rather curtly told
British Secretary of International Development Affairs
Andrew Mitchell in London, that ‘countries including Britain,
which are concerned over the Rohingya issue, should hold
talks with Myanmar instead of putting pressure on Bangladesh.’
If the Indian leadership was susceptible to learning anything,
it would see a strong lesson here.
Unfortunately,
leaderships and administrators in this country remain
tenaciously uneducable. Far from seeing the intentional
mischief in the present troubles, they have sought to
impose a pall of confusion over the most basic issues,
claiming that the violence in the Bodo areas has no relationship
to the long unresolved, and implicitly encouraged, problem
of illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Thus, Chief Minister
Tarun Gogoi baldly claimed, on July 27, 2012, “There are
no Bangladeshis in the clash but Indian citizens.”
Successive
administrations in Assam have refused to address, and
indeed, have sought vigorously to cover up, the issue
of illegal Bangladeshi migration that has destabilized
the State and the wider Northeast for decades now. The
general pretext has been that no authoritative estimate
of illegal migrant populations is available, but this
begs the question, since it is the administration that
is required to produce such an estimate, and has defaulted
persistently on this duty. Indeed, even the Supreme Court’s
goading on this issue has fallen largely on deaf ears,
or has met with fitful efforts at ‘compliance’, quickly
abandoned at the first signs of predictable resistance.
On July
12, 2005, the Supreme Court of India noted that Assam
was facing “external aggression and internal disturbance”
on account of the large-scale illegal influx of Bangladeshi
migrants, and that it was “the duty of the Union of India
to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam
from such external aggression and internal disturbance
as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution…”
In 2005,
the Centre decided to update the National Register of
Citizens (NRC) ‘within two years’, on the basis of the
1971 rolls. The exercise failed to take off. On April
22, 2009, during tripartite discussions between the Central
and State Governments, and the All Assam Students Union
(AASU), the Government promised to initiate NRC updates
in two revenue circles, Chaygaon in Kamrup District and
Barpeta revenue circle in Barpeta District. The process
commenced on June 7, 2010, as a pilot project, but almost
immediately ran into trouble, with ‘law and order problems’
surfacing in Barpeta. On July 21, 2010, protestors under
the banner of the Barpeta District Unit of the All Assam
Muslim Students Union (AAMSU), demonstrated violently
outside the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, demanding a
halt to the process. Police eventually opened fire, killing
four and injuring 50. While no official suspension was
announced, the ‘pilot project’ stood abandoned from this
point on.
On March
26, 2012, the Government announced the ‘decision’ to re-launch
the Registrar General of Citizens’ Registration pilot
project to update the NRC in three phases from July 1,
2012. AAMSU, with 24 other ‘minority organizations’ objected
to the decision. The process has not begun till date.
Over the
intervening years, Governments, both at the Centre and
in the State have done much to muddy the waters. The most
perverse initiative was the introduction of the Illegal
Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act of 1983 (IMDT
Act), ostensibly intended to ‘facilitate’ the quick detection
and expulsion of illegal migrants, but, in fact, designed
to disable the far more effective provisions of the Foreigners
Act, 1946, which continue to apply to the rest of the
country. With action initiated only on the basis of a
complaint, not suo moto by state agencies, and
the onus of proof shifted from the accused to the complainant,
the IMDT made it nigh impossible to identify and expel
any significant number of illegal migrants. The Supreme
Court thus noted, in 2005, that though enquiries were
initiated in 310,759 cases under the IMDT Act, only 10,015
persons were declared illegal migrants, and even among
these, just 1,481 illegal migrants had been expelled in
the duration of the Act, till April 30, 2000. On the contrary,
it was noted, that West Bengal, where the Foreigners Act
was applicable, and which also faced a major problem of
illegal migration from Bangladesh, 489,046 persons had
been deported between 1983 and November 1998, a significantly
lesser period. The IMDT Act, the Court observed, “is coming
to the advantage of such illegal migrants as any proceeding
initiated against them almost entirely ends in their favour,
(and) enables them to have a document having official
sanctity to the effect that they are not illegal migrants.”
In September
2000, the Supreme Court had directed the Union Government
to repeal the IMDT Act by January 2001. The then Bharatiya
Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government
at the Centre failed to comply, claiming it did not have
the requisite numbers in the Upper House. Unsurprisingly,
the present Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
Government failed to initiate any process to implement
the Supreme Court's standing orders, till the Court struck
down the IMDT Act in its order of July 12, 2005. Nevertheless,
the Congress continues to contest every move seeking any
change to the status quo that it has engineered on illegal
immigrants in Assam, on its own cynical electoral calculus.
In the
interim, efforts to ‘regularize’ illegal migrant populations
and entrench their ‘rights’ in what should be protected
tribal areas, on the basis of opportunistic arrangements
with militant formations seeking accommodation with the
State, have continued through the disastrous Assam Accord
of 1985 and, more significantly in the present context,
the Bodo Accord of 2003. Under the latter Accord, the
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, intended to protect
the special rights of vulnerable Tribal populations, was
amended to guarantee the land rights of ‘all communities’
living in the BTAD. It is this unprincipled and opportunistic
legislation that is being used by Muslim communalists
within and outside Assam to claim that all Muslims in
the BTAD are Indian citizens with constitutional protection
to the lands they have acquired.
Through
all this, the sheer enormity of the demographic reengineering
in the region has been entirely ignored. Since no Government
has committed itself to a detailed enumeration of citizens
or of illegal migrants, there are, of course, no ‘official’
estimates of the actual illegal migrant population in
Assam. Nevertheless, authoritative estimates have periodically
come into the open source from official quarters.
In 2005,
then Assam Governor Lt. Gen. Ajai Singh, in a report to
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), leaked to the
Press, had claimed that “upto 6,000” Bangladeshis enter
Assam every day. The statement was subsequently modified
under pressure from the Congress to claim that the number
applied to Bangladeshis entering India, not Assam alone.
A 2001 UMHA estimate claimed that “150 to 170 lakh (15
to 17 million) Bangladeshi infiltrators have crossed into
India illegally since 1971.” Again, on July 14, 2004,
the then Union Minister of State for Home, Shriprakash
Jaiswal, conceded in Parliament that, out of 12,053,950
illegal Bangladeshi infiltrators all over India, 5,000,000
were present in Assam alone.”
Census
figures also provide significant indices for the scale
of infiltration. The Provisional Census 2011 indicated
that Assam’s population, at 31,169,272, had registered
an increase of 4,513,744 over the preceding decade. Of
the State’s 27 Districts, Dhubri, bordering Bangladesh,
had recorded the highest growth, at 24.4 percent. The
decadal growth rate for Assam, at 16.93 per cent, was
lower than the overall national growth, at 17.64 per cent.
Details of trends in various population groupings under
the Census 2011 are yet to be released.
2011 Census
data clearly suggests that the scale of infiltration has
declined. Between 1971 and 1991, the Muslim population
in Assam grew by 77.42 per cent as against 41.89 per cent
for Hindus. Between 1991 and 2001, again, the corresponding
figures were 29.3 per cent for Muslims and 14.95 per cent
for Hindus. The result was that, currently, of 27 Districts
in Assam, at least six have 60 per cent Muslim population,
while another six have over 40 per cent Muslims. And of
the 126 Assembly seats, 54 Members of Legislative Assembly,
are dependent on Muslim ‘vote banks’.
There are
numerous troubles between a multiplicity of communities
in Assam, and the Indian leadership and administration
has failed to keep pace with contemporary trends, with
the growth of populations, and with the transformation,
opportunities and challenges of new technologies and processes.
At base, every administration has to be anchored in principles
of justice, efficiency and honesty. If this is the case,
law and order automatically falls into place. When there
is occasional trouble, people turn to the authorities
and not to radical and armed extremist formations.
Unfortunately,
the integrity of administrations has been comprehensively
compromised across India, and more so in the States of
the Northeast. The communalization of politics, a trend
that commenced well before Partition, has progressed through
the decades of Independence, even under and within purportedly
‘secular’ parties. The external environment has also been
radicalized, with a jihadi ideology now entrenched
in Pakistan finding reverberations across the world, and,
at least in some measure, in India as well. It is significant,
in this context, to note that, Lafikul Islam, the ‘publicity
secretary’ of the All Bodoland Muslim Student’s Union
(ABMSU), had warned the State Government on July 7, 2012,
that, if the ‘culprits’ of the violence of July 6, 2012,
were not arrested within 24 hours and the atrocities against
the minorities did not end, ABMSU would declare jehad
and take up arms. Within the current international milieu,
such sentiments are sure to find their echoes among the
Islamist lunatic fringe – and its mirrors in other communities
– pushing India into a widening conflagration.
India’s
administrators, enforcement and intelligence officials
cannot, within the current global context, continue to
remain as ignorant as they evidently are, both of local
trends within their jurisdictions, and of international
trends impinging on perceptions and motivations of local
populations. There is evidence that the current cycle
of violence was at least partially linked to Bodo-Muslim
competition to encroach on forest land, in the latter
case, for the construction of an Idgah in the Bedlangmari
area in Kokrajhar. However minor such an incident may
appear to be on the surface, no competent administrator
or intelligence operative could possibly ignore its potential
for mischief – and yet, this is precisely what happened.
Vast areas of forest and public land in Assam are being
progressively encroached upon, with full connivance of
the administration, and this cannot continue without consequences.
Law and
order in India can no longer be maintained without understanding
the subtle trends in violence all over the world. Terrorism
and insurgency are no doubt significant patterns that
will demand our attention, but there are other patterns
of low-grade violence – such as the rioting in the Bodo
areas – which will challenge the state progressively,
especially, where terrorist and insurgent movements begin
to fail. Unless administrators, police leaders and intelligence
operatives are sensitive to past trends, social contexts,
and international developments, they will continue to
fail to respond effectively. There is tremendous need,
today, to enlarge the training programmes for the superior
services, whose officers are being found wanting in crises
with increasing frequency.
Above all,
the corrupt politics of vote banks and crass electoral
calculi, to the manifest detriment of the national interest,
must be defeated. India’s diversity can only be held together
by the unity of law and of justice, not by the unprincipled
horse-trading that governs politics today.
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Fatwas
from Hell
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
On August
9, 2012, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
urged senior clerics to issue a fatwa (religious
edict) against the country’s democratic system and Security
Forces (SFs). The letter, sent by TTP spokesman Ehsanullah
Ehsan, also sought to explain why the TTP had rebelled
against the state, arguing that the Army was killing “mujahideen”
who were fighting for the enforcement of “God’s law” in
Pakistan. The TTP also questioned the silence of clerics,
when the Government publicly acknowledged that it was
a “front-line ally of America and NATO forces”.
Meanwhile,
on July 16, 2012, during a protest rally in Jamrud tehsil
(revenue unit) of Khyber Agency in Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), Ibrahim, the Jama’at-e-Islami (JeI)
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief, declared, “NATO supply is haram
(forbidden) and against the Sharia’h, we will issue
a fatwa against it.” However, no subsequent report
of such a fatwa is available in the open source.
On July
10, 2012, the Idara Pasban-e-Sharia’h (Centre of
the Guardians of the Sharia’h), a TTP offshoot,
distributed a pamphlet in the streets and mosques of Miranshah
Bazaar in North Waziristan Agency, opposing the reopening
of the NATO supply route through Pakistan and declared
militant attacks on Pakistan military and Government institutions
halal (legitimate). The Urdu pamphlet criticised
Pakistan’s military and political leadership for striking
a deal with the US and betraying the nation, declaring
“The Pakistani Army is with the kafirs (infidels),
is from among them, and the Mujahidin’s jihad
against it is justified and even mandatory.”
Islamabad
had accepted the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
‘long pending’ apology for the November 26, 2011, Salala
Checkpost incident, in which 24 Pakistani troopers were
killed and which led to the closure of the supply routes,
on July 3, 2012, reinstating the NATO supply. This decision
was not well received by the Islamists. A massive protest
convoy, under the aegis of the Difa-e-Pakistan (Defense
of Pakistan Council, DPC) led by the founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
and the Chief of Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD) Hafiz Mohammad
Saeed on July 7, 2012, moved through the Lahore District
of Punjab, voicing the strongest opposition to the resumption
of the supply lines. The demonstrators rode on the tops
of the buses chanting, “One solution for America, jihad,
jihad!”
On July
24, 2012, militants attacked a NATO truck, killing the
driver, in Jamrud tehsil of Khyber Agency of FATA.
Fearing further attacks, Islamabad temporarily stopped
NATO supply trucks crossing its border to Afghanistan
via its two supply routes in Khyber Agency and Chaman
(Balochistan), on July 26, 2012. Despite rising threats
the supplies to US-NATO troops via Khyber Agency were
restored on August 4, 2012, while the Chaman route was
restored on August 8, 2012.
Unsurprisingly,
a marginal Islamist grouping, the Abdullah Azzam Brigade,
attacked a NATO container on August 6, 2012, killing the
driver in the Tedi Bazaar area of Jamrud tehsil.
Abu Zarar, spokesperson of the outfit, threatened to target
Pakistani security personnel in future if they continued
to provide security to NATO supplies. A second NATO container
was partially damaged in a blast on August 7, 2012, along
the Jamrud Bypass road in Jamrud tehsil.
But Islamist
extremist fatwas in Pakistan are not restricted
to the jihad against the kafirs. In an almost paranoiac
act of hatred, a cleric in the Pakistan’s Punjab province,
on June 12, 2012, warned that a jihad would be
launched against polio vaccination teams, even as the
World Health Organisation (WHO) expressed concern at the
re-emergence of the disease across the country. In Muzaffargarh
District, Maulvi Ibrahim Chisti declared the anti-polio
campaign as “un-Islamic” and announced at the local mosque
that jihad should be carried out against the polio
vaccination team.
Chisti’s
was only one in a long chain of fatwas against
polio vaccination in Pakistan, which endanger the health
of 34 million children under the age of five. The Lancet
medical journal claimed that vaccination problems in 2011
led to the highest number of polio cases in a decade in
Pakistan, 198, compared to 144 in 2010. In the current
year, 23 polio cases had already been recorded by July
20, 2012. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative
(GPEI) notes ‘persistent wild polio virus transmission’
is restricted to three groups of districts: Karachi, Districts
in Balochistan, Districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.
Following
Chisti’s ‘divine formulation’, TTP ‘commander’ Hafiz Gul
Bahadur on June 18, 2012, issued a fatwa denouncing
vaccination as an American ploy to sterilise the Muslim
community and banned it in the North Waziristan Agency
of FATA until the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stopped
its drone strikes in the region. Bahadur’s declaration
was a reflection of the consensus reached by the various
militant outfits that formed the shura-e-mujahidin,
and came two days before health workers had decided to
accomplish their target of 161,000 children in the area.
A tripartite coalition of tribesmen-mullahs-militants
appears to have crystallized against the ‘common enemy’
– the US. Tribal elder Qadir Khan declared, “Polio vaccination
will be banned until drone attacks are stopped.” A similar
line was reiterated by another tribal elder, “Drone martyrs
so many children, while polio afflicts one or two out
of hundreds of thousands.”
The TTP-Gul
Bahadur faction’s announcement also escalated the controversy
surrounding the Pakistani surgeon Doctor Shakeel Afridi,
who had been recruited by the CIA to help find slain al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden under the cover of a polio
vaccination programme. On May 23, 2012, he was sentenced
to 33 years in prison for “high treason” and conspiracy
against the state of Pakistan. Linking the present ban
on polio vaccination to CIA’s attempt at espionage, the
TTP ordered local doctors to halt the vaccination programme
in the Agency. Citing Doctor Shakeel Afridi’s case, Bahadur
declared, “There was a strong possibility of spying on
mujahidin for the US during the polio vaccination
campaign.” The polio vaccination campaign was subsequently
stopped in the North and South Waziristan Agencies. Fawad
Khan, Director of Health, stated that at least 160,000
children in North Waziristan and 80,000 in North Waziristan
would be affected if polio drops were not administered.
The polio
drive was hit further by an armed assault on a doctor
working for WHO in the Sohrab Goth area of Karachi on
July 17, 2012. On July 20, another doctor associated with
WHO’s polio prevention campaign was shot dead in Junejo
Town at Al-Asif Square in Karachi, disrupting immunisation
efforts in and around the city.
Adding
to the corpus of fatwas was the edict issued on
May 11, 2012, in the Kohistan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP), by a former legislator and member of the Jama’at-e-Ulema
Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-Fazl), Maulana Abdul Haleem,
against secular education and justifying the honour killing
of women. Explicitly asserting the notion of male supremacy
over women, he pronounced that parents should not promote
their daughters’ secular education, declaring that those
who send their daughters to school are bound to burn in
hell. Worse, in one of the most abrasive pronouncements
legitimising acid attacks and violence against women,
Haleem announced that any woman using a cell phone would
have acid thrown in her face. Acid attacks on women are
already at an all time high in the region, with at least
150 women disfigured every year. According to a Rand
Corporation commentary, hundreds of women in Pakistan
and Afghanistan have been blinded or maimed by acid thrown
on their veiled faces by male fanatics who consider them
“improperly dressed.”
A law was
enacted in December 2011 establishing tougher penalties
for acid attack convictions: from 14 years in jail to
life imprisonment, and a fine of up to USD 11,000, a large
sum for most Pakistanis. Despite the law there are victims
with scarred bodies and faces every week lined up in hospitals
across the country. A recent victim of an acid attack
was a 10 year old girl, whose face was seared in May 2012
in the Faisalabad District of Punjab.
Haleem
also threatened women working in Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) with forcible abduction and marriage to local Kohistani
men. Declaring NGOs working in the region as “hubs of
immodesty”, Haleem stated:
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Some
women from these NGOs visit our houses frequently,
mobilizing naïve Kohistani women to follow their
agenda in the name of health and hygiene education,
which is unacceptable to Kohistani culture. Married
female NGO workers should go back to their husbands,
whereas the unmarried ones will be forcibly wedded
to Kohistani men to make them stay at home. If women
working in NGOs enter Kohistan, we won't spare them
and solemnize their nikah (marriage) with
local men.
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Endorsing
a Hanbalite morality, local imams and tribal courts have
issued ‘stoning to death’ fatwas for adultery.
In July 2010, the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) was outraged
at a “judgment of stoning to death due to illicit relations”,
pronounced by a self-styled jirga (council) convened
in Kala Dhaka (Torghar District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa),
on the basis of an allegation that a man and a woman were
seen walking together in a field in Madakhail. In another
incident, on July 6, 2012, five women were killed by tribal
elders for dancing and singing with men at a wedding party
in a remote village of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A tribal council
of clerics condemned the women to death for “fornication
and staining their families’ names”.
Adhering
to a Wahhabite literalist interpretation of the Islamic
texts, hardliners prescribe corporal punishments for any
failure to comply with their interpretations of Islamic
codes of dress and conduct. In an attempt to enforce Sharia’h
in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, Maulana Fazlullah, also
known as Mullah Radio, had set up a “parallel government”
in Swat and established Sharia’h courts. Fearing
the wrath of TTP, a popular Pakistani singer, Ghazala
Jawed (24), who fled the Swat District to Peshawar to
pursue her career in music, was shot dead on June 18,
2012. Under the banner of Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohmmadi,
(TNSM,
Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws) Maulana
Fazlullah has issued fatwas against women’s education,
women’s voting rights, barber shops and music shops.
Apostatising
Shias through fatwas issued by orthodox extremist
clergy has hardened the spectre of sectarianism in the
country, incarcerating Shias and other minorities within
a ‘goblet of fire’. In June 2011, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
the breakaway faction of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),
distributed pamphlets calling Shias “wajib-ul-qatl”
(obligatory to be killed), and also issued an open letter
against the Hazara-Shia community in Quetta. In May 2011,
SSP summarised a fatwa that called Shias Kaafir
(Infidel). The fatwa was allegedly issued by various
ulama from Pakistan and Bangladesh, and was found
in a Wahhabi madrassa (religious seminary), Darul
Uloom Imdadia, in the Mariabad sub-valley of Quetta.
Backed
by provocative decrees of apostasy, the extremists have
let loose a reign of terror against Shias and other minorities.
According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism
Portal (SATP), there have been at least 797 incidents
of sectarian violence in Pakistan from January 1, 2005,
to August 12, 2012, which have claimed at least 2,250
lives.
State complicity
in such religious decrees has been a fact since the 1979
Hudood Ordinances introduced by Presidential decree under
the then President General Zia-ul Haq. The laws introduced
under the Hudood Ordinances cover the offences of Zina
(various forms of unlawful sexual intercourse) Qazf
(wrongful accusation of Zina crimes), and offences
Against Property and Prohibition. These laws made certain
offences punishable by hadd, which is defined as
“punishment ordained by the Holy Qur’an or Sunna.”
Current
trends in the pronouncement of fatwas legitimize
barbarity and provide a religious-legal basis for extreme
oppression of women, as well as of minority communities
and those regarded as ‘deviants’ by the extremists. Despite
some legislative restraints on these extremist decrees,
Governments in Pakistan have done little to constrain
the fanatics who announce and impose these fatwas
and the regimes of terror that back them.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
August 6-12,
2012
|
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
|
Left-wing
Extremist
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
|
INDIA
|
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
|
Jharkhand
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
|
Total (INDIA)
|
3
|
5
|
10
|
18
|
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
|
Balochistan
|
1
|
4
|
0
|
5
|
|
FATA
|
6
|
5
|
24
|
35
|
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
5
|
4
|
12
|
21
|
|
Sindh
|
12
|
2
|
1
|
15
|
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
24
|
15
|
37
|
76
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Bangladesh
starts
monitoring
mosques
and
madrassas,
says
Islamic
Foundation's
Director
General
Shamim
Mohammed
Afzal:
Facing
threat
from
militants
and
extremists,
Bangladesh
has
launched
a
nationwide
programme
for
monitoring
mosques
and
madrasas
to
ensure
clerics
follow
guidelines
issued
by
the
state-run
Islamic
Foundation.
Islamic
Foundation's
director
general
Shamim
Mohammed
Afzal
told,
"We
have
engaged
our
40,000
staff
having
background
in
Islamic
studies
to
monitor
the
mosques
and
see
if
the
imams
or
khatibs
are
conveying
our
messages
against
militancy
in
line
with
the
real
Islamic
teachings".
IBN
Live,
August
8,
2012.
INDIA
Death
toll
in
Bodo-Muslim
clashes
in
Assam
reaches
84:
The
death
toll
in
Bodo-Muslim
clashes
in
Assam
has
reached
84
with
the
recovery
of
seven
more
bodies
during
the
week.
While
four
dead
bodies
were
recovered
on
August
8
(two
in
Kokrajhar
District,
one
in
Chirang
District
and
one
in
Baksa),
three
persons
were
killed
in
Kokrajhar
District
on
August
6.
The
clashes
had
started
on
July
20.
Times
of
India,
August
7-13,
2012.
LeT
may
hijack
planes
ahead
of
Independence
Day,
alerts
IB:
Security
at
New
Delhi's
Indira
Gandhi
International
Airport
(IGIA)
has
been
beefed
up
after
Intelligence
Bureau
(IB)
alerted
security
agencies
that
militants
belonging
to
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
may
try
to
hijack
a
plane
ahead
of
the
Independence
Day
on
August
15.
Hindustan
Times,
August
11,
2012.
Two
senior
ISI
officers
are
exclusively
in
charge
of
the
Indian
operatives
of
the
LeT,
says
Abu
Jundal:
One
of
the
prime
handlers
of
the
November
26,
2008
(26/11)
Mumbai
attacks
and
arrested
LeT
operative
Abu
Jundal
told
the
Maharashtra
Anti
Terrorism
Squad
(ATS)
that
two
senior
Inter
Services
Intelligence
(ISI)
officers
are
exclusively
in
charge
of
the
Indian
operatives
of
the
LeT.
He
further
told
that
right
from
the
recruitment
to
the
operations
stage
there
are
always
two
high-ranking
officers
in
charge
of
the
Indian
operatives.
Rediff;
Hindustan
Times,
August
8-11,
2012.
MHA
admits
to
Maoist
influence
in
six
Districts
in
Delhi:
While
there
has
been
no
incident
of
violence
by
the
Communist
Party
of
India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)
in
Delhi,
the
Union
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
has
admitted
that
this
year
they
have
assessed
influence
of
front
organisations
of
Maoists
in
its
six
districts.
"The
influence
of
Maoists
in
areas
is
assessed
on
the
basis
of
both
over
ground
activities
by
front
organisations
and
violent
activities
by
underground
cadres,"
Minister
of
State
for
Home
Jitendra
Singh
said
on
August
8.
India
Today,
August
10,
2012.
Andhra
Pradesh
Government
extends
ban
on
CPI-Maoist
and
six
affiliates:
The
Andhra
Pradesh
Government
on
August
9
extended
by
one
year
the
ban
on
the
Communist
Party
of
India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)
and
six
of
its
affiliates
while
declaring
the
Revolutionary
Democratic
Front
as
an
"unlawful
association".
The
ban
on
CPI-Maoist
has
been
extended
as
per
the
provisions
of
the
Andhra
Pradesh
Public
Security
Act,
1992
and
would
come
into
effect
from
August
17,
the
order
said.
Business
Standard,
August
10,
2012.
Central
Government
identifies
at
least
14
Muslim
fundamentalist
organisations
in
Assam
and
five
in
Manipur,
says
report:
Highly
placed
sources
said
that
the
Union
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
(UMHA)
has
prepared
a
list
of
19
Muslim
fundamentalist
organisations
of
Assam
(14)
and
Manipur
(5).
The
identified
organisations
in
Assam
included
Muslim
Tiger
Force
(MTF),
Muslim
Liberation
Front
(MLF),
Muslim
United
Liberation
Front
of
Assam
(MULFA)
and
Muslim
United
Liberation
Tigers
of
Assam
(MULTA).
Assam
Tribune,
August
8,
2012.
Four
more
factions
of
KCP
willing
to
sign
pact
in
Manipur,
says
report:
State
Government
and
the
Central
Government
are
trying
to
include
four
more
factions
of
the
Kangleipak
Communist
Party
(KCP)
in
the
ongoing
peace
process.
The
report
states
that
Union
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
and
Manipur
Government
officials
met
leaders
of
the
factions
headed
by
Taibangangba,
Lamphel,
City
Meitei
and
Pakhanglakpa
in
New
Delhi
recently
and
the
leaders
agreed
in
principle
to
sign
a
ceasefire
agreement.
Telegraph,
August
11,
2012.
NDFB-RD
calls
off
unilateral
truce
in
Assam,
claims
report:Ranjan
Daimary
faction
of
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB-RD)
on
August
7
announced
its
withdrawal
from
the
one-year-old
unilateral
ceasefire.
A
statement
signed
by
Myanmar-based
IK
Songbijit,
the
chief
of
the
NDFB-RD's
armed
wing,
said
the
decision
to
withdraw
the
unilateral
declaration
for
cessation
from
all
types
of
violence
has
been
taken
after
"considering
all
aspects
of
present
reality."
Times
of
India,
August
8,
2012.
NEPAL
Janajatis
unveil
party
name
and
policy:
Janajati
(indigenous
people)
leaders
and
intellectuals
on
August
9
announced
the
proposed
name
and
the
manifesto
of
the
proposed
party,
the
day
the
country
marked
the
International
Day
of
Indigenous
People.
The
proposed
'Social
Democratic
Pluri-National
Party'
will
aim
to
include
people
from
all
social,
political
and
ethnic
backgrounds,
leaders
said.
eKantipur,
August
10,
2012.
UCPN-M
chairman
Prachanda
steps
up
efforts
to
strike
a
"working
alliance"
with
the
Mohan
Baidya
led
CPN-Maoist:
Unified
Communist
party
of
Nepal-Maoist
(UCPN-M)
Chairman
Pushpa
Kamal
Dahal
aka
Prachanda
has
stepped
up
efforts
to
strike
a
"working
alliance"
with
the
Mohan
Baidya
led
CPN-Maoist-Baidya.
"Dahal
is
working
to
build
an
alliance
with
the
CPN-Maoist
to
boost
his
strength
in
national
politics,"
said
leader
Khajaraj
Bhatta.
Leaders
close
to
Dahal
said
that
he
has
already
held
talks
with
Baidya
and
urged
him
to
maintain
a
working
alliance.
eKantipur,
August
7,
2012.
PAKISTAN24
militants
and
six
civilians
among
35
persons
killed
during
the
week
in
FATA:
Ten
militants
were
killed
and
four
others
injured
when
jet
fighters
bombed
their
hideouts
in
Mamozai
area
of
Orakzai
Agency
in
Federally
Administered
Tribal
Areas
(FATA)
on
August
12.
A
remote-controlled
bomb
attack
killed
three
soldiers
in
Mir
Ali
town
of
North
Waziristan
Agency.
Thirteen
militants
were
killed
and
eight
others
got
injured
when
warplanes
pounded
in
Bootakhel
and
Toorsimath
areas
of
Mamozai
areas
in
Orakzai
Agency
on
August
10.
Daily
Times;
Dawn;
The
News;
Tribune;
Central
Asia
Online;
The
Nation;
The
Frontier
Post;
Pakistan
Today;
Pakistan
Observer,
August
7-13,
2012.
Pakistan
to
release
key
Afghan
Taliban
'commander'
and
former
chief
of
Quetta
Shura
Mullah
Abdul
Ghani
Baradar,
reveals
official:
Pakistan
may
release
a
key
Afghan
Taliban
'commander'
and
former
chief
of
Quetta
Shura
Mullah
Abdul
Ghani
Baradar
to
provide
impetus
to
Afghanistan's
ongoing
reconciliation
efforts
with
the
Taliban.
Mullah
Abdul
Ghani
Baradar,
who
was
arrested
in
Karachi
in
February
2010,
is
ranked
second
in
influence
to
Taliban
head
honcho
Mullah
Omar.
American
officials
believe
that
in
addition
to
overseeing
the
Taliban's
military
operations,
Mullah
Baradar
was
the
head
of
the
Quetta
Shura.
Tribune,
August
8,
2012.
TTP
plans
attacks
on
security
installations
in
Punjab,
warn
Intelligence
reports:
Intelligence
reports
states
on
August
10
that
the
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
may
attack
the
Pakistan
Air
Force
Base
and
other
security
installations
in
Lahore
before
Eid
to
avenge
the
August
1,
2012,
killing
of
its
commander,
Ghaffar
Qaiserani
(alias
Saifullah),
at
Dera
Ghazi
Khan.
Central
Asia
Online,
August
11,
2012.
TTP
urges
senior
clerics
to
issue
fatwa
against
democracy
and
Security
Forces
in
the
country:
The
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
urged
the
senior
cleric
in
a
letter
to
issue
a
fatwa
(religious
edict)
against
democratic
system
and
Security
Forces
(SFs),
and
explain
why
the
TTP
had
rebelled
against
the
state.
The
letter
read,
"Please
go
through
this
letter
and
help
the
Muslims
know
the
Taliban
stance,"
read
the
six-page
letter
in
Urdu,
sent
by
TTP
spokesman
Ehsanullah
Ehsan.
The
letter
also
complained
about
the
clerics
who
were
"silent"
when
the
government
was
publicly
acknowledging
being
a
"front-line
ally
of
America
and
NATO".
Daily
Times,
August
10,
2012.
TTP
will
not
hold
talks
with
any
political
party,
says
TTP
spokesman
Ehsanullah
Ehsan:
The
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
on
August
8
described
the
Government
as
"liberal
and
secular"
and
said
they
will
not
hold
talks
with
any
political
party,
including
the
Awami
National
Party
(ANP)
that
rules
the
north
western
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
province.
TTP
spokesman
Ehsanullah
Ehsan
said
that
an
offer
of
talks
from
the
ANP
was
misleading
and
that
the
militants
considered
the
incumbent
rulers
liberals
and
secular
and
thus
"not
sincere
to
the
cause
of
Islam".
Indian
Express,
August
11,
2012.
Pakistan's
military
to
make
final
decision
on
North
Waziristan
operation,
says
report:
On
August
7
Pakistan's
military
brass
in
its
next
Corps
Commanders
Conference,
which
is
scheduled
to
be
held
sometime
in
August
2012,
would
make
a
final
decision
on
the
operation
in
the
North
Waziristan
Agency
of
Federally
Administered
Tribal
Areas
(FATA).
According
to
the
informed
officials,
two
options
are
likely
to
be
discussed
in
the
moot:
the
launch
of
a
full-scale
military
offensive
with
the
logistical
support
of
International
Security
Assistance
Force
(ISAF),
or
a
curtailed
crackdown
in
the
area
through
intelligence
sharing
between
the
two
forces.
However,
the
Army
said
that
it
was
carrying
out
targeted
actions
against
militants
in
North
Waziristan
Agency,
but
denied
planning
joint
operations
with
the
United
States."
The
Nation;
Dawn,
August
7,
2012.
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