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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 35, March 8, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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From
Terrorism to "Agitational Terrorism" in Kashmir
Ajaat Jamwal
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On October
31, 2009 the General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC-in-C)
of the Army’s Northern Command, Lieutenant General B
S Jaswal, described the ongoing phase of the separatist
campaign in the Kashmir Valley as "agitational
terrorism". The conceptual perspective behind this
formulation has not been publicly articulated by the
Army top Brass, but there is certainly evidence to suggest
the graduation of the terrorist movement into a more
complex and comprehensive assault against state authority,
with mass mobilization campaigns harnessed to compound
calibrated terrorist violence on the ground.
The Special
Director General of the Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Zone, N.K .Tripathi,
on February 3, 2010, disclosed the manner in which terrorist
regimes were crafting public demonstrations and protests,
in conjunction with focused violence. Tripathi confided
that Pakistan’s covert agencies had been hiring people
in Kashmir to pelt stones on security forces: "Our
officers have told us that stone throwers are being
paid money. All of us know where the money is coming
from. Pakistan and its security agencies, having failed
in sustaining the militancy, have adopted the new technique
of stoning us." To the question, whether hawala
money was being circulated for stone pelting, Tripathi
responded, "perpetrators of the militancy have
evolved several ways for funding and Hawala is,
of course, one of them." He disclosed, further,
"During the last one and a half years, nearly 1,500
CRPF personnel have been injured while performing their
duties in the State, while their vehicles have been
targeted 373 times."
Inspector
General of Police (IGP), Crime Investigation Department,
Kashmir, A.G. Mir, revealed another interesting dimension
of the ongoing campaign, the interesting nexus between
the drugs and the public protests. "There is a
co-relation between addiction and stone throwing, and
those addicted to prescription drugs, cannabis, or opium,
find stone pelting a lucrative way to support their
habit. They show bravado under the influence of drugs,
they feel they are invincible. That’s why they indulge
in risk taking behaviour. We have found that there are
people who organize these events and mobilize people
for political gains. They distribute Rs. 100 to 300
[about USD 2 to 6] to each protester." The conflict
environment is conducive to addiction, with unrelenting
tension and uncertainty, and soaring unemployment rates.
The young seek escapism, Mir reasons, and wants to prove
its worth through deeds on the street.
Chief
Minister Omar Abdullah has added the weight of his opinion
to the contention that the street protests are an orchestrated
campaign, and that ‘gangs’ of stone throwers are being
paid by the forces inimical to peace in the State. The
State Government, which is yet to fully recover from
the "India ragdo" (rub out India) campaign
in Shopian, does not appear to have any effective response
to the new phenomenon of what is being dubbed ‘agitational
terrorism’.
The protests
against the killing of a youth, Mohammad Arif Ayub,
who was hit by a tear gas shell on May 22, 2009, during
one such protest and died on May 26, 2009, in a local
hospital, highlights the vicious loop of self-sustaining
demonstrations in the Kashmir Valley. On the other hand,
the February 22, 2010, death of an eleven-day-old infant,
Baby Irfan, during a scuffle between the child’s parents
and a stone-throwing gang in Baramulla, exposed the
nature of these protests as orchestrated campaigns rather
than spontaneous outbursts. The baby’s grieving parents
openly blamed the separatist leaders for forcing them
to participate in their demonstration.
‘Agitational
terrorism’ is a far more sophisticated phenomenon than
is currently being recognized by authorities. Over-ground
support structures of terrorism, including separatist
and religious extremist political formations, civil
rights NGO’s, media organisations, subversive elements
within the Government, international organizations operating
from various countries in the West, have all been cast
into roles in this campaign. Public protests and hartals
(strikes), have been transformed into an assault on
the credibility and symbols of the state. The sheer
persistence of the campaign is remarkable.
A total
of 1,540 strikes have been organized in the Kashmir
valley between January 1990 and December 2009, according
to the State Government. 207 strikes, the highest number
for any year, were organized in 1991, when militancy
was at its peak. Strikes on Republic Day and Independence
Day, February 11 (the day when the Jammu & Kashmir
Liberation Front founder Mohammad Maqbool Bhat was hanged
in Tihar jail in 1984), May 21 (the death anniversary
of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq), July 13 (martyrs day),
October 27 (the day when troops landed for the first
time in Kashmir to repulse the Pakistani attack in 1947)
have been annual rituals since 1990. However, after
a dramatic decline between the 2002-2007 period, the
incidence, and more significantly, the scale and virulence
of these demonstrations, is building up again.
Separately,
2,005 demonstrations and processions were organized
through 1990-2009, with the highest number of 416 processions
and demonstrations occurred in 1992.
Crucially,
however, the statistics relating to hartals/strikes
are an underestimate, particularly over recent years.
Official figures only reflect formal hartal calls.
In the present situation in the separatist central command
structures in the Valley ordinarily maintain an ambiguity,
with formal hartal calls only issued occasionally.
Instead, ‘civil curfews’ are imposed selectively area-wise
to project separatist capabilities to paralyze all aspects
of activity across the Valley.
The number
of strikes registered a sharp decline after 2004. This
was a time when the credibility of the separatist leadership,
across the spectrum, had been eroded because of rampant
corruption and doubts about their integrity among common
Kashmiris. There had also been a significant build-up
of public resentment against such disruptive demonstrations.
Succeeding years have seen strikes confined to local
areas, without separatist leaders committing themselves
to formal calls for wider hartals. Indeed, even
through the major agitations of recent years, this pattern
of a more localized and informal character of mass mobilization
has been in evidence. For instance, both during the
Anti-Amarnath Land Transfer Agitation in 2008 and the
agitation following the alleged rape and murder of two
women in Shopian District in 2009, such demonstrations
were fragmented. During the Amarnath agitation, the
people of Anantnag, the base camp of the Amarnath pilgrimage,
demonstrated little inclination to respond to calls
to march to Muzaffarabad. During the Shopian agitation,
the Shopian leadership accused the Valley separatist
leadership of failing to support them. However, while
formal hartal calls by the separatists have decreased,
selective public protests and strikes have multiplied.
Terrorist
violence has been systematically employed as a prelude
or aftermath to these campaigns, though such activities
may occasionally coincide with the agitational phases
as well. This violence serves two purposes. One, it
acts as a force multiplier, adding fuel to public protests.
This is often compounded by the intentional confusion
that may be created in the wake of such attacks. The
terrorist killing of civilians during the Shopian agitation
in the Pulwama District was itself pinned at the door
of the Government, provoking further public uproar.
Two, while the mobilization is ordinarily over a specific
local issue, it is projected as a widespread revolt
against India, and is also harnessed to the broader
separatist agenda of forcing the Government to initiate
or advance a formal Indo-Pak dialogue on the ‘Kashmir
issue’. Mass mobilization backed by calibrated violence
helps preserve terrorist cadres in the State, particularly
at a time when the ‘international jihad’ is focused
on destabilizing Afghanistan. What is sought to be projected
as an intifada (popular uprising imitating the
Palestine movement) in Kashmir, serves to demoralize
the state machinery, particularly when the Government
response vacillates between a near-total retraction
of authority, on the one hand, and heavy handed crackdowns
and indefinite curfews, on the other.
The situation
takes a particularly bizarre turn when the State Government
appears to be flirting with both sides – the separatists
and the nationalists. The entire agitation in Shopian
crystallized around the death of two women – Nelofar
Jan (23), wife of Shakeel Ahmad Ahangar, and her sister-in-law
Asiya Jan (18) – after their alleged rape by the personnel
of the State Police, on May 29, 2009. But the entire
focus of the radical reaction was the Army and the Central
Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs). As the campaigns lampooning
Indian sovereignty assumed a new stridency in the State,
the manifest ambiguity of the State Government’s response
created a precarious situation. The decision not to
hoist the National Flag at Lal Chowk in Srinagar on
Republic Day, January 26, this year, was the first time
this had happened since the creation of the Republic
in 1951, sending out a message, at least to the separatist
constituency, that the Indian will was weakening. Crucially,
this happened over a case that was an evident fraud,
as the Central Bureau of Investigation determined that
the vaginal swabs of the two women in the Shopian case
were actually planted by the woman doctor who was examining
them, and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
a case of accidental death was deliberately distorted
by the separatists as one of rape and murder. The Government’s
craven responses only have emboldened the planners behind
the ‘agitational terrorism’. By and large, it is the
state’s agencies that have accorded disproportionate
political and administrative attention to these agitational
maneuvers. In the Shopian case, for instance, long before
investigators had been able to establish anything concrete
in the case, and just a day after the bodies were recovered,
a Press Conference was addressed by a State Cabinet
Minister, followed shortly thereafter by another by
the Chief Minister, catapulting this incident onto the
national centre stage.
More
recently, in the Wamiq Ahmed case (killed in teargas
fire on January 31, 2010), the Director General of Police
(DGP) was specially flown into Srinagar to review the
security situation, while the Advisor to the Chief Minister,
a State Cabinet Minister and a Minister of State, offered
clarifications on the action in which the youth was
killed by a teargas shell during a protest demonstration.
The disproportionate political focus on such incidents
demonstrates the degree to which the Government remains
unprepared to deal effectively with the emerging trends
in separatist mobilisation.
Ironically,
while the State Government is now accepting the phenomenon
of organized stone pelting campaigns at the highest
level, it is still not geared up to document these campaigns
for a coherent security evaluation.
A section
of the Press has also become a willing dupe, and in
at least some cases, partner, to these campaigns. In
one case, for instance, on February 4, 2010, a local
daily carried a photograph of CRPF and J&K Police
personnel catching hold of a stone-pelter. The caption,
however, read: "SHO Nowhatta rescuing a youth from
the clutches of CRPF personnel. The youth was caught
by CRPF during a protest demonstration and was being
beaten by CRPF". Separatist propaganda often finds
preferential placement in several local newspapers,
even as a number of high profile ‘civil right activists’
with known pro-separatist leanings issue partisan statements
that are totally divorced from the realities of the
ground. Such projections go virtually uncontested by
the state’s agencies.
The emerging
trends in ‘agitational terrorism’ can only be understood
within the context of the wider security situation in
the J&K. There was, for instance, a 30 per cent
increase in infiltration along the International Border
(IB) and the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K in 2009,
as compared to 2008. There were 342 recorded incidents
of infiltration in 2008 and 485 in 2009, according to
official sources. The security agencies are certain
that more than 300 terrorists successfully crossed over
to the Indian side in these attempts – and this is a
minimal assessment. According to official data (up to
November 2009) 273 terrorists sneaked back to Pakistan,
93 terrorists were neutralised during infiltration,
and 152 were killed across the State. According to State
Government assessments, at least 600-800 terrorists
are currently operating in the State, though this may
well be a gross underestimate.
In the
first month of 2010, there were 25 infiltration attempts
by militants from across the border, backed by five
incidents of ceasefire violation by Pakistani Forces.
The first two months of the year have already witnessed
a steep increase in encounters, grenade attacks and
militancy-related deaths. According to a Government
release, till February 2010, "More than 30 active
militants, 2 former militants, 5 civilians and 9 security
personnel, including an Army Captain, were killed in
various militancy-related incidents in the State.’’
According to SATP data, till March 7, 2010, fatalities
in the year had already mounted to 64, including 43
terrorists, 14 SF personnel, and seven civilians.. On
January 6, militants in the Valley executed a ‘fidayeen’
attack, the first in two years, at Lal Chowk, the heart
of the summer capital, Srinagar. Significantly, 30,000
troops were withdrawn from the twin border Districts
of Rajouri-Poonch in 2009. SFs accept that at least
50 infiltration routes exist along this border.
It is
unsurprising that the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), a conglomerate
of central intelligence agencies, which recently reviewed
infiltration activities on the Indo-Pak border, cautioned
the Centre about the possibility of a ‘more violent
summer’ ahead. The assessment was based on the premise
that terrorists took about six months to settle down,
and would gear up to launch attacks by summer. It is
expected that such attacks would be coordinated with
a rising tide of street agitations, as terrorism and
public mobilization campaigns are deployed in tandem
by separatist controllers.
Regrettably,
even as these tactics secure increasing traction on
the ground, and are widely projected through the media
to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the Indian state,
the strategic and tactical response to these new maneuvers
remains incoherent. If this does not change before the
next wave of coordinated street and terrorist violence
swells, many of the gains that have been consolidated
since the democratic process was restored in J&K
in 1996, would be at risk of being frittered away.
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Treacherous
Frontier
Sandipani Dash
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Myanamar
– one of India’s strategic neighbours on her Northeastern
frontier – shares a 1,643 kilometer long border abutting
the Indian States of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur
and Mizoram. This South East Asian neighbour now remains
the lone safe-haven for militant groups operating in India’s
Northeast, since their alternative refuge in Bangladesh
was shut down by the Shiekh Hasina regime (camps in Bhutan
were shut down earlier, in a military campaign in 2003).
Aggravating the problem is rising evidence of Chinese
mischief in supplying arms to insurgent groups operating
across the Myanmar corridor.
India and
Myanmar have a clearly demarcated – though indiscernible
– border across mountainous and densely forested terrain.
There has always been considerable cross-border movement
down the entire length of the border between consanguineous
tribes that straddle the frontier region. Naga armed groups,
especially the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K),
retain strong affinities with Kachin tribals in Myanmar.
The border regions offer safe haven to a number of insurgent
groups in India’s Northeast, and provide bases for illicit
trade, including arms- and drug-running. There is large-scale
ingress or egress of men and material, substantially controlled
by insurgent groups, across the India-Myanmar border,
which takes advantage of the 10 kilometers zone within
which free movement is permitted on both sides of this
border.
Manipur
Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, addressing the Conference
of Chief Ministers on Internal Security in New Delhi on
February 7, 2010, said that the almost unchecked trans-border
movement of Indian insurgent groups and the continued
existence of their camps in Myanmar constituted a real
threat to internal security of Manipur and the Northeast
region:
It
is no secret that most arms and ammunition used
against our Security Forces (SFs) and the State
Police Forces are smuggled in from Myanmar. It is
also known that whenever our Army, Assam Rifles
and the State Police launch operations, the militant
groups seek and find shelter in neighbouring areas
of Myanmar… Another serious angle is the active
involvement of these insurgent groups in smuggling
of huge quantities of narcotics like heroin. The
proceeds are being used to finance the procurement
of sophisticated weapons and maintaining their leaders
in foreign countries and their cadres in India.
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Meanwhile,
the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 3 Corps, Lieutenant
General N.K. Singh, responsible for counter-insurgency
(CI) operations in the Northeast, declared that there
were approximately 40 to 50 camps of Northeast-based militant
groups in Myanmar. Of these, he indicated further, 25
to 30 were identified as bigger camps or of established
nature, while the remaining were ‘temporary’. Confessional
revelations by arrested cadres of various armed groups
operating in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland consistently
indicate that militant training remains an ongoing process
in the camps located in Myanmar territory.
While there
were a number of militancy related incidents reported
along India-Myanmar border in 2009, the major (incidents
involving three or more fatalities) among these included:
March 16:
Three suspected militants were shot dead by the Assam
Rifles personnel near Kwatha village while trying to infiltrate
into Chandel District in Manipur from the Myanmar side
of the border, along with weapons.
June 20:
At least 10 cadres of an unspecified militant outfit were
killed in a clash in Manipur along the India-Myanmar border.
December
24: Six suspected People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
(PREPAK)
cadres were shot dead by the Assam Rifles personnel at
Sajik Tampak area of Chandel District in Manipur along
the India-Myanmar border.
There has
been a perceptible move by the Northeast militants to
shift their bases from Bangladesh to Myanmar in the wake
of the crackdown by Dhaka. The Inspector General of the
Border Security Force (BSF) for the Assam-Meghalaya, frontier
Prithvi Raj, expressing concern over an exodus of the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
militants to Myanmar to escape the ongoing operations
by the Bangladeshi Security Forces, in December 2009,
stated, "It is quite natural that the militants look for
new pastures to continue their future activities." An
ULFA cadre, Gobin Ojha alias Kiran Jyoti Gogoi
(29), while surrendering at BSF headquarters in Shillong
in Meghalya, disclosed, "Myanmar continues to be a safe
haven for the ULFA cadres after the ongoing crackdown
on militants by the Bangladeshi security forces." Ojha
said three camps of the ‘28th battalion’ of
the ULFA were in Myanmar, located adjacent to the camps
of the NSCN-K. There were 110 ULFA cadres in the three
camps and, among the prominent leaders housed there, were
Konkon Gohain, Bijoy Chinese, Myanmar camp ‘commander’
Bijoy Das and Montu Saikia, he said. He also disclosed
that new cadres had to trek several days to reach the
camps set up in a forest area in Myanmar.
Subsequently,
another ULFA militant, Jatin Shaw alias Alput Thapa
(25), while surrendering before the BSF in Shillong, confessed
that the NSCN and ULFA were operating collectively in
the forests of Myanmar, adding further that some 20 to
25 cadres from Arunachal Pradesh were also undergoing
training at different camps there. Army intelligence sources
had indicated earlier that ULFA had set up camps at Kachin
in eastern Myanmar, jointly with the Manipur-based People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)
and United National Liberation Front (UNLF).
One SF source commented, "It is back to square one for
ULFA. During its initial days, the outfit had its training
camps in Kachin but later shifted to Bangladesh. Now,
the outfit is back to Kachin, which is indeed disturbing
news for us."
There has
been an increase in gun-running across the India-Myanmar
border, due to the steady procurement of arms by Northeast
militants from the common neighbor, China, over the years.
Sources indicate that a major modernization drive in the
Chinese Army has released vast quantities of old weapons,
some of which are being offloaded to arms dealers, to
reach militant groups. Weapons, including AK series and
M-15 rifles, LMGs and ammunition, discarded by the Chinese
Army, are still good enough for militant groups. The managers
of the Chinese State-owned weapons’ factories are reportedly
involved in such clandestine arms supply. There is official
confirmation of frequent visits by Northeast Indian militant
leaders to China. The ULFA ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh
Barua had been traced to Ruili in the Yunan Province of
China, bordering Myanmar. Military sources indicate, "Most
of the arms deals are struck at Ruili and from there the
Chinese arms are brought to Bamo in Myanmar, from where
they are routed to different places, mostly through the
Irrawaddy and its tributaries. ULFA and other militant
outfits of the northeast also bring their arms and ammunition
through this route… Since the Myanmar junta and…
(Myanmarese) rebel groups are in ceasefire, the Indian
insurgent outfits, like NSCN-K, ULFA, and Meitei groups
of Manipur, have found safe haven in the areas under control
of the Kachin and Wa rebels (in Myanmar)." Sources mentioned,
further, that after the Bangladesh Government had stepped
up action against the ULFA, Barua shifted base to the
China-Myanmar border and also set up camp in rebel-administered
areas in Myanmar's Kachin territory.
The United
Wa State Army (UWSA), a Chinese speaking ethnic warring
group in north Myanmar, has acted as a broker for Chinese-produced
arms, as well as to sell weapons from their own arms factory
near Panghsang bordering China. A Jane's Intelligence
Review report in 2008 detailed UWSA’s involvement
in trafficking weapons to Myanmar and Indian insurgent
groups. While the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), based
in the same northern part of Myanmar, claims to have severed
ties to insurgents in India, it is still believed to retain
these linkages, and could be another possible conduit
for weapons. Confirming KIA’s persisting alliance with
the NSCN-K during the course of the Naga group’s recruitment
drive in Arunachal Pradesh, an unnamed senior Police official,
in December 2009, disclosed that newly recruited NSCN-K
cadres had undergone training under the guidance of the
KIA in the Sagaing region of Myanmar: "NSCN-K has turned
to the Kachin Independent Army for logistical help to
build up bases in the twin Districts of Arunachal Pradesh
— Tirap and Changlang — and heavily armed KIA fighters
have already entered these two Districts along the Indo-Myanmar
border." Armed KIA cadres also venture into the Northeast
region. For instance, on May 9, 2009, a KIA cadre was
shot dead by Assam Rifles personnel during an encounter
at Sekmaijin in Thoubal District in Manipur. One AK 56
Rifle with magazine, one grenade launcher, one M-97 rifle,
US made 40-mm Springfield armoury pistol, 15 live rounds
of AK-56, three 40-mm live ammunition, and three fire
cases were recovered from the possession of the slain
Kachin insurgent.
Chinese
weapons in significant numbers are finding their way into
the Northeastern States through five major routes, most
of which pass through Myanmar territory. A senior intelligence
official in Moreh, on February 21, 2010, revealed, "Around
80 per cent of the weapons seized or recovered from the
militants in recent years have 'star' mark on them, which
means they were manufactured in China." Over four dozen
militant groups are active along the India-Myanmar border
and they smuggle traditional weapons like AK series rifles,
grenades, pistols, cartridges and bombs into India through
four land routes and one sea route. Most of the weapons
are brought from southwestern China's Yunnan province,
which borders Myanmar, the official said. The weapons
are smuggled into India via Ukhrul, Moreh in Chandel,
and Churachandpur, the Districts of Manipur bordering
Myanmar, and some parts of Mizoram. The sea route involves
Bangladesh's Chittagong port, from where the weapons are
sent to militants in the Northeast. Though some weapons
are of other origin, the majority of them are Chinese,
he added: "Militants have their camps just inside the
Myanmar territory at a distance of few kilometres from
the Indian border. Some camps are as close as three-four
kilometres from the international border."
The paramilitary
Assam Rifles is deployed for CI and border guarding role
on the India-Myanmar border. Out of a sanctioned strength
of 46 battalions, 31 battalions are for CI and 15 are
for the border guarding role. Nevertheless, the Assam
Rifles is too pre-occupied with the CI operations to attend
to the Myanmar border.
Union Ministry
of Home Affairs (MHA) sources indicate that the reconnaissance
survey and trace cut (RSTC) of the border fencing between
border pillar (BP) Nos. 79 and 81 at Moreh in Manipur
is under way for preparation of the detailed project report
(DPR). The work on the construction of the fencing would
start after approval of the cost estimates/DPR by the
Technical Committee and the High Level Empowered Committee.
Meanwhile, the Manipur Government has asked the MHA to
erect fencing on the Manipur side of the border for a
distance of another 10 kilometers between BP Nos. 79 to
81. Manipur Director General of Police Y. Joykumar said
that activities of militant groups and other insurgency
related problems in the State would be reduced by 80 per
cent, if the neighbouring border of Myanmar is effectively
sealed. He also stated that the successful plugging of
the porous border would enormously increase the possibilities
of finding a solution to the problem of insurgency within
the succeeding two to three years. With regard to the
fencing of border areas in Nagaland, GOC, 3 Corps, Lt.
Gen. N.K. Singh indicated that the Government had failed
to demonstrate any keenness to fence off the Nagaland-Myanmar
borders so far.
There have
been several declarations for strategic cooperation and
co-ordination across the India-Myanmar border, but progress
at the follow up level to concretise the joint CI operation
on a sustained and priority basis has been slow paced.
A piecemeal approach to the border safeguards mission,
consequently, persists. The existing insecurity that has,
for years, permeated this strategic frontier region, consequently
can be expected to persist in the foreseeable future.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
March 2-7,
2010
|
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
7
|
Jammu
and Kashmir
|
0
|
1
|
5
|
6
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
7
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
Orissa
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
West
Bengal
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
Total
(INDIA)
|
7
|
2
|
17
|
26
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
FATA
|
1
|
2
|
59
|
62
|
NWFP
|
12
|
0
|
11
|
23
|
Total
(PAKISTAN)
|
16
|
2
|
70
|
88
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Talks
held between Union
Government and NSCN-IM:
The
first round of talks
between the Union
Government’s newly
appointed interlocutor
R. S. Pandey and the
National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM) were held
in New Delhi on March
2. The NSCN-IM submitted
a list of 30 demands
including sovereignty
for Nagaland. Government’s
interlocutor, however,
conveyed to them that
there was no possibility
of sovereignty for
Nagaland and the talks
could be held around
granting more autonomy.
The Centre offered
more autonomy for
Nagaland under Article
371 (A) of Indian
Constitution but won’t
integrate Naga-inhabited
parts of Arunachal
to Nagaland. The Centre
prepared a 29-point
counter proposal for
the discussions, which
included financial
sops and greater autonomy.
Nagaland
Post;
Times
Now,
March 3, 2010.
Union
Government sanctions
INR 6067 millions
for Central Paramilitary
Forces: Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram
on March 2 said that
sanctions amounting
to INR 6067 millions
were issued in the
month of February
for acquisition of
land and construction
of buildings and barracks
for Central Paramilitary
Forces (CPMFs). Presenting
the Union Ministry
of Home Affair’s (MHA)
report card in New
Delhi, Chidambaram
said that the sanction
includes INR 3588
millions to the Border
Security Force (BSF),
INR 1543 millions
to Assam Rifles, INR
737 millions to the
Indo-Tibetan Border
Police (ITBP) and
INR 199 millions to
the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF).
Chidambaram further
said that sanction
for the release of
INR 26764000 to the
Union Territory of
Dadra and Nagar Haveli
under the Police Modernisation
Scheme was issued
on February 25.
Sify News,
March 3, 2010.
Union
Government sets up
combined SOGs to combat
Left Wing Extremism:
The
Union Government has
set up combined Special
Operation Groups (SOGs)
of State Police Forces
and Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF)
in Left Wing Extremism
(LWE)-affected States,
which will coordinate
among themselves for
joint operations.
The SOGs will commence
operations in seven
most LWE infested
States -- Jharkhand,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
West Bengal, Orissa,
Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh. The SOG teams
would comprise of
40-50 selected personnel
from the paramilitary
and concerned State
Police force.
Meanwhile,
the Union Ministry
of Home Affairs decided
to send 2,000 more
Paramilitary Force
personnel, trained
in jungle warfare,
to Bihar and Jharkhand
to help the Police
counter the LWE violence.
The
Hindu;
Times
of India,
March 4-5, 2010.
Lashkar-e-Toiba
behind Kabul attack,
says Afghanistan intelligence
official: Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
was blamed by an Afghan
intelligence official
for February 26, 2010
car bomb and suicide
attacks that killed
16 people, including
nine Indians, in Kabul.
Saeed Ansari, a spokesman
for Afghanistan's
intelligence service,
said on March 2 that
his agency has evidence
that Pakistani nationals,
specifically LeT militants
were involved in the
attacks. "We are very
close to the exact
proof and evidence
that the attack on
the Indian guest house
... is not the work
of the Afghan Taliban
but this attack was
carried out by Lashkar-e-Toiba
network, who are dependent
on the Pakistan military,"
Ansari said in an
interview. He also
said that one of the
attackers was heard
speaking Urdu. As
reported earlier,
the Afghan Taliban
militants already
have claimed responsibility
for the attacks.
Times of India,
March 3, 2010.
Maoists
aiming to overthrow
Indian State by 2050,
says Union Home Secretary
G. K. Pillai: The
Union Home Secretary
G. K. Pillai said
in New Delhi on February
5 that the objective
of the Communist Party
of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
engaged in an armed
‘liberation struggle'
was to overthrow the
Indian State by 2050,
as indicated by documents
seized from them.
Pillai also said that
an in-depth analysis
of Maoist operations
also pointed to assistance
by former Army men.
"It is quite likely
that the violence
will go up in 2010
or 2011 before the
tide begins to turn,"
he said, adding that
the Government would
need seven to eight
years to have full
control over the areas
lost to the Maoists.
Pillai also said that
the Bihar Government
is a "little soft"
in taking any "hard
action" against Maoists
since assembly elections
are scheduled in 2010.
The
Hindu,
March 6, 2010.
245
terrorists killed
in 2009 in Jammu and
Kashmir: Security
Forces killed 245
terrorists in Jammu
and Kashmir in 2009,
when the number of
infiltration attempts
by militants from
Pakistan went up marginally.
"As per the statistics
provided by the ministry
of defence, the terrorists
killed in Jammu and
Kashmir are 245 in
2009, and 27 up to
Feb 21, 2010,"
Minister of State
for Home Affairs Ajay
Maken told the Rajya
Sabha (Upper House
of Parliament) in
a written reply. "Attempts
at infiltration from
across the Line of
Control (LoC) [saw]
a marginal increase
during 2009,"
he informed, adding,
that 342 incursion
attempts were recorded
in 2008 and 485 in
2009. Maken said that
terrorist activities
showed a 'declining
trend - from 708 in
2008 to 499 in 2009'
in Jammu and Kashmir.
Earlier,
on March 2, Chief
Minister Omar Abdullah
said militants are
grouping in the Sopore
area and Kulgam District.
These areas are a
challenge for us on
the militancy front.
We are taking extra
measures to deal with
the militants there.
Referring to stone
throwing incidents,
he told the Legislative
Council that his Government
would not allow some
700 youths to disrupt
the peace, adding,
"They want a
volcano to spread,
but we will not allow
that."
The
Hindu;
Sify
News,
March 3-8, 2010.
11,876
explosions claim 1,754
lives in two decades
in Jammu and Kashmir:
In
a change of strategy
to avoid casualties
in its ranks, terrorists
have triggered 11,876
explosions which claimed
1,754 lives while
15,589 others were
injured during the
last two decades in
Jammu and Kashmir.
According to the latest
official data of the
State Home Ministry,
terrorists have now
resorted to Improvised
Explosive Devices
(IEDs) and grenade
attacks to avoid direct
conflict with Security
Forces in the State
since 1990. "Militants
are using IEDs and
grenades as a tool
to cause casualties
to security forces
and civilians, and
thereby avoiding direct
conflict with security
forces. This is the
part of their target
and hit strategy to
avoid their own casualty,"
said an unnamed senior
Police officer. Of
these 11,876 explosions,
5,682 were caused
by the IEDs and 6,194
by hurling of grenades.
The highest number
of explosions (1,522)
took place in 1990,
followed by 1,005
explosions in 1993,
it said. Similarly,
the maximum number
of casualties reported
was 153 killed and
1,021 injured in 1995.
While 133 were killed
and 1,443 injured
in 2001, the report
said, adding the number
of blasts in those
two years were 945
and 775, respectively.
However, there was
fall in grenade attacks
during the past two
years with 79 and
170 blasts in 2009
and 2008, respectively.
Around 47 persons
were killed and 208
injured in these grenade
attacks, the report
added.
DNA India News,
March 8, 2010.
PAKISTAN
59
militants and two
SFs among 62 persons
killed during the
week in FATA: At
least eight persons
were killed and two
injured as fighter
jets pounded Taliban
hideouts in the Hamdana
area of Sararogha
tehsil (revenue
unit) in the South
Waziristan Agency
of Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA)
at around 2pm (PST)
on March 7.
At
least 30 Taliban militants
were killed when SFs
retaliated against
a predawn attack on
Marjhana security
post in the Chamarkand
area of Safi tehsil,
some 45 kilometres
northeast of Ghallanai,
in Mohmand Agency
on March 5. An Inter
Services Public Relations
(ISPR) statement said
one soldier was also
killed in the fighting.
However, Taliban spokesman
Akramullah Mohmand
claimed that only
four Taliban were
killed in the fighting,
while "11 security
personnel died in
the attack".
Nine
Taliban militants
were killed in the
on going factional
clash between followers
of Noor Jamal alias
Mullah Toofan and
Mulla Rafique Mengal
in the Neka Ziarat
area of Kurram Agency
on March 4. The Rafique
Mengal faction had
also ‘detained’ 11
cadres of the rival
faction. While the
Mulla Toofan group
is associated with
the Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), the
Rafique Mengal faction
is associated with
the Ishaat-e-Tauheed-Wa-Sunnah.
Both factions are
part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP).
Seven
militants, including
a ‘commander’, were
killed in a clash
between two factions
of militants in the
Dogar area of Kurram
Agency on March 2.
The sources said the
factions of militants
headed by Noor Jamal
alias Mulla
Toofan and Mulla Rafique
Mengal clashed in
Dogar area using heavy
weapons and ammunition.
As a result, seven
militants, including
Qari Yousaf, were
reported to have been
killed. The Mulla
Toofan faction claimed
to have made 48 militants,
including Mulla Rafique,
hostage.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News,
March 3-8, 2010.
12
persons killed in
suicide bombing in
NWFP: 12
persons, including
four women, were killed
and 33 others injured
when a suicide bomber
targeted a Parachinar-bound
civilian convoy carrying
Shia passengers in
the Tull area of Hangu
in the North West
Frontier Province
(NWFP) on March 5.
Local administration
officials said the
suicide bomber blew
himself up when the
civilian convoy, on
its way to Parachinar
and escorted by the
Frontier Corps, slowed
down at a speed breaker
near a petrol station,
some two kilometres
from Tull city. "The
target was a Shia
convoy. This is sectarian
violence," Kohat Division
Commissioner Khalid
Umarzai said.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News,
March 3-8, 2010.
‘Azad
Jammu and Kashmir’
remains a training
ground for militants,
says BBC report: The
militant training
camps for those fighting
in Jammu and Kashmir
(India) are once again
being established
in ‘Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (AJK)’ and
recruitment is also
on the rise in Punjab,
the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC)
said on March 3. In
its latest report,
the BBC also
mentioned that the
United Jihad Council
(UJC) meeting was
held in Muzaffarabad
in mid-January, chaired
by former Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)
chief Lieutenant General
(retired) Hameed Gul.
The meeting decided
that the freedom struggle
or jihad should
continue until the
Indian occupation
of Jammu and Kashmir
comes to an end. According
to the BBC,
it looks evident now
that the Kashmiri
militant groups are
once again working
under the ‘patronage
of the Pakistani establishment
agencies’.
DNA India News,
March 4, 2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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