Nagaland: Revolt within a Rebellion:FICN: Currency of Terror::South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 9.49
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Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 49, June 13, 2011

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
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Nagaland: Revolt within a Rebellion
Guest Writer: Wasbir Hussain
Director, Centre for Development & Peace Studies, Guwahati; Member, National Security Advisory Board

Fresh feuding has broken out among Naga rebels twenty-three years after a bloody internecine struggle left scores dead and an insurgency divided. Another split is now threatening to impact on the protracted Naga peace process.

On June 7, 2011, a meeting of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) ‘expelled’ its 'chairman', S.S. Khaplang, on charges of behaving in a ‘unilateral and dictatorial manner.’ This essentially means that the NSCN-K has split with those who have expelled Khaplang choosing ‘General’ Khole Konyak, until now the group’s ‘commander-in-chief’, as their new chairman. The outfit will drop Khaplang from its name, and is shortly expected to announce a new name. Khaplang is expected to continue to head a faction under the original name, NSCN-K, as he still has a considerable following and can command his cadres from his base in Myanmar.

An internal power struggle has troubled the NSCN-K for some time now, and Khaplang’s ouster is a culmination of growing difficulties within the group. On March 17, 2011, Chipu Menon aka ‘Brigadier’ Khungwang, head of the NSCN-K’s operations in Arunachal Pradesh, was killed near Mon in Nagaland after allegedly being ‘summoned’ by some senior leaders of the outfit for ‘urgent discussions’. Media reports indicate that some NSCN-K leaders had claimed Menon was awarded ‘capital punishment’ for allegedly killing five senior citizen from Bordoria and Kaimai villages under the Tirap District on the pretext that they were working for the rival Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM) in 1999. Menon was also accused by some of his colleagues of setting up a new rebel group, the Arunachal Naga Liberation Force, in Tirap and Changlang in 2010, and extorting money from local businessmen in the name of this new outfit. Menon’s killing demonstrated that the power struggle within the NSCN-K had become acute.

The NSCN now has four factions — the Isak-Muivah faction, the NSCN-K splinter headed by Khole Konyak, the NSCN-K headed by Khaplang, and NSCN-Unification. The NSCN came into being in 1980, after a split from the Naga National Council (NNC). Led by Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and S. S. Khaplang, the NSCN parted ways because it opposed the NNC’s signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975 and its acceptance of the Indian Constitution. In 1988, the NSCN itself split over purported ‘ideological differences’ in a violent parting of ways. Early that year, Muivah apparently received news that the Indian Government was ready for talks within the framework of the country’s Constitution. Although the offer was rejected, there were widespread rumours that Swu and Muivah had ‘sold out’ and planned to oust Khaplang, seize arms from the Konyak cadres and surrender in India. Amidst a ‘National Assembly’ session of the group that was called to resolve the controversy these reports had generated, Khaplang’s fighters, backed by a section of Burmese troops, attacked Muivah’s group in a pre-emptive strike at dawn on April 30, 1988. Some 140 of Muivah’s cadres, primarily Tangkhuls, were killed. This incident resulted in the split of the NSCN, as Isak (Swu) and Muivah formed the NSCN-IM, while Khaplang gave his own name to his faction, the NSCN-K.

In 1997, the NSCN-IM and the Government of India signed a ceasefire agreement and entered into a peace process to resolve what the outfit calls the ‘Indo-Naga conflict.’ Today, fourteen years later, and more than seventy rounds of talks across the world between the NSCN-IM and the Government of India, a ‘solution’ remains elusive. The NSCN-K followed suit, entering into a truce with New Delhi on April 30, 2001, but has not begun formal talks yet.

Another split, though bloodless, came about on November 23, 2007. Several NSCN-IM cadres, led by its one-time ‘home minister’ Azheto Chopey, broke away from the group and formed the NSCN-Unification. On January 21, 2008, the NSCN-IM ‘dismissed’ 27 of its cadres, who had defected along with Chopey from ‘national service’ with effect from January 22, 2008, for ‘deliberately defying’ a directive of the ‘yaruiwo’ (prime minister) Isak Chishi Swu, to return from the “reactionary camp” and report to the Council Headquarters. Since January 2008, the NSCN-U has been involved in bitter clashes with the NSCN-IM, culminating in the death of 14 of its cadres near Dimapur, Nagaland’s commercial hub, on May 16, 2008. Since 2009, however, the NSCN-U has been maintaining a low profile.

Questions have always been asked as to which of the principal NSCN factions (NSCN-IM or NSCN-K) was the ‘true representative’ of the Naga people; or whether New Delhi or the Nagas themselves believed there could be lasting peace with a possible accord being reached with either one of the Naga rebel factions. That the answer was always in the negative is indicated by continuing efforts by Naga civil society groups, particularly Church leaders and the Naga Hoho (the apex tribal council), in trying to unite the two rebel factions. The logic for this, as yet unsuccessful, unity effort is simple — only an accord by the Government of India jointly with the two NSCN factions has the potential of bringing lasting peace. It is impossible to see New Delhi signing two separate deals with two Naga rebel factions fighting over more or less the same issues. With the split in the NSCN-K, the job of Naga civil society and the Government would appear to have been made somewhat more difficult.

There is, however, another side to the story. Reports trickling out of the anti-Khaplang camp suggest that Khaplang was first impeached by the outfit’s ‘Tatar Hoho’ or ‘parliament’ and then expelled, not just for behaving in an ‘autocratic’ manner, but for obstructing the process of unification among the Naga insurgent factions. The accusations against him included the charge that he had unilaterally ‘dismissed’ ‘General’ Khole Konyak, the outfit’s ‘commander-in-chief’, who was also the undeclared vice-chairman of the group, and appointed a new vice-chairman; that he had ordered his leaders not to attend the Naga reconciliation meeting organized by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation on September 18, 2010; and that he has been in exile for too long, operating from his base in Myanmar, and had consequently lost sight of things on the ground.

If charges of Khaplang actually ordering his men to keep away from the Naga reconciliation efforts are true, there is a possibility that his ouster could actually hasten the process of unification of the NSCN-IM and the faction headed by Khole Konyak. There is possible speculation, moreover, that Khaplang’s ouster may have come about because the Hemi Naga from Western Myanmar was not fitting into New Delhi’s scheme of things with regard to a peace deal; and that Khole Konyak and others have inched closer to sorting out differences with the Government. Khaplang, in this scenario, would appear as a spoiler, because his affiliations are with Nagas from Myanmar, allowing him to strike a far more belligerent posture.

Khaplang’s ouster is certainly going to disrupt, or at least weaken, the Myanmar connection of several frontline rebel groups from the Northeast, such as the Paresh Baruah faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and Manipur’s United National Liberation Front (UNLF), which have found safe haven in that country under the wings of the NSCN-K. These rebel formations, operating out of Myanmar, were also provided logistic support by NSCN-K cadres in Nagaland, parts of Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh –states that either share direct borders with Myanmar or that are close to these borders (Assam). This certainly gave Government agencies reason to undermine Khaplang.

These are, of course, just teasers; the reality may be nothing more than the usual power struggle within insurgent formations.

Khaplang’s ouster in a bloodless coup became possible because he has been away from the Naga heartland (Nagaland) for far too long, and had lost touch with the Naga people, mainly in Nagaland and Manipur. Under the new circumstances, the two factions – Khaplang and Khole Konyak – may both weaken substantially; or Khaplang may be progressively sidelined, leaving behind a stronger Khole Konyak formation. In either case, New Delhi may find itself in a better position to dictate terms to the rebels. If, on the other hand, the NSCN-IM and Konyak factions move towards unity in the days ahead, New Delhi would have to listen to a broader Naga voice.

On June 10, 2011, Khaplang had retaliated with the counter-expulsion of several breakaway leaders, including ‘general secretary’ Kitovi Zhimomi (one of those who is in charge of the Konyak faction after Khaplang’s expulsion) and erstwhile ‘home minister’ Azheto Chophy, besides six other functionaries. Khaplang’s silence on ‘General’ Khole Konyak, the new ‘chairman’ named by the group, is, however, significant. Khaplang has sought to add a new dimension to murky NSCN politics by saying that members whom he has now expelled are actually members of NSCN-Unification, and not his group, the NSCN-K. Khaplang has also formally declared that his group would not be part of the Naga reconciliation process.

The realities of Naga insurgent politics remain complicated, and the road to Naga peace is full of traps and pitfalls. A single, united, Naga voice is still nowhere to be heard.

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FICN: Currency of Terror
Shrideep Biswas
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Official estimates indicate that Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) worth over USD 2.2 billion were in circulation in India by 2010, pumped in over the years by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in a strategy intended simultaneously to destabilize the Indian economy, even as it released substantial funds for Islamist terrorism on Indian soil. In 2005, the seizure of FICN in India amounted over INR 70 million; this rose to INR 100 million in 2007; and INR 258.9 million in 2008, INR 229.8 million in 2009. During 2010, 1,850 cases of the circulation of significant quantities of FICN were detected and fake notes to the tune of INR 258.27 million were seized, and 1,265 persons were arrested. A bulk of cases detected indicates a strategy of widespread dissemination of relatively small quantities through a multiplicity of agencies, including terrorist formations. Some cases detected in 2011 help illustrate the pattern:

March 7, 2011: Three cadres of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), including one ‘communications expert’, was arrested near the Khan Market area of New Delhi for allegedly running a FICN racket. Police claimed to have recovered counterfeit notes with a face value of INR  1 million from them.

April 17, 2011: A scrap dealer, identified as Zubair Alam, was arrested in New Delhi, along with FICN worth INR 110,000.

April 24, 2011: Police arrested five persons and seized FICN worth INR 954,000 from their possession near Arif Ke village under Mallanwala Police Station in Punjab. Customs officials also recovered FICN worth 200,000 from a goods train, which runs between India and Pakistan for trade activities at the Attari Railway Station located close to Pakistan.

The FICN seized by the Police from various operations exhibit a very high degree of sophistication. The fake notes have different serial numbers, indicating that they have not been printed from a scanned image of a genuine note by using coloured scanners and printers, but have been printed on a large scale at a security press with advanced technologies and specialized paper, inks and other materials.

Indeed, the problem is now so widespread that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regularly brings out circulars on how to indentify counterfeit currency notes, as well as notifications of fake series in circulation.

Counterfeit currency has long been recognized as a source of funding for terrorism in India. Specifically, investigations into at least three cases — the Hyderabad bombings of August 2007; the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in December 2005; and the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai — have demonstrated such a link. In the first case, in the immediate aftermath of the explosions, the Police had arrested a four-member gang including a Dubai national. The police recovered fake currency of INR 23.6 million. The Police Commissioner disclosed that FICN in the denominations of INR 500 and INR 1,000 had been brought in from Pakistan via Dubai. Intelligence sources found that INR 3 million of the INR 5 million spent on the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in December 2005 was obtained through the fake currency racket. In the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, a significant part of the money to fund the preliminary operations was obtained through fake currency rackets and hawala (illegal money transfer) channels. In May 2011, in its second charge sheet in the 26/11 case, the US Government named a serving ISI officer, Major Iqbal, as a key conspirator charged with providing funds to Pakistani-American Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley. Major Iqbal, posted in Lahore during 2007 and 2008, was handling Headley on behalf of the ISI. He provided USD 25,000 and fake Indian currency notes to Headley, to meet the latter’s expenses during surveillance operations in India preceding the 26/11 attacks.

Indigenous terrorist outfits have also been provided FICN funding from Pakistan. In one such case, the Maharashtra Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) told a Special Court in January 2009 that it was probing the links between the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and fake currency rackets in the country. The ATS submitted before the Special Court at Shivajinagar that Riyaz Bhatkal, Iqbal Bhatkal and Ahmed Yasin, founders and top operatives of the IM, had provided counterfeit notes to Maulana Hussain Shabbir Gangavali (29), who was arrested on December 30, 2008, at a Janwadi Masjid in Pune with FICN worth INR 25,000.

As has been noted elsewhere,
Finances for… all Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist groupings - are provided via tacit state support, including the transfer of large quantities of fake Indian currency that Indian Intelligence sources contend, on the basis of interrogations of arrested terrorists and couriers, is printed at Pakistani Security Presses at the Mlair Cantonment in Karachi, and at Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar, and which Pakistan uses to finance its jihad against India. Significant in this regard is the Indian government's August 2009 announcement that it intends to take up the issue of the importation of currency standard ink and paper by Pakistan from the UK, Sweden and Switzerland, with various international agencies, including Interpol. In addition to very substantial seizures of fake Indian currency notes (FICN) from Pakistan-linked couriers, there have been instances of such currency also being recovered from Pakistan Embassy staff. India's Ministry of Home Affairs has reportedly found that "the ISI has managed to get access to the configuration, specifications and other secret codes of the genuine Indian currency notes from six European companies that supply Indian currency papers fitted with security features, and another company in Switzerland that supplies the security ink used in printing these currency notes in India."

A Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report to the Finance Ministry has reiterated the claim that Pakistan Government Printing Presses in Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, were churning out large quantities of FICN. Reports indicate that the paper for the fake notes is sourced from London. Indian investigators also believe that the Pakistani Government imports currency-standard printing paper far in excess of official needs. The extra quantum is handed over to the ISI for FICN production.

In November 2010, reports suggested that India had decided to raise the charge of printing and circulating FICNs against Pakistan at various international fora. According to Government sources, armed with concrete evidence against Pakistan, India would first approach the Financial Action Task Force (An inter-Governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terror financing). The matter would subsequently be raised with the World Bank, IMF and Interpol as well.

India’s FICN problem received international attention when the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2011, of the US State Department confirmed that India faced an increasing inflow of counterfeit currency, produced primarily in Pakistan, and that terrorist and criminal networks used this money to finance their activities in the country. “India faces an increasing inflow of high-quality counterfeit currency, which is produced primarily in Pakistan but smuggled to India through multiple international routes," the Report noted. Further, criminal networks exchange counterfeit currency for genuine notes, which not only facilitates money laundering, but also represents a threat to the Indian economy.

The ISI pushes large chunks of FICN into India directly from Pakistan, as well as through Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) has been used to transport counterfeit currency to conduits in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The modus operandi was revealed by two Nepali counterfeit currency traffickers who were arrested by the Thailand Police in October 2007. During interrogation, the accused disclosed that they were working for a prominent Nepali businessman. Nepal has long been used for this ‘trade’, so much so that the possession of any high denomination Indian currency note (INR 500 and INR 1000) is prohibited in the country. Significantly, in one of the earliest cases confirming official complicity, a Pakistani diplomat, Asim Saboor, Assistant Secretary at the Pakistani Mission in Kathmandu, was caught by the Nepali Police in the act of conducting a transaction with FICNs, and was found distributing counterfeit Indian banknotes on January 3, 2000. He was summarily expelled from Nepal.

The Uttar Pradesh (UP)-Bihar border with Nepal is the most prominent route for the inflow of fake currency from Nepal into India. After the neutralization of an FICN racket in UP in 2010, interrogations revealed that the gang employed a set of six women couriers from Champaran in Bihar and another set of four hailing from Nepal. The FICN travelled to Uttar Pradesh from Nepal along two routes: from Nepal to UP via Bihar, and directly to UP, particularly through the Siddhartnagar and Maharajganj routes. The gang used private vehicles to cross the Nepal border, while the rest of the movement was done principally on public transport. To minimise suspicion, women couriers, particularly those with young children, were preferred within India, and were paid two per cent of the total face value of the FICN. A male shadow was used to trail the couriers to ensure that they were not trapped by the Police. FICN of INR 1,000 denomination was bought in Nepal at the rate of INR 500 to INR 600, while the INR 500 denomination note was bought for INR 300 to INR 400 each.

The Rajasthan and Punjab borders are the other corridors through which Pakistani agents push fake currency into India. Following a Police raid on an ISI cell in Delhi in 2011, the arrested operatives revealed that the Thar Express, running between Munnabao in Pakistan and Jodhpur in Rajasthan, was being used to smuggle FICN into India. Fake currency to the extent of INR 3.3 million was seized from them. They also confirmed that the Indian currency was printed in Pakistan and illegally pushed into India through Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand.

FICNs are also flown in from Dubai, with the crime syndicate, D-Company, headed by Dawood Ibrahim, playing a prominent role.  The D-Company has been identified as a criminal-terrorist syndicate by the US Congress, and is on the Interpol’s wanted list for organized crime, counterfeiting, and terrorist activities. D-Company operations in Dubai are run by two key lieutenants — Aftab Bhakti and Babu Gaithan. The money is transported to India through regular flights, with ordinary passengers. Indian workers from Dubai are specifically targeted, and are paid the value of a return ticket that enables them to travel home, in exchange for carrying a consignment. From Dubai, the fake currency consignments reach two major transit points — Mumbai and Hyderabad. The fake currency is offered to crime networks throughout India at a 1:2 ratio of original currency to counterfeit currency.

Sea-borne consignments are also delivered to Tamil Nadu (from Sri Lanka) and Gujarat (from Pakistan).

Local criminal networks are also used for distribution. In Rajasthan, for instance, fake currency operations are closely linked to satta (gambling) and opium smuggling. In one case, Asghar Ali, arrested at Ahmadabad in Gujarat in 2009, confessed to operating as a contact point for those who sought to get into the FICN business, and facilitated their contacts with agents who would arrange for the delivery of FICNs against hawala payments, from Dubai and Pakistan. He confessed to linkages with Pakistani intelligence agencies as well.

To tackle the challenge of this new security threat in a coordinated manner, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, in March 2011, asked States to step up their drives against FICNs. States were asked to share a copy of the forensic report on the seized and recovered FICNs with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the RBI. The States were also asked to set up a committee headed by the Directors General of Police, with General Managers/Deputy General Managers of the RBI, officers of the intelligence branch of the State Police, and the Criminal Investigating Department of the State Police, as members. A Home ministry official, on condition of anonymity, disclosed, “States have been asked to designate a Police Station at each District Police Headquarters as the nodal Police Station wherein the offences relating to FICNs recovered by banks can be reported. The banks will also correspondingly designate a nodal officer in each of the districts in their respective banks. These officers will be vested with the responsibility of reporting the seizures of the FICNs.”

States have been asked to evolve an efficient system of registration of cases, crucial to enable both proper investigation and a comprehensive database for a meaningful action to get to the sources of the proliferation of FICNs. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has also been empowered to probe and prosecute cases relating to FICN related offences under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The Centre has nominated the CBI as the Nodal Agency to monitor investigation of fake currency note cases. The RBI has also strengthened the mechanism for detection of counterfeit notes by the banks.

Despite these various measures and a progressive recognition of the problem by international agencies and foreign powers, FICN inflows into India remain uninterrupted. With Pakistan’s unrelenting commitment to the anti-India ‘jihad’, India is yet to find an effective foil to neutralize this tool of economic terrorism, even as it struggles to cope with Pakistan’s terrorist proxies operating on its soil.


Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
June 6-12, 2011



Security Force Personnel







Jammu & Kashmir


Left-wing Extremism












Total (INDIA)








Khyber Pakhtunkhwa





Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


Prime Minister wants to keep Islam as state religion: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina wants to keep Islam the State religion, thus preserving the illegal changes to the Constitution, made in 2007 by the provisional Government. In a statement on June 8, the Prime Minister responded to those calls for the restoration of the original secular constitution, as established by the Supreme Court in July 2010. Spero News, June 9, 2011.


Allahabad High Court judges on IM/SIMI hit list: Two of the three judges of the Allahabad High Court who gave the September 2010 verdict on the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid title suit are on the hit list of Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). From the photographs and literature seized from ten alleged IM and SIMI cadres, who were arrested by the ATS last week, a plot to eliminate the judges and the publisher of a Delhi-based comic magazine for printing drawings of Prophet Mohammed came to light. Times of India, June 10, 2011.

Tahawwur Hussein Rana held not guilty for Mumbai attacks by US court: On June 9, Pakistani-Canadian Tahawwur Hussain Rana was acquitted by a US court on charges of abetting Mumbai terror attacks (November 26, 2008, also known as 26/11) but was convicted for providing material support to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and helping a terror plot in Denmark. The 12-member jury announced the verdict at the end of two days of deliberations against Rana, a co-accused in the Mumbai attack with his friend, the Pakistani-American national, David Coleman Headley. No sentencing date was set. PTI, June 10, 2011.

China had vetoed imposition of sanction against LeT and JeM militants, reveals a confidential cable: From a confidential cable dated August 21, 2009 sent by the American Embassy in Beijing to Washington, it has come to light that Chinese authorities had place a technical hold on an Indian request to impose sanctions on high-ranking Pakistan-based operatives of the Laskhar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). According to the cable, the Indian request to list three militants, namely, Abdul Rahman Makki (brother of LeT/Jud leader Hafiz Saeed and the number two man in the LeT hierarchy), Azam Cheema (LeT intelligence chief and a key advisor of its senior leader Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi) and Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi (the founder of the JeM) under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 was vetoed by China on the grounds of lack of sufficient information to merit such action. According to the U.S. State Department, China's hold on listing the three terrorists was done at the behest of Pakistan. The Hindu, June 7, 2011.

250 militants still active in Jammu and Kashmir, states DGP: Director General of Police (DGP) Kuldeep Khoda said on June 7 that there are an estimated 250 to 300 militants active in the State. According to Police estimates, in central Kashmir which comprises the Districts of Srinagar, Budgam and Ganderbal, there is presence of 15 militants. Daily Excelsior, June 8, 2011.

NSCN-K chairman S. S. Khaplang impeached and expelled: Chairman of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), S. S. Khaplang, was impeached and expelled for his alleged dictatorial leadership on June 7. Khaplang was expelled during a meeting of militant leaders loyal to 'general secretary' N. Kitovi Zhimomi at the Khehoi designated camp near Dimapur, thereby creating two factions of the outfit - one led by Khaplang and the other by Zhimomi and Khole. Khole, 'commander-in-chief' of the group, was elected its acting chairman. Telegraph, June 10, 2011.

Union Government approves use of Russian MI17 choppers for Maoist-hit areas: Union Government on June 6 approved the use of MI17 Russian choppers for Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)-hit areas in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The choppers will be made available to the State Governments within three months. Daily Bhaskar, June 7, 2011.

NATGRID would be in place in 18 months, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram said that the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), which had been given an 'in principle' clearance by the Cabinet, would be in place in 18 months, and would be able to prevent 26/11-type terror attacks. Headline Today, June 11, 2011.

Harbour protection systems to be upgraded to counter terror from seas: India is going in for "a major upgrade'' of its harbour protection systems (HPSs) at the naval bases in Mumbai (in Maharashtra), Visakhapatnam (in Andhra Pradesh), Karwar (in Karnataka), Kochi (in Kerala) and Port Blair (in the Andaman and Nicobar islands), along with the ongoing security audit of ports, airfields, naval facilities, offshore installations and the like. Top Defence Ministry sources said that the plan is to "upgrade existing HPSs'' and "plug gaps'' to ensure that any nefarious activity by regular or irregular enemy forces are detected early and neutralized swiftly. Times of India, June 8, 2011.

1,100-km road planned through Maoist-affected areas:The road transport ministry is finalising a proposal to develop 1,100 kilometres of road corridor along the Andhra Pradesh border linking it with Maharashtra, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The latest plan to expand the road network tops up a 2009 project worth INR 73 billion to build 5,477 km of two-lane roads in the 33 Left Wing Extremist (LWE) hit Districts across eight States. Hindustan Times, June 10, 2011.


Government approves AISC recommendation to appoint 120 officials for secretariat: The Government on June 10 decided to allow the secretariat of the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) to appoint 120 officials to speed up its works. Among the 120 officials, 72 are section officers and 48 computer officers.

Earlier, the AISC on June 7, made public another schedule for the integration and rehabilitation of the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) combatants, aiming to conclude the regrouping of the combatants by August 27. Nepal News, June 8-11, 2011.

Statute sub-committee sets August 18 deadline to complete first draft of new constitution: The sub-committee formed by the Constitutional Committee to narrow down disputes in the new constitution has set a deadline of August 18 to resolve the outstanding disputes and prepare the first draft of the new constitution. In a meeting in the morning of June 9 (today), the sub-committee decided complete the first draft latest by August 18, ten days before the Constituent Assembly (CA) term expires. Nepal News, June 9, 2011.


69 militants and 11 SFs among 80 persons killed during the week in FATA: Five militants were killed and nine others injured when jet fighters pounded their hideouts in different areas of Baizai tehsil (revenue unit) along Afghanistan border in Mohmand Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on June 11.

At least 150 militants armed with rockets attacked a security checkpost in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) on June 9, killing eight soldiers. 12 militants were also killed in retaliatory firing by Security Forces (SFs).

US missile strikes hit a militant training facility and a suspected vehicle in NWA on June 8, killing 24 militants.

Five militants and two SF personnel were killed when militants laid an ambush on the patrol party with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades in the Shaheedan Dhand area of Kurram Agency on June 8.

Five militants and one trooper, Nahid Gul, were killed when militants from Afghanistan attacked a check post in Patala area of lower Kurram Agency near the Pakistan Afghanistan border on June 7.

18 militants were killed in three US drone strikes in South Waziristan Agency on June 6. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, June 7-13, 2011.

43 civilians among 44 persons killed during the week in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: At least 39 persons were killed in twin bomb blasts in the Khyber Super Market in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa late on June 11. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, June 7-13, 2011.

ISI provides weapons to terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, 26/11 key accuse Tahawwur Rana tells FBI: Pointing at the Inter Services Intelligence's (ISI's) direct involvement in providing arms to militants in Jammu and Kashmir, Tahawwur Rana, the Pakistani-Canadian accused in the 26/11, has told FBI that ISI gives weapons to terrorists when they are about to enter the Indian territory. He told FBI investigators that Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley had told him ISI provided weapons to "freedom fighters" in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian Express , June 8, 2011.

US intelligence to Pakistan compromised, says Washington Post report: The US intelligence officials have twice handed Islamabad tips about insurgent bomb-making factories, only to find them abandoned before Pakistani troops arrived, Washington Post reported on June 11. The vacated factories have led US officials to question whether the information had been mistakenly leaked in recent weeks or whether the insurgents had been directly warned by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), according to the report. Dawn, June 11, 2011.

Islamabad rejects US call for action against Intelligence officers and LeT leaders: Pakistan on June 7 rejected calls by the United States (US) to prosecute Intelligence officers and top Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) commanders indicted by a Federal Court for their role in the November 2008 Mumbai attack (also known as 26/11). Earlier, in meetings conducted in May 2011 with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Pakistani officials said that action against the LeT could spark off a war within Pakistan. The Hindu, June 8, 2011.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's adviser terms jails as extremist breeding ground: Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar, an adviser to the Prime Minister, after his visit to a jail in Haripur District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on June 8 came up with the observation that jails have become breeding grounds for extremists because outfits like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) have taken their "ideological campaign" to prisoners. Dawn, June 9, 2011.

Al Qaeda remains biggest global threat, says Interpol: Al Qaeda and outfits linked to it remain the world's biggest Security threat despite the killing of Osama bin Laden, the head of Interpol said on June 7. The Interpol claimed that airlines and other forms of public transport are most at risk, with terrorists using fraudulent passports to travel undetected. The News, June 8, 2011.

Pakistan risks losing control of nuclear arsenal to terrorists, claim reports: According to a new report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on June 7, Pakistan is in danger of "losing control of part of its nuclear arsenal" to terrorists. Times of India, June 8, 2011.

US reduce number of its military personnel in Pakistan: The United States (US) reduced the number of its military personnel in Pakistan following the request of Pakistani Government, a US Defence official said on June 10. A senior Pakistani military official said on June 8 that Pakistan Army had sent home 90 US military personnel. Daily Times, June 11, 2011.

"No confirmation" of Ilyas Kashmiri's death, says US State Department spokesman Mark Toner: US State Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters in Washington on June 7 that he had "no confirmation" of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami's (HuJI) death.

Earlier, Interior Minister Rehman Malik on June 6 confirmed the death of al Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiriin US drone strike on June 3. The News; Indian Express, June 7-8, 2011.


LLRC plans to release final report before Nov 15: The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) on June 10 said that plans are underway to release its final report before November 15, 2011. The Commission stressed that its final report will be completely based on the observations made by the Commissioners through gathering oral and written evidence from the public and field visits. Colombo Page, June 11, 2011.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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