SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 50, June 20, 2011

PAKISTAN	USA

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North Waziristan: Shadow Wars
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

US pressure on Islamabad to launch military operations to clear the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been mounting over the past months. The Agency is the principal base area of the Haqqani Network, one of the deadliest Afghan terrorist factions fighting the Americans, ISAF and Afghan Forces in Afghanistan, and is also host to a number of other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda linked international terrorist formations.

Pakistan, however, has made it clear that no such operations would be launched ‘under pressure’. On June 9, 2011, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani declared, “The Army was following a well thought-out campaign plan and is under no pressure to carry out operations at a particular time. Future operations, as and when undertaken, will be with political consensus.” On June 1, 2011, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said, “We are not fond of any military action and we want to have an exit strategy”, adding further that the Government would “take action when its writ is challenged”. Evidently, the conditions currently prevailing in do not, in this interpretation, constitute a ‘challenge’ to the Government’s writ.

Meanwhile, US drone attacks in the NWA have been steadily escalating since 2004. In 2010, according to the Pak Institute of Peace Studies’ (PIPS) Pakistan Security Report, 87 per cent of US drone strikes in Pakistan were located in the NWA. The New America Foundation, which has tracked drone strikes since 2004, found that 87 out of a total of 118 strikes (73.73 per cent) in 2010 hit targets in the NWA.

Drone Attacks in North Waziristan Agency: 2004-2011*

US drones have succeeded in eliminating some of the top ranking militants of the Haqqani Network in the region. Among the most notable successes was the September 14, 2010, strike in which Saifullah Haqqani, ‘military commander’ of the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan and first cousin to Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of the Network’s chief Jalaluddin Haqqani, was killed along with 11 other militants, in the Dargah Mandi area near Miranshah area of NWA. On February 18, 2010, Mohammed Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother, was killed along with three other militants in the Dandi Darpakhel area of the NWA in another such attack.

On September 8, 2008, however, US drones had fired six missiles at the home of the Haqqanis and a madrassa (seminary) run by the network in the Dandi Darpakhel area, believing that Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin were present. Several family members were among the 23 persons killed, including one of Jalaluddin's two wives, his sister, sister-in-law and eight of his grandchildren. Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin, however, were not present at the time of the attack.

Unintended civilian fatalities have, in fact, been one of the most significant factors in increasing US pressure on Pakistan to launch ground operations. Only ground operations have the potential of greater precision and lower collateral damage – though past Pakistani operations have tended to be far more indiscriminate and bloodier, relying on area weapons, including artillery and aerial bombardments, rather than face to face confrontations with armed extremists.

Nevertheless, despite growing criticism of US drone attacks in Pakistan, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, made it clear to General Kayani on April 21, 2011, that the US strikes would continue till Pakistan had eliminated the Haqqani Network from its tribal region.

The Haqqani Network, which works in cooperation with both al Qaeda and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), is the second largest terrorist group among the Afghan Taliban, after Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. The Network operates in Afghanistan's south-eastern Provinces – Paktika, Khost, Logar, and Ghazni. It has established parallel Governments in parts of Paktika and Khost, and controls the countryside in several other Districts. The Network has repeatedly attacked US and NATO Forces operating in Afghanistan, as also Afghan Army deployments.

Notably, on December 30, 2009, a suicide bomber killed at least six Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers and seriously injured six others at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan, which is used by the CIA to coordinate drone attacks in Pakistan. The Haqqani network claimed responsibility for the attack.

Again, on August 28, 2010, Haqqani Network militants launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US troops retaliated, killing more than 35, including a ‘commander’, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests.

On September 2, 2010, Haqqani Network cadres attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel District of Paktika Province. 20 militants were reportedly killed in the retaliatory attack by US troopers.

US drone attacks have repeatedly demonstrated the presence of the Haqqani Network’s leadership in the Miranshah area of NWA. The Network’s senior leadership maintains influence throughout Pakistan’s tribal region and often plays a central role in mediating disputes between militant groups and the Pakistani state, most recently including the Kurram Peace Pact of February 2011.

NWA also hosts a blend of other insurgent and terrorist formations operating against both Afghanistan and Islamabad, with at least some of these also looking at the US homeland as a potential target.

Perhaps the most influential tribal leader in NWA, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, maintains influence in the territory west of Miranshah. Bahadur is a close ally of the Haqqanis and provides resources, shelter, and facilitation for Haqqani Network operations in Afghanistan. Bahadur was allied with militants acting against the Pakistani State in the past. However, after the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the chief of TTP, he has avoided direct confrontation with the Pakistani military.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) are two predominately Uzbek militant groups with a presence in NWA. Both the IMU and IJU are located around the Mir Ali area in NWA. Both groups have close ties to al-Qaeda, the TTP, and the Haqqani Network. Other militants of foreign origin including Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs, and Turks affiliated with al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), have also found safe haven in NWA. The majority of these individuals operate out of Mir Ali under the protection of the Haqqanis and Gul Bahadur.

The US considers the Haqqani Network and its role in the insurgency in Afghanistan among the most difficult challenges the ISAF faces, but has failed to ‘convince’ Islamabad to take action against the Network’s safe havens on Pakistani soil. Significantly, while talk of ‘imminent’ military operations in NWA is now rife, it is clear that delays are being deliberately orchestrated to provide time for the Haqqanis to shift their base to the Kurram Agency, before ‘showcase’ operations are launched.

Moreover, by delaying operation, the Pakistani establishment is deliberately providing time to Haqqani Network to shift its base to the Kurram Agency. An American Enterprise Institute report of June 1, 2011, for instance, noted: "The Haqqani Network has been preparing an alternative safe haven for itself in Kurram Agency to the north, in the event of a Pakistani operation in North Waziristan.” Militants had been ‘flushed out’ of the Kurram Agency during operations in 2009-2010, reflecting an interesting cycle of relocation, where ‘good Taliban’ and ‘good terrorist’ elements are simply whisked around by dramatic ‘military operations’ from one area to another, with little enduring impact on their strength or capacity.

Indeed, the stage had been set for the relocation of the Haqqani Network to the Kurram Agency with the Haqqanis’ involvement in the Kurram Peace Pact of February 3, 2011. Ceding space to the Haqqanis in the peace initiative, the Pakistan Government and Army created the grounds for the outfit to move into this area whenever it needed an alternate sanctuary, in case Islamabad was forced to launch a sham operation in the NWA.

Pakistan’s reluctance to target the Haqqanis has obvious reasons. The ISI has long nurtured ties with the Network, which it sees as a strategic asset that can help Islamabad consolidate influence in Afghanistan. Indeed, this is confirmed by a transcript passed, in May 2008, to Mike McConnell, the Director of US National Intelligence, according to which Pakistan’s Army Chief General Kayani is reported to have referred to Haqqani as “a strategic asset.” The Haqqanis controls large areas of Eastern Afghan, and are expected to play an important, if not decisive, role in any projected post-American dispensation. Islamabad has always sought to project the myth of the ‘good Taliban’, and, in its imaginings, the Haqqani Network has always been part of this virtuous grouping. The Haqqani Network, moreover, has never threatened or executed any operations against the Pakistani state.

The Haqqanis have also demonstrated their utility in helping secure Pakistani ‘strategic’ goals in limiting Indian ‘influence’ in Afghanistan. An unholy liaison between the ISI and the Haqqani Network was demonstrated in the suicide car bombing on the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 14, 2008, which left 41 people dead. US intelligence had closely followed the build-up to this attack, and had passed on detailed intelligence to Indian agencies, though this proved insufficient to prevent the attack. Further, WikiLeaks documents published on July 27, 2010, indicated that the ISI had paid the terror outfit to plan and execute attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan. A March 2008 intelligence report claimed that the ISI paid the Haqqani network USD 15,000-30,000 to eliminate Indian nationals working on the key Zaranj-Delaram road project. The report noted that “in one particular case, it was reported that the ISI ordered Sirajuddin Haqqani to eliminate Indian nationals working in Afghanistan” and to kidnap “doctors, officers, engineers and labourers” working on the road project.

Islamabad’s perceptions of its ‘strategic interests’ are too deeply intertwined with the fate of the Haqqani Network to allow any effective operations by the Pakistan Army to be directed against this formation, or against its close allies. US pressure may eventually force Kayani to launch a fake campaign, but it is unlikely that this would do any measurable damage to what continues to be regarded as a crucial ‘strategic asset’ by the Army, and by the wider power elite in Islamabad.

BANGLADESH

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Volte Face?
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In a dramatic volte face, the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, on June 7, 2011, declared that she wished to keep Islam as the ‘State Religion’, thus preserving the illegal changes made to the Constitution in 2007 by the Provisional Government led by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed. The announcement was in complete contrast to the ruling Awami League’s (AL) declared pro-secular approach. Hasina, who also leads the AL, appears to be targeting the support of some radical Muslim formations in a replay of her last tenure, 1996-2001. The present posture suggests that the Hasina Government may increasingly incline to the use of Islam for political maneuver. Meanwhile, the Dhaka High Court, on June 8, asked the Government to explain the legality of its standpoint on the status of Islam as the ‘State Religion’.

The instrumentalisation of Islam to secure political legitimacy began in Bangladesh after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975. The successor President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia-ur-Rahman, passed a Presidential decree in 1977, removing the principle of secularism from the Preamble of the Constitution and, instead, inserted the infamous Fifth Amendment declaring "absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah". Further, in 1988, Islam was given the status of ‘State Religion’ through the Eighth Amendment by the even more zealous military regime of H. M. Ershad – Rahman’s successor.

The ongoing controversy regarding the status of Islam and its legality as the 'State Religion' came to the forefront after the General Elections that restored Hasina to power in January 2009. Her Government immediately focused attention on the challenge of tackling religious extremism and terrorism. At that time, the AL Government had made it clear that it would re-introduce the original ‘Four State Principles’ – democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism.

Meanwhile, on January 3, 2010, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court lifted a four year stay against a ban on ‘the abuse of religion for political purposes’. By lifting the stay, the Supreme Court approved the August 29, 2005, judgment of a three judge Bench, led by Justice A. B. M. Khairul Haque, which declared the Fifth Amendment illegal. The Bench also defined the meaning of secularism as religious tolerance and religious freedom. Subsequently, on February 20, 2010, Law Minister Shafique Ahmed stated, "Now we don't have any bar to return to the four state principles of democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism, as had been heralded in the 1972 statute of the State”.

Finally, the 184-page judgment of the Supreme Court was issued on July 28, 2010. The apex Court got rid of the bulk of the Fifth Amendment, including provisions that had allowed religious political parties to prosper, or that legitimized military dictatorship. The verdict further dubbed such parties as extra-constitutional adventurers and suggested "suitable punishment" for those who installed military regimes and imposed martial laws. The simultaneous trial of 1971 War Crimes and the arrest of prominent leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) on such charges further heated up the debate on the role of Islamic parties in the political arena.

At that juncture, it appeared that the Hasina Government was determined to take on the radical Islamic groups – both militant outfits and political parties. On March 16, 2009, Home Secretary Abdus Sobhan Sikder placed a report that identified 12 ‘militant’ outfits – the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Ulama Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islami Democratic Party, Islami Samaj, Touhid Trust, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamir-ud-Deen (Hizb-e-Abu Omar) and Allahr Dal. The Government has so far banned four Islamist militant groups – the JMB, HuJI-B, JMJB and Shahadat-e-al-Hikma. The main targets of the law enforcers, however, were the party activists and cadres of five main groups – Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS, youth wing of the JeI)), JMB, HuJI-B, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Hizb-ut-Tawhid.

The Institute for Conflict Management database indicates quick follow-up action to arrest leaders and cadres of these militant formations. The numbers do not, however, include mass arrests that are common during political rallies, protest marches and violent mass activities. For instance, on April 12, 2010, the Chittagong Police filed a case accusing 1,500 to 2,000 leaders and cadres of JeI and ICS for attacks on the Police at the city's Anderkilla Intersection. The arrests in this incident are not included in the data.

Arrests of Militant Leaders and Cadre: 2009-2011*

Among the arrested are important leaders, such as the founder of HuJI-B, Sheikh Abdus Salam; its current chief, Mufti Abdul Hannan Sabbir; the chief of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Mahiuddin Ahmad; the regional leader of Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Mohammed Moinuddin; among others. Recoveries from the site of arrest have included arms and ammunition, with typical variety of cocktail and hand made bombs, bomb-making manuals, Jihadi literature, anti-Government leaflets, etc.

Contradictions were, however, sharpening within the country, with three visible and polarizing trends consolidating: the ongoing 1971 War Crimes trials; the anti-women Islamist demonstrations protesting the formulation of the National Women’s Development Policy (2011); and the re-emergence of mass and violent street politics, after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party called a 36-hour national protest on June 13, 2011. The Islamist Parties clearly have huge stakes in all three issues, with JeI as the principal target of War Crimes trials, and Islamist allies of the BNP as key components in the anti-women and street demonstrations and protests. Bangladesh has, moreover, a long and infamous tradition of protracted and violent street protests and bandhs (general shutdowns) that have paralysed the country for weeks and months at end.

It is under these cumulative pressures that the AL’s stand on Islam began to shift. When Sheikh Hasina appeared before a Parliamentary Committee (PC) which was reviewing the Constitution in the light of the Supreme Court verdict in April 2010, she had already modified her position to concede that her party was “not against having Islam as state religion”. This constituted a complete reversal of the policy laid down by her father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Hasina also stated that her party was against banning religion-based political parties, though it wanted ‘some restrictions’ on them.

Internal conflicts within the ruling alliance make Hasina’s situation more complex. The Jatiya Party, headed by H.M. Ershad and commanding 29 MPs, is against any ban on religion-based political parties. On the other hand, Left-leaning parties – including the Workers Party, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, Ganotantri Party and National Awami Party – are strongly opposed to the Jatiya Party’s proposal. The Left-parties are lightweight, with three MPs in the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, two in the Workers Party, and none in Ganotantri Party and National Awami Party. The AL, with a more than three fourths majority in Parliament (270 MPs in a House of 345), is, in any event, under no threat, but values the alliances for the stability and inclusive mandate they provide. The management of the alliance, consequently, will remain a matter of concern as polarizing issues come to dominate the agenda.

Against this backdrop, Hasina’s June 7 statement can only worsen the political muddle in the country, as it dilutes its projected Constitutional identity, in the words of Foreign Minister Dipu Moni, as “a secular, not moderate Muslim, country”, and embarks on the slippery slope of an Islam pasand (committed to Islam) country. AL’s progressive ‘secular disillusionment’ can only intensify the percolation of radical thought through Bangladeshi politics and society, even as voices against Islamist extremist dogma are gradually stifled by the original initiator of secular politics in the country.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu & Kashmir

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Maharastra

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)