South Asia Assessment 2003

South Asia remains one of the most volatile regions of the world. The terrorist campaign in India, especially in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), waged by Islamist extremist groups based in and supported by Pakistan, and the growing and disruptive influence of pan-Islamist extremist and terrorist outfits, remain the two greatest threats to regional security in this nuclearised region. In addition, various internal security problems in its constituent countries — India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Bhutan — disturb and vitiate the regional security environment.

Most of the internal security crises that plague South Asian states have a cross-border dimension, and many are inter-related. Thus, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the persistent ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the increasing use of Bangladeshi territory by Islamist extremists, the proliferation of small arms, and the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, each has significant transnational dimensions. Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal also continue engage with the problem of having to deal with terrorist and extremist organisations, as well as subversive elements, based on their soil, and which operate against India.

Internal security problems in South Asia and their ramifications for regional security have been influenced by a host of international and internal factors. The destabilization of Cold War equations and the haphazard emergence of a variety of conflicting international ‘strategic interests’ in the region, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan, and a paradigm shift in the nature of international conflict, have all exacerbated regional tensions. The existence of nuclear weapons has diminished the probabilities of large-scale conventional wars. Consequently, a range of ‘non-standard’, ‘irregular’ ‘low-intensity’ or ‘sub-conventional’ wars has now become the most prevalent manifestation of inter-state confrontations. Terrorism is at the very heart of this new paradigm of international conflict. For its sponsors and perpetrators, it is a low-cost option with a high cost-benefit ratio. This strategy preys on domestic discontent, and involvement in other countries’ internal conflicts is emerging as a preferred strategy for nation-states, and as the most serious threat to regional security.

South Asia Conflict Map (Click to enlarge)

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the focus of the international community has shifted to this region and Afghanistan. The scale and complexity of the September 11 attacks, and the location of the forces that engineered this outrage, made the US engage Pakistan as an ally in its campaign against international terrorism. Despite Pakistan’s emergence as ‘a frontline state’ in the US’ efforts to capture Osama bin Laden and eradicate his Al Qaeda network, the Pakistani state, through its external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), continues with its policy of aiding terrorist organizations active in J&K and other parts of India, even as evidence of its involvement with, and manipulation of, international Islamist terrorism persists.

India, while supporting the US-led international coalition against terrorism and the military strikes against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, has repeatedly emphasized that the ‘global war against terrorism’ should not be restricted to these target groups alone. The Indian position is that any effective strategy to counter the threat posed by the Islamist terrorist networks needs to take into account the range and complexity of its international linkages, and Pakistan’s inextricable relationship with, and role in creating and nurturing, these forces.

Islamist extremism has been used by Pakistan, as an instrument of state policy since the 1980s to further the country’s foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India, and its quest for ‘strategic depth’. The Pakistani state and the Taliban had co-sponsored a terrorist network that essentially relied on Madrassas (seminaries) and terrorist training camps located in Pakistan and (previously) in Afghanistan. There are an estimated over one million students in at least 10,000 seminaries in Pakistan (some private estimates place their number between 40,000 and 50,000), with militant Islam as their core syllabus.

There is, at present, little evidence to suggest that Pakistan has abandoned, or even diluted, its strategy of using Islamist extremism as an instrument of state policy. The Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir remains the prime target of this strategy, and of the activities of Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups. Currently, the most active terrorist groups in J&K are all headquartered in Pakistan. They include the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), linked to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) in Pakistan; the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the armed wing of the Markaz-ud-Da’awa-wal-Irshad; the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM, formerly the Harkat-ul-Ansar), linked to the Jamaat-e-Ulema (JUI), Pakistan, as well as to the Pakistan Tablighi Jamaat and the Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan; Al Badr; and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), created in the year 2000. There are another score of minor and dormant groupings, also located in Pakistan. The umbrella United Jehad Council (UJC) coordinates the activities of 14 of these, including the HuM, the HM and a number of minor terrorist factions claiming adherence to the Deoband sect. Significantly, the proportion of foreign mercenaries and Mujahideen involved in the militancy in the State has been steadily rising from a mere six per cent in 1992 to an estimated 60 per cent today. A majority of these are from Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). More than 35,000 people have lost their lives in the conflict since 1989, and even at present, an average of over 200 lives are lost to each month in J&K.

After, the US-led operation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the steady influx of Al Qaeda operatives into Pakistan has been alarming. American commanders operating out of the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan were quoted as saying in July 2002 that 400 to 1,000 Al Qaeda operatives may be on the loose in the tribal areas in western Pakistan. Of the 443 Al Qaeda suspects arrested by Pakistani authorities till December 2002, 380 were detained in the northwest border region, while the rest were apprehended from various parts of the country.

Apart from being a safe haven for the terrorist groups who operate disregarding borders, Pakistan has also to contend with the sectarian violence unleashed by several sectarian terrorist groups. The Sunni groups include the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); and a militant Wahabi tribal group, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). The Shia groups are the Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) and Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP). Between 1989 and 2003 (till September 5), 1,469 persons had been killed and 3,370 others injured in some 1,815 sectarian incidents in Pakistan.

In Sri Lanka, an uncertain peace continues to prevail. In over 18 years of ethnic conflict in the island nation, over 64,000 civilians, security force personnel and LTTE cadres have lost their lives. In an apparent bid to end the conflict, the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on February 23, 2002, signed the Norwegian-brokered ‘Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities’. After signing the MoU, the Government and LTTE have held five rounds of peace talks (the first three rounds, September, October and December 2002 – in Thailand; the 4th round in February 2003, in Berlin; and the March 2003, 5th round in Tokyo). Peace talks were combined with efforts to mobilize donor funds to rebuild the country, in particular, the North and East. The first donor meeting was held in Oslo in December 2002, followed by the second donor meeting in Washington in mid-April 2003, both of which were preparatory meetings for Tokyo. The LTTE did not participate in the Washington meeting, inter alia, due to its ban in the USA. As part of the ongoing peace process, international donors pledged USD 4.5 billion over the next four years to Sri Lanka at the Tokyo donor conference on June 9-10, 2003. Earlier, on April 21, 2003, the LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in protest against the exclusion of its accredited representatives from the crucial international aid conference in Washington, which was held on April 14, 2003,

The peace process has encountered a number of bottlenecks down the road. Some of the most threatening incidents included the sinking of an LTTE cargo vessel, suspected of carrying arms, by the Sri Lanka navy, which resulted in the loss of over a dozen LTTE lives on March 10, 2003. This was followed by the brutal hacking to death of nearly 20 Chinese civilian sailors on board a shipping vessel flying the Sri Lankan flag, on March 20, 2003. Also, between April 16 and 21, there have been clashes in the multi ethnic eastern region of the country, where there has been widespread violence between Tamils and Muslims, with several hundred Muslims fleeing their homes.

After the Tokyo donor conference, the main challenge for the Government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe will not be so much to spend the foreign assistance expeditiously, but to woo the LTTE back into the peace process. Most donors who pledged aid, and notably Japan which pledged USD one billion, said that the disbursement of their funds would be conditional on the satisfactory progress of the peace process. But the peace process remains stalled with the LTTE refusing to meet in face-to-face talks with the Government until it is provided with ‘a satisfactory interim administration’ to govern the north east of the country.

Though Bangladesh remains largely peaceful and free from terrorist violence, increasing use of its territory by religious extremists, pan-Islamist terrorist outfits, and insurgents operating in India’s Northeast, remain the most serious threat not only to the internal security of the country, but also to the regional security environment. Moreover, rising discontentment in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT), where an Accord in 1997 had brought an end to an ongoing violent movement, has once again become a matter of concern.

Since the elections of October 2001 and the installation of the regime headed by Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), communal tension and Islamist extremist mobilization has also risen dramatically. The Jamaat, which has two Ministers in the new government, and 17 members in Parliament, has also allegedly received support from the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence, including funding and arms flows, as well as technical and training support.

A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various indigenous militant fundamentalist organizations. Prominent among these is the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which was established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992. The HuJI-BD has very close links with the ISI, and has reportedly received financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan (under the Taliban) through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin.

Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast continue to find safe haven and operational bases on Bangladesh territory. Groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have been emboldened by the new BNP Government in Bangladesh, which in its previous term was also seen to be supportive of these groups. Many leaders of Bangladesh’s ruling party are reported to have direct business linkages, including partnerships in corporations and financial operations that are run by or co-owned with leaders of such terrorist organisations. During its previous regime between 1991 and 1996, the BNP is reported to have provided these groups with unhindered facilities, such as training camps, bank accounts, arms purchases, and so on. As a result, these terrorist groups, on the run in India’s Northeast under persistent pressure from Army operations, found much-needed breathing space to regroup and re-launch their offensive against the Indian state

In the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, all hopes and wishes for a peaceful resolution of the Maoist conflict were shattered on August 27, 2003, when Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda unilaterally and ‘temporarily’ pulled out from the seven-month old cease-fire with the Nepalese Government. Following this declaration, Maoists resumed violent activities, provoking the Government to declare the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) a terrorist organization.

The country has witnessed a Maoist insurgency for the past seven years that has claimed over 8,000 lives till date. Launched in February 1996, the Maoist movement initially envisaged a 'republic of Nepal'. It was in November 2001 that the insurgency reached unprecedented levels. At that time, the Maoists jettisoned the four month-old ceasefire that they had announced on July 23, 2001, and launched co-ordinated countrywide strikes on the night of November 23, 2001. Faced with a major crisis, the Nepalese Government declared a nation-wide ‘state of Emergency’ on November 26, 2001 and deployed the Royal Nepal Army to counter the insurgents.

At the onset of the year 2001, the insurgents made their presence felt in varying degrees in 68 of the total of 75 districts that constitute Nepal. Available reports have indicated that in the aftermath of the counter-insurgency operations, there has been a decrease in the number of districts being controlled by the Maoists. After large-scale violence in the year 2002, peace initiatives had led to the Government and the Maoists declaring a ceasefire on January 29, 2003.

The three rounds of talks, which were held on April 27, May 10, and August 17, 2003, have failed to yield any results. The first round was characterized by mutual distrust and wrangling. The Government and foreign donors wanted to concentrate on reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed during the course of the Maoist ‘People's War’, and on humanitarian aspects, including the rehabilitation of displaced persons. But the Maoists wanted to address their core political agenda, maintaining that the Government's proposal was only a conspiracy to delay the peace process. Later, retracting on some aspects of its position, the Government agreed to address all outstanding issues and procedures to be followed during the negotiations. The second round of talks was overshadowed by remarks made by the spokesman of the Royal Nepal Army, who said that the laying down of arms by the Maoist insurgents should be a precondition for the peace talks

Political developments in the country have also compounded the confusion with the resignation of Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand, on May 30, 2003, and the appointment of another royalist, Surya Bahadur Thapa, in his place. Even as efforts are being made to convene the third round of peace talks there have been reports of violations of the code of conduct in different parts of the country, and clashes between the Maoist insurgents and the security forces continue to occur during the present interregnum. Such incidents appear to suggest that simultaneous preparations for war by both sides are underway.

Bhutan has remained largely free from terrorist violence. However, the activities of terrorist groups who have established their camps on Bhutanese soil and operate in India’s Northeast continue to arouse serious apprehensions. The Ngolops (armed Nepalese dissidents) also pose serious concern to the security of this Himalayan Kingdom.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) had set up camps in Bhutan after they were driven into the Bhutanese foothills by a major Indian military offensive in 1990-1991. However, in recent times, the Royal Government of Bhutan has been applying pressure on various Indian terrorist groups, including ULFA, the NDFB and a third group, the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), to remove their camps from Bhutanese territory. Under an agreement between ULFA and the Royal Government on June 18, 2001, the former had agreed to shut down four of the nine camps they had been operating in that country, and to relocate their cadres to some other destination, by December 31, 2001. Although the ULFA had closed down the four camps it had agreed to – Gobarkonda, Nangri, Deori and the Military Training Centre in Martshala – it simultaneously opened a new camp on a mountain ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar–Trashigang highway.

There are an estimated 4,000 ULFA and about 1,000 NDFB militants, as well as an unspecified number of KLO cadres, holed up in Bhutan. According to Bhutan, ULFA has six known camps; the NDFB has seven known camps, including three main camps and four mobile camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam, and the KLO has two known camps. However, certain unconfirmed Indian reports have indicated that ULFA, along with the NDFB, runs more than 30 training camps in Bhutan. It was also reported that several training camps were jointly run by the ULFA and KLO. The terrorists based in Bhutan have executed a series of attacks on security forces in Assam and West Bengal. They also targeted civilians and vital installations of the Government of India. After attacking their targets in India, these terrorists invariably return to their bases inside Bhutan

During the last week of March 2003, the Bhutanese Government reportedly asked the terrorist groups to vacate their camps in that country by June 30. However the outfits have not responded to the deadline thus far. The Government there, however, has reportedly said that efforts were on to resolve the matter peacefully.

Another outstanding problem in Bhutan is the issue of refugees (ngolops), which still remains unresolved. Ngolops, referred to by Bhutanese authorities as anti-nationals, are people of Nepalese origin who claim that they are Bhutanese citizens forcibly evicted by the Royal Government of Bhutan. In 1991, there were about 84,000 people in the camps in Nepal who claimed to be Bhutanese refugees. By the year 2002, this number had risen to almost 100,000 with around 10,700 of them born in the camps. Both Nepal and Bhutan have agreed to solve this problem bilaterally.

Another extremely disturbing aspect of the Indian sub-continent is that two of the three largest drug growing areas of the world are located on its periphery; as the region becomes an increasingly important transit route for the international drug trade, it is progressively drawn into the destabilizing dynamics of organized crime and narco-terrorism, with hitherto unforeseen implications for peace and security far beyond the region. With opium production in Afghanistan surging once again, after a temporary, though drastic, slump, in year 2001, the movement of drugs, and the linkages of the narcotics trade with terrorist groups and operations, could cause significant disturbances in the region. There are, however, several countervailing factors currently in operation as well, including the US presence in Pakistan (traditionally the fulcrum of distribution and narco-terrorist operations), and the easier access to Europe through Central Asia and other routes North of Afghanistan.

In South Asia, the most potent threat to security emanates from the complex interplay of domestic, regional and international factors. These factors are superimposed, in this region, on societies deeply fragmented by their obsession with caste and community; and with linguistic, regional and cultural differences. These are societies, moreover, which are enormously unequal and inequitable. Given the mixed administrative and political record of successive regimes in the various constituent countries, it is unsurprising that the manifestations of discontent in explicit conflict and violence have seen a continuous escalation over the last half-century.

The stability of South Asia, and the success and failure of initiatives for the resolution of existing conflicts will, in the 21st Century, depend on the exploration of new ideas, ideologies and strategies that provide concrete and effective alternatives to violence as a means to political ends; and these alternatives will have to appeal, equally, to the establishment and to the alienated groupings that currently believe that violence is the only method to secure some relief within the prevailing system.