Pakistan Assessment 2001

Pakistan continues to be caught in the trap of extremist Islamist militancy and terror that it constructed as part of its Afghan and Kashmir policy. Official support – both explicit and covert – to Islamic terrorist groupings continues, even while the state struggles to cope with the internal fall-out of this burgeoning terrorist community. This remains the major element in Pakistan's internal security scenario in year 2001, as it has been these past years.

The year 2000 in Pakistan was marked by the near absence of large scale sectarian or ethnic violence, a domineering feature of the Nineteen Nineties. Instead, a series of explosions in several urban concentrations, most of which were promptly blamed on India, caused significant concern. Marking a new trend for Pakistan, the first ever reported suicide bomber attack occurred in a news paper office at Karachi on November 6, 2000, killing three persons. The effectiveness of the military regime's March 16 order to halt the open display of private arms is yet to be officially assessed though this is expected to reduce the menace of gun-battles in Pakistan's two major urban centres, Karachi and Lahore.

The year 2000 had opened on a note of acrimony with India's Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh accusing Pakistan, on January 1, of sheltering the hijackers of the Indian Airlines Flight 814. Pakistan's Interior Minister Lt-Gen. Moinuddin Haider refuted these allegations. However, of the three terrorists released from Indian jails in exchange for the hostages aboard IA 814, the presence of Masood Azhar in Pakistan is well established. The whereabouts of the two other freed terrorists and the hijackers, who were reported to have travelled together from Kandahar and into Pakistan, are not known.

Source: Constructed from media reports

NOTE: Figures for 2000 pertain to terrorist attacks using explosives only. Figures for casualties and incidents of other terrorist activity such as firings, killings of abducted victims, et. al. are not available.

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional

Sectarian Violence in Year 2001

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional

Within Pakistan, a series of bomb blasts rocked major urban centres beginning with a blast on January 5, 2000 in Hyderabad which left 18 persons injured and closely followed with a blast in Karachi on January 17, which killed eight and injured 22 others. SATP estimates indicate that there were at least 56 explosions during the year in which 96 people were killed and 443 others injured. The series of explosions climaxed with four bomb blasts occurring on a single day, December 25, at Lahore, Faislabad, Khairan and Hyderabad, leaving 41 persons critically injured. Among the bomb blast casualties during the year, 10 were killed and 111 injured in Lahore. 19 and 80 respectively in Islamabad. In Sindh province 16 people were killed and 65 injured at Hyderabad, while 15 were killed and 76 injured in Karachi. In Quetta, Baluchistan, bomb explosions killed 11 and left 34 injured. Other cities in Pakistan, which were affected included Peshawar, Gujaranwala, Chaman, Bafa, Khairan, Faislabad and Torkhan. The city of Quetta also witnessed a series of rocket attacks on December 3 and 5, in which one person was killed and five including two army personnel injured. Besides these attacks caused extensive damage to buildings and houses.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in its annual assessment for 2000 estimated that 109 incidents of bomb blasts killed 149 people in the country. A Pakistani news report citing an unnamed study estimated that 37 explosions occurred in 13 cities from January 1 to November 6, killing 81 and injuring 313 persons. Another news report comparing the last 12 months of the Nawaz Sharief regime and the first 12 months of the military regime under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, said that there were 14 bomb attacks in the first phase as compared to 27 while the casualties for the two phases were 36 and 59 killed respectively.

Pakistani reports have also noted that, though the absolute number of bomb attacks has risen dramatically, the casualty rates have been low. Post-blast investigations revealed that the quantity of explosives used in each attack has been quite low. The conclusion drawn is that the perpetrators of these attacks are attempting to draw the attention of the administration to their potential capacity to cause damage, rather than causing immediate and actual damage.

Another disturbing feature in the Year 2000 were two attacks on the Press in Karachi. The office of Business Recorder was attacked by a mob and burnt down on May 18. In the second attack, a suicide bomber exploded herself inside the office of the Nawai Waqt on November 6, killing three persons including herself. This is the first-ever reported instance of a suicide terrorist attack in Pakistan.

Some isolated instances of sectarian strife were witnessed in 2000. In one of the worst incidents of the year, three hand grenades were lobbed at a gathering within a Shia mosque at Malohwali in Attock district on April 12. 13 persons were killed and 30 others injured in this attack. The grenades were reportedly thrown from an adjacent Sunni mosque. Five of those killed were from the family of Syed Sajid Naqvi, chief of a prominent Shia organisation, Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP). The attackers were suspected to be members of the rival Sunni organisation Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) though the SSP promptly denied any involvement in the attack. The HRCP annual assessment said that while 69 deaths were attributed to sectarian violence, the actual figure could be higher.

Unlike previous years, where attacks on mass gatherings in rival mosques were more prevalent, the year 2000 saw several assassinations of prominent leaders from rival sectarian groups. A TJP leader Syed Farrukh Barjees was killed on April 26 at Khanewal, near Multan. A prominent Shia lawyer and member of the Voice of Shia Federation was killed in Karachi on May 15, while a renowned Sunni religious scholar, Maulana Mohammad Yousuf Ludhianvi was killed in Karachi on May 18. He was reportedly described as a cleric and writer who promoted the cause of sectarian unity but was strident in his criticism of the Ahmadiya sect. Anwar Ali Akhunzada, the central general secretary of TJP in Peshawar was killed on November 23, an assassination for which a Sunni terrorist outfit, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) reportedly claimed responsibility. On the other hand, an SSP controlled mosque was attacked by suspected Shia terrorists of the Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP) on on March 12, 2001. Nine worshippers were killed and 12 others injured

Spreading from the traditional Shia-Sunni context, year 2000 saw the sectarian conflict engulfing the Ahmadiya sect, a group officially branded as a non-Muslim community. Several attacks and killings of Ahmadiyas, were reported including an attack on a group that was coming out of a mosque at Sargodha in Pakistani Punjab on November 10. Five Ahmadiyas were killed in this attack.

There were several attacks on the police force too. In quick succession, there were bomb explosions outside two police stations in Karachi on May 3 and 5. In a major development, a police officer was killed in Lahore on December 18. The LeJ claimed responsibility for the assassination. The slain officer, Tariq Kamboh, was promoted as Deputy Superintendent of Police in recognition of his work against sectarian outfits. He was involved in the arrest of terrorists involved in the 1998 Mominpura massacre and the 1999 bomb blast in Raiwind, reportedly aimed at killing former Premier Nawaz Sharif.

The linkages between terrorist elements active in India's J&K or Afghanistan, and those within Pakistan, are not surprising since they share the same madrassas, training camps, bureaucracies and operatives. The ‘boys’ who are trained to fight in Kashmir are also indoctrinated to consider Shias to be non-believers and heretics. One academic assessment (Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", Foreign Affairs, November-December 2000) summarizes the essence of Pakistan’s dilemma.

The military regime, facing international criticism over its status as a host to numerous Islamic extremist elements, has, from time to time, sought to take steps to deflect growing internal and international criticism of the activities of fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. But inner contradictions within the regime are bound to hamper these efforts. Remarks by Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf in the New York Times in June justified jihad and claimed that it was ‘a tolerant concept’. In contrast, speaking at a seminar in Karachi on October 6 about the possible future role of Jihadi outfits in the context of Pakistan's internal security, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider is reported to have asked the participants of the seminar to just imagine what could happen to Pakistan when terrorists of the LeT would start trekking back home from Indian-controlled Kashmir once the their objectives there had been achieved.

Earlier, on March 27, Moinuddin Haider said that the government was in touch with extremist religious groups and hoped to bring them to the negotiating table. He reiterated this the claim at a Press Conference in Islamabad on December 27, stating that the government would hold a dialogue with various sectarian group leaders on January 13, 2001. The meeting, as reported by a Pakistani newspaper produced an opposite reaction with most socio-religious outfits, ridiculing, criticising and challenging the government on measures such as display of arms in public meetings, state control on religious education and Islamisation of the polity.

Earlier, on March 16, 2000, while announcing a ban on public display of weapons, the Minister had added that all militant Islamic groups were ordered to "behave and not make irresponsible and baseless statements" and refrain from organising rallies. On July 18, a meeting of top security officials headed by the Interior Minister decided that, to bolster counter-terrorism efforts, anti-terrorism cells would be established in all the provincial capitals. While revealing this, the minister hoped that these cells would ensure better co-ordination between provinces and the federal authorities for an effective check on sectarianism.

These repeated government threats to rein in sectarian outfits have only elicited counter threats by extremist organisations and open defiance of government directives. On a single day, October 22, three extremist outfits, LeJ, SSP and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) held widely publicised conventions. The LeJ convention in Karachi was partially disrupted due to a bomb explosion in which three persons were killed. Members of the SSP, who were returning after the convention in the same city, were attacked and two activists were killed while 12 others sustained injuries. However, the HuM convention at Peshawar passes off peacefully.

At the SSP convention, the head of the organisation presented a programme for enforcement of its version of Islam in twenty cities of Pakistan. At the HuM convention, Maulana Samiul Haq, a Pakistani parliamentarian, exhorted students of a madrassa to prepare for the coming Islamic revolution. Posing a direct challenge to the government, a sectarian outfit, Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan, on December 27, threatened to organise a march in Islamabad to press for the enforcement of Islamic Sharia law.

Meanwhile, the power struggle which began in October 1999 between the elected executive headed by erstwhile Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief and the military leadership headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, finally came to a close on December 10, 2000, with the erstwhile Prime Minister going into exile in Saudi Arabia. Earlier, on April 6, 2000, Nawaz Sharief was convicted to life imprisonment by a Karachi anti-terrorism court on charges of hijacking and other offences. He was granted a Presidential pardon before being exiled.

This development gave Pakistan's religious parties another occasion to criticise the military regime. After a free run where most religious parties were tacitly involved in the country's raging sectarian violence in 1998 and 1999, there had been a lull in the activities of these organisations subsequent to the military coup of October 12, 1999. As had been assessed earlier on SATP, religious extremist parties and dedicated terrorist outfits had ceased most of their violence after the October coup, but this appeared to be a temporary phase, in essence a ‘wait and watch policy’. The series of bomb blasts in 2000 can be interpreted as a warning to the military regime that these groups remain as serious about pursuing their narrow divisive religious agendas.

Growing internecine clashes between various terrorist outfits based in Pakistan and operating in J&K emerged as another problem area for the military regime in Pakistan. These clashes came to the fore immediately after the unilateral cease-fire by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in Kashmir. The cease-fire antagonised the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) a ‘socio-religious organisation’ which also acts as the Pakistani patron of the Hizb, and that feared a loss of control over the Kashmiri movement. In an attempt to retain control over the outfit, the JeI attempted to replace Masood Sarfaraz, the chief of the Hizb's most active unit, the Pir Panjal Regiment, with its nominee, Shamsher Khan in October. The move triggered internecine clashes which spread to several training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), including those at Nikial, Samani and Kotli.

There were reports that the warring factions were attempting to gain support from other terrorist outfits. This raised the possibility of escalation in these turf wars, with outfits such as Al-Badr, Tariq-e-Jihad and LeT, who significantly have a large number of foreign mercenaries, joining the fray. The army regime is reported to have deployed elite Special Services Group (SSG) forces to prevent any spread of the conflict between the jihadi groups. The situation, however, remains volatile and carries seeds of further destabilisation for the Pakistani establishment. Gen. Musharraf has reportedly asked various army units directly dealing with these terrorist outfits, to deal with internecine clashes firmly.

Urban Sindh (particularly Karachi) continued to be the battleground for politico-sectarian and ethnic violence. The Muttahida Quami Movement-Altaf (MQM-A), which was engaged in a violent conflict with State forces during the early and mid Nineteen Nineties continues to be locked in a violent battle with its splinter faction, Mohajir Quami Movement-Haquiqi (MQM–Haquiqi) for control of urban areas. Several killings on either side were reported in the Year 2000. The MQM (A) leadership continued to accuse the establishment of using repressive tactics to demoralise the Mohajir community and branding them as terrorist and criminals.

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