| |
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 52, June 30, 2014
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
Rousing
a Crippled Giant
Ajai
Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal
Little can be expected
of a one-month old Government, especially on issues as deeply entrenched
as the multiple internal security challenges and crises of capacity
that afflict India. These are the consequences of decades of neglect,
misdirected policies, and an apparatus of governance that has been
hollowed out by corruption. India's problems cannot be expected
to simply disappear with the arrival of a purportedly charismatic
leader, even one with a clear majority in Parliament that has eluded
the succession of ailing regimes after Rajiv Gandhi's unprecedented
windfall of 1984, in the wake of his mother, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's assassination.
Nevertheless, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi's Government is already being judged - and
often misjudged - and it would appear that both his most passionate
detractors and his most ardent supporters 'mis-estimate' what he
can realistically be expected to achieve. It is unlikely, as some
flights of imagination have suggested, that the 'fascist Modi' will
crush all dissent and establish an intolerant, oppressive and authoritarian
regime; or that he is going to engineer a dramatic developmental
transformation, abruptly bringing India into the fraternity of 'great
powers', as his admirers fantasize. He may, of course, initiate
processes of transformation; but given the sheer magnitude of the
developmental deficit, the decades of preceding institutional decay,
and the state of national administration, these will take significant
time to secure measurable impact, even if implemented with complete
honesty.
In the Indian setup,
moreover, we must understand what a Prime Minister does. Personality
contributes a certain character to the idea of India and of the
Indian state, but it does not dramatically alter the fundamentals
of the nature and distribution of power, or of the capacities of
the state, its constituents and its agencies.
Nevertheless, in
terms of posture and public perception, Modi appears, as many have
observed, to have "hit the ground running", articulating
policy perspectives and announcing initiatives in days, where these
had languished under past regimes for the months and years. While
any detailed assessment of security postures and initiatives is
not possible here, significant indicators of the new Government's
approach to the country's principal internal security challenges
- Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism, the Maoist insurgency, and
the multiple insurgencies of India's Northeast - are already available.
On the issue of Pakistan-backed
Islamist terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and across
the rest of India, he has spoken with refreshing clarity, even as
he seized the initiative by inviting Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif - but just as one among other leaders of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation - to attend his oath-taking
ceremony on May 26, 2014. This was, perhaps, the first occasion
in many years where the diplomatic initiative had been seized forcefully
by New Delhi, much to Islamabad's discomfiture. Significantly, Modi
has minced no words on Pakistan's role in promoting and supporting
terrorism on Indian soil, and has rejected the possibility of meaningful
negotiations under the shadow of continued terrorism and proxy warfare
by Islamabad. In an interview on May 8, 2014, as Prime Minister
designate, he declared, "There can be no talks till all this
comes to an end. You tell me, we are sitting here but can we continue
our conversation if we are surrounded by the noise of bomb blasts
and gunshots?" Crucially, moreover, he defined the overarching
principal that would underpin his policy and approach, not only
to Pakistan and terrorism, but, indeed, to the future of India:
"If the country looks strong, then even its companions will
change, neighbours will change and the atmosphere will change."
It is in its own strength, then, that India would seek security,
altering the very context of the regional discourse.
Building on themes
identified by the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence Arun Jaitley
observed, on June 15, that the ceasefire on the Line of Control
(LoC) and International Border (IB) in J&K would be the biggest
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between the two countries, and
that "Talks and aggression can't go together. For the situation
to normalize, it is important for the ceasefire violations to stop."
On June 12, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh told his officers
to strengthen measures to curb infiltration from the Pakistani side.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism
Portal, Pakistan has violated the ceasefire on at least eight
occasions since the formation of the Modi Government, in which an
Indian trooper has been killed. Indian Forces have also thwarted
at least three attempts by militants to infiltrate over the same
period. The preceding nearly five months of 2014 had recorded another
eight ceasefire violations and nine attempted infiltrations.
The broad positions
of the Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the new Government
on various dimensions of the Kashmir conundrum, however, are likely
to be unsettling, sharpening political tensions and communal polarization
in J&K, potentially provoking Pakistani and terrorist escalation,
as they explore initiatives to change the troubled status quo in
the State. A premature debate on the abrogation of Article 370 was
initiated by Jitendra Singh, Minister of State in the Prime Minister's
Office (PMO), on May 26, while arguing that the intention of the
Government was to "convince the unconvinced" regarding
the "enormous advantage which the other States of this country
have enjoyed because they were not under the constraint of Article
370." Defence Minister Jaitley argued, further, that Article
370 was "a temporary provision". The statements provoked
widespread criticism in the Kashmir Valley, with virtually all political
formations adopting a menacing posture, and Chief Minister Omar
Abdullah declaring on Twitter, "Mark my words and save this
tweet - long after Modi Government is a distant memory either J&K
won't be part of India or Art 370 will still exist... Art 370 is
the only constitutional link between J&K and the rest of India.
Talk of revocation is not just ill informed it's irresponsible."
Positions towards
overground separatist formations in the State also appear to be
hardening. While Jaitley claimed on June 15, that the Government
was ready to engage Kashmiri separatists in a dialogue process,
he added that there would be no compromise on India’s Constitution
and sovereignty, and that the Government would talk with “anyone
who respects the Constitution and India’s sovereignty.” Such a position
is anathema to the various separatist formations in the State. The
Chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference-Mirwaiz (APHC-M)
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq thus responded, “As far as the resolution of
Kashmir is concerned, it cannot be solved under the Indian Constitution.
Kashmir can either be solved through UN resolutions or through the
tri-partite talks between the stakeholders of the dispute.” Similarly,
All Parties Hurriyat Conference-Geelani (APHC-G) chief spokesman
Ayaz Akbar stated, “Kashmir can only be resolved outside the Constitution
of India. We have fought over this very basis. How is it possible
that talks under such (constitutional) purview shall be held?” The
Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
Mohammad Yasin Malik similarly argued, “The people here are not
beggars. We are fighting for our birth right and will continue to
do so. Indian Constitution umbrella can never resolve Kashmir.”
The separatist constituency,
which has long projected a 'Kashmiri nationalist' perspectives,
emphasizing the cultural unity and uniqueness of 'Kashmiriyat',
but has pursued a radical Islamist agenda, would also be troubled
by the Modi Government's quick insistence on the return of Kashmiri
pandits to the Valley with "dignity, security and assured livelihood".
The Kashmiri pandits have been displaced since 1990, when a campaign
of ethnic cleansing was launched in the Valley by Pakistan-backed
Islamist terrorists. In a first step, the Union Ministry of Home
Affairs (UMHA) is set to approve an enhanced package of INR two
million per family for re-construction of their houses in the Valley.
Meanwhile, Defence Minister Jaitley observed, "Any attempt
to alter the constitutional position of the State would change the
ground situation. Likewise, any plans to scatter the returnees,
by splitting the single-place rehabilitation demand, would proportionately
reduce the sense of security among them... We do not want Kashmiri
Pandits to live in ghettos in and around Srinagar. We want to settle
them to ensure they can begin their lives afresh and have to ensure
their children have a bright future. This will be a litmus test
of Kashmiriyat.”
The Modi Government,
by its very temperament, is likely to pursue a broadly kinetic approach
to the actual manifestations of terrorism, and the withdrawal of
the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), a long-standing demand
of a wide political constituency in the Valley, is unlikely, and
would be decided on the basis of "how the situation progresses",
according to Jaitley.
While most of these
positions appear confrontationist, and will raise hackles in Pakistan,
as well as among the terrorist and separatist constituencies, a
stronger security posture and a refusal to follow a policy of appeasement
towards Pakistan could work as a significant counter. It remains
to be seen, however, what real capacity transformations the new
Government is able to engineer in the near term. Absent a dramatic
change in capacities, there can be no radical change in policies.
On the Maoist conundrum,
similarly, the Modi Government has articulated a 'muscular' position,
emphasizing dramatic augmentations of both Force and Administrative
outreach. An 'integrated action plan' is to be drawn up by the UMHA,
though its contours are yet to be made public. In the interim, the
following steps have already been announced:
-
10 additional battalions of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to be sent to Chhattisgarh. A UMHA official stated, "We will try to deploy them within three months, or latest by the end of the year."
-
Flagging Naxal area as the "most dangerous zone" in the country, the Government will also enhance hardship allowance for CAPF personnel deployed in these areas to more than what they get while serving in J&K and North-eastern region.
-
The Government may give the officials special
monetary benefits, out-of-turn promotions and choice posting after
completing their tenure successfully in Maoist-affected places.
The incentives are aimed at attracting talented Indian Administrative
Service and Indian Police Service officers to work in Naxal-hit
areas. In the worst-affected Maoist Districts, the Ministry will
try to deploy the most capable officers who have proven their
ability.
-
In a change of nomenclature indicating the broad approach of the Government, the Naxal Management (NM) Division of the UMHA was changed to Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division, indicating that the Ministry doesn't seek to 'manage' Maoists.
-
A decision has been taken to expedite road construction of about 5,477 kilometres and expedite the construction of 2,199 mobile towers in Maoist affected Districts. The project for 5,477km roads was sanctioned in 2010, but just 2,900km have been completed in four years. The mobile tower project for improving connectivity has yet to take off.
-
The ministry has also decided to review all the rejected claims of land title deeds that were to be given to tribals to wean them away from Maoists. Officials feel that a key reason of tribal angst is rejection of genuine claims in many cases as a majority of tribals only have anecdotal evidence to prove their claims to land.
A number of statements
by Prime Minister Modi, during his election campaign and after his
election, also define the broad contours of the Government's approach
to the Maoist issue. On May, 2014, Modi stated, for instance,
Maoism and
terrorism are the biggest threats to our internal security.
I have always advocated a zero tolerance approach to these
problems. Further, we need a clearcut legal framework to address
these challenges. Regardless of what are the reasons for the
people to resort to violence, our ability to deal with it
should not be compromised by lack of preparedness. We can
choose to deal with issues the way we want, but our response
should not be constrained by unavailability of options. Therefore,
I feel that modernizing our police forces and our central
paramilitary forces is something that cannot be delayed any
longer... We should invest to equip our security forces with
modern weapons and equipments, train them and deploy them
effectively. I also feel that Maoism is a problem which has
to be tackled by the Central and State governments acting
in unison with complete coordination.
|
On April 12, Modi
had criticized past approaches to the problem, arguing that the
Government was focusing entirely on the Maoist-affected Districts.
Instead it should first give priority to areas that are contiguous
to Maoist affected areas. In that way the Maoist affected areas
would first be encircled, so that Maoists cannot expand. Then the
state can take on the Maoist. He added that the Government of India
would at least take necessary action so that Maoists’ communication
with the outside world becomes difficult; arms and ammunition don't
reach their areas from outside; and financial transactions with
the outside world becomes difficult. He claimed that these objectives
could be achieved even without direct armed engagement with the
Maoists.
On June 27, Union
Home Minister Rajnath Singh addressing a meeting of Chief Secretaries
and Police Chiefs of 10 LWE-affected states, and Chiefs of the CAPFs,
ruled out talks with the CPI-Maoist. He asserted that the Government
would adopt a “balanced approach” to resolve the problem through
administrative leadership and political commitment.
Elements of the new
Government’s approach to the multiple and degraded insurgencies
of India's Northeast are also being progressively defined, and the
Government has already initiated informal talks with insurgent groups,
to secure a 'lasting solution' to the militancy that has long afflicted
the region. The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju,
who has been given charge of the Northeast Division in the UMHA,
asserted that officials had already been asked to "initiate
formal dialogue", adding, "We have some differences with
ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) and NSCN (National Socialist
Council of Nagaland) and hopefully these will be sorted out in due
course." Rijiju also disclosed that interlocutors holding talks
with militant groups would be given a 'wider mandate' to talk simultaneously
with all stakeholders. However, if negotiations failed, the Government
would clamp down on their front organizations and obstruct their
finances. Encouraging good governance and ending the isolation of
the region are other measures that have been articulated to address
the overall developmental and administrative deficit, and Rijiju
has disclosed that the Government was "considering partial
withdrawal of the Protected Area Permit and Restricted Area Permit
from certain pockets of bordering Arunachal Pradesh and Leh and
Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir... We are not lifting all restrictions,
but would like to open up these areas to domestic and foreign tourists
with less restrictions and develop infrastructure in the bordering
areas to make it easily accessible to all visitors." Such measures,
the Government argues, would help the region develop.
The various initiatives
announced in the early days of the present Government display an
urgency and focus that is in refreshing contrast to the enveloping
environment of vacillation and deferral that characterized the last
Government. Nevertheless, powerful obstacles are likely to persist,
potentially undermining the implementation of the ambitious plans
for internal security reforms that the Modi Government has announced,
and is likely to pursue.
For one thing, while
India's bureaucracy outwardly appears extraordinarily subservient
and pliable, indeed obsequious, in the presence of its political
masters, this is, at best (or worst) only half true. With rare exception,
talk of reforming the bureaucracy has been the staple of each new
Government, but little real reform has been secured over the past
sixty six years, overwhelmingly as a result of resistance (often
passive and concealed) within the intended object of such reform.
While the bureaucracy appears to be disintegrating in terms of its
capacity to deliver basic services of governance, an insidious 'steel
frame' continues to exist as far as protecting the self-interest
of this establishment is concerned. This is an establishment, moreover,
that has mastered the art of subtle obstruction, quietly subverting
the very programmes and objectives it appears to serve. It comprises
many and disparate camps, each serving contesting ideologies and
loyalties, and no Prime Minister in India's history has ever been
able to command its obedience in good faith. A 'strong leader' may
change its outward facade but is unlikely to have any great capacity
to alter its character and substance. Indeed, irrespective of the
party or leader at the helm of affairs, there has been a continuous
secular decline in the quality of governance over time.
The Modi Government,
moreover, appears to be labouring under an ideologically-led misconception
that the Indian Government is in urgent need of 'downsizing'. The
truth is, Government in India is severely
undermanned, as has been repeatedly argued in SAIR, and
while there is tremendous scope and urgency for the rationalization
of enormously wasteful processes and structures, the absolute size
of Government would need to be dramatically augmented, even as its
manpower profile must be improved. There are, unfortunately, relatively
inflexible caps, in the near term, to the possibilities of such
augmentation as a result of the abysmal
manpower and educational profile of the Indian
population. To the extent that the basic premise of the Government
is currently contra-factual, some of its initial efforts are likely
to be misdirected and counter-productive.
Crucially, moreover,
the Prime Minister's role is severely limited by the Constitution,
as, indeed, is the Centre's, and there are sharp boundaries to what
a purported 'strong man' can achieve, irrespective of integrity
or intent. Indeed, if we look back through history, India's Prime
Ministers, despite tremendous variations in style and personality,
have left little positive and permanent imprint on the nation. The
strongest of these by all assessments was Indira Gandhi, and she
left enveloping institutional disintegration in her wake, even as
she failed to address the fundamental dystrophies of the state and
nation.
A dynamic and consensual
leader (most would concede that the latter attribute is one that
Modi does not appear to possess) can exercise greater influence,
but this is not the same as securing obedience. A Prime Minister
today, has extremely limited room for manoeuvre. Some state satraps
may not cooperate. Unlike a State Government, where a Chief Minister
has tremendous powers of direct intervention, the Union Government
must rely for the success of an overwhelming proportion of its plans
and programmes - especially in the internal security sphere - on
their willing and efficient implementation by the States. Unfortunately,
even where willingness may be attainable, efficiency, most often,
is not. Worse, in a polarized polity, States have often, in the
past, done everything in their power to disrupt and subvert central
schemes and programmes, and this remains a possibility under the
current dispensation. Modi, however, has a distinct advantage over
past regimes in his Parliamentary majority, as well as in the number
of 'friendly' State Governments in the present setup - a number
that is likely to augment significantly during his tenure, if his
performance meets even minimal expectations of the public.
Justice lies at the
very heart of a ruler's attainments. The greatest leaders in history
were known for their even handed justice, more than for any other
attribute. On this parameter, the public perception is that Modi's
record is deficient, and it matters little where the truth lies.
Given the condition of India's justice system, moreover, it is unlikely
that, even with the best of intentions, any Government could quickly
create the conditions of justice necessary to alter a pre-existing
negative perception.
Crucially, as with
past Governments, Modi is saddled with a deeply flawed Parliament.
Indeed, of the 539 current Members of the Lok Sabha (Lower House
of Parliament), 186 have criminal charges registered against them,
112 of these with charges of heinous crimes. This compares adversely
to the last Lok Sabha, where 158 Members of the 521 Members analysed,
had criminal charges registered against them, of which 77 were charged
with heinous crimes. Such a Parliament is unlikely to welcome any
initiatives to reform systems of Policing and justice administration
with any great enthusiasm.
There is, today,
a tremendous anger across the country against the perceived failures
of the last United Progressive Alliance Government at the Centre,
and advantage of this will naturally accrue to Modi. But there is
a flip side to this - this advantage is bound, inexorably, to further
exaggerate popular expectations that his electoral campaign and
post-election pronouncements have already raised. Governments with
even the most extraordinary mandates in the past have collapsed
under the burden of disproportionate expectations. Given his sweeping
victory, the expectations from his Government will be the greater
and more unrealistic, potentially leading to a greater sense of
public disappointment. It is, moreover, one thing to take an already
affluent State like Gujarat and accelerate its development; quite
another to take an increasingly dysfunctional and substantially
impoverished federation, turn it fully around, and then make it
run.
After years of cynicism,
public distrust and gloom, a clear mandate for a stable Government
has given rise to a wave of hope. It remains to be seen whether
the present regime can overcome the cumulative deficits of the past,
and the colossal institutional damage that has been done over decades
of mis-governance, to fulfil even a modicum of popular expectations,
and realize an acceptable proportion of the country's limitless
potential.
|
Arms
Trafficking: Residual Networks
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
In perhaps, the single
biggest arms seizure since the April 2, 2004, Chittagong
arms haul case where 10 truckloads of weapons
had been seized, a huge arms cache was recovered by the Rapid
Action Battalion (RAB) of Bangladesh, over several days, from the
Satchari National Park in the Chunarughat Sub-District of the Habiganj
District in Bangladesh, adjoining the West Tripura District in the
Indian State of Tripura. Officials disclosed that they recovered
184 rocket shells (40mm) and 153 chargers for rocket launchers abandoned
inside one bunker on a hillock in the reserve forest, some 130 kilometers
from the capital, Dhaka, during the raid on June 3, 2014. Another
six more empty bunkers were located on the same day. On June 4,
the RAB found another two bunkers and recovered 38 rocket shells,
four machine guns, 95 rocket chargers, 1,300 rounds of machine gun
ammunition, and over 13,000 bullets of different calibres. RAB recovered
more arms and ammunition, including four machine guns in a bunker
on June 8, and also found oil used for cleaning firearms. Another
two empty bunkers were also located. As it resumed a search operation
deep into the reserve forest on the eight consecutive day, RAB made
additional recoveries, including one machine gun barrel, 633 rounds
of ammunition, and 54 anti-tank shells, from three newly discovered
bunkers, on June 9.
The area from where
the arms were recovered was once the base camp of the now-defunct
Indian insurgent outfit, the Tripura-based All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF).
The camp was later captured by insurgents belonging to the National
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT).
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
with its principal theatre of operations in the Indian State of
Assam, abutting Tripura, and ATTF had earlier smuggled a huge quantity
of Chinese-made weapons from the Southeast Asian grey market by
sea, landed them around Cox's Bazar or Chittagong, and transported
these to rebel bases such as Satchari, from where arms were smuggled
into India's
troubled northeast.
However, some confusion
prevails over the present recoveries. Indian security agencies are
yet to ascertain whether these belong to any militant outfit active
in India's Northeast. Media reports have speculated on the distant
possibility of ULFA 'chief' Paresh Baruah asking ATTF to store the
weapons in its one-time bases, and this cannot be ruled out. Reports
also indicate that ATTF leader, Ranjit Debbarma (now in Tripura
jail), who had close ties with Paresh Baruah, had stocked the cache
in collaboration with ULFA militants. A June 4 media report suggested
that the arms and ammunition belonged to ULFA leader Baruah. Information
gleaned by Indian intelligence agencies from Debbarma, and provided
to Bangladesh authorities, led to the recovery of the ammunition
on June 3, three kilometers off the border. According to the report,
arms smuggled from China by Baruah were kept in the Satchari Forest
and were sent to Indian militants at opportune moments.
However, Bangladesh
State Minister for Home, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, asserted that the
haul was based on intelligence collected by local Bangladesh agencies.
RAB Media Wing Director Habibur Rahman added that the arms and ammunition
recovered in the Satchari Forest were apparently similar to those
recovered in Chittagong in 2004, and to a truckload of ammunition
recovered at Bogra
in June 2003. It is significant, moreover,
that investigators of the Bogra ammunition haul had determined that
the ammunition was bound for the Satchari Forest, and had also confirmed
its linkages with NLFT and ULFA.
Earlier, a Bangladesh
Court had arrived at a significant verdict in the Chittagong arms
haul case, nearly 10 years after the incident. On January 30, 2014,
a Chittagong District Court awarded the death penalty to 14 accused,
including Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ameer (chief) of the Jamaat-e-Islami
(Jel), Lutfozzaman Babar of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),
the then Minister of State for Home, and ULFA-I 'commander-in-chief'
Paresh Baruah (in absentia), for smuggling 10 truckloads
of arms into Chittagong District in 2004, during the tenure of the
BNP-led Government. Investigations revealed that the weapons were
manufactured in China and were being shipped to ULFA. The condemned
also include former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)
Director Major General (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury; former
Director General of National Security Intelligence (NSI) Brigadier
General (Retd) Abdur Rahim; and three other NSI officials – Director
(Security) Wing Commander Shahab Uddin Ahmed; Deputy Director Major
(Retd) Liakat Hossain; and Field Officer Akbar Hossain Khan. Others
awarded the death penalty in the case are former Additional Secretary
(Industry) Nurul Amin; the then Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Ltd.
(CUFL) Managing Director Mahsin Uddin Talukder; CUFL General Manager
(Administration) K.M. Enamul Hoque; and three businessmen, Hafizur
Rahman Hafiz, Deen Mohammad and Haji Abdus Subhan.
In the initial stages
of the trial, which commenced in 2005, only some small fry, mostly
labourers, truckers and trawler drivers, were implicated, leaving
out the big shots as the then BNP-led Government allegedly tried
to cover up the involvement of the state machinery, including its
Ministers and high officials of intelligence agencies. However,
after an Army-backed caretaker Government took charge on January
11, 2007, ahead of the country’s General Elections, the Court of
Chittagong Metropolitan Judge ordered further investigations on
February 14, 2008. In June 2011, Muniruzzaman Chowdhury, Senior
Assistant Superintendent of Criminal Investigation Department, submitted
two supplementary charge-sheets, accusing 11 new suspects. While
Paresh Barua and former Secretary of the Industries Ministry, Nurul
Amin, have been absconding ever since the recovery of the arms,
the other nine are behind bars. Baruah and Amin were sentenced in
absentia. The verdict of the Special Tribunal observed that the
role of the then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in the incident was
'mysterious', and pointed to the direct involvement of then Ministers
and top military and civil officials. Judge S.M. Mojibur Rahman
also argued that the smuggling of such a huge volume of weapons
and ammunition was not possible without Government support, and
noted, “They [the intelligence officials] were involved in the conspiracy
to destroy the entire nation by putting the country’s existence
at stake.”
Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina Wajed has now promised separate investigations into the role
of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her party (BNP) in the
Chittagong arms haul case, declaring, ‘The trial of 10 truckloads
of arms haul is over. We will now probe afresh the conspiracies
behind it, from where the arms came, how it was brought to Bangladesh
and who had funded it." The Prime Minister added that Bangladesh
had become hotbed of activities of the Pakistani Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rehman in August 1975.
Analysts note that
the death sentence awarded to Paresh Barua will have little impact
on the outfit as Barua and most of his cadres have already shifted
base out of Bangladesh. Intelligence officials in Assam, however,
feel that the elusive insurgent leader will be under greater pressure
to come forward for talks, should Myanmar act as Bangladesh did,
and evict
insurgents from India's north-east, including Barua and
his cadres, from its soil. The Assam Police have intelligence inputs
that Barua is currently operating out of his base along the Myanmar-China
border. Officials in Bangladesh argue that the death sentence would
at least ensure that Baruah would not be able to enter Bangladesh
without the court’s intervention.
Significantly, the
verdict comes at a time when ULFA-I is facing a crisis. Sources
indicate that not more than 10 hardcore members of the outfit are
inside Assam, and that the group has no more than 180 cadres in
camps in Myanmar. Senior leaders who were in the Mon District of
Nagaland have been called back to Myanmar after the outfit awarded
the death sentence to 'operational commander' Pramod Gogoi alias
Partha Pratim Asom. On March 16, 2014 [the party's 'Army Day'],
ULFA-I asked its members to re-strengthen the outfit, fearing that
certain members had a nexus with the SFs. At least eight ULFA-I
cadres, including Pramod Gogoi, were executed on the instructions
of ULFA-I's 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Baruah, for 'conspiring’
with Police and Security Forces to engineer a mass surrender of
cadres over the preceding four months. Seven cadres had also been
executed in December 2013, while they were trying to flee the Myanmar
base to surrender to the Police. 'Operational commander' Pramod
Gogoi was executed on January 15, 2014 in the Mon District. ULFA-I
is said to have a total of around 240 cadres at present.
Significantly, the
Goalpara Police recovered a stock of ammunition and detonators from
ULFA-I along the Assam-Meghalaya border in the Goalpara District
on January 27, 2014. The Police disclosed that a group of ULFA-I
militants had entered Hatigaon, a village under the Agia Police
Station, with arms and explosive materials, which they stored inside
a rubber plantation. Goalpara Superintendent of Police (SP) Nitul
Gogoi stated, “We got the information that a group under the leadership
of Drishti Rajkhowa brought the ammunition from Bangladesh.”
Coordination
between the Meghalaya based Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA),
one of the biggest procurers of arms in Meghalaya, and ULFA-I,
remains a concern. In the latest incident, on June 26, 2014, a militant
identified as Dharma Kanta Rai, who was on ‘deputation’ from the
ULFA-I to the GNLA, was killed during a rescue operation mounted
by West Garo Hills Police at Darekgre near Rongmasugre village in
West Garo Hills District, to free four abducted persons from the
GNLA and ULFA. The abductions had been carried out on June 25 from Kantanagre
village in West Garo Hills District. The deceased ULFA-I cadre was
reportedly an improvised explosive device (IED) expert, used by
GNLA to target Police movements.
Worryingly, media
reports indicate that a large proportion of weapons and ammunition
that reach the mushrooming
militant outfits in Meghalaya, are from the armory of
insurgent groups presently engaged in peace parleys with the Government.
These groups include the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
and the pro-talks faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF). According to sources,
these frontline militant outfits never divulged the exact composition
of their arsenal and, according to one source, “80 to 90 per cent
of these arms lie unused for five to six years and just before their
life span lapses, these militant groups prefer to dispose of these
weapons.”
Further, despite
dramatically improving relations between India’s Border Security
Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), Northeast insurgent
groups continue to maintain some 45 hideouts in Bangladesh, mostly
belonging to ATTF and NLFT (21 camps), according to BSF Special
Director General B.D. Sharma. He added, on June 20, that the insurgents
could not be fully wiped out from Bangladesh soil because deployment
of BGB was thin compared to requirements, and that, “They are now
raising new forces and we hope that the situation would improve
soon. Besides, the terrain and riverine border also come in the
way of maintaining effective border vigil.” However, Mohammed Latiful
Haider, Additional Director General, BGB, has denied the existence
of any camps of Indian militant outfits in the country. The denial
came on June 25, after the first day of a border coordination conference
held between senior BSF and BGB officials at Kadamtala, at BSF North
Bengal Frontier Headquarters near Siliguri, under the Darjeeling
District of West Bengal.
Bangladesh has now
clearly declared that it would not allow its territory to be used
against India. The assurance, reiterated to Indian External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj on her first foreign visit on June 26, 2014,
came as the External Affairs Minister promised to put extra energy
into bilateral ties. Swaraj stated that New Delhi sought a comprehensive
and equitable partnership with Bangladesh for a secure and prosperous
South Asia. With recent developments, and agreed cooperation between
India and Bangladesh, a further significant improvement can be hoped
for.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
June 23- June
29, 2014
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Jharkhand
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Maharashtra
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
1
|
2
|
7
|
10
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
FATA
|
1
|
7
|
111
|
119
|
KP
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
Sindh
|
24
|
3
|
13
|
40
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
|
|
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Dhaka
Court
awards
death
penalty
to
eight
HuJI-B
militants
including
its
'chief'
Mufti
Abdul
Hannan:
A
Dhaka
Court
on
June
23
awarded
death
penalty
to
eight
militants
of
banned
Islamist
outfit
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al
Islami
Bangladesh
(HuJI-B),
including
its
'chief'
Mufti
Abdul
Hannan,
and
meted
out
life
sentence
to
six
others
for
bombing
to
death
10
people
during
Pahela
Baishakh
(Bengali
New
Year)
celebrations
at
Ramna
Batamul
in
Dhaka
city
on
April
14,
2001.
The
death
row
convicts
of
the
outfit
are
'military
commander'
of
HuJI-B
Mufti
Abdul
Hannan,
Maulana
Akbar
Hossain
alias
Helaluddin,
Maulana
Mohammad
Tajuddin,
Hafez
Jahangir
Alam
Badar,
Maulana
Abu
Bakar
alias
Selim
Hawlader,
Mufti
Shafiqur
Rahman,
Mufti
Abdul
Hye
and
Arif
Hasan
Suman.
Those
who
were
sentenced
to
life
imprisonment
are
Maulana
Yahiya,
Maulana
Shawkat
Osman
alias
Sheikh
Farid,
Maulana
Abdul
Hannan
Sabbir,
Maulana
Abdur
Rouf,
Shahadat
Ullah
alias
Jewel
and
Maulana
Abdur
Rouf.
The
Independent,
June
24,
2014.
INDIA
Maoists
sabotage
suspected
as
four
persons
killed
in
train
derailment
in
Bihar:
At
least
four
passengers
were
killed
and
another
eight
injured
as
12
coaches
of
New
Delhi-Dibrugarh
Rajdhani
Express
derailed
near
Golden
Ganj
station
in
Chapra
in
Saran
District
on
June
25.
Railway
suspected
"sabotage"
by
Communist
Party
of
India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)
behind
the
derailment
as
there
was
a
blast
on
the
track.
"Prima
facie,
it
appears
to
be
a
case
of
sabotage.
There
was
a
blast
on
the
track,
which
could
have
caused
the
derailment,"
said
Railway
Board
Chairman
Arunendra
Kumar.
"Another
goods
train,
60
kms
away
from
the
station,
also
got
derailed
due
to
a
blast.
18
wagons
got
derailed
in
the
accident,"
Kumar
said.
A
live
bomb
fitted
with
a
timer
device
has
been
found
near
tracks,
which
has
given
credence
to
reports
of
Maoists
having
a
role
in
the
incident.
Zee
News,
June
26,
2014.
'LeT
responsible
for
attack
at
Indian
consulate
in
Herat',
says
US
State
Department
spokesperson
Marie
Harf:
US
State
Department
spokesperson
Marie
Harf
said
on
June
25
that
there
is
credible
evidence
that
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
was
responsible
for
the
terror
attack
on
the
Indian
Consulate
in
Afghanistan's
Herat
Province
on
May
23,
2014.
She
commented,
"Based
on
credible
information...
The
US
Government
has
assessed
that
LeT
was
responsible
for
the
attack
in
Herat
on
May
23rd,
2014.
This
is
the
attack
on
the
Indian
Consulate
(in
Herat).
We
make
our
assessments
based
on
a
wide
range
of
all-source
information.
In
this
case
we
believe,
based
on
this
information,
it's
credible.
We
look
at
number
of
different
sources
that
we
gather
on
our
own.
We
have
assessed
that
LeT
did
perpetrate
this
attack."
Business-Standard,
June
26,
2014.
Union
Government
rules
out
talks
with
Maoists:
Union
Home
Minister
Rajnath
Singh
on
June
27
ruled
out
talks
with
the
Communist
Party
of
Maoist
(CPI-Maoist).
He,
however,
asserted
that
the
Government
would
adopt
a
"balanced
approach"
to
resolve
the
problem
through
administrative
leadership
and
political
commitment.
He
said
this
while
he
chaired
a
meeting
of
Chief
Secretaries
and
Police
chiefs
of
10
Left
Wing
Extremism-affected
States
and
the
chiefs
of
the
Central
Armed
Police
Forces
(CAPFs).
The
Hindu,
June
28,
2014.
Union
Government
starts
informal
talks
with
insurgents
in
northeast:
The
Union
Government
has
started
informal
talks
with
insurgent
groups
in
the
northeast
to
find
a
lasting
solution
to
the
militancy
in
the
region,
reports
Times
of
India
on
June
30.
Union
Minister
of
State
for
Home
Affairs
Kiren
Rijiju
stated,
"I
have
full
charge
of
the
NE
division
and
have
been
informally
meeting
representatives
of
some
of
these
outfits.
I
have
conveyed
to
them:
'See,
here
is
your
man
in
Delhi,
and
this
is
your
best
chance
to
come
on
board
and
shun
violence'.
I
hope
these
groups,
as
they
have
indicated
so
far,
are
serious
about
bringing
peace
to
the
region
and
work
together
for
the
development
of
the
long-neglected
NE
states.
I
have
asked
officials
in
my
ministry
to
initiate
formal
dialogue.
We
have
some
differences
with
ULFA
and
NSCN
and
hopefully
that
will
be
sorted
out
in
due
course…
The
government
this
time
will
ensure
that
the
interlocutors
who
hold
talks
with
militant
groups
have
more
mandate
than
just
one-on-one
discussions.
This
would
mean
that
the
interlocutors
could
have
talks
simultaneously
with
all
stakeholders
to
reach
a
comprehensive
solution.
In
case
the
negotiations
fail,
the
government
would
clamp
down
on
their
front
organizations
and
stymie
their
finances."
Times
of
India,
June
30,
2014.
PAKISTAN
111
militants,
seven
SFs
and
one
civilian
among
119
persons
killed
during
the
week
in
FATA:
16
militants
were
killed
and
seven
hideaways
were
destroyed
in
the
ongoing
Zarb-e-Azb
operation
by
Security
Forces
(SFs)
in
North
Waziristan
Agency
(NWA)
of
Federally
Administered
Tribal
Area
(FATA)
on
June
29.
Five
militants
were
killed
and
six
hideouts
were
destroyed
as
the
Pakistan
Army
continued
its
assault
in
NWA
on
June
26.
Four
militants
and
three
khasadar
(tribal
Police
force)
officials
were
killed
in
a
clash
between
SFs
and
militants
in
the
Sur
Qamar
area
of
Jamrud
tehsil
(revenue
unit)
in
Khyber
Agency
on
June
26.
The
fighter
aircraft
of
Pakistan
Air
Force
(PAF)
continued
pounding
hideouts
of
alleged
militants
in
the
Mir
Ali
subdivision
of
NWA,
killing
13
militants
on
June
25.
At
least
47
militants
were
killed
and
about
23
hideouts
were
destroyed
in
the
ongoing
operation
by
SFs
in
Khyber
Agency
and
NWA.
Three
persons,
including
two
soldiers
and
one
civilian
were
killed
in
a
suicide
bombing
in
NWA
on
June
24.
Daily
Times;
Dawn;
The
News;
Tribune;
Central
Asia;
The
Nation;
Frontier
Post;
Pakistan
Today;
Pakistan
Observer,
June
23-29,
2014.
Woman
passenger
killed
and
two
others
injured
as
militants
open
fire
at
PIA
plane
at
Peshawar
airport:
Unidentified
militants
fired
on
a
Pakistan
International
Airlines
(PIA)
plane
as
it
was
landing
at
the
Bacha
Khan
International
Airport
of
Peshawar,
the
provincial
capital
of
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
(KP),
in
the
night
of
June
25,
killing
a
woman
and
injuring
two
others,
including
a
crew
member.
PIA
flight
PK-756
with
178
passengers
and
crew
members
on
board
was
travelling
from
Riyadh,
Saudi
Arabia.
Superintendent
of
Police
(SP)
Cantonment
Faisal
Kamran,
quashing
speculation
that
the
airport
might
have
been
attacked,
said,
"The
gunmen
fired
at
the
airplane
from
outside
the
airport
vicinity,"
adding
that
the
plane
was
damaged
in
the
attack.
Tribune,
June
26,
2014.
US
names
JuD
as
terror
outfit:
The
United
States
(US)
on
June
25
added
Lashkar-e-Toiba's
(LeT)
affiliates,
including
the
JuD,
its
frontal
organization,
to
its
list
of
designated
terror
organisations
and
slapped
sanctions
against
two
LeT
leaders.
The
State
Department
has
amended
LeT's
designations
to
add
the
aliases:
Jamaat-ud-Dawa,
Al-Anfal
Trust,
Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool
and
Tehrik-e-Tahafuz
Qibla
Awwal,
an
official
statement
said.
Simultaneously,
the
Department
of
Treasury
targeted
the
financial
and
leadership
networks
of
LeT
by
designating
Nazir
Ahmad
Chaudhry
(Ahmad)
and
Muhammad
Hussein
Gill
as
specially
designated
global
terrorists
(SDGTs).
Ahmad
and
Gill
are
being
designated
for
acting
for
or
on
behalf
of
LeT.
Treasury
and
the
Department
of
State
have
designated
22
individuals
and
four
entities
associated
with
LeT.
"In
targeting
LeT
leadership,
on
Wednesday's
action
demonstrates
our
unrelenting
commitment
to
combating
terrorism
by
disrupting
terrorist
groups'
financial
activities,"
said
the
Under
Secretary
of
Treasury
for
terrorism
and
financial
intelligence
David
S
Cohen.
"We
will
continue
to
target
LeT's
financial
foundation
to
disrupt
and
impede
its
violent
activities,"
he
added.
Hindustan
Times,
June
26,
2014.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
|
|
|