SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 11, September 19, 2011

INDIA

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Jharkhand: Barren Monsoon
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 1, 2011, Jharkhand Director General of Police (DGP) Gauri Shankar Rath declared ‘Operation Monsoon’ a success. The month long anti-Naxal [Left Wing Extremist]operation was carried out in the Saranda forest by joint Forces from the State, Odisha Police and the Central Reserve Police (CRPF), between August 1 and August 31. Saranda is a dense Sal forest spread across more than 850 square kilometres, covering roughly 700 hills, in the West Singhbhum District of Jharkhand and overflowing into the Sundargarh District of Odisha. It is in Saranda that the headquarters of Eastern Regional Bureau (ERB) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has been established. ERB controls operations in all the east Indian States, and top leaders from Andhra Pradesh and other States are known to visit frequently. Maoists use the area to run training camps and hold meetings of their top cadres. The area has, for almost a decade been compared to Abujmaadh (Chhattisgarh), where the presence and reach of the Security Forces (SFs) is severely limited.

DGP Rath disclosed: “The forces destroyed around a dozen Maoist training camps. The rebels may not have been totally flushed out, but we have been successful in establishing an administration... Earlier, forces returned to their base camps within a few days. This time, they went into Saranda’s core, considered the capital of the Maoists after Bastar in Chhattisgarh, and pulled off sustained operations.” Further, the operation prevented the Maoists from planting landmines, as is their practice during the monsoons, when they take advantage of the softened soil to bury explosive devices.

Over 5,000 SF personnel were reportedly engaged in 'Operation Monsoon'. According to CRPF spokesperson Deputy Inspector General (DIG) (Operations) Bhanu Pratap Singh, "One fully armed jawan [trooper] equipped with food and medicines, on an average walked for 40 kilometres (a day) and cleared the areas after which he rested.” Singh added, further, “For the first time in India an operation has been launched in a specific area for such a long period of time.” Also for the first time, MI-17 and Dhruv helicopters were engaged in the operation, for ferrying troopers, food and medicines into the difficult terrain.

The Police believe that the effectiveness of the Operation was, at least in part, due to the secrecy in which it was executed, with little emerging in terms of detail, at least till mid-August.

Giving further details, DIG (Kolhan Region) N.K. Singh stated, on September 2, "The joint Security Forces met Maoist resistance only five times since the operation began on July 31. Their resistances were brief... They could not match the Police for over 15 minutes at any of these places." The DIG said a total of 33 Maoists were arrested during the operation and at least five Maoist camps were destroyed. 175 IEDs, 416 detonators, three guns, 225 rounds of ammunition, four wireless sets, 175 kilograms of explosives and various documents and other items were seized during the operation.

In a further ‘success’, it was claimed that the link between the Maoists and the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), the political wing of the Manipur-based People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was confirmed by documents seized during the Operation. The documents revealed that the RPF was supporting the training and technical upgrade of the Maoists in Saranda. The top bosses of the two outfits had held a meeting on October 21-22, 2008, and agreed to “consolidate mutual understanding and friendship and extend full support to each other in the liberation struggle to overthrow a common enemy (the Indian government)”.

DIG Singh also claimed that the Maoist ERB could not hold any meeting in the forest as a result of Operation Monsoon, which hampered their policy decisions. Documents found during the operation revealed that Maoist units had to seek prior approval from the ERB for each activity to be launched in eastern states.

In a significant symbolic victory, for the first time in the past decade, CRPF Inspector General (Operations) D.K. Pandey hoisted the Tricolour at Tirilposhi village in the heart of Saranda on Independence Day, August 15, 2011, at a location where black flags had been hoisted by Maoists on every Independence and Republic Day in the past.

In a further possible fallout, a ‘zonal commander’ Prashant alias Shiva Munda alias Lambu, said to be second  in the Maoist hierarchy controlling Saranda, was arrested along with two of his associates and INR 7.6 million in cash on August 11, 2011, in Rourkela (Odisha), bordering Saranda.

Saranda had long been ceded to LWE. Cadres of the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC), which merged with the People’s War Group (PWG) in September 2004 to form the CPI-Maoist, were first noticed in the District in the year 2000. Subsequently, on November 27, 2001, Manoharpur ‘area commander’ of the MCC, Ishwar Mahto, was killed by the Police at Bitkalsoy village under Manoharpur Police Station, in the heart of the Saranda forest. This was the first time that Police had clashed with members of any extremist outfit in the Singhbhum region. Notwithstanding initial reverses, the Naxalites started strengthening their roots in the area and established a training centre in Panta village under Goilkera Police Station in 2002.

It was in December 20, 2002, that the Naxalites first tasted blood in the area, when they ambushed a Police convoy, killing 18 Police personnel and injuring another 20 at Bitkilsoya under the Manoharpur Police Station. They also looted an estimated 30 rifles and an unspecified quantity of ammunition, setting ablaze 11 vehicles in the convoy.

After this incident, the Naxalites started flexing their muscle in the area. Tendu leaf and mine thekedars [contractors] in the region began to pay regular levies to them, funding the further development of their armed capabilities. Armed training camps were established. The Police had located and destroyed at least two such camps during past operations, at Hendecully on August 22, 2003; and at Bendesoker November 13, 2003. MCC cadres from Saranda also made a daredevil attack on the Bara Jamda Police Outpost on March 31, 2004, and looted 10 weapons. Anti-Naxalite operations were launched after these incidents, but the Police fell into a trap near Baliba village under Gua Police Station on July 7, 2004, where 29 police personnel were killed and more than 30 weapons, including one Light Machine Gun, were looted. With this incident, the dominance of the MCC was further enhanced across almost the entire Saranda region.

Some other major incidents orchestrated by the Maoists in the area include:

January 26, 2006: CPI-Maoist cadres exchanged gunfire with the Police in the Manoharpur area of West Singhbhum District. Bodies of two Police personnel and two Maoists were subsequently recovered from the forest.

June 1, 2006: At least 12 police personnel were killed when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered a landmine explosion in the West Singhbhum District.

June 10, 2009: 11 Policemen, including a CRPF Inspector, were killed and six were injured when CPI-Maoist cadres triggered a landmine explosion targeting their vehicle in West Singhbhum District.

Significant anti-Maoist operations were resumed in Saranda in March-April 2010, but with little success. Just a day after the SFs left Saranda, the Maoists blew up two water pump houses inside the jungles, demonstrating the unchallenged presence in their safe havens. However, on June 13, 2010, at least 10 LWEs were killed and eight camps were destroyed. The operation was jointly carried out by the Police, CRPF and Special Task Force near Bandgaon in the West Singhbhum District of Jharkhand. Six Security Force personnel were injured in the encounter.

This was followed by the five-day long ‘Operation Black Thunder’ in Saranda, starting September 25, 2010. Ten Maoists were claimed to have been killed though only one body was recovered. Four SF personnel were also killed in the operation, which was reportedly carried out by a joint force of 2,000 SFs personnel drawn from the State Police and CRPF.

Short duration operations in Saranda were also carried out in December 2010, March 2011and June 2011.

Evidently, past operations failed to inflict permanent damage on the Maoists in the Saranda Forest, and there is little reason to believe that the outcome of 'Operation Monsoon' will be a significant departure on this count. No Maoists were reported killed in the Operation, though two civilians lost their lives. At least one Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) trooper died of malaria and nearly 200 other SF personnel contracted the disease during the Operation. Further, on August 2, 2011, two CRPF personnel were injured in an encounter with the CPI-Maoist cadres at Thalkobad in Saranda. At the end of a month long campaign, the Forces had 33 arrests to show for their ‘success’. Of these, significantly, only an estimated 18 have any prior record as Maoists.

Nor is there reason to believe that the tactical withdrawal by the Maoists and the ‘establishing’ of ‘civil administration’ in the Saranda areas will have any enduring impact. Reports suggest that the Maoists are already returning to the area, and clashes with the SFs have already commenced. On September 2, 2011, just as 'Operation Monsoon' ended, two Maoists were killed in the Ranga area under Manoharpur Police limits in Saranda forest. Reports indicate, further, that the Maoists have started regrouping at Patamda, Bodam and Amdapahad in the foothills of Dalma in East Singhbhum District. ‘Area commanders’ from the Ayodhya Hills in Purulia (West Bengal) and those from Dampara on Jharkhand’s border with Bengal, have temporarily secured themselves in Dalma, and a sizeable number of rebels are believed to have sneaked into the two blocks of East Singhbhum from Ayodhya Hills to aid the Dalma squad. 

It is a misreading of Maoist tactics to believe that permanent success has been achieve in the Saranda Forest, simply because the Maoists offered little resistance to the large SF contingents deployed, or because a handful of cadres have been arrested. Such occasional operations, devoid of any long-term strategic plan or intent, can only create an illusion of success, even as the quiet consolidation of the rebels goes on uncontested.

INDIA

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Assam: Trouble at the Margins
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 19, 2011, Security Forces (SFs) killed seven United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA) militants at Gutguti Pathargenai forest under Ratabari Police Station in the Karimganj District of Assam, bringing this little known group into sharp focus. An Army soldier was also injured during the gunfight, while one UDLA cadre was arrested.

Earlier on May 16, 2011, SFs had arrested UDLA the 'commander-in-chief', identified as Nandaram Reang, and his bodyguard, Gajiram Reang, from the forest area of Kundanala in the Katlicherra Block of Hailakandi District. Further, on April 29, 2011, SFs had arrested an UDLA militant from Channighat in Assam’s Cachar District.

On September 24, 2009, Police in the neighbouring Mizoram State had arrested the UDLA ‘chairman’, Dhainaram Reang, from Kolasib District in Mizoram, and handed him over to the Hailakandi District Police. He, however, managed to secure bail and later escaped into the Mizoram forests. The UDLA was led by Shishumoni Reang, brother of Dhainaram Reang, while he was in Police custody.

Formed sometime in 2008 by Dhainaram Reang, the UDLA has an estimated 50 to 60 cadres, drawn from both the Bru and Bengali Muslim community. The outfit primarily operates in Assam’s Southern Districts of Karimganj and Hailakandi – bordering Mizoram, Tripura and Bangladesh.

UDLA was formed when the United Liberation Front of Barak Valley (ULFBV) came overground with the formal surrender of 305 of its cadres at the Indian Tea Association (ITA) Cultural Complex in Guwahati on September 30, 2008. The ULFBV ‘president’ Panchram Apeto led the surrendering cadres, mostly of them from the Reang tribe of Hailakandi and Karimganj Districts, ending an eight-year-old armed insurrection. Panchram had then claimed that Dhainaram had a hidden nexus with some Muslim militants. Denying this, an UDLA ‘commander’, Rajesh Reang, declared, on September 24, 2010, that his group has close links with Naga militants. He claimed that UDLA’s headquarters were in Bangladesh and that the outfit had been collecting money from various tea gardens in the Karimganj and Hailakandi Districts.

Later, on an unspecified date, a section of UDLA split and formed the United Democratic Liberation Front-Barak (UDLF-B), led by one Danya Ram Reang, along with Lamboo Reang. As in the case of UDLA, UDLF-B has also been brought under tremendous pressure by the SFs.

On April 29, 2011, SFs arrested an 'area commander' of UDLF-B, Thaiboi Reang, from Kundanala village in Hailakandi District. Thaiboi Reang was involved in cases of abduction and extortion since the inception of the group. On July 28, 2011, SFs arrested a UDLF-B militant from Katlicherra in Hailakandi District. On April 28, 2010, two cadres of the UDLF-B were arrested from Alagapur in Hailakandi District, when they were trying to extort money in the Algapur market.

The UDLA split again when Atabur Rahman, once an accomplice of Dhainaram, formed his own outfit, the United Democratic Liberation Tigers (UDLT), on December 3, 2009. The rift occurred reportedly because of soured relations between the Bru and the Muslim communities following incidents of UDLA cadres abducting a number of Muslims from Hailakandi District in 2009. Atabur, who vowed to protect the Muslims from Bru militants, was, however, killed on January 11, 2011, in Mizoram, either by rivals or the SFs, along with his cousin and accomplice, Eklasuddin. The UDLT, though, has been described as a group of dacoits and abductors.

Bru militancy started with the formation of the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) in 1996, following violent clashes between ethnic Mizos and Bru tribesmen in the Mamit District in Mizoram. The immediate cause of the conflict was the demand for an Autonomous District Council (ADC) in the Bru-dominated areas of western Mizoram by the Bru National Union (BNU), a political organisation of Bru tribesmen that was formed in 1994. The Reang/Bru Democratic Convention Party (RDCP), another Bru organisation, passed a resolution in this regard, subsequently provoking Mizo organisations like the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) and Young Mizo Association (YMA) to organise violent attacks in October 1997 on Bru settlements. The Mizo groups apprehended the geographical division of Mizoram. Following the ethnic-violence of 1997, some 35,000 Bru refugees fled Mizoram and took shelter in six relief camps at Kanchanpur in North Tripura, while a significant number fled to Assam. Bru militants have, thereafter, changed their demands to include the formation of a separate homeland in Karimganj and Hailakandi Districts of Assam.

The ULFBV, formed in 2002, was specifically created with the objective of creating a separate Bru homeland in the Karimganj and Hailakandi Districts of Assam. However, on April 26, 2011, the UDLA ‘chairman’ stated that the group was contemplating surrender if the Government was ready to constitute a separate Autonomous Council for the Bru community.

Meanwhile, the repatriation of Bru refugees to Mizoram has emerged as a major concern. Repatriation started in May 2010, for the first time, and a total of 231 displaced Bru families consisting of 1,115 persons, returned to Mizoram. The second phase of repatriation occurred in November 2010, in which another 53 Bru families returned to Mizoram. The third phase began in April 2011 and continued till May, with more than 600 families restored to Mizoram. The fourth phase, which was to begin from June 7, 2011, failed to take off. The stalled repatriation process was reported likely to be resumed from September 15, 2011, but has not yet commenced.

Despite significant losses, UDLA and its splinter groups continue to operate and, over the past two years, UDLA alone has been involved in the killing of at least three civilians in two separate incidents:

July 17, 2011: Suspected UDLA militants shot dead a member of the Bru community, identified as Birguram, branding him a Police informer, in Thinglian village of Kolasib District in Mizoram. 

September 18, 2010: UDLA militants attacked the managerial staff of Dullavcherra Tea Estate in Karimganj District, killing two employees.

Meanwhile, on September 8, 2011, UDLA militants attacked the hamlets of Bagmara, Banglabasa, Gandacherra, Baruncherra, Haticherra, Harincherra, Sontila and Jhumtila, forcing people of their own tribe to flee or shift to other places. The Bru militants have been moving about in this area, threatening people to leave the places, possibly to sanitize their own safe havens in the forests.

The group has also been involved in several incidents of abduction and extortion. On June 6, 2011, UDLA militants abducted two executives of a road construction company, Anupam Bricks and Concrete Industries Limited (ABCIL), from Kolasib District in Mizoram, reportedly demanding a ransom of INR 50 million. The Mizoram Police, however, rescued both the executives after an encounter at Banglabasha village in Hailakandi District on June 16, 2011, and no ransom was paid. On April 20, 2011, a small-time businessman, Zakir Hussain Laskar, was abducted by UDLA militants from Hailakandi District. Earlier after the September 18, 2010, killing of two managerial staff of the Dullavcherra Tea Estate, UDLA threatened, on September 24, 2010, that it would continue such attacks until the garden management pays INR 1.5 million, as demanded. On December 21, 2010, UDLA stepped up extortion by issuing notices demanding INR 300 per household in Hailakandi, Dullavcherra and Karimganj Districts, threatened villagers with dire consequences for failure to comply.

Meanwhile, on May 11, 2011, UDLF-B abducted an assistant manager of the Dullavcherra Tea Estate in Karimganj District. He was, however, released at Betcherra in Katlicherra block of Hailakandi District on May 20, 2011. There is no official confirmation of any ransom paid to the abductors, but intelligence sources disclosed that INR 200,000 was paid to ensure his safe release.

Since the formation of UDLA, there have been 16 recorded incidents of killings, abductions and arrests, in which Bru militant outfits have been found involved. Of these, UDLA was connected with nine incidents, UDLF-B with four, United Liberation Army of Bruland (ULAB) with two, and United Liberation Army (ULA) with one incident.

There are seven Bru groups in the region. Significantly, however, three of them, the BNLF, Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM) and ULFBV have surrendered. 195 BNLF militants, including the outfit's ‘president’ Surjya Moni Reang and ‘general secretary’ Solomon Prophul Ushoy, surrendered at the Sidan transit camp in West Tuipuibari on July 25, 2005. Further, 802 BLFM cadres surrendered before the Mizoram Government on October 26, 2006. ULFBV surrendered arms on September 30, 2008. Very little is heard about ULA and ULAB, which leaves the UDLA and its splinter UDLF-B as the only two Bru militant outfits still operational.

The SFs have intensified operations and secured significant successes against most of the militant groups operating elsewhere in the State as well, as is evident by the decreasing fatalities, With both UDLA and UDLF-B under sustained fire, it is unlikely that these groups will retain their capacities for disruption and violence for long.

INDIA

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Transcript
9/11: A Decade After
Interview with K.P.S. Gill,
President, Institute for Conflict Management
On September 11, 2011

How has the world been transformed by 9/11 and by terrorism over the past decade?

KPS Gill: The transformation of the world in the face of terror attacks, especially after 9/11, has been total and complete... After 9/11 there has been a change in the perception and the world has realized that terrorism is an activity which is not permissible today, which is an activity which impinges on civilization, and impinges on activities which are very vital now to the progress of human kind, especially economic activities. So there's been a sea change during the last ten years.

Does the world understand terrorism better today than it did a decade ago?

KPS Gill: Politically I think the incoherence persists and the perception in the minds of people is determined by propaganda to which they are exposed. But I must say that pro-terrorist groups have been very effective in launching their propaganda war. The theory of the root causes of terror, which has been pronounced by some of the leaders in the world, is a direct result of this sort of propaganda, and the repetitive propaganda on these lines. So now everyone accepts that, although that is not a correct perception. So as far as the political response to terrorism is concerned, it still has to crystallize internationally and it still has to crystallize within the countries itself...

So there's been no coherent response to terror... President Bush talked about a war on terror, and he inducted the Army to fight terror, to 'drain the swamps', as he said. But the recent raid on Osama bin Laden, in which he was killed, shows that what is required is motivated, well-trained groups to go for terrorist leadership, and thereby make a change. Not by launching infantry attacks and military attacks on so called terror hideouts.

You had spoken of a transformation of the Muslim world from within. To what extent has this come to pass?

KPS Gill: We have also to talk about the impact of terror on Islamic populations as such. And one can see that there has been a gradual distancing of large sections of the population from Islamic terror groups. The enthusiasm and the ease with which recruits were available a few years back is not evident today. For instance, there was a news item saying that the Taliban had abducted a number of youngsters to convert them to their way of thinking, when they didn't have to abduct (earlier). They used to get volunteers easily. But what has happened is that, within the Muslim countries there has been a lot of turmoil, political turmoil, which has impacted large sections of the population. And that turmoil is not of anyone's making, but it is an internal dynamic of the countries concerned... What is happening in quite a large number of Muslim countries is that people are probably disenchanted with this technique and want to move on, and want to better their livelihood, better their conditions. And that is what is keeping people away from terror...

So, this shows the large disenchantment of large sections of Muslim populations, and specially Muslim women, with terror. They are getting away from it. They want to go to schools, to colleges, and the evidence of that is the difficulty with which women are pursuing their studies in Afghanistan, in spite of tremendous opposition, in spite of fear of death and disfigurement and torture, ostracization. Inspite of all that, they are trying to go out of the narrow confines of the type of education they are being imparted, and join the mainstream, the world's mainstream, of education, which is a sort of universal education. But the impact of this is not visible as dramatically as it should be, because I think the impact will take time. May be another 10 years, may be another 15 years. But then the impact will certainly be there, and it will certainly lead to a lessening of terror activities. It may not lead to a total stoppage, but it'll lead to a reduction in terrorist activities.

Is the Arab Spring turning into an Islamist Autumn?

KPS Gill: Different countries have had their, shall we say, what they call the Arab Spring. But like all mass movements, after toppling the regimes concerned, it appears they do not know what to do. And this happens, I think, it happens whenever the changes are done without a clear political orientation among those people who are trying to change society. And this is, of course, a larger issue which comes up, the larger issue being that the new technologies that are developing, require a new politics, which has not happened. The political idiom is still the 20^th century idiom, or the 18^th century idiom, or the 19^th century idiom. But what should be the politics of the 21st century, which will be conducive to mankind's progress? That still has not emerged and I don't think that there is much thinking going on about that. So, in the Arab world, you had these regime changes and a movement towards democracies, but how these democracies will function is very difficult to say. And the confusion within the Muslim world, I think to a very large extent, is reflected in what is happening in Turkey, and has been happening for the last ten-fifteen years. There is a constant struggle going on, between the fundamentalists and the liberals, within the Muslim mindset. This particular struggle is still, I should say, based on the old ideologies. The question remains, how do you get these things together and work out a relationship between the scriptures of any religion, and the new thought which is emerging out of the new technologies. There is a conflict there, and that is a conflict which has not been resolved...

So that conflict brings about, shall we say, various different types of strands into communities. You just had this shootout in Norway the other day, which was based on that gentleman's reading of various histories of various religions, including the impact of Islam on those religions. So how the mindset of the people belonging to various religious groups will respond to the new technologies is difficult to say.

There has been much speculation about WMD terrorism and the Islamist terrorists' efforts to acquire WMD capabilities. How real is this danger?

KPS Gill: But in new technologies are also the weapons of mass destruction. They are the products of technologies, may be a little older, but they are the products of such technologies. How would... if it comes into the hands of terrorist groups or Islamist terrorists, how would they use these technologies is very difficult to predict. You could not predict what Osama bin Laden would do till he did it. And no one could predict that people can use an aeroplane full of people as a missile, and self-destruct and destroy property and kill such a large number of people. Similarly, when such weapons, both biological and nuclear, fall into the hands of terrorist groups, it is very difficult to predict as to how they will use it. Of course, the obvious conclusion would be that they would use it to destroy cultures which they feel are opposed to their own culture. And in that they have already, shall we say, highlighted, the cultures of the Christian West, the Hindu India and the Israelis, as the three main enemies of Islam. So these countries, these cultures, will have to be careful about what may become a grave threat to them, when such weapons fall into hands of the Islamist extremists, who not only see enemies, but they also have an agenda of world domination...

Is terrorism weakening, or have we entered the age of endless war?

KPS Gill: What happens, say, starting from today, in the next ten years? Does the world continue to live under fear of terror? And that fear is there because incidents keep on happening, which keep on reminding people of what terrorists can achieve or do. So, is the world fated to live with this sort of fear for the remaining 10, 20, 30 years, for the coming 10, 20, 30 years...?

As the spread of education takes place, as a mindset change is brought about, not through a conscious effort of anyone, but through the automatic spread of technology and greater interaction between people in different parts of the world, the number of people espousing the terrorist mindset will reduce... But when will it reduce to a proportion of the population that it becomes negligible, or it becomes totally marginalized, is difficult to say. But ultimately, the world is tending towards that. It is tending towards the ultimate marginalization of terror, and whatever action is being taken by various governments in the world, that is contributing to it, but not to such a large extent, as the automatic spread of technology without any effort, through opening up of trade, through opening up of commerce, through interaction between nations, through easier travel. And probably, this process itself, within the next ten to fifteen years, should lead to a situation where people would not be talking about terror as one of the central issues on our civilizational horizon....

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

INDIA

Delhi

Jammu & Kashmir

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Total (PAKISTAN)