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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 38, March 24, 2014
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Critical
Cusp
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
With less
than a fortnight to go for the all important Presidential
Elections scheduled to be held on April 5, 2014, a wave
of terror strikes has enveloped the length and breadth
of Afghanistan. In the most recent of major incidents
(each resulting in three or more fatalities) at least
nine persons, including four foreigners and five Afghans
(including two children and two women), were shot dead
by Taliban terrorists inside the luxurious Serena Hotel
complex in national capital Kabul, in the night of March
20, 2014. The attackers managed to smuggle pistols past
security checkpoints and then hid in a bathroom, eventually
springing out and opening fire on guests and hotel guards.
All the four terrorists were killed in the subsequent
operation by the Security Forces (SFs). The attack took
place despite recent security reports rating Serena Hotel,
guarded round the clock by dozens of security guards armed
with assault weapons, among the highest-risk locales in
the city. The hotel is frequented by foreign officials
and the Afghan elite.
In another
incident earlier in the day, Taliban
terrorists killed at least 11 people, including the Police
Chief of Jalalabad District, and wounded another 22, in
a suicide bomb attack and gun battle at a Police Station
in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar Province. The assault began
with two explosions just before dawn targeting the Police
Station and a nearby square, close to compounds used by
international organizations, including the United Nations.
The initial attack was carried out by two suicide bombers,
one of them driving a three-wheeler vehicle. Afghan SF
personnel, with the help of International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) helicopter gunships, launched retaliatory
fire. The ensuing gun battle lasted for over three hours,
at the end of which six Taliban terrorists, all of them
wearing suicide vests, were killed.
On March
18, 2014, a suicide bomber riding a rickshaw blew himself
up outside a checkpoint near a market in Maymana, the
capital of Faryab Province, killing at least 15 civilians
and injuring another 46. The explosion took place some
200 metres away from the Provincial Governor’s residential
compound.
On January
17, 2014, at least 21 persons, including 13 foreigners
and eight Afghans, were killed in a suicide bombing by
the Taliban, at a Lebanese restaurant, Taverna Du Liban,
in Kabul. Wabel Abdallah, the International Monetary Fund’s
Resident Representative in Afghanistan, was among the
dead. Three attackers were also killed. The restaurant,
popular among foreigners and wealthy locals, is located
in an area that houses several diplomatic missions.
According
to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict
Management’s (ICM's) South Asia Terrorism Portal
(SATP), since the beginning of 2014, a total of 682 persons,
including 141 civilians, 101 SF personnel and 440 terrorists,
have been killed in terrorism-related incidents across
Afghanistan (data till March 23, 2014). The country has
recorded at least 45 major incidents in 321 deaths during
this period. More worryingly, 21 out of these 45 incidents
were suicide attacks, accounting for 132 killings.
Violence
recorded a significant escalation through 2013. SATP data
indicates that at least 6,363 fatalities were recorded
through 2012, including of 2,754 civilians, 893 SF personnel
and 2,716 terrorists, rising to 7,074 fatalities in 2013,
including 2,959 civilians, 1,413 SF personnel and 2,702
terrorists - an increase of 11.17 percent in overall fatalities.
More worryingly,
civilians continued to face the brunt, with civilian fatalities
increasing by 7.44 percent in 2013. According to United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the
number of civilians killed through 2013 surpassed civilian
fatalities in all the previous years since the beginning
of war in 2001, barring 2011, when the civilian fatalities
stood at 3,021. UNAMA, however, started compiling data
only from 2007, in which year 1,523 civilian deaths were
documented across Afghanistan.
Other parameters
of violence, includng suicide attacks and improvised explosive
device (IED) attacks also witnessed an increase in 2013,
as compared to the previous year. As against 101 suicide
attacks in 2012, year 2013 recorded 107 such attacks,
according to UNAMA. 73 of 107 suicide attacks in 2013
targeted civilians, killing 255. Throughout 2013, the
use of IEDs remained the leading cause of civilian deaths
and injuries. 962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injuries occurred
in 2013 due to IED explosions, as compared to 868 civilian
deaths and 1,663 injuries in 2012.
Indeed,
varying media sources estimate that the Taliban, which
lost power in 2001 as the US and its allies launched Operation
Enduring Freedom in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,
has regrouped and now dominates an estimated 40 to 60
per cent of Afghanistan.
More than
50,000 ISAF combat troops who are still in Afghanistan
are due to leave by the end of the year. Afghan Forces
now control almost 93 per cent of their territory and
lead 97 per cent of all security operations across the
country. They are also responsible for over 90 per cent
of their own training activities. Afghan National Security
Force (ANSF) troops have demonstrated their capabilities
in a number of successful operations, but difficulties
persist, as is evident in the failure to stall the rise
in violence. US Director of National Intelligence, James
Clapper, thus told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on February 11, 2014, that, on the battlefield, Afghan
Forces often score tactical victories against Taliban
insurgents, but had difficulties holding cleared territory,
particularly when Police units were involved. Clapper
also observed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) had,
improved but still suffered from “extensive desertion
problems”. About 30,000 Afghans deserted from the ANA
in 2013, out of a total strength of 185,000, Clapper disclosed.
The head of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant
General Michael Flynn, added, at the same forum, that
Afghan troops had made “modest progress”, but still needed
international assistance with logistics, air transport
and intelligence.
Clearly,
the current situation demonstrates tremendous vulnerabilities
in the ANSF, and the need for a continued and significant
presence of ISAF troops, if the state is to retain its
structure and dominance in future engagements. Nevertheless,
the process of the premature
drawdown of ISAF Forces continues
to accelerate. On March 16, 2014, the United Kingdom (UK)
handed over another two bases to Afghan Forces. From 137
UK bases in the country, there now remain just two bases
- Camp Bastion, which is the main base for UK personnel,
and observation post Sterga 2, both of which are in Helmand
Province.
On February
25, 2014, the White House announced that US President
Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare for a
possible complete withdrawal of troops, following Afghan
President Hamid Karzai's refusal to sign a Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) with the US, despite the US and Afghanistan
agreeing to details of the BSA and the agreement being
endorsed by a council of 3,000 Afghan tribal elders, the
Loya Jirga. Karzai has stated that he will only
sign the BSA if the US publicly starts a peace process
with the Taliban and ensures transparent elections this
year. Indeed, according to a February 3, 2014, media report,
President Karzai has been engaged in secret contacts with
the Taliban. Aimal Faizi, Karzai's spokesman, characterized
the contacts as among the 'most serious' the presidential
palace had with the Taliban since the war, adding, “The
last two months have been very positive. These parties
were encouraged by the President’s stance on the bilateral
security agreement and his speeches afterwards.” Despite
coalition reservations, the Karzai Government has also
gone ahead with its decision to release detainees at Bagram
Prison in Bagram District, Parwan Province. It has so
far released 120 detainees – 55 on March 20, 2014, and
65 on February 13, 2014. The US Forces had handed over
the prison at Bagram Air Base to full Afghan control on
March 25, 2013.
The final
word on the BSA, however, will only be heard after the
Presidential Elections of April 2014. Indeed, soon after
Obama’s telephonic conversation with Hamid Karzai on February
25, 2014, the White House issued a statement noting, “We
will leave open the possibility of concluding a (security
agreement) with Afghanistan later this year. However,
the longer we go without a (deal), the more challenging
it will be to plan and execute any U.S. mission.” Crucially,
all the nine candidates who are in fray for the President's
post have supported the signing of the BSA, though none
of them have stated this openly, with the exception of
Abdullah Abdullah, who was the runner up to Karzai in
the disputed 2009 elections. Abudllah observed, “It is
in the interest of Afghanistan to sign the BSA.” The pact
would allow the US to keep as many as 10,000 troops in
the country to focus on counterterrorism and the training
of Afghan security forces.
The BSA
alone, however, cannot ensure peace in Afghanistan. Unless
the Taliban's safe sanctuaries and infrastructure of support
in Pakistan are dismantled, Pakistan-backed Islamist extremists
will continue to wreak havoc in Afghanistan. In his final
address to Afghanistan’s Parliament on March 15, 2014,
Karzai declared, in an obvious reference to Pakistan,
that the US could bring peace to Afghanistan if it went
after terrorist sanctuaries and countries that supported
terrorism. Similarly, Major General Stephen Townsend,
who commands US and NATO Forces in eastern Afghanistan,
noted, "Until the Pakistanis do something about the
safe havens, that's going to be a problem. (Terrorists)
can recruit and train and equip and prepare to launch
in Pakistan."
The most
immediate concern is, of course, conducting a free and
fair Presidential election. Indeed, in 2004, the fatalities
during the campaign period (September 7 to October 7)
stood at 196. The elections, which were conducted on October
9, 2004, were by and large fair. As a result, violence
in the post-election period remained low. On the other
hand, in 2009, a total of 1,173 persons were killed during
the campaign period (June 16 to August 18), and the elections,
which were held on August 20, 2009, were marred with controversy
so much so that a runoff election was declared on November
7, 2009, which was finally called off on November 2, when
second runner up Abdullah Abdullah decided, on November
1, not to contest, citing the “inappropriate actions of
the Government and the election commission”. The violence
and lack of transparency in the elections catalyzed the
growth of the Taliban. Present developments indicate that
this process might well be repeated in the present round
of polls. Since the beginning of the campaign on February
2, 2014, 534 persons have already been killed in Afghanistan,
till March 23. The campaign will last till April 2. Unless
this rising violence is contained at the earliest and
an environment where free and fair elections can be conducted
can be established, the outcome could bode ill for the
future of Afghanistan.
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Northeast:
Uncertain Relief
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
India’s
troubled Northeast continues to witness varying levels
of insurgency related violence, as well as tensions between
various ethnic groups, with troubles further compounded
by external agencies and a proliferation of new rebel
formations. Nevertheless, insurgency-related fatalities
in the region have seen sustained and dramatic improvements,
from a recent peak of 1,051 in 2008, collapsing to 246
fatalities in 2011. Though 2012 saw a reversal of this
trend, with 316 killed, the region saw a significant improvement
in 2013, with 252 killed. A multiplicity of enduring insurgencies
has weakened considerably, either disintegrating or seeking
peace through negotiated settlements with the Government.
However, the mushrooming of new militant outfits and splinter
groups in the region, the worst of which is witnessed
in Garo Hills of Meghalaya, continues to renew the menace
in the region.
Fatalities
in Militants Violence in India's Northeast 2005-2014*
Years
|
Civilians
|
SFs
|
Militants
|
Total
|
2005
|
334
|
69
|
314
|
717
|
2006
|
232
|
92
|
313
|
637
|
2007
|
457
|
68
|
511
|
1036
|
2008
|
404
|
40
|
607
|
1051
|
2009
|
270
|
40
|
542
|
852
|
2010
|
77
|
22
|
223
|
322
|
2011
|
79
|
35
|
132
|
246
|
2012
|
90
|
18
|
208
|
316
|
2013
|
95
|
21
|
136
|
252
|
2014
|
35
|
4
|
40
|
79
|
Total
|
2073
|
409
|
3026
|
5508
|
Source:
SATP, *Data till March 23, 2014
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The two
States worst afflicted by insurgency in 2012, Nagaland
and Manipur, recorded dramatic declines in insurgency
related fatalities. According to the South Asia
Terrorism Portal database, Nagaland
dropped dramatically from 61 [six civilians and 55 militants]
in 2012 to just 32 [11 civilians and 21 militants] in
2013. Internecine clashes within the State also declined
from 43 incidents in 2012, resulting in 53 persons killed
and 23 injured, to 18 incidents in 2013, resulting in
12 killed and 11 injured. 2012 had witnessed intense factional
killing between Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang
(NSCN-K)
and NSCN-Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK), which visibly slowed
down in 2013. Factional killings amongst the Nagas had
spiked after the formation
of NSCN-KK on June 7, 2011, and the
Zeliangrong
United Front (ZUF), a Manipur based
outfit, on February 25, 2011. Further, seven incidents
of fratricidal clashes [resulting in nine killed and two
injured] between Naga militant groups were recorded outside
Nagaland in 2013, as against such 13 such incidents [resulting
in 27 killed and 10 injured] in 2012. Fatalities in Nagaland
had registered an upward trend, till they peaked at 145
in 2008, but fell drastically in 2009 and 2010, in the
aftermath of the signing of the Covenant
of Reconciliation in mid-2009.
However, this emerging trend saw a reversal after the
emergence of ZUF and NSCN-KK in 2011. Nagaland faces fresh
challenges in 2014, carrying forward
tensions from the December 2013 incidents between the
Rengma Nagas and Karbis of Assam. 2014 has already recorded
11 fatalities, including 10 civilians and one militant.
In Manipur,
according to the SATP database, total fatalities,
at 110 [25 civilians, 12 Security Forces-SFs, 73 militants]
in 2012, reduced to just half, at 55 in 2013 [21 civilians,
six SFs and 28 militants killed in 10 incidents]. 2013
recorded 76 incidents of bomb blast, in which 24 people
were killed and 103 were injured; 107 incidents of explosion
had been recorded in 2012, though the total fatalities
were nine, and 90 persons were injured. Of the 107 blasts
in 2012, Corcom (the Coordination Committee of six Valley-based
groups) was responsible for 33; 28 of the 76 incidents
in 2013 were attributed to CorCom. 2013 data also demonstrates
the greater lethality of bomb attacks, despite the reduction
in incidence. Fratricidal clashes between Naga militants
also declined in frequency. There were at least 10 clashes
between the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) – at times
a combined force of ZUF and NSCN-K – and the NSCN-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM),
which resulted in 25 fatalities in 2012. There were just
seven such incidents and nine fatalities through 2013.
2014 has already recorded 10 fatalities [two civilians,
three SFs and five militants]. The People's Liberation
Army (PLA),
a member of Corcom, was involved in the three SF killings.
According
to SATP, 101 persons, including 60 militants, 35 civilians
and six Security Force (SF) personnel, were killed in
71 incidents of killing through 2013 in Assam.
There were 91 killings in 2012, including 45 militants,
31 civilians and 15 SF personnel, in 64 incidents of killing.
This marginally reversed a continuously declining trend
since 2009, when fatalities were 392 (158 in 2010, 94
in 2011). The current scale of violence is far below its
peak in 1998, when the State recorded 783 terrorism-related
fatalities. Ingti Kathar Songbijit faction of National
democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS) emerged as the
most lethal group in the State, with a confirmed involvement
in 19 fatal incidents, resulting in 25 deaths; followed
by Karbi People's Liberation Tiger (KPLT),
involved in 11 incidents of killing, resulting in 16 fatalities.
The Anti-Talks faction of ULFA (ULFA-ATF), which rechristened
itself ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I) continued to maintain
its strike capability, and was involved in at least 12
killing incidents resulting in 14 deaths. On March 16,
2014 [the party's 'Army Day'], ULFA-I asked its members
to re-strengthen the outfit, fearing that certain members
had a nexus with the SFs. At least eight ULFA-I cadres,
including its 'operational commander' Pramod Gogoi alias
Partha Pratim Asom, were executed on the instructions
of the ULFA-I's 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Baruah, for
'conspiring with Police and Security Forces to engineer
a mass surrender of cadres over the past four months.
Seven cadres were executed in December, 2013, while they
were trying to flee the Myanmar base to surrender to police.
'Operational commander' Partha Pratim Asom was executed
on January 15, 2014 in Mon district of Nagaland. The State
has already recorded a total of 38 fatalities in 2014
[15 civilians, one SF, 22 militants]. NDFB-IKS was involved
in 11 of the 14 civilians killed and in the killing of
SF personnel. Of the 22 militants killed, five were known
to belong to NDFB-IKS, three ULFA-I and three KPLT. Worryingly,
on March 13, 2014, NDFB-IKS released a video-clipping
to announce the launch of an 'operation' to assassinate
State politicians, Director General of Police (DGP) and
Superintendents of Police (SPs). The video-clipping revealed
that NDFB-IKS has sent its 35-member "Iragdao Brigade"
to launch the "2nd Urailang Operation." Sources
said the militants have been asked to sacrifice their
lives if need be to accomplish the mission. A March 17,
2014, report observed that, according to the Union Ministry
of Home Affairs (UMHA) the NDFB has killed as many as
70 people in Assam during through 2010-14. In January
2014, State Police Headquarters declared 15 members of
the NDFB-IKS, including its chief Songbijit Ingti Kathar
(IK Songbijit), as 'most wanted'. Assam Police said valuable
information leading to the arrest of these 15 NDFB-IKS
militants would be worth INR 9.5 million. In a significant
development, 2,009 cadres of the Dilip Nunisa faction
of Dima Halam Daogah (DHD-N), surrendered en masse on
March 9, 2013. The outfit had signed a Memorandum of Settlement
[MoS] with the Government on October 8, 2012. In another
positive development, a six months long tripartite Suspension
of Operations (SoO) agreement was signed between
the Ranjan Daimary faction of NDFB (NDFB-RD), the Central
Government and the State Government, on November 29, 2013.
In Meghalaya,
according to the SATP database, insurgency related
fatalities increased from 48 in 2012, to 60 in 2013. After
dramatic declines between 2004 and 2008, there has been
a continuous year on year increase in fatalities in the
State. Worryingly, SF fatalities have spiked from
just two in 2012 to nine in 2013. 2013 also recorded six
major incidents (each resulting in 3 or more fatalities)
in which 22 persons were killed [9 militants, 5 SF personnel
and 8 civilians].Insurgent violence had declined after
the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Achik National
Volunteer Council (ANVC)
on July 23, 2004, but resurfaced again with the formation
of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA),
followed by the emergence of various new
and splinter groups. The GNLA continues
to be responsible for the largest proportion of violent
activities in the State. On January 5, 2013, a draft agreement
was signed between the ANVC and ANVC-B with the government.
During 2013, the State also saw several
agitations relating to demands relating to statehood and
Inner Line Permit (ILP) arrangements. 2014 has already
recorded 15 fatalities [six civilians and nine militants].
In Arunachal
Pradesh, at least four militants [three from NSCN and
one from ULFA-I)] were killed in the State in three encounters
through 2013. Three militants [two from NSCN-K and one
from NSCN-IM] were killed in 2012 in factional clashes
between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K. Significantly, there were
no civilian or SF fatalities, and no factional killings,
in 2013. Worryingly, however, 2014 has already recorded
five fatalities in the State, with two civilians and three
militants killed. Outgoing Arunachal Pradesh Governor,
General (Retired) J.J. Singh, on May 23, 2013, observed
that the insurgency in the eastern Arunachal Districts
-Tirap, Changlang and Longding - could be solved only
after a permanent solution to the vexed Naga issue was
reached.
The stabilisation
process in Tripura
gained further momentum through 2013, without a single
terrorism-related fatality through the year - a signal
achievement secured for the first time since 1992. 2012
had recorded two fatalities, both militants, in two separate
incidents. Significantly, at its peak in 2004, the militancy
had claimed as many as 514 lives, including 453 civilians,
45 militants and 16 SF personnel. Of all the factions
of the NLFT, Biswamohan Debbarma faction of National Liberation
Front of Tripura (NLFT-BM) alone remains active, though
mounting pressure by the SFs resulted in the surrender
of 14 of its cadres in 2013 alone. In a further setback,
NLFT-BM 'Chief of Army Staff', Pasaram Tripura alias Parshuram alias T.
Thomas alias Wathak (51) surrendered
in Agartala in West Tripura District on January 10, 2014.
Further, NLFT-BM 'second-in-command' Panther Debbarma
alias Pandit surrendered before the Police along
with his wife and an associate at Kanchanpur under North
Tripura District on March 13, 2014, after they escaped
from the NLFT’s base camp in the Jupui area of the Chittagong
Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. Debbarma disclosed that
NLFT had few weapons and the outfit had been marginalised
due to continuous surrenders and desertions among members
over the past three years.
In Mizoram,
unresolved challenges including talks between the Mizoram
Government and the insurgent Hmar People's Convention
- Democracy (HPC-D),
as well as the unfinished repatriation of Bru (Reang)
refugees from neighbouring Tripura were further compounded
by occasional activities of militant groups from adjoining
States engaging in abduction and arms smuggling. Despite
an enduring peace after an agonizing twenty years of insurgency,
a variety of issues, principally the result of ethnic
tensions and overflows of insurgency from the neighbourhood,
continue to rankle in Mizoram.
The Northeast
had also witnessed several agitations demanding the creation
of new States through 2013, particularly following the
resolution of the Congress Working Committee (CWC), on
July 30, 2013, to sanction statehood to Telengana by bifurcating
Andhra Pradesh in South India. In Assam, statehood demands
include agitations by the Bodos for Bodoland; Koch-Rajbongshis
for Kamatapur; Karbis and the Dimasas for an autonomous
or full-fledged State. In Meghalaya, the Garos renewed
their stir for Garoland; and tribals in Tripura, under
the banner of the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura
(IPFT), demanded a separate state. In Manipur, the Kuki
State Demand Committee (KSDC) revived its demand for a
‘Kuki State’, even as the Eastern Naga Peoples Organization
(ENPO) in Nagaland resumed its demands for a ‘Frontier
Nagaland’ State.
Other concerns
also persisted. According to April 18, 2013 report, the
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
was planning to strengthen its base in the Northeast.
A six page letter sent to 13 States, by the UMHA on CPI-Maoist
efforts to expand to new areas, noted that the Maoists
planned to strengthen their Eastern Regional Bureau: "The
North-East is another region where the CPI (Maoist) is
trying to spread its wings … with the objectives that
include strengthening the outfit's Eastern Regional Bureau,
procurement of arms/ammunition/communication equipment."
The Maoist efforts to increase bases in the North East
region are now directly supervised by Prashant Bose, Politburo
Member and 'second in command' of the CPI-Maoist.
In November
2013 UMHA declared Assam a Maoist afflicted State, with
the Joint Secretary (Northeast) Shambhu Singh noting that
a review of law and order indicated that "Maoist
presence in Assam and border areas of Arunachal Pradesh
has been noticed and hence their activities were noticed
in Golaghat, Dhemaji, Lakhimpur and Tinsukia Districts
of Assam and Namsai area of Lohit District in Arunachal
Pradesh." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing
a conference of State Governors in New Delhi on February
12, 2013, noted that Left Wing Extremism’s (LWE) geographical
spread in the country was showing a shrinking trend, though
it was expanding in Assam, which was "worrisome".
On February 5, 2014, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi
disclosed that CPI-Maoist had entered into an understanding
with militants based in the Northeastern region as well
as with Pakistan's external intelligence agency Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), to spread its network in his State.
Meanwhile,
on March 14, 2014, the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF),
the political body of the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
which had signed an agreement with the CPI-Maoist in 2008,
congratulated CPI-Maoist for their successful strike against
Security Forces (SFs) in Sukma
District of Chhattisgarh on March 11,
and declared that RPF and CPI-Maoist were 'strategic partners'.
There were
also reports of Northeast militant groups forming a common
platform to fight the ‘enemy’. This was disclosed by Paresh
Baruah, ‘commander in chief’ of ULFA-I, who declared that
all the groups have realized the fact that there is need
for fighting the “common enemy” together and after a series
of talks among the various outfits, the decision was taken
to form the proposed common platform. He said that the
move in this regard started three to four years earlier
and final shape had been given recently: “More than 90
per cent of the work of forming the common platform has
been completed and only the name of the platform has to
be declared... Though the name of the platform is yet
to be announced, the words ‘west-south east Asia’ would
be included in the name.” Baruah added that outfits that
had started “so-called talks” with the Government would
not be included in the platform.
Significantly,
on January 19, 2014, Assam DGP, Khagen Sarma stated
that the ISI was behind the unification bid of Northeastern
militants: “It is the Pakistani ISI and other external
forces that are behind the fresh initiative taken by ‘commander
in chief’ of ULFA-I to form a common force on all the
insurgent groups based in Northeast to fight Indian security
forces.” Earlier, in 2012, there had also been reports
of China encouraging the CPI-Maoist, militant groups from
Jammu & Kashmir and from the North East region to
unite to form a single 'united strategic front' against
the Indian State.
In March
2013, Minister of State for Home Affairs M. Ramachandran
stated that insurgent groups in the Northeastern region
were getting arms and ammunition from China. Subsequently,
Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushilkumar Shinde disclosed,
"There are reports that the insurgent groups operating
in the north eastern states of India have been augmenting
their armoury by acquiring arms from China and Sino-Myanmar
border towns and routing them through Myanmar. Significantly,
India and Myanmar have agreed to cooperate to prevent
cross border movement of armed groups, share information
on seizure of arms and check arms smuggling/drug trafficking".
Shinde added that the agreement was reached during the
20th Sectoral Level (Joint Working Group)
Meeting between Myanmar and India held in Bagan, Myanmar,
from June 19-20, 2013. The UMHA has described the 1,643-kilometre-long
India-Myanmar border - the locus of cross-border movement
of militants, illegal arms and drugs - as 'extremely porous'.
In a significant
breakthrough, on August 30, 2013, the NSCN-IM arms supplier,
identified as Wuthikorn Naruenartwanich alias Willy
Narue, was arrested by Bangkok Police on India’s request.
He had brokered a USD 1 million deal involving supply
of some 1,000 firearms, including 600 AK-47s and ammunition,
with Chinese arms dealers.
On March
7 and 8, 2013, in the biggest arms haul in Mizoram thus
far and one of the biggest in the Northeast, Mizoram Police
and Assam Rifles seized 31 AK-47 assault rifles, one Singapore-made
Light Machine Gun (LMG), one US-made Browning automatic
rifle, 809 rounds of ammunition, and 32 magazines, from
a farmhouse near the Lengpui Airport, on the outskirts
of State capital, Aizawl. The arms were smuggled from
Myanmar and were meant to be delivered to the Parbotia
Chatagram Jana Sangata Samiti (PCJSS), a group claiming
to fight for the rights of the indigenous people of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) tribes of Bangladesh.
Militant
groups operating in Northeast continues to maintain camps
in neighboring countries. Significantly, the Border Security
Force (BSF) submitted a list of 66 militant camps operating
from Bangladesh, to the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB),
during a three-day bi-annual border coordination meeting
[March 7-9, 2014] between the BSF inspector-generals and
BGB’s region commanders held in Shillong (Meghalaya).
The Venkaiah Naidu-led department-related Parliamentary
Standing Committee had recommended, in March 2013, increasing
pressure on countries bordering the Northeastern region
during trade discussions to close down Indian rebel training
camps operating on their soil.
The
North East Students Organisation (NESO), on March
25, 2013, asked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to expedite
the ongoing peace process with various rebel groups in
India’s Northeastern states and reverse the “unabated
influx of illegal migrants from neighbouring countries”,
which had brought a serious demographic change in the
North East. NESO urged the Prime Minister to extend the
Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, to the entire
Northeastern region. Worryingly, United Nation Department
of Economic and Social Affairs data indicated that, in
2013, India was home to 3.2 million Bangladeshi residents.
India remained the favourite destination for Bangladeshi
migrants in 2013, the UN report added.
Delays
in bringing negotiations with various militant formations
to a conclusion, irreconcilable 'settlements' with different
ethnic groupings, the mushrooming of splinter insurgent
formations, a continuing politics relying excessively
on ethnic identity mobilisation, and poor governance have
combined to keep insurgencies and disorders alive across
the Indian Northeast, with both the regional States and
the Indian Government displaying little sagacity in their
approach to the region's enduring problems. However, exhaustion,
disintegration and the loss of ideological motivation
have undermined most insurgent organisations in the Northeast,
giving its people some relief, though the threat of insurgent
violence remains a permanent sceptre hanging over their
heads.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
March 18-23,
2014
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
4
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
2
|
0
|
5
|
7
|
FATA
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Punjab
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
Sindh
|
14
|
4
|
3
|
21
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
|
|
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Dhaka
Court
indicts
former
Prime
Minister
and
BNP
leader
Begum
Khaleda
Zia
in
corruption
charge:
A
Dhaka
Court
on
March
19
indicted
former
Prime
Minister
and
Bangladesh
Nationalist
Party
(BNP)
Chairperson,
Begum
Khaleda
Zia,
in
charge
of
corruption
for
allegedly
using
an
illegal
fund
to
buy
land
for
a
charity
named
after
her
late
husband,
Ziaur
Rahman.
The
charge
is
that
Zia
had
illegally
collected
more
than
USD
1
million
in
donations
for
the
charity
named
after
her
husband.
Times
of
India,
March
20,
2014.
INDIA
Centre
deputes
70
IPS
officials
and
6,000
troops
to
assist
the
Election
Commission
in
ensuring
free
and
fair
elections
in
insurgency
prone
areas
of
the
country:
The
Centre
has
deputed
70
Indian
Police
Service
(IPS)
officers
of
Inspector
General
level
and
6,000
troops
to
assist
the
Election
Commission
in
ensuring
free
and
fair
elections
in
insurgency
prone
areas
of
the
country.
A
majority
of
these
IPS
officers
will
be
deputed
in
the
Communist
Party
of
India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)
affected
regions
of
Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand,
Odisha,
Bihar,
Maharashtra
and
Andhra
Pradesh.
DNA,
March
19,
2014.
New
airstrip
soon
for
reconnaissance
in
LWE-affected
areas:
The
Central
Government
has
expedited
the
process
of
shifting
the
airstrip
for
aerial
reconnaissance
Drones
in
Left-Wing
Extremism
(LWE)-affected
areas.
"The
airstrip
for
Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicles
(UAV)
is
expected
to
be
functional
within
three
months.
The
new
airstrip
will
enable
effective
reconnaissance
of
the
Naxal-infested
regions,"
said
an
official.
The
Hindu,
March
22,
2014.
Four
Northeast
militant
groups
to
participate
in
the
deliberations
for
creation
of
an
umbrella
organisation
in
Myanmar:
Representatives
of
Nationalist
Socialist
Council
of
Nagaland-
Khaplang
(NSCN-K),
Independent
faction
of
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA-I),
IK
Songbijit
faction
of
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB-IKS)
and
the
Manipur-based
People's
Liberation
Army
(PLA)
will
participate
in
the
deliberations
for
creation
of
an
umbrella
organisation
in
Taga
of
Sagaing
division
in
north-western
Myanmar
on
March
20.
The
meeting
is
likely
to
be
convened
by
NSCN-K
'chairman'
S.S.
Khaplang,
an
influential
leader
in
parts
of
northern
Myanmar.
Telegraph
India,
March
20,
2014.
NGOs
vulnerable
to
money
laundering
and
terror
financing,
according
to
UMHA:
With
voluntary
organisations
receiving
more
than
INR
115
billion
of
foreign
funds
annually,
the
Union
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
(UMHA)
has
warned
that
the
Non-Government
Organisations
(NGOs)
in
India
were
vulnerable
to
risks
of
money
laundering
and
terror
financing.
"While
it
is
not
proper
to
make
sweeping
generalisations,
it
is
necessary
to
note
that
the
NGO
sector
in
India
is
vulnerable
to
the
risks
of
money
laundering
and
terrorist
financing,"
its
annual
report
said.
Oman
Tribune,
March
20,
2014.
NEPAL
CPN-UML
asks
Government
to
declare
local
election
date
without
further
delay:
The
Communist
Party
of
Nepal-Unified
Marxist
Leninist
(CPN-UML)
asked
the
Government
to
declare
the
date
for
local
election
without
further
delay.
It
said
the
delay
in
holding
the
overdue
polls
would
largely
undermine
democracy
and
people's
right
to
elect
their
representatives
at
the
local
bodies'.
ekantipur,
March
21,
2014.
Government
launches
CMP
vowing
to
frame
new
constitution
within
a
year:
The
coalition
Government
of
Nepali
Congress
(NC)
and
the
Communist
Party
of
Nepal-Unified
Marxist
Leninist
(CPN-UML)
on
March
19
launched
its
13-page
Common
Minimum
Programme
(CMP)
vowing
to
frame
a
new
constitution
within
a
year,
complete
the
remaining
tasks
of
peace
process
as
soon
as
possible
and
immediately
fill
vacancies
in
the
constitutional
bodies.
Unveiling
the
CMP,
Minister
for
Information
and
Communications
Minendra
Rijal
said
the
Government
would
have
zero
tolerance
against
corruption.
Himalayan
Times,
March
19,
2014.
PAKISTAN
ISI
Chief
General
Ahmed
Shuja
Pasha
knew
whereabouts
of
Osama
bin
Laden's
hideout,
reveals
The
New
York
Times:
According
to
The
New
York
Times,
Inter-Services
Intelligence
(ISI)
Chief
Lieutenant
General
Ahmed
Shuja
Pasha
knew
where
the
slain
al
Qaeda
leader
Osama
bin
Laden
was
hiding.
The
Newspaper
states
that
a
Pakistani
official
stated
that
United
States
had
direct
evidence
about
the
ISI
Chief
knowing
Bin
Laden's
presence
in
Abbottabad
at
the
time.
Tribune,
March
20,
2014.
Federal
Government
to
lodge
FIR
against
army
officials
in
missing
persons'
case,
Attorney
General
of
Pakistan
informs
Supreme
Court:
The
Federal
Government
on
March
19
decided
to
register
a
case
against
Army
officials
allegedly
involved
in
the
illegal
removal
of
35
undeclared
inmates
from
an
internment
centre
in
Malakand
Agency
of
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
Attorney
General
of
Pakistan
(AGP)
Salman
Aslam
Butt
told
this
to
a
three-judge
bench
headed
by
Justice
Jawwad
S
Khawaja
which
resumed
the
hearing.
Tribune,
March
20,
2014.
Five
Pakistanis
remain
in
detention
in
Guantanamo
Bay
prison,
says
Foreign
Office:
The
Foreign
Office
on
March
20
revealed
that
there
were
at
least
five
Pakistanis
who
were
being
detained
at
US'
Guantanamo
Base
in
Cuba.
The
Foreign
Office
Spokesperson,
Tasnim
Aslam
Khan,
revealed
that
a
two
member
delegation
that
had
visited
the
facility
in
August
2006,
had
found
six
Pakistanis
among
the
164
people
detained
at
the
facility.
One
of
the
six
detainees
had
been
released,
but
five
still
remain
in
detention.
Tribune,
March
21,
2014.
No
Pakistani
'boots
on
the
ground'
in
other
countries,
says
Prime
Minister
Nawaz
Sharif:
Prime
Minister
(PM)
Nawaz
Sharif
on
March
20
said
that
Pakistan
was
not
sending
its
military
troops
to
other
countries.
The
PM
dismissed
the
impression
that
some
countries
have
asked
Pakistan's
Armed
Forces
for
operations
on
their
land.
Daily
Times,
March
21,
2014.
Army
is
with
us
to
make
talks
a
success,
claims
TTP
dialogue
committee
head
Maulana
Samiul
Haq:
Head
of
the
Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan
(TTP)
dialogue
committee
Maulana
Samiul
Haq
on
March
18
said
"the
Army
is
with
us
for
the
success
of
talks
and
the
TTP
have
not
yet
put
up
their
demands".
He
said
both
TTP
and
Government
committees
are
in
contact
to
mark
out
a
"peace
zone"
for
the
sake
of
continuation
of
talks.
Meanwhile,
the
Pakistan
Government
negotiators
on
March
22
agreed
on
an
undisclosed
location
to
hold
direct
peace
talks
with
the
Taliban
soon
to
find
a
way
to
end
the
decade-long
insurgency.
"The
process
of
talking
directly
to
the
Taliban
will
start
in
two
to
three
days,
both
sides
have
agreed
on
the
venue",
Samiul
Haq,
a
negotiator
for
the
TTP,
said,
adding
the
location
would
be
declared
a
"peace
zone"
but
did
not
reveal
what
would
be
the
exact
venue
of
the
shura
or
council
meeting.
The
News,
March
19,
2014;
Business
Standard,
March
22,
2014.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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