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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 19, November 16, 2009
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Assam:
Crippling the ULFA
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management,
New Delhi; Director, Centre for Development and Peace
Studies, Guwahati
Trans-border
terror in South Asia received a severe setback on November
4, 2009, when two top leaders of the separatist United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
fell into the hands of the Indian Security Forces (SFs).
The official version of the story is that ULFA’s self-styled
‘foreign secretary’ Sashadhar Choudhury and ‘finance
secretary’ Chitraban Hazarika were trying to sneak back
into India from Bangladesh, when they were captured
by Border Security Force (BSF) troopers near Gokulnagar
in Tripura. The duo was then handed over to a visiting
Assam Police team on November 6, who brought them over
to Guwahati and produced before a magistrate. The next
day, the magistrate sent them on a ten-day Police remand.
Though there is reason to believe that the duo were
actually picked up by Bangladesh authorities and informally
handed over to the Indian side, there are complex reasons
why both New Delhi and Dhaka prefer that people believe
the official version. In any event, the fact remains
that the pair has been captured and is now in Indian
custody, after years on the run.
It required
just a squeeze by authorities in Bangladesh to actually
uproot Northeast Indian insurgent leaders like Choudhury
and Hazarika from that country’s territory. India and
Bangladesh do not have an extradition treaty yet, and
have consequently shied away from giving details of
how a dozen armed security men in civvies captured the
ULFA duo from a house in Dhaka’s up-market Uttara locality
on November 1, 2009, before they landed up in the hands
of Indian authorities. Nevertheless, a confirmation
that the rebel leaders were picked up by Bangladeshi
security officials came from none other than the exiled
ULFA ‘chairman’ Arabinda Rajkhowa, who issued a Press
Statement on November 7 saying ‘unidentified armed men
from Bangladesh’ had abducted the duo around midnight,
November 1. The ULFA ‘chairman’ and remaining leaders
may actually have panicked and issued the statement
disclosing the capture to prevent the possible ‘disappearance’
of the two men, Choudhury and Hazarika. The rebel group
has not forgotten how some of its important leaders
went missing after the Bhutanese military assault against
the ULFA in 2003.
The arrest
of the two ULFA leaders has great significance, because
it demonstrates Dhaka’s seriousness in tackling trans-border
terror, particularly in dealing with Northeast Indian
insurgents, who have been enabled to make Bangladesh
a safe staging area for nearly two decades now.
"Dhaka
has greatly increased its pressure on the ULFA and other
(Indian) militants operating from there," Union
Home Secretary G. K. Pillai told this writer after Choudhury
and Hazarika’s arrest. He confirmed that ULFA’s elusive
‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah was no longer in
Bangladesh. Indian intelligence officials say Paresh
Baruah, along with some 50 of his trusted fighters,
is currently in China’s Yunnan province, close to the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters in northern
Myanmar. The ULFA has managed to open shop in Yunnan
province because elements in China had been supplying
arms to rebels in Northeast India. Union Home Secretary
Pillai confirmed, earlier in November 2009, that China
had been arming Naga rebels and that leaders of the
Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council
of Nagaland (NSCN-IM)
were making frequent visits to that country.
The arrest
of the two ULFA leaders has definitely put the rebel
group, formed in 1979 to push for a ‘sovereign, Socialist
Assam’, on the back-foot. G. M. Srivastava, former Assam
Police chief and now a security advisor to the State
Government, observes, "Sashadhar Choudhury as the
ULFA’s so-called foreign secretary was responsible for
maintaining the group’s links with foreign sympathizers
like the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence. Chitraban
Hazarika was responsible for the group’s money bags.
The ULFA cannot replace this loss easily." The
group’s chain of command has been totally disrupted.
While its ‘c-in-c’ Paresh Baruah is on the run, ‘chairman’
Rajkhowa is said to be lying low in Bangladesh. ULFA
‘general secretary’ Anup Chetia is under detention in
Bangladesh since 1997. Publicity and cultural ‘secretaries’,
Mithinga Daimary and Pranati Deka, respectively, have
long been in custody in Assam, along with ‘vice-chairman’
Pradip Gogoi. With ‘foreign secretary’ Choudhury and
‘finance secretary’ Hazarika trapped in the security
net, that leaves the group with Paresh Baruah’s close
aide and ‘deputy c-in-c’ Raju Baruah and a few other
middle-level leaders.
The crackdown
by Bangladesh could not have come at a more inopportune
time for the ULFA. The group has been unable to recover
from the split it suffered in June 2008, when the ‘Alpha’
and ‘Charlie’ companies of its crack ‘28th
battalion’ called a unilateral cease-fire. "We
have given up our original demand for sovereignty. We
are now looking for an acceptable solution to our problems
within the framework of the Indian Constitution,"
Mrinal Hazarika, a leader of the erstwhile ‘28th
battalion’, declared. Hazarika now says his faction
be called the ‘pro-talks’ ULFA group. Earlier in November
2009, New Delhi held an exploratory round of talks with
the pro-talks faction, raising the question whether
this faction could, at some point in time, actually
make the Paresh Baruah-led ULFA hawks irrelevant in
Assam’s insurgent politics.
But what
explains Dhaka’s sudden change of heart? It is true
there has been a change of guard in Bangladesh, with
the return of the supposedly pro-India Awami League
led by Sheikh Hasina in December 2008, but the mood
among the Bangladeshis had remained anti-India during
Hasina’s earlier tenures. It was the enduring anti-India
sentiment, among other things, that the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP) of Begum Khaleda Zia had also capitalized
on. Begum Zia had, in fact, told this writer in an interview
a couple of years ago that her party regarded the ULFA
as ‘freedom fighters’, much as the Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh’s
founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rehman were freedom fighters.
It has, in large measure, been pressures of the ‘global
war on terror’ and the general worry among affluent
Bangladeshis that the country was being hijacked by
fundamentalists and foreign terrorist elements operating
from its soil, which led the Awami League regime to
crack down on terror. New Delhi has also been on a diplomatic
overdrive to persuade Dhaka to act, and this has yielded
dividends.
There
were, however, more pressing reasons for Dhaka to act
against the ULFA. ULFA’s linkages with the official
establishment in both Bangladesh and Pakistan have been
confirmed with the May 16, 2009, arrest of two former
chiefs of Bangladesh’s main spy agency, the National
Security Intelligence (NSI), Maj. Gen. (Retd) Rezzaqul
Haider Chowdhury and Brig. Gen. (Retd) M. Abdur Rahim.
The duo, who had been directors general of the NSI,
were held for their alleged involvement in the 2004
seizure, in the port city of Chittagong, of ten truckloads
of arms and ammunition meant for the ULFA. One of the
reasons why Paresh Baruah fled Bangladesh was Dhaka’s
decision to reopen this case, in which Baruah was named
as one of those involved.
ULFA
had opened shop in Bangladesh in 1985, setting up safe
houses at Damai village in the Moulvi Bazaar District,
bordering the northeastern Indian State of Meghalaya.
When the Army, assisted by the Police and the paramilitary
forces, launched a crackdown against the ULFA in Assam,
its top leaders were nowhere in the State, having secured
themselves in their safe havens in Bangladesh. Dhaka,
however, bluntly denied the presence of Indian separatists
in that country, although confirmation came in December
1997, when ULFA general secretary Anup Chetia was arrested
with satellite phones and a huge amount of foreign currency,
by Bangladeshi authorities in capital Dhaka. Things
have evidently changed now and Dhaka has confirmed,
in more ways than one, the presence of ULFA and other
Northeast Indian militants in Bangladesh. India is expected
to give Bangladesh a great deal in return.
Bangladesh
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will pay a three-day visit
to India from December 18, 2009 and the two neighbours
are expected to settle the issue of putting an extradition
treaty in place. New Delhi has already rushed Foreign
Secretary Nirupama Rao to Dhaka to meet with the Bangladeshi
leadership, ahead of Sheikh Hasina’s visit. Dhaka hopes
to get several major concessions from New Delhi, including
a land route to Bhutan and Nepal for purposes of business
and trade. India is also expected to take concrete steps
to reverse the trade imbalance between the two countries,
which is heavily in New Delhi’s favour. Over the past
ten months, Bangladesh has been trying hard to demonstrate
its clear intent through a crackdown against Indian
insurgents operating from its soil, and that is something
New Delhi would clearly want to see continuing.
The ULFA
is clearly down, but not out as yet. With evidence of
some Chinese support, there is certainly some potential
for a regrouping. Bangladeshi cooperation has been critical
in crippling the rebels, but India will need further
cooperation from its neighbours if it is to bring down
the curtain on this 30-year-old insurrection in Assam,
the gateway to the Northeast.
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Manipur:
The Persistence of Despair
Sandipani Dash
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
With 369 insurgency related
fatalities, and the year 2009 drawing to an end, Manipur
remained the most violent State in India’s Northeast.
Assam, the other major theatre of conflict in the region,
with 11 times the population and 3.5 times the land mass,
stood at second place, with 344 fatalities through 2009.
There are, however, tentative indications suggesting some
gains for the counter-insurgency (CI) grid in Manipur,
with Security Forces (SFs) inflicting rising costs on
State’s multiple insurgent groups, neutralizing significant
numbers of their cadres and contracting their areas of
dominance.
Insurgency
related Fatalities in Manipur: 2001-2009
Year
|
Civilians
|
SFs
|
Insurgents
|
Total
|
2001*
|
70
|
25
|
161
|
256
|
2002*
|
16
|
03
|
71
|
90
|
2003*
|
13
|
03
|
70
|
86
|
2004*
|
88
|
36
|
134
|
258
|
2005*
|
158
|
50
|
202
|
410
|
2006*
|
96
|
28
|
187
|
311
|
2007*
|
130
|
39
|
219
|
388
|
2008**
|
136
|
16
|
347
|
499
|
2009***
|
64
|
13
|
292
|
369
|
*Union
Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India
**MHA and South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP)
combined
***SATP - Data till
November 15, 2009
The steady
increase of violence in Manipur since 2004, when insurgency-related
fatalities took an abrupt upward turn, coinciding with
the alleged rape and custodial death of a supposed female
insurgent, Th. Manorama Devi, at the hands of Assam Rifles
personnel, has witnessed its second reversal in 2009.
A similar de-escalation had earlier been recorded in 2006.
Manipur registered 499 fatalities in 996 insurgency-related
incidents in 2008, according to combined data of the MHA
and SATP. 2009 has seen 878 such incidents,
claiming 369 lives, including 292 insurgents and 64 civilians,
till November 15, according to the SATP database.
While civilians and SFs together account for some 21 per
cent, insurgents comprise nearly 79 per cent of the total
fatalities in 2009. All the nine Districts of Manipur,
including four in the Valley and five in the Hill areas,
continue to be affected by varying degree of militant
activities. Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, on July
20, 2009, informed the State Legislative Assembly that
more than 30 militant groups were operating in Manipur.
Manipur’s
insurgent groups have singled out the non-local Hindi
and Bengali speaking population in their efforts to consolidate
their support base within the indigenous population of
the State. Of the 64 civilians killed in 2009, 28 belonged
to this category – comprising migrant labourers and petty
traders, who were killed in at least 23 attacks distributed
across all the four Valley Districts. In the biggest attack
of 2009, unidentified insurgents killed nine non-locals
inside the Keibul Lamjao National Park in the Khordak
Awang Leikai area in Bishnupur District on May 11. Exactly
a month later, on June 11, four non-local labourers were
killed when unidentified insurgents opened fire inside
the Central Agriculture University campus at Iroisemba
under Lamphel Police Station in Imphal West District.
Police suspected that insurgents belonging either to the
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
or the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
were behind these attacks.
Unlike
the killings among the non-local labourer classes, which
fail to register in the imagination and concerns of the
scores of community groups and students’ associations
operating in Manipur, one killing that created great sensation
was that of the July 23 encounter in which a suspected
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
militant was shot dead by the Imphal West District Police
in the Khawairamband Bazaar area. A pregnant woman was
also killed and five other persons sustained injuries
in the cross-fire. The Apunba Lup, the apex body of several
agitating groups in the State, has alleged the encounter
to have been faked, and has spearheaded a State-wide agitation
demanding the Chief Minister’s resignation. While the
Chief Minister announced the suspension of six personnel
of the State Police’s Commando Force and the setting up
of a judicial inquiry, the All Manipur Students Union,
Manipuri Students Federation and Kangleipak Students Association
launched a class boycott campaign resulting in the closure
of a majority of educational institutions, including Manipur
University, particularly in the four Valley Districts
on September 9. The Manipur Government’s efforts to reopen
the educational institutions are being countered by the
agitating students’ associations who have set ablaze school
and college buildings in Thoubal and Imphal East Districts.
The violent demonstration of sympathy by students groups
for militant groups is no surprise in Manipur where, the
Director General of Police, Y. Joykumar, had earlier declared
at least one such student association – the Democratic
Students’ Alliance of Manipur (DESAM) – to be a front
organisation of the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).
Joykumar had asserted that "there is a linkage between
DESAM and KYKL."
Representatives
of local level self-Government institutions have also,
at times, been found to have links with the insurgent
groups in Manipur. In one such case, on August 19, 2009,
a PLA militant was arrested by a combined force of the
Imphal West District Police and Army from the residence
of a woman member of the Thongju Gram Panchayat (village
level local body), Ningthoujam Ongbi Mani Devi, at Thongju
Pechu Lampak.
Meanwhile,
the extortion drive by multiple insurgent groups remains
intact across the State, with all most all the armed groups
extracting levies and ransoms from residents and transients
in their areas
of operation. The continuing dominance
of the insurgents in Manipur is also strongly reflected
in the enveloping regime of extortion that targets Government
offices, local self-Government and educational institutions,
health centres, commercial establishments and the wider
civilian population alike.
The militants’
demonstration of power extends to the issue of numerous
'decrees' as well. In January 2009, PREPAK declared the
imposition of a temporary ‘ban’ on all gas agents for
allegedly duping consumers and for failing to heed the
outfit’s call for a ‘dialogue’ over the issue. In February
2009, the UNLF ‘banned’ the General Manager of the Imphal
Urban Cooperative Bank, Y. Ningthemjao Singh, from entering
the bank premises because of his alleged involvement in
malpractices. Again, in April 2009, the Military Council
faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)
declared a ‘ban’ on private hospitals for allegedly accumulating
wealth at the cost of economically weak patients. Such
moral policing by insurgent groups on occasion also gives
vent to the resurfacing faultlines between the Valley
and Hills in Manipur. In October 2009, the Military Council
faction of the United Kuki Liberation Army demanded the
abolition the Kut festival (autumn festival of different
tribes of Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups in Manipur). The outfit
stated that the venue of the festival should be in one
of the chief towns of these ethnic groups, such as Churachandpur,
Moreh, Kangpokpi or Motbung, but not in Imphal City.
The spillover
of the Naga insurgency into Manipur Hills had significant
impact on the State through 2009, as the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) sought to consolidate
influence in the Naga populated areas of the State, in
its quest for Nagalim
(Greater Nagaland). An attempt by the NSCN-IM to establish
a permanent camp at Siroy in Ukhrul District was foiled
in February 2009. After a two-week standoff, the insurgents,
who had already set up the camp, were provided safe passage
by Assam Rifles personnel, and the camp was dismantled.
However, another three unauthorised camps – established
prior to the 1997 cease-fire between the NSCN-IM and the
Union Government in Nagaland – at Bonning (Senapati District),
Ooklong (Tamenglong District) and Phungchong (Chandel
District), remain. The NSCN-IM reportedly receives patronage
from Government officials working in the Naga populated
hilly regions of Manipur. On February 13, 2009, for instance,
the Sub-Divisional Officer of Khasom Khullen in Ukhrul
District and his two colleagues were abducted by NSCN-IM
militants, with the alleged connivance of the Deputy Commissioner
of the District. The abducted officials were later killed.
Parliamentary
elections were held in the Outer and Inner Manipur constituencies
respectively on April 16 and 22, 2009, with 63 per cent
of the voters casting their ballot in Outer Manipur and
60 per cent in Inner Manipur. The NSCN-IM allegedly provided
support to the incumbent Parliamentarian, Mani Charenamei,
belonging to the People's Democratic Alliance, who was
seeking re-election from Outer Manipur, and who advocated
the formation of Nagalim at the territorial expense
of Manipur during his election campaign. There was, consequently,
strong resentment in the Valley, partially articulated
in the creation of the Thoubal District Development and
Demand Council by voters of eight Assembly Constituencies,
who boycotted Charenamei in the election. Charenamei eventually
lost to Thangso Baite of the ruling Congress party. The
NSCN-IM had also threatened 'capital punishment' against
persons associated with an influential community group,
the Tangkhul Nagalong (apex council of the Tangkhul community)
in Chandel District, for campaigning in favour of the
Bharatiya Janata Party candidate, Loli Adanee, in Outer
Manipur. In the Inner Manipur constituency, the Military
Council faction of the KCP declared a ‘ban’ against the
Congress party prior to election. The ban was subsequently
‘lifted’. Though the Congress retained its seat in Inner
Manipur as well, its offices were targeted and activists
attacked. On April 12, for instance, two persons were
wounded when the Mayang Imphal Block Office of the Congress
party was blown up by militants.
The smooth
conduct of a relatively peaceful Parliamentary election
in Manipur coincided with the counter-insurgency Operation
Summer Storm, jointly launched by the 57 Mountain
Division of the Army, the para-military Assam Rifles and
Manipur Police, involving about 500 SF personnel. The
operation, demonstrating an increasing synergy of efforts
in combating the militancy, targeted PREPAK in the Loktak
Lake area and the adjoining Keibul Lamjao National Park
of Bishnupur District, located south of Imphal, between
April 11 and 21, 2009. The 10-day offensive resulted in
the killing of 12 militants, the neutralisation of five
camps, and the recovery of 10 weapons. Six months later,
another CI Operation, Thunderbolt, was launched
by troops in the northern side of the Loktak Lake at Yangoi
Maril Pat under Wangoi Police Station of Imphal West District,
in the first week of November 2009. While a suspected
PREPAK cadre was shot dead, three hideouts belonging to
different militant groups operating in the Valley were
neutralised in the operation.
The Manipur
Police has 627 Policemen per 100,000 population, a ratio
that is dramatically higher than Assam (176), and the
national average, at 125. Nevertheless, the State Government
plans to recruit more Policemen, and the Manipur Cabinet
has taken a decision to induct 1,600 Police Commandos,
in addition to the existing 1,600 Commandos who are currently
deployed in the Valley Districts of Imphal East, Imphal
West, Bishnupur and Thoubal. The new batch of Police Commandos
is to be deployed in the Hill Districts, in order to cover
the entire State with this trained ‘strike force’. A Commando
post and an India Reserve Battalion post have been opened
at Ukhrul and Senapati, respectively, two of the worst
affected Districts in the State. The Cabinet has also
agreed to add one Company each to the existing six battalions
of the Manipur Rifles. Further, the Government has reportedly
decided to recruit 2,400 Police Constables for deployment
in the Armed Reserve in all Districts, excluding Imphal
West. It has also decided to recruit Village Defence Forces
to assist the Police in the four Valley Districts. The
Police have, at best, played a marginal role in countering
the insurgency in the State.
Despite
the overwhelming and augmenting availability of Police
in the State and a reduction in violence during 2009,
it remains the case that the State lacks the political
will to confront the insurgents on a sustained basis,
within the framework of a coherent strategy. While there
have been some positive developments, there is little
to suggest any fundamental transformation in the orientation
of the State’s political leadership and Government, or
in the dynamics of the multiple conflicts in the State.
|
Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November
9-15,
2009
|
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
Jammu and Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
9
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
Tripura
|
8
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
7
|
Orissa
|
4
|
3
|
0
|
7
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
West Bengal
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
16
|
3
|
23
|
42
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
FATA
|
1
|
36
|
133
|
170
|
NWFP
|
59
|
21
|
45
|
125
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
61
|
57
|
178
|
296
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Government
to use UAVs to flush out Maoists from their
hideouts: The Government will for
the first time use unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) to detect Maoist hideouts in dense forests
and hilly terrain and monitor the movement of
the insurgents to help ground forces carry out
precision attacks. The UAVs, with in-built camera
and well-equipped data and video link, will
gather and record information which will be
shared among Security Forces engaged in anti-Maoist
operations, especially in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Orissa, Maharashtra and West Bengal. Trials
of these UAVs, developed by the Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd (HAL), were recently conducted in Hisar
and Delhi while more trials will be conducted
in the forests of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand
soon. "We are satisfied with the UAV trials
in Hisar and Delhi. If we are satisfied with
the next stage of trials, we will take the help
of UAVs in our operations against Naxals [Maoists],''
an unnamed Union Home Ministry official said.
The UAVs also provide flexible surveillance
and reconnaissance capability with external
payload, including weapons capability. "Since
Maoists keep changing their movements, deployment
of UAVs will certainly be an advantage for security
forces,'' the official added. The anti-Maoist
plan also includes INR 7,300 crore package for
undertaking developmental works in areas cleared
off the left-wing extremists, a report indicated.
Times
of India, November 16,
2009.
Maoist insurgency
could affect investment climate, warns FICCI
report: Recognising
that the Maoist insurgency-related violence
could cripple India as a growing economic power,
the corporate sector has proposed deeper international
cooperation and private sector involvement in
securing domestic and international borders.
The Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (FICCI) taskforce report on national
security and terrorism released on November
9, 2009 stressed on strengthening the Intelligence
Bureau and preventing its misuse for political
ends, developing human intelligence, revamping
coastal security and involving the private sector
in fighting terrorism.
The
Maoists may pose a graver threat to India's
economic power, potentially more damaging to
Indian companies, foreign investors and the
state than pollution, crumbling infrastructure
or political gridlock, the report said. "The
growing Maoist insurgency over large swathes
of the mineral-rich countryside could soon hurt
some industrial investment plans. Just when
India needs to ramp up its industrial machine
to lock in growth and when foreign companies
are joining the party -- Naxalites are clashing
with mining and steel companies essential to
India's long-term success,'' the report said.
There was growing concern over the widening
reach of Maoists as they operated in 30% of
India, up from 9% in 2002, the report said.
The terror groups have already begun operating
on the edge of industrialised Maharashtra. "They
(Naxalites) are planning to penetrate India's
major cities, and are looking to encircle urban
centres, find sympathy among students and the
unemployed and create armed, secret, self-defence
squads that will execute orders,'' it added.
The
report suggested that a vulnerability assessment
be done and investments made in foolproof security.
Outlining implications for India's economic
growth, the report said such attacks were sending
a signal that India was not in control of its
territory and the "investment climate'' was
worsening. The other reason for sounding the
alarm stems from the increasingly close proximity
between the corporate world and the forest domain
of the Maoists. Times
of India, November 10,
2009.
PAKISTAN
133
militants and 36 soldiers among 170 persons
killed during the week in FATA: 18 militants
were killed as fighter jets targeted Taliban
hideouts in the Orakzai Agency, a private TV
channel reported on November 15. The bombings
also destroyed 10 Taliban hideouts in the Ghaljo,
Dabori and Mamozai areas of upper Orakzai Agency.
Separately, five militants were killed in the
ongoing Operation Rah-e-Nijat in the
South Waziristan Agency on November 15. The
Security Forces (SFs) claimed killing five militants
in Ahmadwam village on the Jandola-Sararogha
Road. In addition, the SFs on November 15 launched
a counter-offensive after the militants attacked
checkpoints in various areas of Khar subdivision
and killed a tribesman in the Mamond sub-division
of Bajaur Agency.
The
SFs killed seven Taliban militants during Operation
Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan, the Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement
on November 14. It said the SFs cleared the
area around Madike, located two kilometres northeast
of Ahmed Wam, and also secured an important
height, Point 1663, at Parmonkai Roghzai. Separately,
seven militants were killed and a Taliban ammunition
depot destroyed as fighter jets pounded suspected
Taliban hideouts in the Orakzai Agency on November
14.
Six
militants and two soldiers were killed in South
Waziristan Agency, an ISPR press release said
on November 13. Two soldiers were killed and
an equal number were wounded during an encounter
with the militants at Ahmed Wam. In addition,
one militant was killed and several others sustained
injuries when Pakistan Air Force fighters bombarded
suspected hideouts of the militants in Kurram
Agency on November 13. Militants fleeing the
operation in South Waziristan Agency had reportedly
been hiding in the Kurram and Orakzai Agency.
17
soldiers were killed in stiff resistance to
Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan
Agency by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
on November 12. This is the highest death toll
for the military since operations were launched
on October 17, security officials said. At least
15 soldiers were killed in clashes while a roadside
bomb blast killed two soldiers in the Sararogha
area further east. The ISPR earlier said that
five soldiers and 22 militants were killed in
the last 24 hours of the offensive. But the
Army and security officials in the area told
AFP that the military death toll was 17. An
unnamed official also said the clashes included
face-to-face fighting.
A
landmine blast and ambush killed 10 SF personnel
in the Mohmand Agency on November 11. "Eight
soldiers were martyred and two were wounded
when their vehicle hit a landmine buried on
the roadside… The soldiers were on a routine
patrol. The landmine was buried by the militants.
The explosion damaged the pick-up," Frontier
Corps spokesman Major Fazalur Rehman said. In
addition, two paramilitary personnel were killed
and eight others reported missing after Taliban
militants attacked their convoy at Ghanam Shah.
Two bodies were recovered after the ambush and
10 militants killed after attack helicopters
shelled suspected Taliban hideouts in the Bai
Zai area. Separately, seven Taliban militants
were killed and two soldiers wounded in the
Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan
Agency, an ISPR statement said on November 11.
"An intense gunbattle took place at the
recently-established checkpost at Fort Knoll,
where seven terrorists were killed and two soldiers,
including an officer injured," it said.
In addition, five suspected militants were killed
when helicopter gunships targeted the hideouts
of Taliban in the mountainous area of lower
Orakzai Agency on November 11. Officials said
that at least six camps and hideouts of the
Taliban were completely destroyed in the air
strike in Sultanzai area in the evening. Security
Forces on November 11 also killed three militants
and seized a huge quantity of arms and ammunition
in the Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency. Two
militants were killed in an encounter with the
SFs in the Mamond sub-division while four personnel
of the Bajaur Levies sustained injuries in a
remote controlled bomb blast in the Nawagai
sub-division of Bajaur Agency on November 11.
The
Army on November 10 claimed killing nine more
militants to raise the Taliban death tally to
492 since the launch of the Operation Rah-e-Nijat
in South Waziristan Agency on October 17.
Among the nine slain militants, the Army said
five were killed in the north of Ladha and four
others were killed in the Tauda Cheena and Fort
Knoll areas of Makeen. Separately, five militants
were killed and seven injured on November 10
when fighter jets bombed Taliban hideouts in
Ghalju, Khawga Rehri and other parts Orakzai
Agency. In addition, five militants were killed
in an exchange of fire with the SFs after attacks
on the base camp of the Frontier Crops and check-posts
in the Bajaur Agency on November 10.
The
SFs fully secured the Shakai-Ladha road and
started patrolling the Kaniguram-Ladha axis
as eight militants and four soldiers died in
clashes in South Waziristan on the 24th
day of Operation Rah-e-Nijat on November
9. A local source said four soldiers died in
a roadside bomb blast in the Makeen area. However,
the Army said militants fired several rockets
at a security post in the Makeen area, killing
four soldiers and injuring another. Eight militants
were also killed in retaliatory action by the
troops, said an ISPR statement. Separately,
eight suspected militants were killed and several
others injured as military planes targeted their
positions in the Kurram Agency on November 9.
According to sources, the areas which came under
the air attack included Chinarak, Spairkot and
Ormigai in the east of Parachinar. A vehicle
carrying militants was hit in Khwaidatkhel,
leaving eight occupants dead. In addition, three
SF personnel and two militants were killed and
a soldier sustained injuries in a bomb blast
and firing incidents in different areas of Bajaur
Agency on November 9. Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, November 10-16,
2009.
59
civilians, 21 soldiers and 45 militants killed
during the week in NWFP: 12
militants were killed in clashes with the Security
Forces (SFs) in Karakar and Shamozai Gharai
while 14 bodies were found dumped in Charbagh’s
Gulibagh area in the Swat Valley on November
15, 2009. It was the second consecutive day
that clashes between the SFs and militants were
reported from Swat District. Eight casualties
of militants were reported from Charbagh on
November 14 when the SFs claimed killing them
in a clash during a search operation in the
Ashar Banr and Nala areas. The bodies dumped
in Gulibagh were stated to be of militants.
Separately, volunteers of the Lashkar (militia)
shot dead three veil-clad men near the residence
of an anti-Taliban Nazim in Bazidkhel village
of Peshawar District on November 15.
15
persons, including a Policeman and a three-year-old
child, were killed and 35 others injured when
a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden
vehicle at a Police check-post in Peshawar,
the NWFP capital, Police and hospital staff
said on November 15.
Troops
killed 13 Taliban militants in two separate
clashes in the Swat District, the Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement
on November 14. Five militants were killed after
a group of militants ambushed a military convoy
near Totakan village, while, eight more militants
were killed during a search operation in a forest
near Mangaltan village.
13
people – 10 military personnel and three civilians
– were killed and 60 injured when a suicide
bomber blew himself up in front of the regional
headquarters of the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) in Peshawar on November 13. An Inter-Services
Public Relations (ISPR) statement said the bomber
rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into a military
check-post on Artillery Road at 6:45am (PST),
killing 10 military personnel and three civilians,
and injuring 60. The NWFP Inspector General
of Police, Malik Naveed, said the vehicle was
loaded with around 200 kilograms of explosives.
NWFP Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain told
the media that nine ISI officials were killed,
while three were missing. Hussain also said
that surrounding walls and an entire block of
the agency headquarters were completely destroyed,
while six blocks had been partially damaged.
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility
for the attack.
Ten
persons, including nine security officials,
were killed and 22 injured in a suicide attack
at a Police Station in the Bannu town of Bannu
District on November 13. A Police official said
that a suicide attacker rammed his explosives-laden
vehicle into the Bakkakhel Police Station on
Miranshah Road – killing seven Security Force
personnel, two Frontier Corps troops and a pedestrian.
He also said that 22 people, including 19 Policemen,
were also injured in the suicide attack. The
station is close to the border with North Waziristan.
The bomber reportedly struck 25 minutes after
the suicide attack on the ISI building in provincial
capital Peshawar.
The
SFs in a fresh offensive in the Elum Ghar area
of Buner District killed two local militant
‘commanders’ among four persons on November
13. Sources said militant ‘commanders’ Asmatullah
and Habibur Rehman of the Pir Baba area were
killed in an encounter with the SFs in Elum
Ghar. Habibur Rehman’s wife and a child were
also killed in the clash.
Two
persons were killed and six others were wounded
in separate bomb and hand grenade explosions
at Gul Bagh and Wuch Bazaar in the Hangu town
of Hangu District in the early hours of November
12. Separately, Syed Abul Hassan Jaffry, media
manager of the Iranian consulate in Peshawar,
was shot dead near his home in Gulbarg on November
12-morning. Jaffry was going to his office when
he was shot at point-blank range as he turned
his car towards the Swati Phatak.
34
persons were killed and nearly 100 others sustained
injuries in a powerful car bomb blast at a crowded
intersection in the Charsadda bazaar of Charsadda
District on November 10. Scores of women and
children are reported to have died and dozens
of shops and vehicles were damaged in the suspected
suicide attack. District Police chief Riaz Khan
said the explosives were packed in a car parked
near the Farooq-i-Azam chowk. He said Police
suspected that it was a suicide attack because
limbs and shoes of the suspected bomber had
been found. Shopkeepers and vendors were preparing
to put down the shutters and a large number
of people were waiting at a taxi stand when
the explosion took place. Seven children and
three women were among the dead, Police said.
Three
persons, including a Policeman, were killed
and five others sustained injuries when a suicide
bomber riding an auto-rickshaw blew himself
up at a Police barricade on the Ring Road in
the Latifabad area of Peshawar on November 9.
An eyewitness, Attaullah, told reporters that
Policemen deployed at a barricade near a canal
signalled an auto-rickshaw to stop around 10:00
am (PST). "A man in his early 20s, having
a trimmed beard and wearing brown clothes, came
out of the three-wheeler and detonated explosives
strapped around his vest," he recalled.
Another eyewitness, Sher Afzal, said he saw
two people going towards the barricade in a
rickshaw a few moments before the blast. Investigators
said five to six kilograms of explosives were
used in the incident. This was the second suicide
bombing in Peshawar during the last 24 hours.
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, November 10-16,
2009.
ISI used CIA money to build new Islamabad
headquarters: The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA
has funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars
to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
since the 9/11 attacks, accounting for as much
as one-third of the CIA’s annual budget – reported
an American newspaper, citing current and former
US officials. The Los Angeles Times quoted
officials as saying that the ISI had also "collected
tens of millions of dollars through a classified
CIA programme that pays for the capture or killing
of wanted militants, a clandestine counterpart
to the rewards publicly offered by the State
Department." The officials said the payments
have triggered intense debate within the US
Government, because of "long-standing suspicions
that the ISI continues to help Taliban who undermine
US efforts in Afghanistan and provide sanctuary
to Al Qaeda members in Pakistan." But US
officials have continued the funding because
the ISI’s assistance is considered crucial:
"almost every major terrorist plot this
decade has originated in Pakistan’s tribal belt,
where ISI informant networks are a primary source
of intelligence", said the newspaper.
The
White House National Security Council has "this
debate every year", said a former high-ranking
US intelligence official involved in the discussions.
Despite deep misgivings about the ISI, the official
said, "there was no other game in town".
The payments to Pakistan are authorised under
a covert programme initially approved by former
President George Bush and continued under President
Barack Obama. "The CIA payments are a hidden
stream in a much broader financial flow... the
US has given Pakistan more than $15 billion
over the last eight years in military and civilian
aid," said Los Angeles Times. "The
ISI has used the covert CIA money for a variety
of purposes, including the construction of a
new headquarters in Islamabad... that project
pleased CIA officials because it replaced a
structure considered vulnerable to attack: it
also eased fears that the US money would end
up in the private bank accounts of ISI officials,"
it said. Daily
Times,
November 16, 2009.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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