SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 32, February 24, 2003

INDIA

Northeast Polls: Bullets & Ballots
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

Guns still seem to do most of the talking in the battle of the ballots in India's Northeast. Come election time, the separatist rebel armies in this troubled frontier region jump into the murky world of electoral politics, backing or opposing particular candidates and political parties. Armed to the teeth, insurgent cadres roam about the countryside, mostly in the deep interiors, coercing voters or threatening and intimidating candidates. Their objective: to ensure that candidates of their choice win through, or at least that a government sympathetic to their rivals does not get elected. This is, indeed, ironic since these separatist rebel groups 'reject' the Indian Constitution and, consequently, claim that they do not 'recognize' elections held under the country's constitutional provisions.

Once again, the shadow of insurgency looms large over the elections on Wednesday, February 26, in three of the seven Northeast Indian States - Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya. The voters in these States would elect 60 members each to their respective State legislatures. In Tripura, which shares a porous border with Bangladesh, the outlawed National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) is on a rampage, killing, abducting and intimidating cadres and supporters of the ruling Left Front, led by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM). The NLFT and its offshoot, the Borok Nationalist Council of Tripura (BNCT), are said to be responsible for most of the 42 people killed between January 11 - the day the poll schedule was announced - and February 23.

In Nagaland, contrary to promises of non-interference in the polls by the rebels themselves, as well as recent developments in the peace process [Nagaland: A Very Long War Ends? SAIR 26; The Northeast: Tackling a Rebellion, Quelling a Revolt, SAIR 27], the situation has taken an abrupt nosedive. Rival factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), headed by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM), on one side, and by Shangnyu Shangwang Khaplang (NSCN-K), on the other, are engaged in mutual accusations of election-related violence and coercion. The general charge is that the NSCN-IM cadres are 'openly canvassing' against the ruling Congress and its candidates, while the NSCN-K is supporting the Congress camp. Kughalu Mulatonu, 'Deputy Information Minister' of the NSCN-K, telephoned this writer last week from one of the group's bases in Nagaland to say that NSCN-IM 'kilonsers' (ministers) and cadres were canvassing in favour of the Congress, wearing police uniforms. He also admitted that his cadres ambushed a vehicle carrying a group of NSCN-IM men in the district town of Zunheboto, north of State capital Kohima. One NSCN-IM cadres was killed and another wounded in that attack which, Mulatonu said, took place while the NSCN-IM men were engaged in 'undesirable election activity.'

Rebel groups in Meghalaya, by contrast, appear to be maintaining a relatively low profile thus far. The only direct election-related statement made by a rebel group in this State was by the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) in its February 1 newsletter, which asserted: "Holding the State Assembly elections under the Indian colonial system is rejected by the HNLC, and such an election can be said to be null and void." There are, at this point, no reports of any major interference in the poll process by either the HNLC - which is active in the Khasi and Jaintia hills districts - or the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) - which holds sway in the Garo hills, bordering Bangladesh.

The intrusion of separatist and insurgent groups in the constitutional electoral process is, in large measure, collusive, and is based on a history of declining standards in political leadership in the region as a result of which most political parties, both regional and national, have yielded to the imperatives of expediency to form opportunistic alliances with violent rebel groups to secure some illegitimate electoral advantage. Deals are, consequently, struck on the election eve between political parties and insurgent groups, who lend their muscle and arms to the campaign in return for political patronage in the post election regime. The party that comes to power with such support is naturally bound to follow a policy of relative leniency against the supportive rebel group - at least for some time - creating 'breathing space' for such groups to consolidate their hold and expand their activities.

This time round, the NLFT has been accused of directly backing the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT), an ally of the opposition Congress party in Tripura. Both the NLFT and the INPT share a common ideology and project the same set of grievances - the restoration of the rights and privileges of the tribals in Tripura, who have been reduced to a minority in their own land as a result of waves of migration from Bangladesh. The tribals, at one time a majority in the area, today comprise less than 30 per cent of Tripura's 3.2 million population. An examination of the INPT's emergence easily exposes its roots and support base. It was formed early last year with the merger of three major tribal forces - the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), the one-time rebel group that bid adieu to arms with the signing of the Tripura Accord in 1988; the Tripura Upajati Yuba Samity (TUJS), an influential tribal political party; and the Indigenous People's Front of Tripura (IPFT). Significantly, TNV supreme Bijoy Kumar Hrangkhawl, a dreaded former guerrilla leader who signed the 1988 peace agreement, is the president of the INPT. He is a sitting member of the Tripura Assembly and is seeking re-election this time from the Kulai constituency in the insurgent-infested Dholai district. Both the TUJS and the TNV had earlier been allies of the Congress, and this alliance shifted to a relationship with the INPT when the three forces merged under its banner.

The IPFT emerged as a major tribal force in Tripura during the April 2000 elections to the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC). On that occasion, the IPFT ousted the ruling CPM from power in rural Tripura for the first time in decades, a victory that was projected as the first major step in tribal resurgence in the State. The CPM had, at that time, accused the IPFT of securing its victory as a result of the direct backing of the insurgent NLFT. This, precisely, is the charge that the CPM now levels against the IPFT-Congress combine.

The levels of violence in Nagaland are visibly lower as compared to Tripura, but the situation on the ground is indeed messy. NSCN-IM leaders Swu and Muivah had stated during their visit to New Delhi in January, that their organization would neither participate in, nor obstruct, the election process in Nagaland. Similar views were echoed by NSCN-IM leaders based in the State. A.K.Lungaleng, an NSCN-IM leader, had declared: "We are not getting involved in the elections, but we would like to tell the electorate to vote in a free and fair manner and urge political parties not to indulge in electoral malpractice." Despite this, however, allegations of the rebel group engaging in coercive actions are flowing thick and fast. Nagaland Chief Minister S.C. Jamir has claimed that the NSCN-IM cadres were intimidating voters and directing them to defeat the Congress. The Congress party has accused Lt. Gen. (Retd) R. V. Kulkarni, head of the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee in Nagaland, of remaining a silent spectator to the NSCN-IM's activities.

The situation is complicated further by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is desperately trying to make an entry into the Nagaland Assembly (Nagaland has a 95 per cent Christian population). These leaders have been arguing that since the NSCN-IM wants the 'corrupt Congress' out of the State, the rebel group was bound to 'support us'. The BJP has been trying to take credit for increased momentum of the Naga peace process under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, to buttress its case. Such a thinly veiled demand for support from the NSCN-IM by a major political party on the eve of the elections is certainly a disturbing development. The NSCN-IM's official position, of course, remains that it will not be involved in the Nagaland elections in any way. However, in view of the fact that a solution to the longstanding Naga problem is now being approached at great speed, the NSCN-IM would obviously be keen to see that a government which is soft towards them assumes power in Nagaland. The Congress - and Jamir in particular - is not likely to give the NSCN-IM the 'kid gloves' treatment if it returns to power once again. As of now, consequently, Jamir's assurance that he was ready to relinquish power for the sake of peace in Nagaland has not cut much ice with the NSCN-IM. Moreover, Jamir's persistent demand that not just the NSCN-IM, but all other Naga rebel factions must be involved in the peace process for any lasting solution to be reached, is a position acutely disliked by the NSCN-IM. The NSCN-IM considers itself the 'sole representative' of the Naga people, and claims a popular mandate to secure an acceptable peace deal with New Delhi. The poll-eve heat in Nagaland is, consequently, just the beginning of more trouble in hand.

NEPAL

Hope in an Uncertain Peace
Guest Writer: Deepak Thapa
Kathmandu-based Journalist and Editor

February 13th is a date etched into the Nepali national consciousness. This is the day the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) started their 'people's war' seven years ago, to establish a 'communist republic'. The conflict has already cost more than 7000 lives. According to the plan of action announced by the Maoists late last December, February 13th this year was to be the beginning of a two-day shutdown, itself preceded by a 'people's resistance campaign' for two weeks. The shutdown would also have signaled the beginning of an 'indefinite' forced closure of schools by the students' wing of the Maoists. Fortunately for the country, as a result of a ceasefire announced between the government and the rebels on January 29, the protests were called off and things are moving towards normalcy in the country.

There are, however, many hurdles before true normalcy can return to Nepal. The major one is building trust among the government, the parliamentary parties and the Maoists. The present truce was possible because the government agreed to the rebel's key conditions that the Interpol 'red corner' notice be withdrawn along with the terrorist tag and the bounty on the heads of top Maoist leaders. There have been no major developments since then apart from the announcement of a team by the Maoists to negotiate their demands for a roundtable conference, an interim government and a constituent assembly. That the present team consists of those from the highest echelons of the CPN (Maoist) has been viewed as an indication that the Maoists are more serious this time around than during the earlier ceasefire in 2001. The government is yet to respond to the last Maoist overture, arguing that it is awaiting formal intimation of the same from the rebel side.

Some confidence-building measures are also being explored, despite occasional bouts of mutual accusation. The Maoists are demanding that the anti-terrorist law be withdrawn and their supporters released by the government as a step towards creating a 'trustworthy' atmosphere for the talks to proceed. Accordingly, a number of those jailed for Maoist-related offences have been released (although in some cases, they have subsequently been re-arrested as soon as they stepped out of jail). After the Defence Ministry reported that extortion was still continuing in the countryside, the CPN (Maoist) chairman, Prachanda, released a statement instructing his cadre to desist from 'all forms of fund-raising except voluntary donations until further notice'. The two sides are also to work on a code of conduct during the negotiations in order to avoid any unpleasantness that could disrupt talks.

The third force in the unfolding political equation, the parliamentary parties, have suddenly found themselves in danger of becoming irrelevant since the center stage is presently occupied by the Maoists and a government led indirectly by the King. Given the unexpectedness of the ceasefire, the parties, while welcoming it, have decried the fact that the negotiations leading to it were not 'transparent'. Some leaders even expressed suspicion that some secret understanding may have been reached between the Maoists and the King.

The Maoist leadership has been at pains to reiterate that everything is above board. A couple of rebel leaders are presently doing the rounds in Kathmandu, meeting leaders of political parties to convince them that the proposed roundtable conference would not proceed without the participation of the parliamentary parties. In his statement to the Press on the eve of the anniversary of the February 13 commencement of the 'people's war', CPN (Maoist) chairman, Prachanda, reiterated: "Rather than viewing the [upcoming] talks as between the establishment and our party, it should form part of the dialogue process among all political parties, the intelligentsia and the common people." King Gyanendra also referred to the need to address the common distrust in his annual message to the nation on the occasion of Democracy Day on February 19, when he appealed upon all to stop 'blaming and doubting each other'.

For the moment, however, the biggest stumbling block seems to be the distance between the political parties and the government that was appointed by the King in October, after the democratically elected Prime Minister was ousted for 'incompetence'. The Prime Minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, has repeatedly called for an understanding between the two sides, but his offers have, so far, been in vain. A recent all-party meeting called by the Prime Minister to discuss the Maoist issue was boycotted by all the seven parties represented in the last parliament that was dissolved in May last year. Even Chand's own party, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), preferred to opt out.

This show of solidarity among the political parties is, however, quite misleading when it comes to concerted action. Of the seven parties, three have been treated as pariahs by the other four. Two of the former, the RPP and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party, have been shunned because the Prime Minister and his deputy are from those parties respectively; the third, the Nepali Congress (Democratic) because it was responsible for the dissolution of the parliament which has ultimately led to state power being concentrated in the hands of the King. The remaining four, which includes the two largest, the Nepali Congress and the CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist), have finally agreed to demand the restoration of the dissolved parliament and are preparing to launch an agitation, though the strategy and the timing are still to be decided.

Meanwhile, in the countryside, the Maoists have begun holding mass meetings openly, and are also approaching various political parties for roundtables at the district level. Unlike previous occasions, the security forces have, however, not let down their guard. Security in Kathmandu is still tight, checkpoints at highways are still in place, and some outlying towns are still under nighttime curfew. The situation remains in a flux at present, and no one knows if the ceasefire will hold at all. But it is altogether clear where public opinion lies - in the hope that the rather muted celebrations on 13 February, the seventh anniversary of the 'people's war', should also be the last.

DUBAI	INDIA

Extradition: Pressure Works, but just a little
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

The extended and, till the recent past, largely fruitless, saga of efforts to secure the extradition of Indian crime lords and terrorists operating out of Dubai appears, tentatively, to have entered a new phase under escalating Indian and international pressure. On February 19, Dubai authorities decided to deport Iqbal Kaskar, younger brother of the Karachi-based underworld kingpin Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, and the another Dawood associate and gangster, Ejaz Pathan, to India. Iqbal Kaskar is a relative lightweight in the crime family with 'only' six cases of murder and attempt to murder pending against him in India. Ejaz Pathan, on the other hand, has an extended criminal record, with an Interpol red corner notice against him, and charges of involvement in the serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in 1993, in which 257 persons lost their lives.

Relations between India and Dubai have come under increasing strain since early December 2002, when authorities in Dubai arrested Anees Kaskar Ibrahim - another of Dawood's brothers and a prime accused in the Mumbai Bomb Blasts case. Dubai acutely embarrassed UAE authorities, who were negotiating Anees' extradition to India under an Interpol red corner notice, by abruptly releasing and deporting the long-time fugitive to Pakistan [Dubai-Pakistan: The Fellow Travellers of Terrorism, SAIR 1.22]. It has been clear for some time now that, while the UAE authorities are eager to cooperate with India on the extradition of terrorists and criminals operating from the Emirates, Dubai has inclined to resist such moves. Within the loose federal structure of the UAE, little could apparently be done to hold Dubai to international norms and bilateral commitments on extradition with India. Then again, on February 3 this year, Dubai arrested an estimated 110 gangsters of the notorious 'D Company', including two of Dawood's brothers, Noora and Mustaqim, as well as a number of its frontline leaders, raising - and again dashing - expectations in India that these criminals would be extradited to face justice in this country.

These incidents brought Dubai under the glare of international criticism [India-Dubai: The Criminal-Terror Nexus, Again, SAIR 1.30] and cautious Indian sanctions when permission for 12 special flights to Dubai to cater for the annual shopping festival rush was refused by Indian authorities. It is also believed that the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha, may have raised the issue of extradition with authorities in the UAE during a brief stopover in Abu Dhabi on January 28, 2003. There have also been reports of increasing apprehensions in Dubai that the criminal networks that have long operated with impunity from this city-state's soil could now bring their gang-wars into the region - with the January 19 assassination of Sharad Shetty, one of Dawood's prominent lieutenants, at the India Club in the city setting off alarm bells. The possible loss of the very substantial Indian business in the city has also caused some anxiety in the city-state's trading community.

India has had an extradition treaty with the UAE since 1999, but, so far, has succeeded in securing the extradition of only seven criminals or terrorists - excluding economic offenders, and including Iqbal Kaskar and Ejaz Pathan. This includes Mohammad Altaf, the accused in the Ghatkopar bus blast at Mumbai, who was extradited on January 26, 2003; Imran Rahman Khan, another accused in the same case, extradited on January 9; Muthapa Rai and Raju Anadkad, members of the 'D Company', extradited on May 30, 2002; and Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Malik, the main accused in the shootout near the American Centre at Kolkata, extradited on February 9, 2002.

The cumulative impact of these extraditions is negligible. The 'big fish' of the 'D Company' have easily moved from their headquarters in Karachi to and through Dubai on a regular basis for the past two decades. The latest extraditions suggest that this ease of movement may, in some measure, be curtailed by the uncertainty of possible arrest and deportation to India, and this may have some dampening impact on the movement of the top leadership of this organised criminal-terrorist operation. The broad nature of the operations of this entity, however, would not be affected until fundamental structural changes occurred in the character of the regime in Dubai, which has long profited from a collusive arrangement with a wide range of criminal operations and loose, unregulated financial and trade transactions that have made this port city a haven for the illegal international movement of tainted money and contraband.

Number of seats, polling stations, candidates and voters in
Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura

Terrorism related casualties in Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura between
January 11* and February 23, 2003