South Asia Terrorism Portal
Governance by Hysteria Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP
Another frenetic cycle has ended, not with a bang, but a whimper. There is a pattern here: every few months – sometimes less – Indian authorities drum up hysteria about a new and imminent catastrophe that, we are led to believe, the Khalistanis are preparing to inflict on the evidently fragile Indian state. Each time around, little happens. However, very quickly, another edition of the same frenetic cycle is repeated. Is it, indeed, the case that Indian intelligence is invariably so far off the mark? Or are we witness to nothing more than cynical political manipulation?
In the wake of the deaths of three prominent Khalistani activists over just 45 days between May 6 and June 18, 2023, wild claims have been made both by the Khalistanis and Hindutva nationalists that these – including the death in a Birmingham Hospital, apparently by cancer, of Avtar Singh Khanda, on June 15, 2023 – were ‘hits’ by India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). Interestingly, the Khalistan Freedom Rally on July 8 focused on the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar alone, surprisingly leaving out Khanda and Paramjit Singh Panjawar. Panjwar was gunned down in Lahore, Pakistan, on May 6, 2023, while Nijjar was killed outside the Nanak Sikh Gurudwara in Surrey, of which he was President, on June 18.
The Khalistan Freedom Rally was announced through near-identical posters in Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), United States and Australia, with the difference that, in each country, the photographs of the diplomats labelled ‘Shaheed Nijjar’s killers’ were changed to include the heads and deputy chiefs of mission in each country. Garish, violent, images and the slogan, “Kill India”, featured prominently in the announcements. There has been an electronic and social media storm in India since the announcement, with dire assessments of the resurgence of the Khalistan movement among the global Sikh Diaspora. The Indian diplomatic response was also uncharacteristically vigorous, perhaps in view of the arson attack at the San Francisco Consulate on July 2. Minister for External Affairs, S. Jaishankar stated on July 6, 2023, “The issue of these posters is very serious. It involves inciting violence against our diplomats, Embassies, and Consulates, along with issuing threats.” Further, he singled out Canada, noting, “we have seen statements from Prime Minister Trudeau. However, the issue is not about freedom of expression; the issue is of its misuse, which provides an opportunity for terrorist elements or separatist elements to thrive and gain support.” Indeed, it is questionable whether the contents of the posters for the Khalistan Freedom Rally would come under freedom of speech protection, given the specific targeting of named Indian diplomats, the false charges of murder against them and the exhortation alongside to “Kill India.”.
The eventual response to the Khalistan Freedom Rally was strikingly underwhelming. With the exception of a car rally from Walton to Surrey in Canada, comprising over a hundred vehicles, the demonstrations were limited to no more than a few scores of individuals at each venue. The Walton-Surrey cavalcade also appears to have produced little more than a single participant per vehicle, with a fairly tiny gatherings eventually protesting outside the Indian Consulate at Vancouver and the High Commission at Toronto. The gathering outside the Indian Embassy at Melbourne was estimated, at peak, by local eyewitnesses at under 150 protestors, matched by a comparable number of Indian flag-waving opponents across the street. The London and San Francisco rallies were comparable – possibly smaller. The reality that the Khalistanis among the Sikh Diaspora are a mere nuisance, rather than a major threat, was more than evident.
It is useful to recall here that The Bloom Review, published in the UK on April 26, 2023, emphasised the incitement of violence and engagement in intimidation was essentially limited to a small but extremely vocal group who were "hijacking" the Sikh faith and pushing a subversive pro-Khalistan narrative. The Review described the pro-Khalistan minority of British Sikhs as “aggressive, subversive and sectarian” and mentioned that there were possible overlaps between terrorist groups and current Sikh political groups in the UK. The descriptive applies substantially to Khalistani groups in other countries as well, where they tend to exercise far greater influence than their numbers could justify, principally as a result of their aggression and violent suppression of voices that do not accept their distorted creed.
Nevertheless, the violence and stridency of the discourse on the Indian electronic media and the wider social media need separate explanation. The coarseness of the exchanges on social media are often simply dismissed as the nature of the beast, but this is not so. The discourse is being fed; the frenzies are coordinated, orchestrated. Prominent media houses receive regular feeds of evident plants that give direction to, and fuel the fire of, the abusive agitations of the choreographed anti-Khalistan campaigns in the social media. This would be understandable if there was a clear strategic direction in evidence, but these campaigns have, certainly since the London Referendum 2020 rally, only been counter-productive from an Indian perspective, giving increasing prominence to a minuscule Khalistani element in the Diaspora, and fuelling ever increasing excesses of language and, occasionally, action.
It is important to recognize that exaggerating the Khalistani threat serves extremists on both sides: the Khalistanis gain by securing attention and projecting an image far out of proportion to their actual capacities and support base, and this, in turn, helps Hindutva nationalists create anxieties about the ‘growing threat’ to national security and the ever-terrorised (albeit overwhelming) Hindu majority in India.
It is, moreover, clear that the language, idiom and imagery of the Khalistani Diaspora protests is gradually feeding into the Indian establishment’s interests, and is also contributing to the diminution of the global prestige of the larger Sikh community. Further, the more raucous and disruptive these elements in the Diaspora become, the more will this work to the advantage of the ruling establishment in India, particularly on three specific grounds:
Henry Adams observed, in the early 20th Century, “Politics, as a practice, whatever its professions, has always been the systematic organization of hatreds.” This dictum has been unashamedly embraced with great enthusiasm by contemporary politicians across the world, prominently including the present Indian leadership. There are, nevertheless, implicit dangers here, both of over-reaction and under-reaction. The Indian state cannot be indifferent to the activities of the Khalistani Diaspora, especially since these have been increasingly associated with the activities of transnational criminal gangs and in terrorist actions on Indian soil. On the other hand, any over-reaction, even through visible proxies in the media and organised trolls on social media, can only undermine the Indian state’s legitimacy standing in the international community. There is, however, evident conflict here between the interests of the state – which demand restraint and statesmanship – and the interests of the ruling party, which relies on an unconstrained polarizing discourse for political and electoral mobilization.
Of the four countries where mobilization for the Khalistan Freedom Rally was attempted on July 8, Canada presents the greatest and most persistent difficulties. There has been overwhelming and cumulative evidence – certainly since the intentionally botched run up to and investigations into the IC 182 Kanishka bombing of 1985, the largest terrorist incident in Canada till date, and the largest terrorist incident in the air until 9/11 – of extraordinary political leeway given to the Khalistanis in that country. This includes the persistent neglect of hate speech, open demonstrations of support to Khalistani terrorist groups banned in that country, the participation of leading politicians from the ruling and supporting parties in Khalistani events where such transgressions occur, and dogged foot-dragging by investigative and enforcement agencies in cases involving Khalistani transgressions. Vote bank politics and an alliance with the Jagmeet Singh-led New Democratic Party (NDP) underpin these divergences from civilized behaviour by the present regime led by Justin Trudeau, but these biases have a much deeper history. (Jagmeet Singh is a known Khalistan supporter and India baiter).
Two possible trajectories exist for the Punjabi, particularly Sikh Diaspora, especially in Canada. The first of these is that those who support and represent violent and criminalized Khalistani cabal will be voted out of key positions in Government, as well as in various religious institutions, particularly the Gurudwaras that remain under their control. On the other hand, the possibility of a progressive criminalization of those who oppose the Khalistanis also exists, potentially leading to an escalation of violent confrontations and gang wars in the host country. There are certainly many in Canada, as well as in other Western countries, who have begun to adopt the postures and language that the Khalistanis have, for decades, employed against them.
Western nations have long rued the snakes in others’ backyards. It is time they looked at the snakes in their own manicured gardens.
Assam: Towards peace Afsara Shaheen Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
On July 6, 2023, around 1,182 cadres, belonging to as many as eight Adivasi militant groups from Assam, laid down 304 sophisticated arms and 1,460 rounds of ammunition, at a ceremony held at the Srimanata Shankardeva Kalakshetra at Guwahati in the Kamrup (Metro) District of Assam (The tribal groups indigenous to other states, who were brought into Assam by the British as plantation workers in the early 19th Century). The militants who surrendered belonged to the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), the Amrit Beck faction of AANLA (AANLA-AB), Birsa Commando Force (BCF), Badal Tudu faction of BCF (BCF-BT), Santhal Tiger Force (STF), Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF)/Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA), Chunka Tudu faction of ACMA (ACMA-CT), and the Adivasi People’s Army (APA).
During the event, Assam Chief Minister (CM) Himanta Bishwa Sharma stated,
Sharma also appealed to the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Assam-Independent (ULFA-I), which has long remained outside the peace process, asserting,
The CM also announced a rehabilitation package of INR 400,000 each for the surrendered cadres, and INR 6,000 every month for three years to each of them, to enable them to achieve their goal of self-employment. The CM asked the cadres not to get carried away by any external stimulus and urged them to work with the government for the upliftment of the Adivasi community.
On the same day, July 6, 2023, ACMA held a disbanding ceremony in Gossaigaon in the Kokrajhar District of Assam. Cadres of ACMA, STF and APA gathered to bid farewell to their ‘military’ operations.
Significantly, on September 15, 2022, a tripartite agreement was signed between the Union Government, Assam Government and representatives of the above-mentioned eight Adivasi groups, to end the decades old crisis of Adivasis and tea garden workers in Assam. The July 6, 2023, surrender has resulted out of this agreement. ACMA had signed a Suspension of Operations (SoOs) agreement in 2001; followed by BCF, in 2004; APA, on July 16, 2011, and AANLA, on September 1, 2011. Later, 557 cadres of BCF, 453 cadres of ACMA, 134 cadres of STF, 90 cadres of AANLA, and 70 cadres of APA surrendered at Sarusajai Sports Complex in Guwahati on January 24, 2012. Since then, they had been holding talks without reaching a final agreement.
Later, in May 2023, the Assam Government constituted a 16-member Adivasi Welfare and Development Council in line with the agreement signed between the three sides.
Since the September 15, 2022, agreement, apart from the 1,182 cadres who surrendered on July 6, 2023, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), another 85 cadres of various Adivasi militant groups in Assam have surrendered (data till July 9, 2023). These included 46 cadres of AANLA and 39 of APA. The prominent incidents of surrender include:
June 2, 2023: 39 leaders/cadres of the newly formed Adivasi People's Liberation Army (APLA), including its ‘commander-in-chief’, Sahil Munda, laid down arms before the Security Forces (SFs) in Karbi Anglong District in Assam under ‘Operation Samarpan’. According to an official statement, APLA cadres laid down a total of 31 weapons, including three AK series Rifles, five other rifles, 19 pistols, two grenades and assorted live ammunition. Sahil Munda said his group was a break-away faction of AANLA, with about 125 members, adding, “We moved away from AANLA for personal reasons. After seeing the development in the State under the Himanta Biswa Sarma–led government and how problems of the Adivasi community are being addressed, we have decided to return to the mainstream.”
January 22, 2023: 46 AANLA cadres laid down arms in the Sonitpur District of Assam, including eight pistols, six rifles and ammunition. Former AANLA ‘president’ D. Nayak stated they surrendered in the belief that the government would protect the rights of the tribals in tea estates, and ensure their development in line with the peace agreement signed on September 15, 2022.
During this period (September 15, 2022-July 7, 2023) SFs arrested 16 cadres of various Adivasi militant groups. The arrested cadres belonged to APLA (14) and AANLA (two). The arrests included:
November 16, 2022: Police arrested nine APLA cadres from the Golaghat and Karbi Anglong Districts of Assam. G.P. Singh, Special Director General of Police (DGP), Assam, disclosed, “Assam police has neutralised a newly formed insurgent group APLA from Golaghat and Karbi Anglong area in less than four days. Nine cadres have been detained and weapons seized.”
Significantly, the Government of India has signed several agreements over the past three years to end extremism and bring lasting peace to the northeastern states. The principal agreements with Assam-based groups include:
During the signing of the September 15, 2022, agreement, Union Home Minister (UHM) Amit Shah had stated that the Central Government had "decided that, before 2024, all border disputes between the North Eastern states and all disputes related to armed groups will be resolved." Further, he observed, “this Adivasi agreement will prove to be another important milestone in the direction of making North-East extremism-free by 2025.”
While the UHM is hopeful, concerns remain.
On February 1, 2023, a new militant outfit, the Boro Liberation Army (BLA), emerged in the Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) of Assam, demanding a separate ‘Bodoland’ state. The core members of the outfit include B. Dwidengra (‘president’), B. Rwngwra (‘vice president’), B. Ankhlai (‘army chief’) and B. Bwkhangsa (‘general secretary’). This development demonstrated that the long-standing demands of a separate State of Bodoland and an autonomous state in the Hill Districts, which was supposed to have been finally resolved by the Bodo and Karbi Accords, linger on.
Similarly, another Adivasi outfit, APLA, had also emerged even before the agreements with the eight Adivasi outfits were implemented on ground.
The overall security situation in Assam has improved considerably over the years, and these agreements have played an important role in this recovery. However, the trend of government signing agreements with known groups and the subsequent emergence of new or splinter groups is yet to be tackled, and needs to be addressed effectively.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia July 3-9, 2023
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
NS
Total
AFGHANISTAN
BANGLADESH
CHT
INDIA
Manipur
India (Total)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
PAKISTAN (Total)
Total (South Asia)
60 per cent of girls and 46 per cent of boys of primary school age are currently not getting any level of education in Afghanistan, reports UNICEF: On July 6, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) said in a report that 60 per cent of girls and 46 per cent of boys of primary school age are currently not getting any level of education in Afghanistan. UNICEF said that Japan has provided USD 10 million to support the "continuity of children's learning amidst a learning crisis in Afghanistan." Tolo News, July 8, 2023.
US President Joe Biden's comments on Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is 'divorced from reality', says US official Michael McCaul: The chairman of the United States (US) House Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael McCaul, responding to US President Joe Biden's recent statement regarding Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, said that it is completely divorced from reality for Biden to claim that Al-Qaeda is no longer operating in Afghanistan or that the Taliban has somehow become our national security partner in the region. Tolo News, July 7, 2023.
UN Framework for Afghanistan prioritizes women, minorities and IDPs, says deputy spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Farhan Haq: At a press briefing on July 3, the deputy spokesperson for the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), Farhan Haq, said that the UN will prioritize issues relating to women and girls, ethnic and religious minorities, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan. The framework focuses on three complementary and mutually reinforcing joint priorities: sustaining essential services; economic opportunities and resilient livelihoods; and social cohesion, inclusion, gender equality, human rights, and the rule of law, he added. Tolo News, July 6, 2023.
Six persons killed in separate incidents in Rohingya camps of Cox's Bazar District: Five Rohingya men were shot dead on July 7, in what Police said was a gunfight between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) in a camp in Balukhali in Ukhiya sub-District of Cox's Bazar District. Four of the victims are Anwar Hossain, Muhammad Hamim, Nazibullah, and Nurul Amin, the other victim had not been identified yet. In another incident at the same camp, Police recovered the body of a man named Sanaullah. According to Police and Rohingya leaders, at least 57 Rohingyas, including 17 community leaders and 11 ARSA operatives, got killed in clashes over the last six months. The Daily Star, July 8, 2023.
AQIS Dawah unit 'chief' arrested in Dhaka city: Ikramul Haque alias Milan alias Abu Talha alias Mawlana Sabet, who was arrested on May 30 from Madartek area in Dhaka city on charges of militancy, was 'chief' of Dawah unit of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). The law enforcers claim that Ikramul was involved with militant activities in India. He had the passport of India and his wife had the Aadhaar Card of India. He is close with Osman Gani alias Abu Imran, the top leader of Ansar Al Islam in Bangladesh. Prothomalo, July 8, 2023.
UK provides £11.6 million aid for Rohingya and locals hit by disasters: On July 3, the United Kingdom (UK) government donated £11.6 million (about USD 15 million) to help the Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar District and locals who were impacted by disasters across the nation. The British High Commission in Dhaka said that this aid will provide food, water, and sanitation to Rohingya refugees and child protection services to refugees and neighbouring host communities. Anadolu Ajansi, July 4, 2023.
'Kill India' rally organised by Khalistani groups held in Canada, UK, Australias and US: A 'Kill India' rally organised by pro-Khalistan groups was held outside the Indian High Commission in London in United Kingdom (UK) on July 8, with a turnout of 35-40 participants in the demonstration. The rally used controversial posters inciting violence with images of the High Commissioner of India, to UK, Vikram Doraiswami and Shashank Vikram, Consul General of India in Birmingham, UK, blaming them for the killing of Khalistani leader, namely, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, who was shot dead on June 19, 2023.
On July 8, a pro-Khalistan rally took place in St Kilda Road in Melbourne in Australia, with approximately 10-15 protestors displaying 'Kill India' posters targeting the High Commissioner of India, Manpreet Vohra, and the Consulate General of India in Melbourne, Sushil Kumar.
Around 250 pro-Khalistani elements, supported by the pro-Khalistani group Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), gathered outside the Indian consulate in Toronto in Canada on July 8, after 'Kill India' posters attributed to the slain Khalistani 'chief' Hardeep Singh Nijjar and targeting senior Indian envoys in Canada were circulated online. The Hindu, The Australia Today, News 18, Hindustan Times, July 9, 2023.
Around 1,100 cadres of five Adivasi militant groups surrender in Assam: 'On July 6, around 1,100 cadres, belonging to as many as five Adivasi militant groups from Assam laid down 304 sophisticated arms and 1460 rounds of ammunition at a ceremony in Guwahati in Kamrup (Metro) District in Assam. The militants who surrendered belonged to All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), Birsa Commando Force (BCF), Santhal Tiger Force (STF), Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) also known as Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA) and Adivasi People's Army (APA).Times of India, July 7, 2023.
US Government asks court to deny 26/11 mastermind Tahawwur Rana's plea against extradition to India: 'On July 6, the United States (US) Government led by President Joe Biden urged a court in California to deny the writ of habeas corpus filed by Pakistani-origin Canadian businessman Tahawwur Rana and reiterated that he be extradited to India where he is sought for his involvement in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks (26/11). In May a US court approved Rana's extradition to India, who is currently detained at the Metropolitan Detention Centre in Los Angeles. The Economic Times, July 7, 2023.
LeJ threatens to attack churches and Christians over Sweden Quran incident: The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) announced on July 2 that it will attack Christians and churches in Pakistan in retaliation for the Quran burning incident in Sweden. The outfit said it will also initiate suicide bombings targeting members of the minority in Pakistan. It added that it will work with like-minded terror groups in the region to attack the Christian community to avenge the Quran incident that took place in Sweden on Eid. In a statement, LeJ 'spokesperson' Naseer Raisani threatened that, "no Church or a Christian will remain safe in Pakistan." Daiji World News, July 5, 2023.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
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