South Asia Terrorism Portal
Assam: ULFA-I's Battle of Perceptions Giriraj Bhattacharjee Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On May 17, 2022, the Assam Police alerted two leading Public Sector Undertakings (PSU)s engaged in Oil and Gas exploration and refining - Oil India Limited (OIL) and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) - to strengthen the security of their installations and personnel after receiving intelligence about a possible threat from the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I).
An unnamed senior Police official stated,
Conspicuously, a year earlier, on May 14, 2021, ULFA-I had demanded that 95 percent of jobs in ONGC, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), and OIL, be reserved for the locals of Assam. It also demanded that INR 50 million from each of these companies be used for infrastructure development in the State and that these companies provide Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) to the rural areas through pipelines.
Significantly, in the past (more frequently when ULFA was united) they targeted pipelines in remote locations and abducted officials. In the most recent incident, on April 21, 2021, ULFA-I militants abducted a Junior engineer, Ritul Saikia, and two of his colleagues – M.M. Gogoi and Alokesh Saikia – from the ONGC rig site at Lakwa in Sivasagar District. On April 24, 2021, M.M. Gogoi and Alokesh Saikia were rescued in a joint operation involving the army, the Assam Rifles, Nagaland police, and village guards, from near the India-Myanmar border in the Mon District of Nagaland. Later, on May 22, 2021, ULFA-I released Ritul Saikia.
According to partial Data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the last incident of attack on an oil installation was on May 25, 2017. On that day, one person was killed in an explosion at an OIL pipeline, around 500 meters from the oil collecting station at Dikom in Dibrugarh District. Later, ULFA-I claimed it had carried out the blast and identified the deceased as one of its cadres, Bobby Dohatia aka Palash Asom.
Meanwhile, on May 14, 2022, Arunodoy Asom, ‘secretary’ of ULFA-I's ‘publicity wing,’ asked Assam’s Labour and Employment Minister, Sanjoy Kishan, to apologize for his comments on ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah and on the death of ULFA-I cadre Biju Gogoi aka Bhagya Axom. Arunodoy Asom stated that Kishan, who represents the Tinsukia constituency of the Assam Assembly, would be ‘boycotted’ in public functions in Tinsukia and Dibrugarh Districts if he failed to apologize within 24-hours. He warned that any person who supported the Minister or attend his programs would have to face ‘dire consequences’ for which “ULFA-I would not be responsible.” On May 13, while commenting on the execution of ULFA-I cadre Biju Gogoi, Sanjoy Kishan called ULFA-I’s ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah a ‘liar.’ The death of Biju Gogoi became a talking point when ULFA-I militant Santosh Lama aka Apu Asom,arrested on May 10, 2022, revealed during police interrogation, that ULFA-I cadre Biju Gogoi was killed by fellow ULFA-I cadres while he was trying to flee the camp in Myanmar. Later, Paresh Baruah declared that Gogoi had committed suicide between 12:00 am and 03:00 am on February 21, 2022. On May 12, Tinsukia Superintendent of Police, Debojit Deuri disclosed that Police has accessed some leads that indicated that at least 13 or 14 of 35 cadres who had joined the ULFA-I group since December 2021 had been killed by the outfit itself, for different reasons.
The strong stand taken by ULFA-I regarding the Minister’s comments exposes the group leadership’s fears that the episodes of killing of its own cadres would lead to erosion of its support amongst locals, further marginalizing its cause. Continued recruitment might also have suffered due to negative perceptions amongst potential recruits.
Nevertheless, Minister Sanjoy Kishan publicly apologized to ULFA-I, on May 14, declaring,
On May 7, 2022, ULFA-I executed two of its recruits, Dhanjit Das and Sanjib Sarma, in Myanmar for allegedly spying for the "occupational Indian forces." ULFA-I 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah proclaimed,
Before the execution of both the suspects, their confessional statements were shot on video.
On April 4, 2022, an ULFA-I Over Ground Worker (OGW), Suraj Gogoi, was killed in the Sonari area of Charaideo District.
Significantly, ULFA-I had declared a unilateral ceasefire on May 15, 2021, which was again extended for three months, given the COVID-19 situation in Assam. Then, on August 14, 2021, the ceasefire was extended for another three months. However, on March 4, 2022, Baruah decided not to extend the ceasefire.
Though ULFA-I did not carry out any attack during the entire period of ceasefire, or since the announcement of abrogation of the unilateral ceasefire, various developments, including recruitment activities and the executions listed above, indicate that ULFA-I has sought to exploit the ceasefire period to strengthen itself, and is now trying to reassert itself.
Indeed, reports indicate that, between September 2021 to March 11, 2022, around 204 Assamese youth joined ULFA-I in Myanmar. On April 7, 2022, Assam Chief Minister (CM) Himanta Biswa Sarma revealed that 47 boys and girls had joined the outfit in the preceding few days. He said,
CM Sarma reasoned that the attraction for the youth was that "it [ULFA-I] has an organization having its ideology."
Undivided ULFA's 'general secretary' and leader of the Pro-talks faction of ULFA Anup Chetia, referring to the continuing recruitment, explained,
Indeed, the recent signing of the Memorandum of Understandings (MoU)s with Bodo (in 2020) and Karbi ethnic groups might have led to such perceptions among recruits looking for ‘empowerment’ (both material and social). For instance, the Assam Government had approved INR 1.6 billion for the rehabilitation of Bodo militants.
According to State Government data, a total of 3,439 militants surrendered between 2016 and July 6, 2021. In addition, according to partial data by SATP data, from July 7, 2021, to May 19, 2022, another 627 militants had surrendered.
According to the latest surrender policy, effective since April 1, 2018, relief measures incude an immediate grant of INR 400,000 to each surrenderee, which is to be kept in the name of the surrenderee as a Fixed Deposit in a bank for a period of three years. This money can be utilized as collateral security/Margin Money against loan to be availed by the surrenderee from the bank for self-employment. Also, the policy provides for the payment of stipend of INR 6,000/- per month to each surrenderee for a period of three years; besides monetary incentives are also provided for surrendering weapons and ammunition. There is also a provision for vocational training to the surrenderees for self-employment.
On May 16, 2022, commenting on reports of recruitment by ULFA-I during 2021, Lieutenant General R.P. Kalita, Indian Army Commander of the Eastern Command, observed,
Lieutenant General Kalita further claimed that most recruits had criminal backgrounds.
There have been talks about peace talks between the Government and the ULFA-I for some time now. On May 10, 2021, the then newly elected CM Himanta Biswa Sarma appealed to ULFA-I to come forward for peace talks, declaring,
On January 1, 2022, CM Sarma reiterated,
On May 17, 2022, in an interview to a local TV channel, Paresh Baruah stated that he was ready for talks if the ‘core issue’ (Assam’s sovereignty) was also on the table. He ruled out measures such as an economic package, or granting of Sixth Schedule status or Scheduled Tribes status for certain communities, as part of any solution. He, however, disclosed that there had been no formal proposal of talks from Government of India so far.
The brutal action against ULFA-I’s dissidents and potential strikes on PSUs are likely intended to dissuade cadres from leaving the group, and to attract a more ideologically committed cadre. Another possible motive could be to establish some additional leverage in negotiations by demonstrating the group’s nuisance potential. It is important, consequently, for the Government to be cautious in its dealings with ULFA-I and not to hurry peace talks just for the sake of talks.
Ahmadis: Killed, Tortured, Hounded Sanchita Bhattacharya Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
On May 17, 2022, Abdul Salam, a 33-year-old man from the Ahmadi community was stabbed to death by a seminary student, Hafiz Ali Raza alias Mulazim Husain, in the Okara District of Punjab. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), condemning the killing, tweeted,
Earlier, on March 5, 2022, a man was killed and another wounded when unidentified assailants attacked the clinic of an Ahmadi doctor in the Scheme Chowk area of Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). A Police official disclosed that the doctor was not at the clinic when the attack took place.
As reported on February 7, 2022, the Punjab Police defaced as many as 45 Ahmadi graves in the Hafizabad District of Punjab, removing plaques and destroying gravestones at the cemetery.
On November 9, 2021, a 40-year-old Ahmadi man, identified as Kamran Ahmad, was shot dead by unknown assailants in Peshawar.
On September 3, 2021, a 55-year-old Ahmadi man, Maqsood Ahmed, was shot dead by unidentified assailants at Dharowal in the Gujrat District of Punjab.
According to partial data collated by SATP, since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on conflicts in Pakistan, at least 129 Ahmadis have been killed and 139 injured in 33 incidents of violence.
A report titled “Violence and Discrimination against Women of Religious Minority Backgrounds in Pakistan”, published by the Institute of Development Studies in November 2020, states that, in Pakistan, between 1984 to 2019, 265 Ahmadis were killed; 393 were assaulted for their faith; there were 70 instances of Ahmadis denied burial in a common cemetery; 39 Ahmadi bodies were exhumed; and there were 44 incidents of removing Kalima (the formal content of the declaration of the Islamic faith) from Ahmadi homes and shops, and on 103 occasions Kalima were removed from Ahmadi mosques. Data on Police cases registered against Ahmadis on religious grounds indicates that 765 Ahmadis were booked for displaying the Kalima, 38 were arrested for making the Islamic call to prayer (azaan), 453 were arrested for ‘posing’ as Muslims, 161 were booked for using Islamic epithets, 93 were charged for performing namaaz (a mandatory prayer which Muslims offer five times a day), 825 were booked for preaching, 49 were booked for allegedly defiling the Holy Qur’an, 1,222 Ahmadis were charged in other religious cases, and 315 Ahmadis were charged under the blasphemy law.
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), three Ahmadis were killed in 2020. During the year at least 24 cases were registered against Ahmadis on religious grounds, including a jeweler who was booked in Toba Tek Singh for having sacrificed a cow and distributed the meat among Sunni Muslims. In 2021, three Ahmadi community members were killed and nine were assaulted. Over 100 cases were registered against members of the community on religious grounds, including ‘posing as Muslims,’ preaching their faith, and alleged blasphemy.
Meanwhile, the Violence Register PK's Violence Report 2021 data shows that, between 1963 and 2021, a total of 231 incidents targeting Ahmadis have taken place, resulting in 177 deaths and 193 injured. The report notes:
Ahmadis are considered by mainstream Pakistani Muslims as heretics because of their belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadi sect. In 1984, the then Pakistan President General Zia ul Haq promulgated Ordinance XX introducing Ahmadi-specific laws to prohibit Ahmadi people from engaging in "anti-Islamic activities," restricting them from referring to themselves as Muslims or preaching their belief. Ordinance XX prohibits Ahmadis from self-declaration as a Muslim, to make prayer call (azaan), from paying alms (zakaat), from observing fast during Ramzaan and pilgrimage to Mecca. All such acts also fall under Blasphemy laws for outraging the feelings of Muslims, punishable under PPC 298C with three years imprisonment and a fine, and under PPC 295C with death. The Ahmadi population in Pakistan has declined over almost two decades, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics report on the sixth Population and Housing Census-2017, with Ahmadi/Qadiani people making up just 0.09 per cent of Pakistan's population of 207.68 million However, the 1998 census indicated that they constituted 0.22 per cent of the population, according to the Refworld report, Pakistan: Situation of members of the Lahori Ahmadiyya Movement in Pakistan; whether differences exist between the treatment of Lahori Ahmadis and Qadiani Ahmadis; procedure for verification of membership in Lahori Ahmadiyya Movement, February 2006, published on March 1, 2006.
The main population centres for Ahmadis in Pakistan are Sialkot, Multan, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Faisalabad in Punjab; Quetta in Balochistan; and Karachi in Sindh. They are also in significant numbers in Sargoda, Khewra, Shahpur, Bhalwal, Shahpur and Gujranwala. Rabwa or Chenab Nagar in Punjab is still considered the centre of the Ahmadi community. Unfortunately, most Ahmadis in Pakistan live shadowy and restricted lives. Many never reveal themselves to people outside the community. Every Ahmadi, knows someone chased out of university or work or the country after being outed. In Pakistan, Ahmadis aren’t employed in government departments or the Police, nor can they hold office unless they contest as religious minorities. Every year, the community braces itself for processions led by orthodox Muslim clerics, who rattle through towns and cities throwing threats and insults at Ahmadis, declaring them wajib-ul-qatl — worthy of being murdered. Despite being less than 0.09 per cent of Pakistan’s total population, Ahmadis constitute almost 33 per cent of persons against whom blasphemy cases are registered.
Even in cyberspace the Ahmadis are not safe. While anti-Ahmadi speech proliferates on the internet, the Pakistani state cracks down on Ahmadi content online. Under the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), authorities can review internet traffic and report ‘blasphemous’ or offensive content to the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) for possible removal, or to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) for possible criminal prosecution. In 2020, the PTA issued new rules mandating data localization. Under these new regulations, tech platforms face a fine of up to USD 3.14 million for failure to curb the sharing of content that may be religiously offensive, sexually explicit, or a threat to national security. In December 2020, shortly after the passage of these rules, PTA sent a legal notice to the US-based administrators of trueislam.com, which provides general information about Ahmadi beliefs. The PTA claimed that the site was in violation of Pakistan’s Constitution, a move condemned by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other rights groups. The website is still up, but remains blocked in Pakistan.
Minorities in Pakistan are more persecuted than protected. Pakistani authorities have not only failed to protect Ahmadi Muslims, but also facilitated their harassment and intimidation. The authorities are often complicit in the destruction of Ahmadi houses of worship and tombstones that if they reflect the Muslim belief. Continuous fear of being targeted or accused of blasphemy has caused many Ahmadis of Pakistan to flee to countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Indonesia, and Malaysia, but, unfortunately, they often face further discrimination in these countries as well.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia May 16-22, 2022
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
NS
Total
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Jammu and Kashmir
INDIA (Left-Wing Extremism)
Maharashtra
India (Total)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
KP
Punjab
Sindh
PAKISTAN (Total)
Total (South Asia)
IEA has hosted and mediated talks between the TTP and the Pakistani Government in Kabul, says IEA spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid said that the IEA has hosted and mediated talks between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistani Government in Kabul. Mujahid added that there has been good progress in negotiations and that both sides agreed on a short-term ceasefire. Tolo News, May 18, 2022.
Taliban regime dissolves several key institutions of the erstwhile Afghan republic: The Taliban regime has dissolved the National Assembly, the National Security Council (NSC), the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR), Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC) under the verbal guidance of its Amir (supreme leader), Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. Hasht e Subh Daily News, May 17, 2022.
Kashmiri separatist leader Yasin Malik convicted by Delhi court in terror funding case: The chief of banned Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Yasin Malik was convicted by a Delhi court on May 19 under the stringent anti-terror law in a case related to funding of terror activities in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), after he pleaded guilty to all charges framed against him. Special Judge Praveen Singh posted the matter for May 25 to announce the quantum of punishment and also directed the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to assess Malik's financial condition to determine the amount of fine that could be imposed. Daily Excelsior, May 20, 2022.
'Operation Parivarthana' has hit the extremist activities of the Maoists in AOB region, says Andhra Pradesh DGP K. V. Rajendranath Reddy: The Director General of Police (DGP) of Andhra Pradesh K. V. Rajendranath Reddy remarked on May 19, 2022 that the 'Operation Parivarthana' has hit the extremist activities of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) in the Andhra-Odisha Border (AOB) region. Earlier, the Police of Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, in association with the Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) had launched the 'Operation Parivarthana' in November 2021, in which more than 400 teams conducted raids in the forests and destroyed ganja plantations in about 7,500 acres worth more than 9,000 crores in 313 villages in the AOB region. The Hindu, May 20, 2022.
Can talk to Naxalites if they accept Constitution, says Chhattisgarh CM Bhupesh Baghel: Chhattisgarh Chief Minister (CM) Bhupesh Baghel on May 19 said he is open for talks with Naxalites [Left Wing Extremists, LWEs] but the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) must first declare their allegiance to the Indian Constitution. "As a Chief Minister of a state, my allegiance is to the Constitution of India. So, for any constructive talks, the other side should also have total trust and loyalty in the Constitution. It will help in having fruitful talks and a permanent solution," CM Baghel said during a public interaction drive (Bhent-Mulaqat Abhiyan) at Sukma. The Pioneer, May 20, 2022.
CPN-UML ends eight-month obstruction of House: The main opposition, Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), which had been obstructing the Parliament since September 8 over Speaker Agni Prasad Sapkota's refusal to confirm the expulsion of 14 CPN-UML lawmakers, including Madhav Kumar Nepal, ended the obstruction on May 17. The government had not been able to pass any bill due to the CPN-UML obstruction and had to pass this fiscal's budget and get the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Nepal compact ratified by the Lower House amidst the CPN-UML's obstruction. The Himalayan Times, May 18, 2022.
TTP extends ceasefire with Pakistan Government until May 30 as talks continue in Afghanistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on May 18 announced an extension in a ceasefire with the Government of Pakistan as talks with the militant outfit continued in Afghanistan. In a statement shared with the media via Whatsapp, TTP 'spokesman' Mohammad Khurasani said that the ceasefire would remain in place until May 30. "Talks are under way between the committees of the TTP and the government of Pakistan," he said in the statement, adding that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - the Afghan Taliban - was mediating between the two sides. Dawn, May 19, 2022.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal
To receive FREE advance copies of SAIR by email Subscribe. Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) To A Friend