South Asia Terrorism Portal

Disputed Borders
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 18, 2019, Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa disclosed that Pakistan was strengthening the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border through fencing, construction of new forts and posts and increasing the strength of the Frontier Corps (FC) to effectively manage the troubled north-western boundary. He made this statement while addressing troops on forward posts along the Border at Dawatoi in the North Waziristan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Significantly, three Pakistani soldiers were killed and seven injured on May 1, 2019, when a group of 60 to 70 terrorists from bases in Afghanistan attacked Pakistan Army troops undertaking fencing efforts in the Dawatoi area.

On May 6, 2019, one Pakistani soldier was killed and three seriously injured in a militant attack on SFs patrolling the Pak-Afghan border in the Kher Qamar area of Data Khel tehsil (revenue unit) in the North Waziristan District of KP.

On October 2, 2018, terrorists from across the Afghan border opened fire at a check-post in the North Waziristan District. The Pakistani army retaliated, killing seven terrorists. Military sources stated that, due to the extensive fencing along the border, terrorists cannot physically attack and now resort to 'fire raids' — concerted targeting of Pakistani assets from a distance. 

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since 2007, there have been at least 103 militant attacks from across the border, in which 277 Pakistani SF personnel and 74 civilians were killed while another 285 sustained injuries. Two of these incidents (above) have already been reported in 2019. The whole of 2018 recorded 10 such attacks in which 19 SF personnel and 15 militants were killed. 2017 recorded 16 cross-border attacks, in which 15 SF personnel and 11 civilians were killed.

Further, the Afghan SFs fired from across the border on at least six occasions, since 2007, resulting in the death of 32 Pakistani SF personnel and 16 civilians.

Pakistani SFs have also been continuously shelling across the border. On February 22, 2019, Afghanistan complained to the United Nations (UN) about violations of its territory by Pakistan’s military, including shelling of Afghan territory, violation of its airspace by military aircraft and construction of military posts and barriers on its soil. The complaint was made in a letter sent by Afghanistan’s deputy permanent representative at the UN, Nazifullah Salarzai, to the UN Security Council President Anatolio Ndong Mba. The Afghan letter said, concerns about the violations had been conveyed to the UN several times, including through a report on recorded incidents during 2012-17. This document stated Pakistani forces fired nearly 29,000 artillery shells into Afghanistan during this period, killing 82 people and injuring 187. The letter further mentioned that, since January 2018, Pakistani troops had been involved in 161 violations and fired more than 6,000 mortar and artillery shells into Afghan territory.

The first border fencing-related skirmish was reported in the then South Waziristan Agency of the then Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in April 2007. Pakistani SFs operating in South Waziristan made a three-tier security deployment on April 11, 2007, to stop cross-border infiltration by militants into Afghanistan. Pakistan fenced 12-kilometers of its border stretch with Afghanistan to ‘choke off’ cross-border infiltration, but Afghan troops tore down the fence on April 19, leading to a gun-battle, though there were no casualties.

The conflict over the legitimacy of the Durand Line - the border imposed by Imperial Britain - between Pakistan and Afghanistan is more than a century old. However, it came to attention in September 2005, when Pakistan announced for the first time that it had plans to build a 2,611-kilometres fence (1,230 kilometres in KP and 1,381 kilometres in Balochistan) along its border with Afghanistan, purportedly to check armed militants and drug smugglers moving between the two countries. Afghanistan, expectedly and immediately, raised objections on the grounds that this was an attempt to make the disputed border permanent. On several occasions thereafter, Afghanistan has opposed Pakistani plans to fence the border. Most recently, Kabul's Ambassador to Islamabad, Omar Zakhilwal, reiterated these objections while speaking to the media on October 10, 2018,

Not surprisingly, since its first announcement in 2005, Pakistan’s work for mining and fencing the border has been stopped and renewed on at least three occasions. Nevertheless, Pakistan has succeeded in making some progress. Providing details, Major General Asif Ghafoor disclosed, on January 27, 2019, that work on about 900 kilometres of fencing along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had been completed. He added that work on another roughly 1,200 kilometres, the most sensitive portion of the 2,611 kilometres long border with Afghanistan, had commenced in 2018, and was expected to be completed by the end of 2020.

The construction of 150 of the 443 planned forts under the project, some on mountaintops as high as 12,000 feet, had also been completed. Another 750 forts, with an inter-fort distance of 1.5 to 3 kilometres, are under construction or at a planning stage. Meanwhile, according to a February 10, 2018, report, at least 1,100 border posts had also been established.

Major General Ghafoor claimed that the project, which would cost about PKR 70 billion, including the cost of technical and surveillance equipment to keep strict vigil on the illicit movement from across the border, is expected to help check the movement of terrorists. Islamabad has, for long, blamed terrorists and militant coming in from Afghanistan for creating trouble inside Pakistan. After the April 17, 2019, Ormara attack in which 14 bus passengers were forcibly offloaded from a bus and shot dead, Pakistan asked both Iran and Afghanistan on April 20, to take ‘visible action’ against terrorist groups operating from their soil and also to dismantle logistics and training camps of such elements located across the border.

On the other hand, Kabul has, for long, held Pakistan responsible for violence inside Afghanistan. On February 1, 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani once again accused Pakistan of sheltering Taliban insurgents and blamed Islamabad for a recent wave of urban terrorist attacks. In a televised address, President Ashraf Ghani described Pakistan as the “centre of Taliban terrorism” and demanded that Pakistani officials take swift, concrete steps to drive insurgents from their country. “The Afghan nation is waiting for clear action” from Pakistan, he said.

In a more direct reference, subsequent to emergence of reports stating that militants who participated in Ghazni attack retreated to Pakistan and were receiving medical treatment there, President Ghani stated, on August 27, 2018,

While Pakistan is building fences and fortifying the border on the pretext of stopping cross border infiltration, Afghanistan is opposing the action claiming it as a malicious move to legalise the contentious border. The AfPak border remains volatile, and little is expected to change.

NDFB-S: Depleted, not Decimated
M.A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 16, 2019, the Myanmar Army launched a fresh offensive targeting Indian Insurgent Groups’ (IIGs’) camps in Myanmar, the second such offensive within a span of three months. The latest offensive is focused in the vicinity of Lahe and Nayun townships in Sagaing region near the Indo-Myanmar border. Details of the offensive are still awaited.  

Earlier, on February 17, 2019, the Myanmar Army had launched a crackdown on IIGs. The offensive lasted till March 2, 2019, and resulted in the dismantling of IIG infrastructure in the Sagaing Region, and the arrest of at least 24 IIG militants.  

The February-March operation created commotion in the cadres of several IIGs sheltering in Myanmar, and also provoked surrenders en masse. The targeted groups included the Independent-faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Saraigowra (NDFB-S). As noted earlier the impact of the February-March operations on ULFA-I were crippling. According to a May 9, 2019, report, more than 500 militants, including those of ULFA-I and NDFB-S (specific numbers not available) reportedly approached Security Forces (SFs) in separate groups to surrender. Unidentified senior leaders of NDFB-S were also reportedly in touch with Police officers to work out the modalities of surrender.

In a significant incident demonstrating the impact of the clamp down in Myanmar, on March 24, 2019, NDFB-S ‘foreign secretary’ Ne Esera Evangel, along with his body guard ‘lance corporal’ R. Mwnthwr, surrendered in the Mon District of Nagaland. Evangel is the highest ranking leader of NDFB-S to surrender till date. He joined NDFB-S in 2013 and was appointed as ‘publicity secretary’ some time in 2014-15. On April 15, 2015, he was appointed ‘foreign secretary’. Esera was also a ‘drafting committee’ member of the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWESEA), a conglomerate of northeast militant groups formed in April 2014, of which NDFB-S is a part.

Since its formation in November 20, 2012, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 39 NDFB-S cadres have surrendered, including two confirmed in 2019 (data till May 26, 2019). One NDFB-S cadre surrendered in 2018, 27 in 2014 and nine in 2013. There were no incidents of surrender in 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017. Details of significant numbers of surrenders subsequent to the crackdown in Myanmar would substantially increase these figures.

SFs have also been successful in arresting at least 750 NDFB-S cadres since November 20, 2012, including two in 2019 (data till May 26, 2019). The number of arrests stood at 48 in 2018, 53 in 2017, 163 in 2016, 273 in 2015, 107 in 2014, 103 in 2013 and one in 2012. In a significant arrest, on March 7, 2019, a female cadre, wife of NDFB-S ‘home secretary’ D. Rebgon, was arrested from the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. Earlier, on December 2, 2018, nine NDFB-S militants who had completed training in Myanmar and were attempting to enter Assam, were arrested from Jagun in Assam’s Tinsukia District.

Since its formation, NDFB-S has also lost at least 126 cadres (data till May 26, 2019) in encounters with Indian Security Forces (SFs). The outfit suffered its last such fatality on August 3, 2018, when one NDFB-S militant, identified as Koma Boro, was killed in an encounter with the Meghalaya Police at Tarasin village in East Garo Hills District in Meghalaya. The areas is used as a transit point from Myanmar by the group.

NDFB-S was considered one of the most lethal outfits in Assam from the time of its formation on November 20, 2012 till December 2014. Between these dates, out of 236 fatalities (223 civilians and 13 SF) recorded in Assam, NDFB-S’ principal area of operation, the group was involved in the killing of 151 persons (146 civilians and five SF personnel, i.e. 61.8 per cent of killings in the State.

In the worst incident, on December 23, 2014, NDFB-S cadres killed 69 Adivasis in the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) (consisting of Kokrajhar, Baksa, Udalguri and Chirang), and in Sonitpur District. The December 23 incident had followed the massacre in April 2014 by the NDFB-S in BTAD, in which 46 civilians were slaughtered.

AS NDFB-S excesses mounted, the Central Government directed the Army to launch Operation All Out  on December 26, 2014, against the outfit in BTAD areas. On July 13, 2018, a Defence Spokesperson stated that 18 terrorists had been killed while 539 terrorists and Over Ground Workers (OGWs) were arrested in the Operation. Some 175 weapons, 180 hand grenades and seven IEDs were recovered during the operation. There is no further update and also no clarity about the status of the Operation.

The military action largely succeeded in dramatically reducing the rank and file of NDFB-S. According to a 2016 estimate, NDFB-S cadre strength declined from an estimated 300 to 400 in 2014, to 150 in 2016. The current cadre strength is not known.

Not surprisingly, since the launch of the operation, NDFB-S has only been involved in one major incident (resulting in more than three fatalities) of violence. On August 5, 2016,  at least 14 people were shot dead when NDFB-S militants opened fire in a market in the Kokrajhar District of Assam. The outfit has not inflicted a single civilian fatality thereafter. The last SF fatality was reported on May 9, 2017, when a Sub Inspector (SI) of Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) was killed in an encounter at Manas National Park in Chirag District.

On November 20, 2012, the then ‘army chief’ of the Ranjan Diamary faction of the NDFB (NDFB-RD), IK Songbijit aka Songbijit Ingti Kathar announced the formation of a nine member ‘interim national council’, which came to be known as NDFB-IK Songbijit. According to reports, IK Songbijit was removed from NDFB-IKS during a ‘general assembly’ held on April 14-15, 2015. The ‘interim council’ was dissolved during the meeting and a ‘national council’ was formed under the leadership of B. Saoraigwra, and the group thereafter came to be known as NDFB-S. Currently, B. Saoraigwra is the NDFB-S ‘president’, while G. Bidai is ‘vice president’ and ‘army chief’ and his deputy is Batha aka Binod Mushahary. Ranjit Basumatary aka B.R Ferrenga is the ‘general secretary’. D. Rebgon is ‘home secretary’, I. Sulung ‘publicity secretary’ and B. Dwmwilu, ‘finance secretary’.

NDFB-S operates in Assam has a stated objective of securing a 'sovereign Bodoland'. According to a National Investigation Agency (NIA) charge sheet filed on July 3, 2015,

Despite the visible SF successes, the NDFB-S top leadership continues to survive and evade the Forces. In May 2018, 400 SFs conducted operations along the Indo-Bhutan border, particularly in the Manas National Park, to neutralise 20 NDFB-S cadres, including G. Bidai, the ‘vice president’ and ‘army chief’. The two-week long operation, however, was unsuccessful and the militants were able to escape.

Meanwhile, ousted leader, I. K. Songbijit, who is an ethnic Karbi, now heads another militant group, the People’s Democratic Council of Karbi-Longri (PDCK), formed in Myanmar in October 27, 2016. According to intelligence officials, the group is patronized by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and ULFA-I.  During its formation PDCK strength was estimated at about 60. The current strength is unknown.

NDFB-S’ ability to regroup has been significantly reduced due to concerted SF efforts. With fresh operations by the Myanmar Army, the possibility of further surrenders becomes more likely. However, the fact that much of the top leadership remains intact remains a concern. The residual capacity of the group to execute attacks on soft civilian targets remains significant.