South Asia Terrorism Portal

J&K: Collapse of Global Terror
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 26, 2019, ‘spokesperson’ of the Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (AGH, supporters of holy war in India), Shabir Ahmad Malik alias Abu Ubaidah, was killed in an encounter by the Security Forces (SFs) in the Tral area of the Pulwama District of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). 

On June 23, 2019, SFs killed four AGH militants, Ahmad Mir aka Arsha ul Haq, Hafiz Azad Ahmad Khanday aka Samiullah Haq, Suhail Yousuf Bhat aka Huzaif ul Haq and Rafee Hassan aka Imaam ul Haq, during an encounter at Daramdora Keegam area in Shopian District.

In the intervening night of May 23-24, 2019, Zakir Rashid Bhat aka Zakir Musa, the ‘founder’ and ‘chief’ of the AGH, was killed in an encounter with the SFs at Dadsara village in the Tral area of Pulwama District. 

According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, the AGH has lost (killed by the SFs) at least 19 of its cadres since its inception in July 2017 (data till June 30, 2019). The SFs have arrested another nine AGH cadres during this period.

On July 27, 2017, the Global Islamic Media Front, an online propaganda platform of al Qaeda, issued a statement announcing Zakir Rashid Bhat aka Zakir Musa as ‘commander’ of its new-found AGH. Reports then suggested that Musa’s group comprised of around two dozen terrorists.

Musa, an engineering student at the time of his joining Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in 2013, became a close aide of the then HM’s ‘operational commander’ Burhan Muzaffar Wani and worked for the outfit, helping recruit a number of ‘new generation’ educated youth into the militancy. Musa succeeded Wani as HM’s ‘operational commander’ in Kashmir, after Wani was killed on July 8, 2016. In May 2017, Musa broke away from HM claiming ‘ideological’ differences and even threatened to behead the separatist leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) for calling the ‘Kashmir issue’ a political struggle instead of a religious struggle to establish an Islamic State. In an audio message released on May 13, 2017, he had warned,

Not surprisingly, most of the early AGH cadres were former HM militants. Some cadres of the Lashkar-e e-Taiba (LeT) also joined AGH, notably including Abu Ubaidah, the AGH ‘spokesman’ killed on June 26. An unnamed police spokesman disclosed, “As per the police records, he was initially affiliated with proscribed outfit LeT and later on was part of Zakir Musa group.”

There was a significant degree of ideological ambivalence in the earlier stages of Zakir Musa’s efforts to forge a new terrorist formation, after his breakaway from the Hizb. A May 30, 2017, report quoted an official stating, “There have been several instances of ISIS [Islamic State or Iraq and Syria, now known as Islamic State] flag being displayed in Kashmir. Initially it appeared to be some sort of mischief. But now a small group led by Musa is openly advocating the ISIS ideology." On July 16, 2017, on the first death anniversary of Burhan Wani, Musa hailed Wani as the propagator of the caliphate, declaring, "Burhan Wani laid down his life for khilafat. Burhan and militants did not do this for the love of country (freedom) but he laid down his life for establishment of caliphate and khilafat. Will meet Burhan soon." Musa appeared to have inclined towards the Islamic State (Daesh), before finally settling on the al Qaeda.

Thus, AGH was a group which revolted against the Pakistani proxies in India – the separatists as well as the terror outfits operating out of Pakistani soil. Unsurprisingly, the fountainhead of terror, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), did not support AGH. Its success and survival were, consequently, always doubtful as it has long been established that, for any Islamist terrorist outfit to make inroads or succeed in India, it is imperative for it to secure ISI support.

Despite the high profile its purported affiliation with al Qaeda gave AGH, the outfit failed to carry out a single terrorist attack in J&K. The National Investigation Agency (NIA), however, filed a charge sheet against AGH in the September 14, 2018, grenade attack on the Maqsudan Police Station in the Jalandhar District of Punjab, in which two Police personnel were injured. The charge sheet stated that the attack was part of a conspiracy hatched by the AGH to target security installations throughout the country. In November 2018, Zakir Musa and some of his associates had reportedly been spotted in Amritsar in Punjab.

Subsequently, however, there seemed to have some realization on both sides – the ISI as well as the AGH – that they needed each other for their jihad to succeed. The realization in the ISI came as almost all the top militant leaders of Pakistan-based terror outfits operating in India had been killed in quick succession over the past three years, and and that Musa was the only surviving ‘poster boy’ of militancy (before his killing). According to a May 26, 2019, report, eight top ‘commanders’ of HM, JeM and AGH have been killed in SF operations during the current year. They include Al Badr ‘chief commander’, Zeenat ul Islam Shah aka Dr. Usman, (killed on January 12); LeT ‘district commander’, Irfan Ahmad Sheikh, (February 6); February 14 Pulwama attack ‘mastermind’ and JeM ‘commander’, Mudasir Ahmed Khan aka 'Mohd Bhai', (March 10); and ‘commander’ of an Islamic State-inspired module, Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK), Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi aka Umar (May 10). Meanwhile, the Government informed the Parliament on June 25, 2019, that, since January 1, 2016, at least 733 militants had been killed in J&K, including 113 in the current year (data till June 16, 2019).

Musa also realized that rebellion against the ISI has not paid any dividends.

Indeed, reports indicated that Musa had decided to cooperate with the ISI-backed terror outfits in J&K, which was evident from his last few audio messages, where he withheld criticism of other militant groups, unlike his earlier pronouncements. Moreover, according to a December 23, 2018, report, present HM chief Riyaz Naikoo, in an audio message supporting Zakir Musa, had stated, “We are not against Zakir Musa. Our initial priority is getting freedom from India, and we all are fighting for Islam.”

Islamabad had lately tasked Musa to create a ‘militant hybrid group’ comprising HM and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militants in Kashmir. A May 24, 2019, report quoted an unnamed Government official as stating,

However, the ‘patch-up’ came too late. Musa was killed. Though Abdul Hameed Lelhari was named the new emir (chief) of AGH, with Ghazi Ibrahim serving as the deputy, the outfit is on the verge of extinction.

Following Daesh’s June 2014 declaration of jihad in India, including Kashmir, instances of raising of Daesh flags during street protest were reported occasionally from the Valley. A group called Islamic State-Jammu and Kashmir (ISJK) was formed in 2016 by two militants – Mugais Mir and Dawood Salfi – who defected from the Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM). Both Mir and Salafi were killed in separate encounters in 2017. Dawood Sofi who replaced Mir as leader of ISJK was killed along with three others, during an encounter in Anantnag on June 22, 2018. The IS has found few takers for its ‘ideology’ in the State, and appears to have failed to establish a direct link with Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The Parliament was informed on February 12, 2019,

Tough its present strength is not known, a ‘commander’ of ISJK, Aadil Rehman Dass, was killed in a group clash with the LeT in the Sirhama village of Bijbehara in Anantnag District in the night of June 24. Sources disclosed, “He (Dass) was killed in a group clash with LeT militants as he had recently switched sides. The LeT then decided to get the weapon back from Dass which he may not have accepted and was killed.” Dass’ body was recovered on June 25. The SFs also arrested his associate, Arif Hussain Bhat, who was injured during the clashes, from the incident site.

Meanwhile, the NIA, in a charge-sheet filed on May 22, 2019, disclosed that most ISJK members were previously associated with the LeT, the Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM) and the HM.

Al Qaeda’s attempts to make inroads into India, especially in the J&K, which started as far back as in 1996, and were given renewed impetus in July 2017 with the formation of AGH for J&K, have comprehensively failed, as have Daesh’s efforts since 2014. The ISI and its proxies remain the principal sources of Islamist terrorism on Indian soil.

Refugee Woes
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 18, 2019, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) unanimously agreed on a joint 12-point declaration aimed at the "safe and honorable" repatriation of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan for the past four decades. In a declaration issued at the end of the Tripartite Commission meeting in Islamabad, they expressed their commitment to extend the existing Tripartite Agreement governing the voluntary repatriation of Afghan citizens living in Pakistan, pending approval by the Federal Cabinet. The parties also appreciated the progress achieved by the Government of Afghanistan in the development of the Policy Framework and Action Plan, the decision to implement the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework which reaffirms the commitment to include refugee returnees in the National Priority Programmes, particularly the Citizen’s Charter, as well as the enactment of the Presidential Decree on Land Allocation. They called for continued support for the implementation of these initiatives and requested that progress of these initiatives be shared with the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, including through an awareness-raising programme, in order to enable them to make an informed decision to voluntarily return, with the facilitation of and in coordination with the host government.

Also, on June 17, 2019, representatives of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and UNHCR, during the 6th Quadripartite Steering Committee Meeting held in Islamabad, reaffirmed their commitment to the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees [SSAR] and agreed to extend the refugee repatriation program to year 2021. According to a May 2019 report, between 2002 and 2019, a total of 4.4 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated from Pakistan.

According to UNHCR, Pakistan hosts more than 1.4 million Afghan refugees who have Proof of Registration (PoR) cards. The card allows Afghan refugees the right to temporary legal stay in Pakistan. The latest Census Report of Pakistan (2017) provides no specific number for Afghan refugees staying in the country though, according to a June, 2019 report, the Minister of State for States and Frontier Region, Shehryar Khan Afridi, stated that 68 per cent of the refugee population has been integrated with the mainstream Pakistani population, while 32 per cent live in camps.

2019 marks the 40^th year of Afghan displacement. It all started in 1979, when the world witnessed a great movement of refugees crossing borders into Pakistan to seek shelter due to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. In the same year, the Government of Pakistan established the Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees in the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) to facilitate their settlement in each provincial capital. A Chief Commissionerate was also set up in Islamabad with a mandate to look after Afghan refugees. Regrettably, the organisation has turned into a white elephant; plagued with corruption, nepotism and favouritism, this institution has added to the miseries of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

The first wave of the Afghan refugee influx into Pakistan occurred as a result of the internal conflict following the takeover of Afghanistan by the Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Party and later due to the Soviet invasion of 1979. The second wave, during the 1990s, occurred as the Taliban gained control and their extreme Islamic policies, discriminatory practices and human rights’ abuses contributed to the flight of refugees into Pakistan. A third wave entered Pakistan after the 9/11 attacks, with the ouster of the Taliban Government in Kabul.

Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nor to the 1967 Protocol. It regulates the entry, stay and movement of foreigners through the Foreigners’ Act of 1946, according to which all foreigners without valid documentation, including refugees and asylum-seekers, are subject to detention, arrest, and deportation. Accordingly, electricity is frequently cut off in the villages and camps, houses destroyed, camps are closed down and thousands of refugees are pressured to leave against their will. State policy also gives the Police power to make random arrests without warrants and refugees are often victims of harassment and beatings by the officials. A major chunk of the Afghan population in Pakistan lives in difficult circumstances, and usually falls in the below poverty line category. Substantial needs relating to refugees’ access to education, reproductive health services, and vocational training and livelihood opportunities remain unmet.

The Peshawar school attack of December, 2014 was a watershed event vis-à-vis refugee situation in Pakistan, as the Afghans faced a backlash. A campaign to flush out militants from the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa resulted in raids, arbitrary arrests and harassment of Afghan refugees as well, and drove an estimated 33,000 Afghan refugees out of Pakistan just between January and February 2015, according to the International Organization for Migration.

Though the refugee situation in Pakistan is gloomy, there is still a feeling of risk and social alienation from Afghanistan. As the migration started in the early 1980s, a sizeable chunk of the present generation has been born and brought-up in Pakistan, and find it exceedingly difficult to relate to their country of origin. Some refugees have been living in Pakistan for three generations, have established businesses, and some of them have even married locals, and are deeply integrated into Pakistani society. They do not think of going back to Afghanistan as it would mean starting again from scratch.

The refugees are also unwilling to return to Afghanistan due to the volatile atmosphere of the country. Over the past 10 years, more than 32,000 civilians have been killed and 60,000 have been wounded in Afghanistan. In the first quarter of 2019, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 581 civilian deaths. Children are also abducted by terrorists in Afghanistan to become suicide bombers, plant Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or carry out other terrorist activities. A May 2018 UN report verified 84 cases of the recruitment and use of boys in the Afghan conflict in 2017. They were used as suicide bombers, for combat, as bodyguards, at checkpoints, to assist in intelligence gathering, and to plant IEDs.

General conditions in Afghanistan are also miserable. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan estimates that half of the population in the country would need food assistance over the course of 2019. These 3.3 million people would starve as a result of crop failures and dry irrigation channels, in the absence of such support. Drought in western Afghanistan has sent an additional 275,000 people in search of food, walking across the country, bewildered and desperate. Hunger will intensify malnutrition and illness. Any the refugee repatriation at this stage would only add to the existing misery. 

The present state of the ‘peace talks’ give little reason for hope, with divergent negotiations led, respectively, by the US at Doha and Russia at Moscow. At Doha, the Taliban is negotiating with the US Government, while at Moscow the Taliban has been meeting with Afghan opposition leaders — including former President Hamid Karzai. Absent from both meetings is the incumbent President Ashraf Ghani and his Government, who the Taliban dismisses as illegitimate and irrelevant. The dominance of the Taliban in both processes is suggestive of the future course of events in Afghanistan.

Any plans for repatriation of Afghan refugees at this stage are clearly misconceived and, as conditions in Afghanistan deteriorate, both on the security and economic front, the possibility of a new flood of refugees across the Durand Line once again looms large.