South Asia Terrorism Portal

Quetta: The Persistence of Terror
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 3, 2019, at least six Islamic State (IS) militants, including a woman, were killed in an operation launched by Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) personnel at a compound near the Eastern Bypass area of Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. Four CTD personnel were also injured in the incident.

On August 16, 2019, four people, including the prayer leader Ahmadullah Akhundzada, the brother of Afghan Taliban ‘chief’ Hibatullah Akhundzada, were killed in a blast inside a mosque in the Kuchlak town area of Quetta. Some 25 people were also injured in the blast.

On July 30, 2019, five people, including two Policemen, were killed and 27 injured in an explosion near a Police Station near Bacha Khan Chowk in Quetta city.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Quetta District has accounted for at least 53 terrorism-related fatalities [34 civilians, 11 terrorists and eight Security Force (SF) personnel] in 2019, thus far (data till September 15, 2019). These fatalities were recorded in at least 11 incidents of killing. 

Since March 6, 2000, when SATP commenced compiling data on conflicts in Pakistan, Quetta District has witnessed 2,544 fatalities (1,641 civilians, 535 SF personnel, 211 militants, 157 Not Specified). On year on year basis, the number of total fatalities in the District has witnessed a cyclical trend. In terms of fatalities, 2013 was the worst year, while 2002 was the most peaceful.

The District has recorded a total of at least 1,843 violent incidents since March 2000. At least 846 of these were incidents of killing, of which 202 incidents were major (incidents involving three or more fatalities). The worst three of these were:

January 10, 2013: At least 105 persons were killed and over 169 injured in two separate but connected bomb blasts in Quetta on January 10, 2013. At 8.30 pm, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a snooker club on Alamdar Road, which has two Shia prayer halls. Within 10-minutes, as Police, rescuers and media persons rushed to the site, another bomb fixed to a vehicle parked nearby went off. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) claimed responsibility for the attacks. In calls made to local journalists, LeJ spokesmen Abu Bakar Siddique disclosed that the first blast was carried out by a suicide bomber and the second was a bomb planted in a car that was triggered by remote control.

August 8, 2016: At least 55 lawyers were among 74 persons killed, with over 100 wounded in a suicide bombing at the emergency ward of Quetta’s Civil Hospital. Scores of people had gathered at the Hospital to mourn the death of Balochistan Bar Association (BBA) President Bilal Anwar Kasi in a gun attack earlier in the day. Kasi’s body had been brought to the Civil Hospital, and a number of friends, colleagues and relatives, as well as a posse of Press photographers, reporters and television cameramen had also gathered. The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed the targeted killing of Advocate Kasi and the subsequent suicide attack. JuA ‘spokesman’ Ehsanullah Ehsan vowed more attacks “until the imposition of an Islamic system in Pakistan”. The Islamic State (IS) group also claimed responsibility for the suicide attack at the Quetta Civil Hospital. IS’s Amaq news agency declared, “A martyr from the Islamic State detonated his explosive belt at a gathering of justice ministry employees and Pakistani policemen in... Quetta.”

February 16, 2016: A remote-controlled bomb targeting Hazara Shias killed 84 people including women and children, and wounded more than 200 in the Hazara Town of Quetta. Wazir Khan Nasir, senior Police officer in Quetta noted, "It was a sectarian attack; the Shia community was the target.”

Civilians have borne the brunt of terrorism in the District, with Shia Hazaras particularly under attack. Over a period of almost 20 years, according to the SATP database, at least 367 Shia Hazaras were killed in Quetta, while another 113 sustained injuries. Unsurprisingly, the worst attack in the District recorded till date targeted Shia Hazaras (the January 10, 2013, incident above).

On the other hand, there were a relatively small proportion of SF fatalities and an even smaller number among the terrorists. The data clearly indicates that frontal engagements between SFs and terrorists occur infrequently, suggesting a tacit understanding between the two apparently warring sides. Indeed, while Pakistan has launched region specific major military operations (with uncertain outcomes) in almost all its Provinces, barring Punjab, and including the Baloch rebel areas of South Balochistan, there has been persistent reluctance to take any such measure in the Taliban dominated North Balochistan areas, including Quetta and its surroundings. The reason is obvious and increasingly acknowledged by security observers: the existence of the Quetta Shura, the 'executive council' of the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban. The Quetta Shura started operating out of Quetta following the Taliban’s ouster from Afghanistan.

Significantly, following the example of Safe City Projects previously implemented in Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, and Parachinar, the Balochistan Government approved the establishment of the Quetta Safe City Project (QSCP) on January 24, 2018. The Project was subsequently inaugurated by the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa on May 8, 2018. The Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) in a release on May 8, 2018, stated,

The Balochistan Government planned Quetta Safe City Project in 2013 to tackle terrorism and maintain peace.

In the meantime, a May 2, 2019, report quoted a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), who was first made in-charge of the ‘Safe City Project’ in Islamabad as stating that there were a total of 1,929 cameras installed under the project at strategic locations all over the federal capital. But only around 1,200 were operational at the time of this statement, and their performance was erratic because of poor quality of resolution. He further disclosed,

Under the Quetta Safe City Project at least 1,400 CCTVs were to be installed at various locations, including at six entry-exit points of the city. More than a year after its inauguration, the project has yet not been operationalised. The Balochistan Inspector General of Police, Mohsin Hassan Butt, on June 29, 2019, asserted that the provincial police department was being computerised and once this process was completed, data on terrorists and criminals would be linked with the network of other provinces. Computerization would also help functionalise the Quetta Safe City Project.

However, given the experience in other areas, including the capital, Islamabad, the Quetta Safe City Project cannot realistically be expected to chalk up any remarkable success.

The truth is, as long as Islamabad continues to discriminate between ‘good and bad terrorists’, it is unlikely to be able to secure any of its cities or, indeed, regions across the country.

Maoists: No Takers
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), facing continuous reversals on ground, is reportedly trying to strengthen its ‘Central Military Commission’, the group’s principal fighting force. According to a September 10, 2019, report, intelligence inputs suggest that around 250 Maoist cadres have joined the ‘CMC’, presently headed by Nambala Keshav Rao aka Ganganna aka Basavaraj (63), who is also the present ‘general secretary’ of the outfit.

Though the total strength of the ‘Central Military Commission’, then led by Basavaraj, in September 2004, at the time of formation of the CPI-Maoist, is not known, an October 2005  media report stated that the total underground strength of the Naxalites [Left Wing Extremists, LWEs] in 2003 was over 6,300 and rose to over 7,100 in 2004. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA)’s 2005-2006 Annual Report estimated the armed-underground cadre strength of the CPI-Maoist at over 9,300 (male and female), holding some 6,500 regular weapons and a large number of country-made arms. On February 12, 2014, the then Minister of State in the UMHA, R.P.N. Singh, had informed the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of India’s Parliament) that the strength of LWE cadres in the country was estimated at around 8,500 and the approximate weapon holding is 12,000 which included both factory-made and country-made weapons. According to a June 5, 2018, report it is estimated that the all-India armed-underground strength of the Maoists had dropped to around 6,000.

Indeed, successful intelligence-based operations by the Security Forces (SFs) have dealt a severe blow to the Maoist leadership at several levels, including the CMC. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the CPI-Maoist has lost at least 1,133 ‘leadership elements’ since 2010. These include 24 at the national level (three killed, 18 arrested and three surrendered); 250 State level (23 killed, 188 arrested and 39 surrendered); and 859 local level (144 killed, 393 arrested and 322 surrendered).

Moreover, as noted earlier, at the time of its formation in 2004, CPI-Maoist reportedly had a 16-member strong ‘politburo’, the outfit’s highest decision-making body, which is now left with only eight members of the original formation ‘in position’ or whose whereabouts are not known. Of the other eight, two have been killed, two died due to illness, and four have been arrested. Similarly, at the time of its formation in 2004, the CPI-Maoist reportedly had a 34-member strong ‘central committee (CC)’, the second highest decision-making body in the outfit, which included all the 16 members of the ‘politburo’ and another 18 members. Of the latter 18, at least two have been killed, nine arrested, one surrendered and one died due to illness. Thus, only five of these 18 remain ‘in position’ or whose whereabouts are not known. Moreover, of the five members who were added to the ‘alternative CC’, one has been killed, while the whereabouts of the remaining four are not known. Thus, out of 39 members of the ‘CC’, including the ‘alternate CC’, only 17 members remain ‘operational’ or are untraceable: eight ‘politburo’ members, five ‘CC’ members, and four ‘alternate CC’ members. Further, according to a September 27, 2017, report, another three members have been added to the ‘CC’, of whom one has already surrendered, while the other two reportedly remain underground. 

Crucially, the existing leadership is rapidly ageing and many top leaders are chronically ill. According to the September 27, 2017, report, in a meeting of ‘CC’ members in February 2017, it was decided to relieve the ‘veteran comrades’ of crucial responsibilities, if they were unable to discharge their duties due to physical or health reasons. A resolution on this issue, adopted in the 2017 ‘CC’ meeting, was the culmination of a discussion on this serious problem of ageing leadership taken up during an earlier ‘CC’ meeting in 2013.

Unsurprisingly, according to an April 14, 2019, report, a study conducted by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), “Countering Maoism—Way Ahead”, asserted that the CPI-Maoist was mired in its worst leadership crisis.

Amidst efforts to strengthen the ‘force’ at the top, the Maoists were also attempting to recruit more cadres. However, Maoists ‘successes’ in this direction have been severely limited in their present ‘core areas’. An October 31, 2018, report quoted Brigadier B.K. Ponwar (Retd), Director of the Bastar-based Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College (CTJWC), as stating, “The Maoists are facing their worst days in Bastar. Their recruitment has entirely dried up, the arms supply network has been cut off…" More recently, R.K. Vij, Special Director General of Police (SDGP), Chhattisgarh, in an article published on August 12, 2019, wrote that “the ‘Central Committee’ of the CPI-Maoist has repeatedly admitted in various reports and meetings that their base area has shrunk, fresh recruitment almost dried up, and desertions increased.” Further, on September 2, 2019, Chhattisgarh’s Director General of Police D.M. Awasthi, disclosed that Maoists’ cadre strength in Chhattisgarh has declined from 10,000 in 2016 to around 1,000 cadres and 5,000 supporters in 2019. There were reports, however, to suggest that the Maoists were able to recruit some cadres in areas of their erstwhile dominance. For instance, according to an October 15, 2018, report, the Maoists were able to recruit about 60 persons in Andhra Pradesh.

In utter frustration and finding no youth attracted to their ‘ideology’, they are increasingly recruiting children. Worried about this trend, in a report on Children in Armed Conflict released on July 30, 2019, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated that Maoist groups had recruited children as fighters. The report noted that there were reports of "systematic recruitment" of children by the Maoists. Further, on July 2, 2019, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Shri G. Kishan Reddy, had disclosed in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of India’s Parliament), that there have been some reports of the CPI-Maoist inducting children in their outfit in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, using them for cooking, carrying daily use materials and collecting information regarding the movement of SFs. They were also imparted military training. However, no information was available regarding the number of such recruitments.

Meanwhile, the Government has taken several measures to keep the youth and children away from joining the Maoist insurgency. According to a July 28, 2019, report, for instance, in a school that is run by the Police, located in the Narayanpur Police Lines in Chhattisgarh, more than 300 erstwhile Maoists, many victims of the cross-fire between the Maoists and SFs, and 150 children, were getting the education they missed out on. Commenting on the effort, SP, Narayanpur, Mohit Garg, thus stated;

Earlier, on June 11, 2019, SP Visakhapatnam Attada Babujee disclosed that the Visakhapatnam District Police had trained over 500 youth in driving and provided them with valid driving licenses to eke out a living by running taxi services in places such as Araku and Paderu. The District Police also trained a few hundred youth as automobile technicians and provided kits worth INR 15,000 to each of them to start their own business. For the women, he said, the Police was providing training in nursing, and over 100 had already been trained and had been placed in jobs. SP, Babujee, further stated,

Nevertheless, though the Maoists are increasingly considered to be a spent force, they still remain a threat. The ongoing attempt by the Maoists to replenish their armed cadre, both at leadership levels and in the rank and file, is a significant and worrying development, despite its very limited success.