South Asia Terrorism Portal

Heresy, Thy Name
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On October 25, 2019, an Ahmadi place of worship located in Chak 161 Murad in Hasilpur village of Bahawalpur District in Punjab was demolished by the Police. The ‘operation’ was led by the Assistant Commissioner of Hasilpur, Mohammad Tayyab.

A place of worship for Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan cannot be called a mosque under Pakistani Law, which prohibits Ahmadis from claiming to be Muslim, under Ordinance XX [Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance (1984)]. Earlier, through the Second Amendment of the Constitution, the Ahmadis were declared ‘non-Muslims’ in 1974.

Ahmadis also face harassment, threats, employment termination, social ostracism, abduction, torture and even death. They are frequent victims of terrorism and incarceration, most notably evidenced by the 1953 riots of Lahore, in Punjab Province; 1974 Anti-Ahmadi riots and May 2010 attacks on Ahmadi places of worship in Lahore. According to a June 19, 2019, report, about 400 Ahmadis have been killed in Pakistan since the introduction of anti-Ahmadi laws. Many in the community have relocated to Rabwah (Chenab Nagar in the Chiniot District of Punjab), looked upon as a safe haven by Ahmadis.

Some prominent instances of violence targeting Ahmadi places of worship and individuals include:

March 18, 2019: Bullet-riddled bodies of two missing Ahmadi doctors, identified as Iftikhar and Aziz were recovered from a small dam in Dhoke Soba area of Attock District of Punjab Province.

August 24, 2018: 31 people were injured when an Ahmadi place of worship was destroyed in Ghaseet Pura area of Faisalabad District in Punjab Province.

July 7, 2018: In Jaranwala town of Faisalabad District, an Ahmadi couple was shot at and injured by two un-identified gunmen who broke into the house in Abu Zar Colony.

June 27, 2018: An Ahmadi was shot dead in Nishtar Colony area of Lahore city.

May 23, 2018: A 100-year-old Ahmadi place of worship located in the city of Sialkot in the Punjab Province was destroyed by an angry mob.

August 28, 2017: A local Ahmadi place of worship was set on fire by a youth at Muridke in Sheikhupura District of Punjab.

May 3, 2017: An Ahmadi, Basharat Ahmad, from Khanpur in District Rahimyar Khan of Punjab Province was shot dead for his faith, while he was going home on motor bike from his petrol station located outside the city.

April 7, 2017: Prof. Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed, who belonged to Ahmadi community, was shot dead in the Sabzazar area of Lahore.

March 30, 2017: Saleem Lateef, an Ahmadi, was killed in Nankana Sahib District of Punjab, while his son sustained injuries in the attack.

On December 12, 2016: While the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at (AMJ) was holding a peaceful convention at its place of worship in Chakwal District of Punjab, an armed mob attacked and destroyed the structure.

There are also numerous reports of the vandalising of Ahmadi graveyards – whole cemeteries have been desecrated in some cases. These assaults are aimed particularly at the destruction of gravestones because they featured Quranic inscriptions. On December 9, 2013, the word "Muslim" on the tombstone of Pakistani scientist Abdus Salam, a member of the Ahmadi community and Pakistan's only Nobel laureate, was painted over by vigilantes in the Ahmadi graveyard in the town of Rabwah.

More worryingly, anti-Ahmadi rhetoric has become a potent source for politicians to gain or consolidate their sectarian vote banks. Vehement opposition to Ahmadis brought the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) two provincial seats in Sindh in 2018. TLP won the Sindh Assembly seats from PS-107 (Lyari) and PS-115 (Baldia Town) in Karachi.

On the other hand, it was the Ahmadi factor that ended the political career of former law minister Zahid Hamid. Interestingly, before his resignation on November 27, 2017, Hamid released a video message on YouTube to assure the people that he believed in the Finality of the Prophethood of Prophet Muhammad, declaring,

Again, it was the Ahmadi issue, which became the reason for throwing a shoe at three-time Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during a speech at Jamia Naeemia Seminary in Lahore on March 11, 2018. The attacker screamed slogans in favour of Mumtaz Qadri (killer of Salman Taseer) and Khatm-e-Nabuwat (Finality of Prophethood). The act was in reaction to the ‘amendment’ of Khatm-e-Nabuwat clause in the Election Bill of 2017. The Election Bill, became a cause of controversy, when it was revealed that a declaration regarding the finality of Prophethood had been modified somewhere during the process of its passage. However, the Government had claimed that the modification was the result of a "clerical mistake" and promised to restore the declaration to its original form, which it did in November 2017. Also, on September 7, 2018, the Government asked Princeton University economist Atif R. Mian to step down from the Prime Minister Imran Khan-led Economic Advisory Council (EAC). The decision followed mounting pressure from religio-political parties, including TLP against the appointment of Mian, who is an Ahmadi.

The fundamental doctrinal difference between Ahmadis and Sunni Muslims, on the basis of which the Ahmadi community has historically been deemed heretical by orthodox Sunni Muslims, concerns the status of the founder of the Ahmadi sect, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who lived from 1835 to 1908 in the city of Qadian in erstwhile undivided Punjab province (now in the Gurdaspur District of India’s Punjab). The majority of Sunni Muslims believe that Mirza Ahmad was an apostate who claimed Nabuwat or the status of divine prophet for himself. Traditionally, Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet to be sent by God, thereby holding the seal of prophecy, a belief that holds a central place in Islamic religious precepts. Any proposition to the contrary is professed to be blasphemous.

The entire situation is murky because the Pakistani State seeks to appease Muslim fundamentalists and right-wing parties. The Pakistani state continues with its strategy of hatred towards religious minorities, and to encourage majoritarian fundamentalism.

Regrettably, in March 2018, Islamabad’s High Court ruled that all citizens must declare their religion when applying for identity documents, a move human rights advocates say is another blow against the country’s persecuted minority communities, particularly members of the Ahmadi sect.

Sunni religio-political groups engage in relentless intimidation of the Ahmadi community, organising congregations, posting advertisements on rickshaws, walls, billboards, outdoors. The Sunni clergy hijacks public spaces in Pakistan to propagate hate and violence with complete impunity. In stark contrast, the state increasingly places curbs on the freedom of minorities, journalists, human rights defenders and civil society at large.

Unsurprisingly, the Ahmadis also suffer from Police discrimination and atrocities. In most of the attacks against Ahmadis, the incidents go unreported. Worse, the Police often blame the victim, and complainants approaching the Police for help risk prosecution under the anti-Ahmadi laws. According to the Pakistan Penal Code, Section 298 makes Ahmadis referring to themselves as Muslims, preaching, propagating, or disseminating materials on their faith, or referring to their houses of worship as mosques, criminal offences. The “Country Policy and Information Note Pakistan: Ahmadis” Report, 2019, of the Home Office, Government of UK, cites statistics of Police cases registered against Ahmadis on religious grounds between April 1984 and December 31, 2017.

It is now widely recognised that Pakistan inflicts great hardship on citizens who do not practice mainstream Sunni Islam and the status of Ahmadis is a distressing example of systemic abuse. According to a June 19, 2019, report, Pakistan’s Ahmadi community, which is facing severe persecution by the Pakistani government, are fleeing in large numbers to Nepal in search of a safe life.

For those who remain in Pakistan, however, there is little hope of security and any guarantee of rights. The state’s exploitation of majoritarian Sunni identity politics, and its progressive surrender before extremist elements creates an environment of fear, intimidation and abuse, with no recourse to any established processes or institutions that offer the possibility of justice.

ZUF: Festering Factionalism
M. A. Athul
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On November 11, 2019, the Chawang-Kamson faction of the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF-Chawang- Kamson) claimed that its defection from the ZUF was to secure better future for Zeliangrong people living in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. The group broke away from ZUF (on an unspecified date) and signed a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with the Government of India (GoI) on October 26, 2019. Raitu Chawang is the ‘chairman’ and S. Kamson the ‘vice chairman’ of the splinter group. They were in the same position, respectively, in the United ZUF. The ‘parent’ ZUF is led by ‘chairman’ Pou Jenchui Kamei.

On the same day, i.e. October 26, 2019, ZUF-Chawang-Kamson also merged with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Unification (NSCN-U). NSCN-U is a part of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), an umbrella organisation of various Naga groups who are involved in peace talks with GoI.

The reports of the latest factional fissures had started emerging a bit earlier. On September 19, 2019, ZUF alleged that some of its members (led by S. Kamson) had defected from the group and the new group was engaging in smuggling of arms and ammunition. The then ‘parent’ ZUF ‘chairman’ Raitu Chawang stated, on September 20, 2019, that the group led by S. Kamson had given basic military training to a Kuki group (name not specified) led by Thongkhomang Hoakip, without the consent of ZUF. Raitu Chawang defected and joined Kamson later on an unspecified date.

On September 22, 2019, the ‘home secretary’ of the ‘parent’ ZUF, James Kamei, stated that the defected cadres, along with S. Kamson have been expelled from the group.

Meanwhile, the ‘parent’ ZUF, in a press statement on October 24, 2019, stated that the Zeliangrong people’s demand was to live together under a separate administrative unit either in the Indian Union or Nagalim.  It also urged GoI to grant a separate State or Union Territory for the Zeliangrong people living as minorities in the States of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. Further, on October 31, 2019, it asserted, “We will never back down or surrender to any group and we will fight till the last drop of our blood for our people”.

On October 15, 2019, cadres of the two factions clashed at Jaolinpung and Soubunglong villages in Noney District of Manipur. One militant, identified as Abuan Puimei, was killed in the clash at Soubunglong; and two militants were wounded in the clash at Jaolinpung. All the casualties were from the ‘parent’ ZUF.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least another two factional clashes, resulting in three fatalities (all militants), had been reported since February 25, 2011, the day of formation of the ZUF (data till November 14, 2019). These incidents include: 

May 3, 2018: Two ZUF militants were killed in an internecine clash in Dima Hasao District in Assam.

March 15, 2018: A ZUF militant, identified as 'sergeant major' Gonbi Gonmei, was killed in a factional clash at Dima Hasao District in Assam.

No further factional clashes have been reported, thus far (data till November 14, 2019).

Interestingly, there has been no reported incident of factional clashes in ZUF within the territory of Nagaland. 

ZUF was formed on February 25, 2011, by breakaway elements of NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSNC-IM) and NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) with the declared objective of protecting the interests of the Zeliangrong tribe (a Naga sub-group). On February 25, 2017, ZUF had stated,

The initial instance of factionalisation in ZUF, had come out in open in April 2017. The ‘Information and publicity secretary’ of the ZUF, Hemsin Kamson, in a press release on April 5 stated, that that ZUF ‘commander-in-chief’ Jenchui Kamei and 'finance secretary' Benjamin aka Gaichampou Pamei, were 'expelled from ZUF for their ‘anti-party activities'.

However, the two opposing factions united later in 2018. On July 17, 2018, the ZUF released another press release stating that the opposing factions had come together as ‘one entity’. The press release read,

Besides factional clashes, ZUF has also been involved in clashes with the NSCN-IM. ZUF’s demand for separate statehood for the Zeliangrong puts the group in direct conflict with NSCN-IM, which envisions a ‘greater Nagalim’ which consists of all Naga dominated areas in neighbouring states. According to the SATP database, since February 25, 2011, these two groups have clashed with each other on at least 38 occasions resulting in 41 fatalities. Recently, in September 2019 (exact date not available), ZUF clashed with NSNC-IM at Jalukie village in Peren District of Nagaland, over the setting up of a camp near the village. An unspecified number of houses were burnt during the clash, though no casualty was reported.

The present factional realignments in ZUF will inevitably result in the weakening of the insurgent group and strengthen the ongoing Naga peace process. However, with a faction of ZUF still keeping away from the peace process, incidents of sporadic factional flare-ups remain possible. Although this wouldn’t have any significant effect on the Naga peace process, factional friction could become an irritant in an already complicated security scenario.