South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Terror & Impunity
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

Backed by ‘all weather friend’ China, Pakistan again escaped the ignominy of being put into the ‘club’ of High-Risk Jurisdictions, commonly referred to as the ‘black list’, by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran are the two present members of the ‘club’.  

Despite Islamabad’s continued attempts to deceive FATF by taking superficial action and come out of the Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, the ‘grey list’, however, FATF decided to keep Pakistan in this listing, along with 17 other countries. Pakistan has been on the ‘grey list’ since June 2018.  

FATF President Xiangmin Liu of China, chaired the FATF Plenary held on February 19-21, 2020, at Paris, France. In a release dated February 21, 2020, FATF noted that "all deadlines in the action plan have expired" and the FATF "again expresses concerns given Pakistan's failure to complete its action plan in line with the agreed timelines and in light of the TF [terrorist financing] risks emanating from the jurisdiction". The FATF warned,

Interestingly, in a release dated October 18, 2019, FATF had raised a similar warning,

In June 2018, Pakistan had made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and the Asia Pacific Group (APG) to strengthen its Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/ Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies. It had submitted a 27-point action plan.  

Given the international community’s indifference towards Islamabad’s tacit support to terrorism and China’s brazen support to Islamabad in all its acts of ‘sponsoring terror’, for instance Beijing’s support at UN proceeding to Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) leader Maulana Masood Azhar, it is highly unlikely that Islamabad will be put under the ‘black list’ in the near future, if ever.  

Pakistan was on FATF’s ‘grey list’ between 2012 and 2015 as well. Nevertheless, United States’ aid to Pakistan recorded increase between 2013 and 2015: USD 813 million (2013), USD one Billion (2014), USD 1.1 Billion (2015). Islamabad even received an International Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘bail-out’ in 2013. More recently, in a release on May 12, 2019, IMF stated that “the Pakistani authorities and the IMF team have reached a staff level agreement on economic policies that could be supported by a 39-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for about US $6 billion.” The release, however, went on to add that “this agreement is subject to IMF management approval and to approval by the Executive Board, subject to the timely implementation of prior actions and confirmation of international partners’ financial commitments”. Among other “commitments”, Pakistan was expected to continue “anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism efforts.” Interestingly, on July 3, 2019, the Executive Board of the IMF approved the arrangement.  

It is pertinent to recall here that Pakistan has now been on FATF’s ‘grey list’ since June 2018.  

It is not, therefore, surprising that Pakistan is no particularly deterred by the threat of continued grey or possible black listing, and the threat of dubious ‘sanctions’. Islamabad’s agenda of using terror as a “strategic asset”, and choosing between ‘good terrorists’ and ‘bad terrorists’, remains unaltered.  

Pakistan has acted vigorously against domestic terrorists, even as it continues to instrumentalize terrorism against its neighbours. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Pakistan recorded a total of 370 fatalities (142 civilians, 142 Security Force, SF, personnel, and 86 terrorists) in 2019 as against 694 such fatalities (359 civilians, 160 SF personnel, and 161 terrorists) registered in 2018. The trend of declining fatalities established since 2014 has thus been maintained through 2019. At peak in 2009, Pakistan recorded 11,317 fatalities, including 2,154 civilians, 1,012 SF personnel, 7,884 terrorists, and 267 in the ‘unspecified’ category. Other parameters of domestic violence have also witnessed significant decline.  

Pakistan's use of terror as US and its allies, as well as other major powers, to concede to its demand of giving Islamabad a central role in the Afghanistan peace process. The Four-Party Joint Statement on the Afghan Peace Process released on July 12, 2019, stated,

This was the first time Pakistan joined the US, Russia and China’s trilateral consultations on the Afghanistan peace process, though it has been pivotal to the Afghan talks at various stages in the past, even as it has continued with its support to terrorist formations such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. This has been repeatedly emphasised by Afghanistan and, most recently, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reiterated, on February 16, 2020, "We haven't seen any notable developments and concrete anti-terrorism step taken by Pakistan.

Islamabad’s continued support to terrorism in India’s Jammu and Kashmir and the resultant turmoil in the region has helped it keep the Kashmir issue constantly at the fore front both of its domestic discourse, and at international fora. Unsurprisingly, US President Donald Trump, on quite a few occasions in recent past, has made gratuitous offers to mediate between the India and Pakistan to ‘resolve’ the Kashmir issue, proposals that have been summarily rejected by New Delhi.   

Pakistan hosts five broad types of Islamist terrorist groups – globally oriented terrorists, Afghanistan-oriented, India- and Kashmir-oriented, sectarian and domestic terrorists. Its leaders believe that they have learnt to deal with the consequent risks and can continue with this policy without facing any extraordinary reverses in the foreseeable future.  

Nevertheless, using terror as a “strategic asset” has its own inherent dangers. According to the SATP database, the SF: terrorist kill ratio in 2019 stood at 1.65:1 in favour of the terrorists. This is the second instance since 2000 that an adverse ratio has been recorded, with the previous instance way back in 2001, when it stood at 1.19:1. In 2020, the ratio has worsened to 1.5:1. During the first 54 days of 2020, Pakistan has recorded a total of 91 fatalities (36 civilians, 33 SF personnel, and 22 militants) in 21 incidents of killing, as against 54 fatalities (13 civilians, 23 SF personnel, and 18 militants) recorded in 19 incidents of killing during the corresponding period of 2019. Some of the major incidents of terrorism in 2020 include:

The domestic 'overflow' of terrorism, despite its relative decline from the peaks of 2008-14, has also inflicted tremendous political and economic costs on the country. However, as long as Islamabad is ready to bleed its own people for the sake of an imagined 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and to create unrest in India, there is little reason to believe that it will abandon its use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Unless, of course, the international community can find the consensual will to inflict crippling sanctions on Islamabad - a solution that has remained elusive despite decades of Pakistani terrorist depredations in its neighbourhood and far beyond.

INDIA

Nagaland: Rising Skepticism
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On February 10, 2020, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio announced that the Government of India (GoI), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), and the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) had wound up “the talks and are now working out the competencies to ink a solution to the Naga issue.” Adding a note of caution, CM Neiphiu Rio clarified that “nowhere has it been mentioned that the peace process has concluded. Only the talks have concluded on a positive note, which signifies that the negotiating parties have arrived at meeting points on the various topics of the negotiations”. 

The NNPGs comprise of seven Naga militant groups: the NSCN–Neokpao-Kitovi (NSCN-NK), NSCN-Reformation faction (NSCN-R), Khango Konyak faction of NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K) and four factions of the Naga National Council (NNC) – Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), NNC-Parent Body, Non-Accordist faction of NNC/National People's Government of Nagaland (NPGN/NNC-NA), and Government Democratic Republic of Nagaland /NNC-NA (GDRN). The NNPGs were included in talks with GoI under an effort to widen the peace talks on September 27, 2017.  

Earlier, on January 17, 2020, the interlocutor for Naga peace talks and State’s Governor R. N. Ravi noted, “The negotiations which were going on for the past many years between the Government of India and the Naga political groups have been successfully concluded’’. Like the Chief MInister, Governor R. N. Ravi qualified his utterance, observing, “It gives me great pleasure to share with you that we could be now very close to it (a solution).” 

Both Chief Minsiter Rio and Governor Ravi were referring to the ‘breakthrough’ achieved between the GoI and the NSCN-IM on October 31, 2019, at the end of the three-month deadline set by Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi. During the deliberations. Among other things, the NSCN-IM “came on board” on the contentious issues of ‘Naga flag’ and ‘Naga constitution.’  

However, though the Government is officially maintaining that the Naga talks are on the verge of completion, there is significant skepticism. Notably, an unnamed member of NSCN-IM’s negotiation team following the talks told the media, “The flag and the Constitution will be pursued later.”

Also, on January 16, 2020, the Naga Hoho (apex body of Naga tribes in Nagaland) observed that the October 31, 2019, announcement of the conclusion of formal Naga talks has not brought about any progress and went on to describe the status as “inconclusive talks”. Naga Hoho further said it is unfortunate that the Nagas are not united, as some groups are demanding a separate solution for the present State of Nagaland, whereas some others are trying to settle the issue on behalf of the entire Naga community. Hoho doubted GoI’s intention and alleged that it is trying to divide the Nagas, and also of wanting to resolve the Naga issue by modifying the July 26,1960, 16-Point Agreement within the ambit of the Indian Constitution. Naga Hoho asserted, “The government of India must not backtrack or misinterpret the Framework Agreement which must be the basis of solution or agreement.” 

Moreover, reports suggest that, after slipping into Myanmar from India in October 2019, Phungting Shimrang, an NSCN-IM ‘Steering Committee Member’, was trying to talk to the Chinese authorities for “aid in their fight against India”. This is quite contrary to the GoI’s demand, as conceded by an unnamed Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) official, of return of hundred odd armed cadres of NSCN-IM currently based in Myanmar, before finalizing the accord. Significantly, on January 20, 2020, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), during searches at the premises of close associates and relatives of ‘Cabinet Kilonser (minister)’ Alemla Jamir, recovered INR 8.26 million in cash and documents of different properties worth INR 30 million. Earlier, on December 18, 2019, the NIA had arrested Alemla Jamir with cash worth INR 7.2 million. Alemla Jamir is the wife of Phungting Shimrang and these arrests could be a way to pressurize Shimrang to return.  

Even though the Naga talks continue to linger and there remain some unresolved impediments to a successful conclusion, insurgency-related violence in the State is on a decline. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the State registered a total of three insurgency-linked fatalities, including one civilian, two Security Force (SF) personnel and one militant, in three separate incidents in 2019. There were seven such fatalities, including three SF troopers and four militants, in three incidents in 2018. Not a single fatality has been recorded in the current year, so far (data till February 20, 2020).  At the peak of the insurgency, Nagaland had recorded 360 fatalities (104 civilians, 38 SF personnel, and 218 militants) in 1997. The highest civilian fatalities, 144, were recorded in 1996. The maximum number of SF personnel, 48, were also killed in 1996.  

Also, instances of internecine clashes between Naga militant groups outside Nagaland declined from six in 2018 to three in 2019. The resultant fatalities decreased from seven [two civilians (one each in Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh) and five militants (three in Manipur, two in Arunachal Pradesh)] in 2018, to a single fatality of a NSCN-K-Khango Konyak faction overground worker in Arunachal Pradesh in 2019.  

However, there was surge in total number of incidents of terrorism from 117 in 2018 to 131 in 2019. Two incidents of explosion resulting in two fatalities (both SF personnel) were reported in 2019, as against one explosion recorded through 2018, resulting in injury to one civilian. Two incidents of internecine clashes were reported, resulting in the death of one militant in 2019. Turf wars between various Naga militant factions were common till 2015. There were no such clashes in the subsequent three years (2018, 2017 and 2016). Fatalities were reordered in three districts – Mon (2), Dimapur (1) and Kohima (1) in 2019, as against two districts – Mon (6) and Paren (1) – in 2018. 

Incidents of abduction and extortion also remain unabated. According to reports, in Dimapur alone, the commercial hub of the State, there were 140 cases of extortion cases registered between January to December 28, 2019 [extortion and abduction cases are significantly underreported, as families of victims often accede to demands without involving the Police).  

SFs arrested 187 militants in 108 incidents in 2019, in addition to 148 such arrests in 92 incidents through 2018. Those arrested in 2019 included 42 from NSCN-IM; 37 from NSCN-K; 19 from NSCN-KN; 12 from NSCN-R; five each from the Unification faction of NSCN (NSCN-U), the NNC-NA, and People’s Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK); two each from Naga National Council (NNC), NSCN-K-Yung Aung faction, and National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Saoraigwra (NDFB-S); and one militant each from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),United National Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), and Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA) . 

Insurgency within the state was clearly under control through 2019, but developments beyond the State, such as the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution in August 2019 and the issue of Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), 2019, had an impact on Nagalaind.

Following the 'revocation' of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, some fears were voiced in certain quarters within the State, including the influential Naga Hoho, about the durability of Article 371(A). Correctly sensing the public sentiments attached to the special constitutional provision, Governor R.N. Ravi on August 6, 2019, sought to address such apprehensions, stating,

Article 371 (A) confers special provisions on Nagaland by restricting Indian Parliament's ability to make laws on religious and social practices of the Nagas, and also provides autonomy in the practice of Naga customary law and procedure. The Article also restricts Parliament's ability to make laws for the ownership and transfer of land and its resources in Nagaland, and both these subjects are to be decided by a resolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State (Nagaland).

Separately, the agitation against CAA 2019 largely seen in Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura, also gained traction in the State. Militant formations tried to use the emotive CAA issue to propagate their agenda of 'sovereignty'. The Aung Yung faction of NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K-Aung Yung) extended support to the mass agitation against CAA 2019. On December 19, 2019, Joseph Lamkang of NSCN-K-Aung Yung thus stated,

Sensing trouble the Government on December 9, 2019, acceded to the long-standing demand for the extension of the Inner Line Permit (ILP) system to Dimapur. The ILP regime was already in place in the State, excluding Dimapur, the only railhead in, and gateway to, the State. 

Amidst a conducive environment for talks, and with insurgency in the state at an all-time low, it was expected that the Union Government would push for an early conclusion to the Naga peace process. Regrettably, a settlement remains elusive, giving rise to skepticism on both sides. The possibility of the entire process getting derailed, and a spillover into escalating violence, remains a disturbing reality, as the Centre’s policies exacerbate popular apprehensions.