South Asia Terrorism Portal

JuD: Another Eyewash
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 27, 2019, the Lahore High Court reportedly issued notices to the parties concerned on a petition seeking to quash the First Information Reports (FIRs) against Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) ‘chief’ and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and 65 others. The Court sought replies in the matter from the Federal Government, Punjab Government and the regional headquarters of the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) within two weeks.

Significantly, Malik Zafar Iqbal, Secretary, Al-Infal Trust (a subsidiary of JuD), contended in his petition that there were 23 FIRs registered at different Police Stations against Hafiz Saeed and others, under false charges. He claimed that the impugned FIRs described the petitioner as the head of LeT, which, Iqbal asserted, was both factually and legally incorrect. The petition sought the quashing of all the FIRs.

On July 3, 2019, CTD had registered 23 FIRs against JuD leaders, including Saeed, on charges of terror financing, in different cities of the Punjab Province, specifically, Lahore, Gujranwala and Multan. The FIRs contained allegations of collection of funds for terrorism financing through assets/properties made and held in the names of Trusts/Non-Profit Organisations (NPO) including Al-Anfaal Trust, Dawatul Irshad Trust, and Muaz Bin Jabal Education Trust.

Saeed was arrested on July 17, 2019, by the Counter-Terrorism Police in Gujranwala, Punjab, under charges of terror financing. On August 7, 2019, the CTD of Punjab Police declared Saeed "guilty of terror financing" in the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) in the Gujranwala District of the Punjab Province. Presently, Saeed is being kept at Lahore's Kot Lakhpat prison amid high security.  May 15, 2019, reports indicate that the Pakistani Government had also arrested JuD's ‘second-in-command’ or ‘Naib Emir’, Abdul Rehman Makki, Saeed’s brother-in-law, on charges of making an extremist public speech and terror financing.

Nevertheless, given Pakistan’s past record, Saeed is likely to be freed soon.

According to various media reports, Saeed has, so far, been ‘arrested’ nine times (including the latest occasion) and released thereafter. He was last arrested on January 30, 2017. However, predictably, the Judicial Review Board of Pakistan’s Punjab province ordered his release on November 22, 2017, on the grounds that "the government was not able to present any evidence to justify [Saeed's] continued detention." There is little reason to believe that the Government will abruptly present any decisive evidence to the courts this time around.

Meanwhile, JuD was banned on March 7, 2019, along with seven of its affiliated groups. The organisations which were proscribed included Al-Anfaal Trust, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalaq, Al-Dawat ul Irshad, Mosques & Welfare Trust, Al-Medina Foundation, Muaz Bin Jabal Education Trust and Al-Hamad Trust. All these groups are Lahore-based. Apart from these, the Lahore-based Al-Fazal Foundation/Trust and Al-Easar Foundation were also banned for having links with the Falah-i-Insaliyat Foundation (FIF), another JuD front. The FIF, like JuD, had also been banned in March 2019 by the Pakistan Government.

The Government also ‘took control’ of JuD and FIF properties, including seminaries and mosques across the country. According to the Punjab Police, as reported on March 7, 2019, the Government seized control of 160 seminaries, 32 schools, two colleges, four hospitals, 178 ambulances and 153 dispensaries associated with JuD and FIF in Punjab. The Punjab Home Department later disclosed that the seized properties, spread across 36 Districts of the Province, were ‘taken over’ by the respective district administrations. The district administrators took control of the management and operational conduct of the properties. There was, however, no report of any change of staff in the establishments and they continued to be run by the same people who were running them previously, indicating that the takeover was a sham. Indeed, it was further clarified that the administrators’ role would only be that of a ‘supervisor’.

Significantly, Saeed was asked to keep a low profile at his Jauhar Town residence in Lahore and was barred from entering the JuD headquarters in the Markaz-e-Taiba complex in Muridke and Jamia Al Qadsia in Lahore.

The ban and the subsequent action, however, had no major impact on JuD’s functioning. Notably, soon after the ban, JuD joined hands with other groups to carry out terrorist activities on its behalf. According to an August 12, 2019, report, intelligence inputs suggested that JuD was using fringe groups for terror financing and money laundering. JuD has also been misleading the United States and global anti-terror watchdogs by using Jihadi 'tanzeems' (organisations) who are not on the banned list to carry out its terror-related operations.

This is not the first time that the JuD has collaborated with other groups. In the year 2011, more than 40 Islamist and right-wing parties and groups in Pakistan joined together to establish the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) or the Defense of Pakistan Council, led by the JuD, including the Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), the new name of the sectarian terror outfit Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The presence of JuD and the ASWJ in the DPC, where most of the other parties and groups were those who openly participated in national politics, was worrisome as it signified the radicalisation of Pakistani Civil Society. Indeed, the DPC openly held several anti-Shia, anti-Barelvi, anti-Ahmadi, anti-Christian public rallies in various cities of Pakistan, including, Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Multan, to promote Islamist extremism. In one such incident, as reported in February 2012, the DPC vehemently campaigned against a mosque in Rawalpindi run by the Ahmadiyya community.

Overtly, JuD acts as a socio-religious, cultural, spiritual and educational force, but underpins its armed wing, LeT. JuD’s funding sources include charities, state sponsorship, and businesses. Funds are transferred from various sources through banks, use of hawala (illegal money transactions) and by couriers. Funds are used for dawa (preaching), khidmat-e-khalq (provision of social services), and jihad, including recruitment, training, and procurement of equipment and weapons. JuD has also used social media to collect funds. According to officials, JuD's network includes 300 seminaries and schools, hospitals, a publishing house and an ambulance service. JuD and FIF have about 50,000 volunteers and hundreds of paid workers.

Actions against externally directed terror formations in Pakistan, including the JuD led by Saeed, have long been a mere eye wash, intended to safeguard Pakistan from punitive action by international agencies and the West. In the immediate context, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), during its meeting on June 16-21, 2019, retained Pakistan, as expected, on its ‘grey list’, along with seven other countries. A FATF spokesman categorically stated, “The FATF has decided to continue to keep Pakistan on its compliance document (i.e. Grey List) for the ICRG [International Co-operation Review Group] monitoring…” Pakistan has been on the FATF grey list for the second time since June 2018. Pakistan was first put on the grey list in 2012 and remained there for three years.

More recently, on August 23, 2019, FATF’s Asia-Pacific Group (APG) placed Pakistan on its Blacklist for its failure in meeting required global standards and its failure to combat terrorism and money laundering. Pakistan was put in the Enhanced Blacklist because the country was non-compliant in 32 of the 40 compliance associated elements of the FATF and ranked low in 10 of the 11 Effectiveness Parameters. FATF’s 40 recommendations are related to money laundering, terrorist financing, targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing, financial intelligence units, etc.

Pakistan is now under pressure to avoid its entry into the FATF Blacklist in October 2019, when FATF will hold its Plenary meeting in Paris to decide on Pakistan’s status. This final FATF meeting is crucial, as it would be decided either to exclude Pakistan from the grey list, keep it there, or put the country into the blacklist.

If Pakistan lands on the list, which indicates that the country concerned is "non-cooperative" in the global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the FATF members could, as an ultimate recourse, even agree to restrict, target or prohibit financial transactions with Islamabad. This would not only negatively impact foreign investor sentiment but also lead to a downgrading of the country by multilateral lenders like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU). This would have grave consequences for Pakistan's financial sector and its economy, which are already reeling under severe stress, with foreign investment dwindling, and funding avenues to keep the country afloat drying up. Pakistan is expected to grow at less than 3 per cent in both 2019 and 2020, according to the IMF. As of March 2019, the country’s outstanding debt was more than USD 85 billion. It has taken loans from a very large number of countries, the largest creditor being China.

In his recent visit to the US, in the month of July, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan admitted that about 30,000 to 40,000 “armed people”, who fought in Afghanistan or Kashmir, were in Pakistan. He also stated, “There were 40 different militant groups operating within Pakistan…” Reiterating Pakistan’s ‘commitment’ to fight terrorism, he said, “There was a watershed in Pakistani politics. In 2014, the Pakistani Taliban slaughtered 150 school children at Army Public School (in Peshawar). All the political parties signed the National Action Plan and we all decided after that, that we will not allow any militant groups to operate inside Pakistan.”

Khan’s formulation “we will not allow any militant groups to operate inside Pakistan”, is crucial. Islamabad has no doubt gone after domestic terror formations operating within the country, but has studiously protected groups operating from Pakistani soil and targeting other countries, particularly Afghanistan and India. Terrorist formations such as the JuD-LeT complex and its affiliates, Jaish-e-Muhammad, the various groupings operating under the United Jihad Council, and of course, the Taliban and Haqqani Network, continue to flourish in Pakistan, under state protection and patronage. Despite Pakistan mounting internal difficulties and looming economic catastrophe that would follow a FATF blacklisting, Islamabad remains a minimal satisfier, going through the formal motions of some elements of compliance, even as its favoured terrorist formations continue to operate with impunity.

'Bastar Division': Diminishing Prowess
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 24, 2019, five Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were killed in an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) in Narayanpur District. Two troopers of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) were also injured in the encounter. The encounter occurred when a DRG team was out on a counter-insurgency operation. The dead Maoists are yet to be identified.

On July 29, 2019, two CPI-Maoist cadres, including a woman, were killed in an encounter with SFs in the forest near Kanhaiguda village under Konta Police Station limits in Sukma District. The encounter took place when a patrolling team was advancing through the forest – located around 500 kilometres from the capital, Raipur – and met a group of Maoists. A gun battle broke out. The identities of the slain Maoists are yet to be established.

On July 28, 2019, seven Maoists, including three women, were gunned down in an encounter with SFs in the Tiriya Forests of near Jagdalpur city in Bastar District. The exchange of fire occurred at around 4pm [IST] when a joint team of State Forces was out on a counter-insurgency operation. Three of the seven Maoists killed were identified as ‘area committee member’ Sitta, a resident of Chinateenarla village in Vishakhapatnam District in Andhra Pradesh, who was a member of the AOBSZC (Andhra Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee) supply team; Somulu, another member of the supply team; and Shanthi, who was a member of the AOBSZC military platoon.

According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling statistics on Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in India, the Bastar ‘division’ has witnessed 1,113 Maoist deaths.  At least 39 of these Maoists have been killed in the current year (data till September 1, 2019). The ‘Bastar Division’ comprises of seven Districts – Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma. At least 992 SF personnel have also been killed since March 6, 2000, including 17 in the current year.  

The SF:Maoist kill ratio in ‘Bastar Division’ over the period 2000-2019 (data till September 1, 2019) has been marginally in favour of the SFs, at 1: 1.12. However, over 20 years, the ratio remained in favour of the Maoists for eight [2001 (1.33:1); 2003 (1.33:1); 2005 (1.90:1); 2007 (2.73:1); 2010 (1:80:1); 2011 (1.01:1); 2013 (1.06:1); and 2014 (1.33:1)]. The ratio was in favour of the SFs in 10 years [2002 (1:1.5); 2004 (1:13); 2006 (1:2.02); 2008 (1:1.15); 2009 (1:1.96); 2012 (1:1.39); 2016 (1:4.06); 2017 (1:1.21); 2018 (1:2.24) and 2019 (1:2.29)]. In 2015, the SF:Maoist kill ratio was at par, while no fatality was recorded in 2000.

More significantly, the ratio has remained in favour of the SFs for three consecutive years, between 2016-2018, for the first time ever. A positive kill ratio in favour of the SFs had not endured for more than two successive years before this.    

The increasing dominance of the SFs in the region has resulted in overall improvement of the security environment. The ‘Bastar Division’ recorded 19 civilian fatalities in the first eight months of 2019, as against 31 in the corresponding period of 2018.  The ‘Division’, however, has witnessed a cyclical trend, as evident, from the data above, in terms of civilian killings over the period 2000–2019.

Nevertheless, the region continues to remain the ‘heartland’ of Maoist activities. In 2019, 'Bastar Division' accounted for 84.26 per cent of total fatalities recorded in the entire Chhattisgarh state, and 33.33 per cent of total Maoist-linked fatalities recorded across India. Since March 6, 2000, the ‘Bastar Division’ has accounted for 90.50 per cent of total LWE-related fatalities recorded in Chhattisgarhand 27.58 per cent of such fatalities across India. Unsurprisingly, it has been called the Maoists’ ‘heartland’.

Moreover, all seven Districts of the ‘Bastar Division’ are among the 60 Districts currently considered affected by LWE in 10 States by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) across the country. These seven Districts are also among the 30 worst LWE-affected Districts.

The ‘Bastar division’ spread over a geographical area over 40,000 square kilometres, is principally home to a tribal population, afflicted by low standards of human development, as well as widespread absence of healthcare, education, drinking water, sanitation and food, creating an alarming humanitarian situation. These conditions clearly suit the Maoists who are there to exploit the population’s vulnerabilities. Admitting the poor situation, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel admitted, on June 19, 2019: "Bastar region has the highest malnutrition level across Chhattisgarh.”

There are several ‘divisions’ of the Maoists operating in the ‘Bastar Division’. The ‘South Bastar division’ reportedly headed by Maoist ‘commander’ Raghu aka Pungar Mandavi, looks after Dantewada and Sukma Districts. The CPI-Maoist’s ‘Darbha division’ oversees these two Districts along with Bastar, and is led by a senior Maoist, Surinder aka Kabir. He is also reportedly ‘heading’ the new ‘MMC (Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh) region’.

The large forest cover provides tactical advantages to the Maoists. As almost all the districts in 'Bastar Division' are surrounded by currently Maoist-affected or erstwhile Maoist-affected Districts of the State and neighbouring States of Odisha and Telangana, the Maoists feel 'at home' in the region. Indeed, on April 17, 2018, the then Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh stated in an interview that the South Bastar region, by virtue of being surrounded by four inter-State borders with Maharashtra, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, is subject to Maoist violence perpetrated by those who come from outside Chhattisgarh, noting,

The Maoists have, however, suffered significant losses at leadership level in the region. The former ‘South Bastar division’ ‘secretary’, Kurasam Mothi Bai aka Madhavi (40), was arrested in Vijayawada city in Krishna District of Andhra Pradesh on June 3, 2013. At least 47 ‘commander’ level Maoist ‘leaders’ operating in the ‘division’ have been killed between March 6, 2000 and Augusts 31, 2019. Another 37 ‘commander’ level leaders have been arrested. Also, mounting SF pressure has forced at least 22 ‘commander’ level leaders to surrender. The total number of arrest and surrender in ‘Bastar Division’ since March 6, 2000, stands at 2,800 and 2,964, respectively.

Indeed, on August 9, 2019, on the occasion of the Vishwa Adivasi Diwas (World Tribal Day), the Maoists in Chhattisgarh asked the tribals to observe a ‘day of struggle to protect the rights and identity of tribals’. A note issued by Sainath, ‘secretary’, ‘Darbha division committee’ of the CPI-Maoist, appealed to the tribals to stage an aggressive struggle against “exploitation of tribals, violation of their rights and an attempt to annihilate the existence and identity of tribal population by the government”.

Meanwhile, the State Government and the Union Government which have taken several initiatives in the past to meet the challenges in the region are engaged in furthering such measures. On July 24, 2019, Minister of State in the UMHA, G. Kishan Reddy, informed the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of India’s Parliament) that all the seven Districts of the Bastar Division, along with Rajnandgaon, are covered under the Special Central Assistance scheme (SCA) for most LWE-affected Districts, and an amount of INR 3.0667 billion has been released to Chhattisgarh under the SCA scheme. Notably, the SCA scheme has been approved by the Government on September 27, 2017, as a sub-scheme of the Umbrella Scheme, ‘Modernization of Police Forces’ for a period of three years i.e. from 2017-18 to 2019-20, to fill critical gaps in public infrastructure and Services.

On the security front also, several measures have been introduced. According to an August 14, 2019, report, Danteshwari Fighters or Danteshwari Ladake, consisting of 30 women commandos, was formed in the DRG Force to fight the Maoists and the unit was deployed in the Dantewada District of Bastar Division. This is in addition to the “Bastariya Warriors”, comprising personnel drawn largely from the Bastar region, and tasked with carrying out anti-Maoist operations in the area, since May 21, 2018. According to varying media reports, around 65,000 SF personnel, including 45,000 Central Armed Police Forces and 20,000 State Police personnel, are posted in the seven Districts of Bastar Division. However, an estimated 40 per cent of personnel deployed, i.e. around 26,000, would ordinarily be operationally available.

The Maoists continue to suffer reverses in their ‘heartland’, but are still far from losing their relevance. With significant surviving operational capacities, continued SF pressure will be necessary to ensure that no opportunity is given to them to restore their dominance.